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SUMMARY 
A legally protectable trade secret is secret information which is applicable in trade or 
industry, in respect of which the owner has the will to keep it secret, which has 
economic value, and which is concrete enough to be embodied in a tangible form and 
to exist separately form its owner. A comparative study reveals that while trade 
secrets can be infringed in three ways - namely unauthorized acquisition, use and 
disclosure - contemporary legal systems differ in respect of both the ambit and 
juridical bases of protection against such infringing conduct. 
The legal protection of trade secrets is promoted by the recognition of a subjective 
right to the trade secret. This right is an intellectual property right independent of 
statutory intellectual property rights like patent rights and copyright, the common law 
intellectual property right to goodwill, and the personality right to privacy. 
In South African private law, trade secrets can be adequately protected by the 
application of general delictual and contractual principles. Delictual wrongfulness of 
trade secret misappropriation is constituted by an infringement of the right to the trade 
secret. Thus any act that interferes with the powers of use, enjoyment and disposal 
exercised by someone with a subjective right to that trade secret, is, in the absence 
of legal grounds justifying such interference, wrongful. Patrim·onial loss caused by 
both intentional and negligent infringement of trade secrets should be actionable 
under the actio legis Aquiliae. Wrongful trade secret infringements can - also in the 
absence of fault on the part of the infringer - be prevented by an interdict. Protection 
of trade secrets is not restricted to the contexts of either unlawful competition, or 
fiduciary relationships. 
Trade secret protection is on a sound footing in South African law, compares 
favourably with the position in other legal systems, and is in step with the 
international agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to 
which South Africa is a signatory nation. 
KEY TERMS: Trade secrets; Confidential information; Legal protection; Private law; 
Contract; Delict; Intellectual property; Subjective rights; Unlawful competition; 
Fiduciary relationships. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
FOREWORD ........................................................... . 
SUMMARY .............................................................. ii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................... . 
1.1 TRADE SECRETS AND TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION TODAY ........ 1 
1.2 PARAMETERS AND METHODOLOGY ................................. 6 
1.3 STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
CHAPTER 2 ENGLISH LAW ........................................... 10 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2.1 
2.2.1.1 
2.2.1.1.1 
2.2.1.1.2 
2.2.1.1.3 
2.2.1.1.4 
2.2.1.2 
2.2.1.2.1 
2.2.1.2.2 
2.2.1.2.3 
2.2.1.2.4 
2.2.1.2.5 
2.2.2 
2.2.2.1 
2.2.2.1.1 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS ................. 12 
TERMINOLOGY ................................................. 12 
Confidential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Trade secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Know-how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Commercial or industrial applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Secrecy/confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
The owner's/possessor's will to preserve secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Economic value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
ORIGIN AND BREACH OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE .............. 25 
ORIGIN OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
2.2.2, 1.1.1 Express contractual obligation of confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
iv 
2.2.2.1.1.2 Implied contractual obligation of confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
2.2.2.1.2 Non-contractual confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
2.2.2.1.3 Situations in which an obligation of confidence will arise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
2.2.2.2 BREACH OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE ........................ 32 
2.3 REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
2.3.1 DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
2.3.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
2.3.3 INJUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
2.3.3.1 INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
2.3.3.2 FINAL INJUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
2.3.4 ORDERS FOR DELIVERY UP OR DESTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
2.3.5 ANTON PILLER ORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
2.4 SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
2.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
2.4.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
2.4.3 THIRD PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
2.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION ...................................... 52 
2.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN ENGLISH LAW . . . . . . . . . . 54 
2.5.1 CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
2.5.2 EQUITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
2.5.3 PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
2.5.4 TORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
2.5.5 SYNTHESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
CHAPTER 3 AMERICAN LAW ........ , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
3.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
3.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
3.2.1 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS ................. 61 
3.2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
v 
3.2.1.1.1 Defining trade secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
3.2.1.1.2 Know-how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
3.2.1.2 ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
3.2.1.2.1 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
3.2.1.2.2 Commercial or industrial applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
3.2.1.2.3 Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
3.2.1.2.4 Use of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
3.2.1.2.5 Economic value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
3.2.1.2.6 Concreteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 
3.2.2 MISAPPROPRIATION ............................................ 75 
3.3 REMEDIES AND PRESERVATION OF SECRECY DURING LITIGATION ....... 78 
3.3.1 DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
3.3.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS .......................................... 81 
3.3.3 INJUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
3.3.4 ORDERS FOR DELIVERY UP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
3.3.5 PRESERVATION OF SECRECY DURING LITIGATION .................... 85 
3.4 SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
3.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
3.4.2 INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
3.4.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
3.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION ...................................... 91 
3.4.5 CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS LAW AND FEDERAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
3.4.6 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ................................. 100 
3.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN AMERICAN LAW . . . . . . . 100 
3.5.1 CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
3.5.2 TORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
3.5.3 PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
3.5.4 UNJUST ENRICHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
3.5.5 PRIVACY OF A BUSINESS ORGANISATION .......................... 109 
vi 
3.5.6 SYNTHESIS 110 
CHAPTER 4 GERMAN LAW .......................................... 111 
4.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
4.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
4.2.1 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
4.2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
4.2.1.2 ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
4.2.1.2.1 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
4.2.1.2.2 Commercial or industrial applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
4.2.1.2.3 Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
4.2.1.2.4 Geheimhaltungswil/e - owner's will to preserve secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
4.2.1.2.5 Geheimhaltungsinteresse - a legally protectable economic interest in the secrecy 
of the information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
4.2.1.2.6 Concreteness potential 117 
4.2.2 MISAPPROPRIATION 117 
4.2.2.1 SECTION 17 GESETZ GEGEN OEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB . . . . . . . . . . 118 
4.2.2.1.1 Section 17(1) UWG 118 
4.2.2.1.2 Section 17(2) UWG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 
4.2.2.1.2.1 Section 17(2)(1) UWG 122 
4.2.2.1.2.2 Section 17(2)(2) UWG 123 
4.2.2.2 SECTION 18 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB . . . . . . . . . . 126 
4.2.2.3 SECTION 20 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB . . . . . . . . . . 130 
4.2.2.4 SECTION 20a GESETZ GEGEN OEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB . . . . . . . . . 130 
4.2.2.5 SECTION 19 GESETZ GEGEN OEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB AND THE 
PRIVATE LAW PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS .................... 131 
4.2.2.6 SUMMARY 132 
4.3 REMEDIES 133 
4.3.1 DAMAGES 133 
4.3.2 INTERDICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
4.3.2.1 UNTERLASSUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
vii 
4.3.2.2 BESE/TIGUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
4.3.2.3 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
4.4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
4.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
4.4.2 INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
4.4.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
4.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 
4.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN GERMAN LAW ......... 146 
4.5.1 CRIMINAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 
4.5.2 DELICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 
4.5.3 CONTRACT ................................................... 147 
4.5.4 PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 
4.5.5 SUBJECTIVE RIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
4.5.5.1 SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 
4.5.5.2 TRADE SECRET AS ELEMENT OF THE OBJECT OF A SUBJECTIVE RIGHT . . 153 
4.5.6 SYNTHESIS .................................................. 156 
CHAPTER 5 THE INTERNATIONAL GATT AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (TRIPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
5.1 THE GATT TRIPS AGREEMENT ................................... 158 
5.2 SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION UNDER THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE GATT TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR TRADE 
SECRET PROTECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL LAWS OF 
SIGNATORY COUNTRIES ........................................ 162 
CHAPTER 6 A COMPARISON OF ENGLISH, AMERICAN AND GERMAN 
TRADE SECRETS LAW AND THE GATT TRIPS 
AGREEMENT ........................................... 163 
6.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
6.2 THE NATURE OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
6.2.1 THE MEANING OF SECRECY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 
viii 
6.3 MISAPPROPRIATION 166 
6.4 REMEDIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 
6.5 SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH TRADE SECRET PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
6.5.1 TRADE SECRET INFRINGEMENT BY FORMER EMPLOYEES AFTER 
TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT .................... 172 
6.5.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
6.5.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS ......................................... 174 
6.5.4 DURATION OF LEGAL PROTECTION ............................... 175 
6.6 THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ............ 176 
6.6.1 CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
6.6.2 EQUITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
6.6.3 DELICT ...................................................... 177 
6.6.4 PROPERTY ................................................... 178 
6.6.5 THE TRADE SECRET AS OBJECT OF A SUBJECTIVE RIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 
6.6.6 OTHERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 
CHAPTER 7 THE NATURE OF TRADE SECRETS; BASES OF 
LEGAL PROTECTION; AND THE RIGHT TO THE 
TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
7.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
7.2 ELEMENTS OF TRADE SECRETS .................................. 180 
7.2.1 INFORMATION ................................................ 180 
7.2.2 COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 
7.2.3 SECRECY .................................................... 182 
7.2.4 THE OWNER'S WILL TO MAINTAIN SECRECY ........................ 184 
7.2.5 ECONOMIC VALUE ............................................. 185 
7.2.6 CONCRETENESS OR POTENTIAL CONCRETENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 
7.2.7 CONCLUSION: A DEFINITION OF A TRADE SECRET ................... 186 
7.2.8 RELATED TERMINOLOGY ........................................ 186 
7.2.8.1 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION .................................... 187 
ix 
7.2.8.2 KNOW-HOW 187 
7.3 BASES OF LEGAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 
7.3.1 CONTRACT AND DELICT 188 
7.3.2 DELICT AND PROPERTY 190 
7.3.3 TRADE SECRETS AS PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 
7.3.4 ENRICHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
7.3.5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 
7.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 
7.4.1 THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS ........................... 200 
7.4.1.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
AND LEGAL NORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 
7.4.1.2 CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS AND A 
JUSTIFICATION OF ITS USE IN THIS STUDY ......................... 207 
7.4.2 THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 
7.4.3 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET AS AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHT ...................................................... 211 
7.4.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET DISTINGUISHED FROM SIMILAR 
RIGHTS ..................................................... 213 
7.4.4.1 PATENTRIGHTS .............................................. 213 
7.4.4.2 COPYRIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 
7.4.4.3 RIGHT TO PRIVACY ............................................ 218 
7.4.4.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET AND THE LAW OF 
UNLAWFUL COMPETITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 
7.4.4.4.1 The right to the trade secret and the right to goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 
7.4.4.4.2 The right to the trade secret and the right to the business enterprise or undertaking 223 
7.4.4.5 RIGHTS TO TRADE MARKS AND SIMILAR LEGAL OBJECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 
7.4.4.6 THE RIGHT TO EARNING CAPACITY ............................... 227 
7.4.4.7 THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION .................................... 229 
CHAPTER 8 A MODEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW .................................. 235 
8.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
8.2 DELICTUAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
x 
8.2.1 ACT 236 
8.2.2 WRONGFULNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 
8.2.2.1 THE CRITERION OF WRONGFULNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 
8.2.2.2 GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION .................................... 240 
8.2.2.2.1 Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 
8.2.2.2.2 Double invention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 
8.2.2.2.3 Reverse engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 
8.2.2.2.3.1 Reverse engineering and the identical copying of a competitor's product . . . . . . . . 244 
8.2.2.2.4 Statutory authority and official capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 
8.2.2.2.5 Public interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 
8.2.2.2.6 Other grounds on which wrongfulness may be disproved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 
8.2.2.3 THE ROLE OF MOTIVE .......................................... 248 
8.2.3 FAULT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 
8.2.4 CAUSATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
8.2.5 DAMAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 
8.3 CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 
8.3.1 EXPRESS CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 
8.3.2 IMPLIED CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 
8.4 CONCURRENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 
8.5 REMEDIES 260 
8.5.1 DAMAGES 260 
8.5.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 
8.5.3 ENQUIRY INTO DAMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 
8.5.4 INTERDICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 
8.5.5 DELIVERY UP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 
8.5.6 ANTON PILLER-TYPE ORDERS .................................... 268 
8.6 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 271 
8.6.1 TRADE SECRET INFRINGEMENT BY FORMER EMPLOYEES AFTER 
TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT .................... 271 
xi 
8.6.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 
8.6.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 
8.6.4 DURATION OF LEGAL PROTECTION ............................... 280 
CHAPTER 9 THE RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS IN SOUTH AFRICAN POSITIVE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 
9.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................... 282 
9.2 ELEMENTS OF A PROTECTABLE TRADE SECRET ..................... 282 
9.2.1 INFORMATION ................................................ 283 
9.2.2 COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 
9.2.3 SECRECY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 
9.2.4 THE OWNER'S WILL (OR STEPS TAKEN) TO MAINTAIN SECRECY ......... 285 
9.2.5 ECONOMIC VALUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 
9.2.6 CONCRETENESS OR POTENTIAL CONCRETENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 
9.2.7 SYNTHESIS AND EXAMPLES ..................................... 288 
9.3 BASES OF LEGAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 
9.3.1 DELICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 
9.3.1.1 ACT ........................................................ 295 
9.3.1.2 WRONGFULNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 
· 9.3.1.2.1 The general criterion for wrongfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 
9.3.1.2.2 The infringement of a subjective right as touchstone of wrongfulness in cases 
of trade secret misappropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 
9.3.1.2.3 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 
9.3.1.3 FAULT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 
9.3.1.4 CAUSATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 
9.3.1.5 PATRIMONIAL LOSS ............................................ 312 
9.3.2 CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 
9.3.2.1 EXPRESS CONTRACT .......................................... 312 
9.3.2.2 IMPLIED CONTRACT ............................................ 314 
9.3.3 CONCURRENCE OF DELICTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 
xii 
9.4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS 319 
9.4.1 THE POSITION OF EMPLOYEES AND EX-EMPLOYEES USING THE 
EMPLOYER'S TRADE SECRETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 
9.4.2 APPLICATION OF THE INTERDICT IN TRADE SECRET CASES ............ 326 
9.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 
9.4.2.2 DURATION OF AN INTERDICT .................................... 328 
9.4.3 INTERFACE OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET WITH 
STATUTORY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ..................... 331 
9.4.4 THE SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION, FIDUCIARY RELATIONS 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION 337 
SELECTED ABREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 
TABLE OF CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION ............................................ 364 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 TRADE SECRETS AND TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION 
TODAY 
One of the most important determinants of the success of modern commercial and 
industrial enterprises is the information utilized by them. 1 The competitive edge 
provided by such information is potentially at its premium if the information is only 
available to one enterprise and not to others.2 Thus trade secrets - which may 
provisionally be defined as secret information capable of application in trade and 
industry - are jealously guarded by many entrepreneurs and commercial enterprises 
from access by competitors and potential competitors. Such trade secrets may 
include information as varied as medical and cosmetic formulae, manufacturing 
processes, geological studies pinpointing the location of rare minerals, computer 
software, customer lists, and plans for corporate take-overs. 3 
The lengths to which individual enterprises will go to protect their particular trade 
secrets, give an idea of the perceived value of trade secrets in the commercial world. 
A good example is the measures taken by the Coca-Cola company to protect the 
complete formula of Coca-Cola. This formula has been described in an American 
court as one of the best-kept trade secrets in the world.4 Most of the ingredients of 
Coca-Cola are common knowledge, but the ingredient which gives it its distinctive 
taste is a secret combination of flavouring oils and other ingredients, known as 
"Merchandise 7X". The formula for Merchandise 7X has been tightly guarded since 
Coca-Cola was first invented. It is known to only two persons in the company at any 
one time. Only these two persons may oversee the actual preparation of Merchandise 
7X. Their identity is never disclosed to outsiders, and they are not allowed to fly on 
the same aeroplane at the same time. The written version of the formula of 
1 Pooley ixff. 
2 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 1; Delport 1982 BML 164; Pienaar 2ff. 
3 Cf eg Eells and Nehemkis 11 O; Van Heerden and Neethling 227. 
4 Coca-Cola Bottling Co v Coca-Cola Co 107 FRO 288 (1985) 289. This judgment is the source 
from which the protective measures of the Coca-Cola Company in respect of the formula of Coca-Cola, 
as set forth in the main text, have been gleaned. 
2 
Merchandise 7X is kept in a security vault in a bank in Atlanta, and this vault can only 
be opened by a resolution from the company's board of directors. The company 
decided not to produce Coca-Cola in India, a potential market of 550 million persons, 
because the Indian government required disclosure of the secret formula as 
precondition of doing business there. The value of this specific trade secret becomes 
even clearer if one keeps in mind that Coca-Cola is credited by the Guinness Book 
of Records5 as the world's most popular soft drink, with sales in 1992 of 506 million 
drinks per day, representing an estimated 46 per cent of the world market. 
A further indication of the potential value of trade secrets, is the eagerness with which 
competitors in the market endeavour to gain access to the trade secrets of others. 
This phenomenon is not a new one. Thus Eells and Nehemkis describe,6 for 
instance, how the French succeeded in the eighteenth century to learn the secret 
manufacturing process employed by the Chinese to produce high quality porcelain, 
only to have the secret stolen from them by the English.7 However, the surreptitious 
acquisition of the trade secret of others is particularly prevalent in modern times. Eells 
and Nehemkis paint8 the following picture of industrial espionage in contemporary 
societies: 
"The corporate spy's mission is to acquire a rival's secret proprietary 
information - by outright theft, when necessary, or by more subtle, 
conventional methods, when possible. Whichever method is utilized, 
industrial espionage is widespread and commonplace throughout the 
contemporary business world. Owing to the technical nature of their trade 
secrets, competitive espionage is prevalent and intense in the high-
technology industries - in aerospace, electronics, computer, instrumentation, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and weaponry. In addition, few US industries -
large or small, well-known or obscure - are entirely free from economic 
espionage. One security expert puts it this way: 'Little companies steal from 
big companies. Big companies steal from little companies. Everybody steals 
from everybody.' As Japan, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the 
United States vie with increasing intensity for economic supremacy, 
5 222. 
6 108-109. 
7 Cf further Eells and Nehemkis 109: "The catalogue of misappropriated technology and trade 
secrets is extensive. In the march of industry there is scarcely a technological development which has 
not been stolen by competitors or would-be competitors: the secret for steel production was stolen from 
the British by the German Alfred Krupp; the secret of rubber was stolen by spies and pirates who 
repeatedly infringed on Charles Goodyear's basic patent for vulcanization; and representatives of 
various nations freely pirated Rudolf Diesel's car engine. It is not an exaggeration to say that modern 
industry is largely wrapped in the mantle of stolen trade secrets." 
8 109-110. 
3 
industrial espionage has reached epidemic proportions." 
The enormity of losses sustained by the misappropriation of trade secrets is not 
easily assessed. The misappropriation of trade secrets is not always easy to detect. 
Enterprises may be unable to demonstrate that their poor performance in the market 
is due to the misappropriation of their trade secrets,9 and if they can, they may be 
too embarrassed to do so. 10 Accurate statistics are therefore impossible to compile. 
Nevertheless, in a text published in 1987, Pooley states 11 that the losses sustained 
by American businesses as a result of the misappropriation of trade secrets, are 
estimated to exceed $4 billion annually. In the late 1950's and early 1960's the 
American Cyanamid Corporation was the victim of systematic theft of its trade secrets 
relating to drug cultures, and the sale thereof to Italian competitors. Cyanamid 
claimed that the development of the antibiotics concerned had cost them $30 million 
in research and development, 12 and estimated that sales losses to Italian 
competitors resulting from the trade secret misappropriation might have been as 
much as $100 million.13 
Many different methods are employed to gain access to trade secrets without the 
consent of the owners thereof. These methods range from very basic procedures 
which may be performed by almost anyone, to highly sophisticated procedures which 
can only be performed by specialists armed with costly technological aids. 
Commercial rubbish may be collected and analyzed with the purpose of finding items 
like memoranda and reports, computer printouts, used floppy and stiffy discs, fax 
sheets containing fax numbers and names of senders, customer lists, invoices and 
delivery notes of raw materials, containers which can give an indication of contents, 
ingredients and volumes, bank details, and so forth. 14 In one instance on record, a 
cleaning woman was persuaded by a competitor of the chemical company where she 
was employed, to sell the trash she collected to the mentioned competitor, who 
eventually found a secret batch formula among discarded notes. 15 Agents are 
recruited from the labour force of competitors, or the services of professionals are 
9 Cf Saunders 8-9. 
10 Bottom and Gallati 16. 
11 x. 
12 Hamilton 49-50; cf Saunders 3 who puts the amount at $24 million ($8,57 million at the time the 
espionage took place). 
13 Hamilton 49-50. 
14 Bottom and Gallati 36; Croft 35-41. 
15 Eells and Nehemkis 126. 
4 
hired, to obtain details of new product designs, details of research and development, 
board minutes, memoranda and so forth. 16 In the United States there are industrial 
espionage agents who specialize in locating engineers and technicians with 
disproportionately large mortgages on their homes, or who are otherwise obviously 
living beyond their means, for recruitment to their espionage networks. Once such 
individuals have been persuaded to accept payment for supplying relatively harmless 
information, they are frequently easily conditioned to purloin valuable trade secrets. 17 
Sophisticated surveillance equipment is used to spy on competitors. A survey in the 
USA estimated that over 1 O 000 illegal "bugs" or listening devices 18 are planted 
each year - more than twenty times the amount of legal bugs for law enforcement 
purposes.19 These devices may be concealed in any conceivable position inside 
buildings,20 in corporate gifts,21 and in clothing.22 Directional microphones of 
various descriptions facilitate the recording of conversations from a distance.23 A so-
called "laser bug" makes it possible to eavesdrop on conversations conducted behind 
closed doors from adjacent buildings or parked vans up to a distance of 500 meters 
away. A laser beam, which is in the invisible infrared waveband, is aimed at a window 
of the room in which the conversation is being conducted. As the light waves hit the 
surface of the window, they are modulated by vibrations of the glass caused by the 
conversation inside the room. The beam is reflected back into a device which 
converts the light waves into audible sound. 24 Current technology has made it 
possible to listen in on conversations conducted not only on conventional telephones, 
but cordless and cellular phones as well.25 Facsimile (fax) machines can also be 
"tapped".26 Miniature cameras built into items such as cigarette packets, wrist 
16 Croft 41-43. 
17 Eells and Nehemkis 127; cf Bottom and Gallati 50. 
18 Cf Croft 98ff for a discussion of different types of listening devices employed in industrial 
espionage. 
19 Saunders 121. 
20 Saunders 44-45. 
21 Cf Croft 98. 
22 Eells and Nehemkis 126: "[A] 'stereo bra' with a separate microphone in each cup ... enables the 
wearer, seated in a bar, to transmit simultaneously conversations from both her left and right. In short, 
the bar girl who is hired to eavesdrop becomes a veritable broadcasting station." 
23 Croft 102-105. 
24 Croft 100; Saunders 45. 
25 Croft 110-114. 
26 Croft 106. 
5 
watches, pocket watches, ballpoint pens, vanity cases and walking sticks may be 
used to photograph documents, machinery and production lines.27 Conventional 
35mm cameras equipped with high-magnification telephoto lenses, as well as video 
cameras, may also be used for espionage purposes.28 Photography from an 
aeroplane has been employed to record the layout of a new production plant under 
construction.29 Current trends towards the wholesale computerisation of information 
makes trade secrets increasingly vulnerable to unauthorized access by computer 
"hackers", who can - with access to no more than a computer terminal and a 
telephone - invade computer systems. Computer security consultants maintain that 
no computer has yet been built which cannot be penetrated.30 
Not all methods of obtaining the trade secrets of others, can strictly be termed 
industrial espionage. A most prevalent method of obtaining a competitor's trade 
secrets is "reverse engineering" or "bench-marking" - that is, the analysis of new 
products released on the market.31 Croft32 cites the example of Canon producing, 
in the late 1970's, a photocopier that was cheaper than the comparable machine 
manufactured by Xerox, resulting in Xerox's market share in photocopiers shrinking 
from forty-nine per cent to twenty-two per cent in just a few years. By reverse 
engineering Canon's machine, Xerox succeeded in arresting the downward slide in 
their market share. Eells and Nehemkis33 quote a spokesman for General Motors 
stating in public: "It's no secret that we buy damn near all our competitors' products 
and tear them down to the last bolt... It's good business." Furthermore, increasingly 
mobile employees34 frequently leave their employers to take up new employment or 
start their own businesses, often taking knowledge of their former employers' 
production and marketing secrets with them. 35 
27 Cf Croft 138-140. 
28 Croft 141-142. 
29 Croft 76-77; Eells and Nehemkis 112; Bottom and Gallati 19. 
30 Eells and Nehemkis 134-138; cf Croft 124-131; Saunders 6-7. 
31 Croft 77-78; Eells and Nehemkis 131-132; Pooley 171. 
32 78. 
33 131. 
34 Cf in general Saunders 11-21. 
35 Such employees may be enticed away by their employers' competitors as part of an industrial 
espionage strategy (cf Bottom and Gallati 42-43: "Hiring away a key employee has long been a 
technique of industrial espionage. Such a technique has an increased value in an age of job mobility, 
an uncertain business climate, and a decline in moral values. The new employee is expected to bring 
all knowledge gained while at the previous job. Sometimes the new employee is expected to bring 
6 
It is clear that trade secrets are extremely valuable assets in industry and commerce 
today. It is equally clear that trade secrets are increasingly under threat of 
appropriation by people with no authority to do so. Whereas the examples cited here 
have been taken from literature dealing with other countries, there is no reason to 
presume that the position is meaningfully different in South Africa. 36 It stands to 
reason that the law must take cognizance of trade secrets and trade secret 
misappropriation. In this study, the basis and scope of the legal protection of trade 
secrets are investigated. 
1.2 PARAMETERS AND METHODOLOGY 
This study is confined to the following parameters: 
a) The study is basically confined to private law. Cognizance is taken of criminal 
law provisions only in so far as they shed light on the protection of trade secrets 
in private law.37 Constitutional law is considered in so far as private law rules 
are influenced by fundamental human rights. 
(b) For the purposes of this study a trade secret is regarded as information 
(i) capable of commercial or industrial application (ii) which merits legal 
protection on account of its secrecy, that is, its limited accessibility.38 The 
approach followed is not to take terminology at face value. If information 
complies with the two mentioned minimum requirements, it falls within the scope 
of this study - irrespective of whether it may be called a 'trade secret', 'business 
secret', 'industrial secret', 'confidential information', or 'know-how' by a particular 
judge, statute or commentator. Information which is not applicable in commerce 
or industry, or which is not protectable on account of its secrecy, strictly falls 
copies of data that could be useful to the new employer. Due to the miniaturization in data storage and 
the expansion in microchip usage, this illicit transfer will be harder to prevent as time goes by.") 
However, no sinister undertones need to be present - the employee's move may be a bona fide step, 
taken in the absence of any undue outside influence, to make a new occupational start. 
36 Industrial espionage may not be as intense or as sophisticated as in, say, the United States of 
America, but the same threats of trade secret misappropriation are undoubtedly present. This is clearly 
evident from the number of trade secret misappropriation cases which have already served before our 
courts - see ch 9 below. 
37 Thus in the comparative study of German law it was necessary to examine the criminal law 
protection of trade secrets in German law in some detail to determine the scope of private law 
protection - see ch 4 below. 
38 These are the minimum requirements employed to help define the parameters of this thesis. 
Other characteristics or elements of protectable trade secrets will be highlighted later. 
7 
outside the compass of this study. However, in some instances attention is given 
to such information, since a juxtaposition of such information and trade secrets 
may contribute to a clearer understanding of the nature of the latter and the 
scope and basis of the legal protection thereof. It may be noted that although 
information cannot be "owned" or "possessed" in quite the same way as a 
tangible thing, it was nevertheless judged more convenient for the purpose of 
this study to refer to the owner and possessor (the latter for instance under a 
license) of a trade secret, rather than the "right-holder" or the "person with a 
right to a trade secret". 39 
(c) The study is a comparative one. One of its main objectives is to produce a 
relatively comprehensive exposition and critical appraisal of the protection of 
trade secrets in South African private law. To facilitate evaluation of the position 
in South African law, a comparative survey of the protection of trade secrets in 
the contemporary legal systems of three industrialized Western countries is 
undertaken. Cognizance is also taken of the GATT4° Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TR/Ps). A comparative study is 
preferred to a historical one because the immense economic importance of trade 
secrets, and concomitantly the threats of misappropriation in their current guises 
and of their current magnitude, are essentially modern phenomena. 41 A 
comparison of contemporary legal protection of trade secrets in industrialized 
countries, is therefore considered to be more appropriate and productive than 
an inquiry into the historical development of the legal protection of trade secrets. 
The growing trend towards international uniformity of laws of commercial 
application, including those pertaining to intellectual property, 42 also contributes 
to make a comparative study the logical choice. 
Legal systems for comparative study were chosen to represent both of the two 
39 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 488 fn 1; Domanski 1993 THRHR 232-233. 
40 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See ch 5 below. 
41 Cf in general Van Heerden and Neethling 51-52. (The misappropriation of trade secrets was, 
however, probably not entirely unknown in eg Roman law. The actio servi corrupti might have been 
available to the owner of a slave for recovery of double damages from someone who had enticed or 
forced the slave to disclose the owner's business secrets. Cf Schiller 1930 Columbia LR 837ff; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 52 fn 7.) 
42 Cf Ch 5 on the GA TT TRIPs agreement. Consider further eg the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; 
The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations (Rome 1961 ); and the Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Integrated Circuits. 
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major Western legal families - the common law systems43 with their generally 
more casuistic approach and strong case law tradition, and the Romano-
Germanic (civil law) systems44 with their strong emphasis on general principles 
of liability and their codification tradition. English law was chosen as mother 
system of the common law legal family, and because of its pervasive influence 
on the protection of trade secrets in South African law. The law of the United 
States of America was chosen as a second example of the common law legal 
family. The American law of trade secrets provides enlightening comparative 
material since it shares the same common law origins of English law, but has 
seen more progressive development than the mother system. American law is 
furthermore a contender for comparative research by virtue of American authority 
having been cited in South African trade secret cases. German law, generally 
held in high esteem among South African legal scientists,45 was chosen as 
representative of the civil law legal family. Finally, American and German trade 
secrets law developed in societies governed by constitutions with entrenched 
human rights. Since South Africa does not have a long tradition of fundamental 
human rights, but all laws must now conform to the values upheld by the new 
Constitution,46 a study of trade secret protection in these two foreign legal 
systems is also valuable from this perspective. 
1.3 STRUCTURE 
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 the protection of trade secrets in respectively English, 
American and German law are examined. The elements of protectable trade secrets, 
the different forms of infringement recognized, legal remedies, specific problems with 
the legal protection of trade secrets, and the legal bases of protection, are 
investigated in respect of each of the chosen foreign legal systems. In chapter 5 the 
relevant provisions of the GATT TRIPs agreement - to which the three countries 
mentioned, as well as South Africa, are signatories, and which can therefore be 
expected to exert an important influence on the legal protection of trade secrets in 
43 Cf in general David and Brierley 24-26 307ff; Van Zyl Regsvergelyking 169ff; Zweigert and Kotz 
187ff. 
44 Cf in general David and Brierley 22-24 33ff; Van Zyl Regsvergelyking 56ff; Zweigert and Kotz 
76ff 138ff. 
45 Probably because, as a result of the influence of the German Pandectist School, the German 
codification displays a precision and rigour of thought unmatched by other continental codes - cf eg 
Zweigert and Kotz 150. Furthermore, German law saw a more complete reception of Roman law -
which is also the foundation of South African common law - than other Romano-Germanic systems -
cf Hosten et al 306; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 228ff. 
46 Act 200 of 1993 sec 35(3) - cf par 8.2.2.1 below; Van Heerden and Neethling 16. 
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these territories in future - are examined. Chapter 6 contains a brief juxtaposition of 
some of the results of the comparative study described in the foregoing four chapters. 
Thus common ground between the three foreign systems and the provisions of the 
GA TT TRIPs agreement is highlighted on the one hand, while differences between 
them, and peculiarities of each system, are also exposed. 
Chapter 7 is an analysis of the nature of trade secrets as valuable assets protected 
by the law, and the basis of such protection, in the light of insights gained from the 
comparative study and an application of the doctrine of subjective rights as 
recognized in South African law. Thus the universal elements of legally protectable 
trade secrets are discussed in some depth, various potential bases of legal protection 
and their compatibility with the South African legal system are considered, and the 
case in favour of the recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret is argued. 
In chapter 8 a theoretical model for the protection of trade secrets in South African 
law is presented. In constructing this model, insights gained from all the foregoing 
chapters are built upon. Thus it is endeavoured to emulate the strengths and avoid 
the weaknesses of the practical protection of trade secrets in the three foreign legal 
systems where possible, whilst care is taken to promote results harmonizing with the 
provisions of the GATT TRIPs agreement. The elements of protectable trade secrets, 
and the implications of the recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret, are 
also kept in mind. It must be stressed, however, that this model is not intended to be 
of universal application to all legal systems. Therefore an important element of the 
model is an exposition and application of general principles of the South African law 
of delict and contract. A model of how trade secrets should be protected by an 
application of general South African legal principles, in the light of insights gained by 
comparative legal research and the acceptance of a subjective right to the trade 
secret, is thus presented. It is hoped that this model will serve two purposes - first, 
as a basis for a critical evaluation of the existing recognition and protection of trade 
secrets in the South African positive law, and second, to suggest answers to some 
questions concerning trade secret protection which have not yet been addressed by 
the South African courts or legislature. 
Chapter 9 contains a critical statement of the South African positive law concerning 
the recognition and protection of trade secrets. Whereas the previous chapter 
contains expositions of many general principles of South African law, South African 
case law dealing specifically with trade secrets, is only discussed in detail in this 
chapter. The position is evaluated on the basis of the theoretical model of trade 
secret protection presented in the previous chapter. 
Chapter 1 O contains a brief conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENGLISH LAW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In English law trade secrets are protected principally1 by the action for breach of 
confidence.2 This action has been described3 as a "civil remedy affording protection 
against the disclosure or use of information which is not publicly known and which 
has been entrusted to a person in circumstances imposing an obligation not to 
disclose or use that information without the authority of the person who has imparted 
it". Various types of information - not only trade secrets - may be protected against 
breach of confidence by this action.4 Broadly they may be categorized as information 
of a commercial or industrial nature - such as trade secrets - and information 
concerning an individual's private life and experience.5 Little legal significance 
attaches to the distinction between the various classes of information - they are 
basically subject to the same legal principles.6 The law of breach of confidence is 
almost entirely based on case law. 7 
The English Law Commission investigated the law relating to breach of confidence 
in England and Wales. 8 Working Paper No 58 on Breach of Confidence was 
1 See Vitoria 177ff for a brief overview of torts and crimes which can conceivably be committed in 
connection with trade secrets; cf Winfield and Jolowicz 590. 
2 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 4; Gurry 3; Vitoria 162ff. 
3 LAW COM No 11010. 
4 Cf Bainbridge 219; Coleman Trade secrets 1; Cornish 215; Gurry 6ff; LAW COM No 110 9. 
5 LAW COM No 110 9. Cf Coleman Trade secrets 1 who mentions trade secrets, personal secrets 
and governmental secrets; Gurry 6ff who lists trade secrets, personal confidences, government 
information and artistic and literary confidences. 
6 Cf Cornish 215 220; LAW COM No 110 9. However, Coleman Trade secrets 1-2 9 and Gurry 89 
suggest that different policy considerations govern legal intervention in respect of the different classes 
of confidential information. 
7 Cf Bainbridge 219. The action for breach of confidence has received statutory recognition in sec 
17(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and sec 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989 
provides for a number of offenses relating to the disclosure of confidential information. 
8 The Scottish Law Commission investigated the Scottish law of breach of confidence, culminating 
in the publication in 1984 of a report on Breach of Confidence (SCOT LAW COM No 90). 
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published in 197 4, and a final report on Breach of Confidence9 in 1981. The report 
contained a thorough examination of the existing law10 relating to breach of 
confidence as a whole - and thus not only to trade secrets, but personal confidences 
as well. A number of perceived shortcomings were pointed out, 11 and it was 
recommended12 that the present action for breach of confidence be abolished and 
replaced by a statutory tort of breach of confidence. The published report also 
contained a draft Breach of Confidence Bil/13 which has, however, never been 
enacted. 14 The future development of this branch of the law is thus still firmly in the 
domain of the courts. 15 
2.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
To found the action for breach of confidence, a plaintiff must prove that: 16 
(a) the information which is sought to be protected is in some measure 
confidential or secret; 
(b) it was imparted in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of 
confidence; and 
(c) the defendant has breached this obligation of confidence by some 
unauthorized use or disclosure of that information. 
The prerequisites for reliance on the action for breach of confidence may therefore 
be said to relate basically to the following: 
(a) information of a secret or confidential nature; and 
(b) the origin and breach of an obligation of confidence. 
9 Cited as LAW COM No 110. For a general discussion of the report, cf Coleman 1982 EIPR 73. 
1
° Cf Gurry 474. 
11 These views of the Law Commission will be referred to below where deemed appropriate. 
12 LAW COM No 110103. 
13 LAW COM No 110 Appendix A 179-236. 
14 Cf Bainbridge 222-223; Coleman 1982 EIPR 78. 
15 See further Coleman Trade secrets 15-18 48-49 85-87; Gurry 474-479. 
16 Cf Bainbridge 221-222; Chandler and Holland 22; Coleman Trade secrets 4; Coleman Intellectual 
property 9-1 O; Cornish 220; Gurry 4-5. The requirements stated are based on Coco v AN Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41. However, Bainbridge 223 suggests that the second requirement, viz 
that the information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, 
might make this test unduly restrictive. Thus it is problematical to apply to persons improperly acquiring 
information, eg by industrial espionage. See further par 2.4.2; 2.4.3 below. 
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2.2.1 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS 
2.2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY 
2.2.1.1.1 Confidential information 
In English case law, reference is often made to the term confidential information, 
rather than trade secrets. These two concepts are often used as apparent synonyms, 
but certain distinctions must be borne in mind. In the first place, confidential 
information protectable against breach of confidence need not necessarily be capable 
of commercial or industrial application, but can also relate to an individual's private 
life.17 In South African law the last-mentioned category of confidential information 
belongs to the sphere of the law of privacy, 18 a subject falling outside the scope of 
this study. Secondly, it has been suggested that information can be confidential 
without being secret.19 The issue(s) of secrecy and confidentiality will be examined 
in depth. 2° For the time being it should be borne in mind that even confidential 
information that can be applied in commerce and industry may possibly not qualify 
as trade secrets since confidentiality may be a wider concept than secrecy. 
2.2.1.1.2 Trade secrets 
While the term trade secret is used eo nomine in English cases, it is difficult to find 
a generally accepted definition of trade secrets in English law.21 In its report on 
Breach of Confidence22 the English Law Commission adopted the stance that it was 
17 Cf par 2.1 above. 
18 Neethling Personality 33ff; par 7.4.4.3 below. 
19 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.4.1 below. 
20 Par 2.2.1.2.3 below. 
21 Cf Bainbridge 226: "The term 'trade secret' is often used in relation to confidential information 
associated with industrial and commercial activity. The classification of some forms of confidential 
information as trade secrets is important because the protection afforded by the law may depend upon 
it. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory legal definition of the term." The tendency of English judges 
and legal scholars not to devote too much attention to the formulation of definitions for recognized legal 
concepts, and its apparentness particularly in the field of trade secrets law, is pointed out by Vitoria 
9. Cf Coleman Trade secrets 4: "It is probably impossible to define a trade secret, but this is not 
particularly important. It is much better to look at a number of descriptions in order to acquire a general 
appreciation of the concept, for this is the approach adopted by the courts when attempting to classify 
information in order to assess whether it is capable of being protected by the laws of confidentiality." 
Cf Purvis and Turner 1989 EIPR 4: "[T]he word[s 'trade secret'] had never ... been used to mean 
anything more precise than commercially sensitive or valuable information with an element of 
confidentiality about it." 
22 LAW COM No 110 9. 
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impracticable and unnecessary to distinguish between information of a commercial 
or industrial nature on the one hand and information concerning an individual's private 
life and experience on the other,23 and therefore declined to furnish a definition of 
a trade secret. 
Vitoria24 extracts the following elements of a trade secret from case law: 
(a) it consists of information; 
(b) the information must be secret either in an absolute or a relative 
sense; 
(c) the possessor must demonstrate that he has acted with an intention 
to treat the information as a secret; 
(d) the secret information must be capable of industrial or commercial 
application; and 
(e) the possessor must have an interest in the information worthy of legal 
protection, bearing in mind English principles of equity; this will 
generally be an economic interest. 
Taking Vitoria's elements as a point of departure, a trade secret protectable under 
English law may be defined as secret information capable of industrial or commercial 
application,25 in respect of which the possessor has the will to keep it secret. 
2.2.1.1.3 Know-how 
Apparently from American origin,26 the term know-how is also often encountered in 
English case law. Its vagueness and "chameleonic character" have been mooted by 
several authors.27 On the one hand it is used as a synonym for confidential 
information of a technological character, particularly information concerning the 
practical day-to-day working of complicated and definite processes.28 On the other 
hand it is sometimes used to denote subject-matter that cannot be protected as 
confidential information, such as the acquired skill and experience of a technician 
23 For the purposes of this study it was deemed necessary to make this distinction, inter alia to 
facilitate comparison with South African law, where the distinction is a real and necessary one. Cf par 
2.2.1.1.1 above. 
24 11. 
25 Cf also Bainbridge 226. 
26 Vitoria 79; Reid 2. 
27 Cf Coleman Intellectual property 12; Reid 3; Turner 17-20; Vitoria 79-95. 
28 Reid 2; Turner 17. 
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which are inseparable from him or her.29 
2.2.1.1.4 Conclusion 
As this study deals with trade secrets, only the protection of confidential information 
applicable to commerce or industry is considered here. Even though the legal 
protection of confidential information of a personal nature30 is in English law effected 
by the same action, it will not be considered here. Because of its ambiguity, the term 
know-how will not be used as a technical term in this study.31 
2.2.1.2 ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET 
The following elements of a trade secret protectable at English law may be discerned: 
(a) information; 
(b) commercial or industrial applicability; 
(c) secrecy; 
(d) a will on the part of the possessor to preserve secrecy; and 
(e) economic value. 
2.2.1.2.1 Information 
A trade secret consists of information. This information may be well developed and 
organized, as in the case of a specific recipe or manufacturing process; or it may be 
a yet undeveloped idea.32 The information may be recorded in writing, be it in words, 
figures, diagrams, drawings or other pictorial rendering; or it could be embodied in a 
physical object like a machine or a tool. 33 The important point here is that the action 
for breach of confidence protects the information itself and not its carrier - that is, the 
piece of paper on which, or other physical object in which, the information may be 
embodied.34 In fact, the information can be protected even if it has not been 
29 Cf Coleman /ntel/ectual property 12; Reid 3; Turner 17. 
30 In South African law, this is the province of the law of privacy, a field distinct from trade secrets 
law - cf par 7.4.4.3 below. 
31 Cf Reid 3; and see again par 1.2 above on the approach to terminology adopted in this study. 
32 Cf eg Turner 14ff. 
33 Cf Gurry 66-67 and authorities cited. 
34 Vitoria 12. 
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expressed in a tangible form, but has been communicated in confidence orally.35 
2.2.1.2.2 Commercial or industrial applicability 
Although this requirement is not given much prominence in case law or literature, it 
is clear that in order to constitute a trade secret, information must be capable of 
commercial or industrial application.36 
2.2.1.2.3 Secrecy/confidentiality 
If information capable of industrial or commercial application is to qualify as a 
protectable trade secret, it must be secret or confidential.37 The locus c/assicus 
normally cited38 for this requirement is Mustad v Oosen.39 In that case, the plaintiffs 
applied for an injunction restraining the communication of information regarding a 
process for the manufacture of fish hooks. However, the plaintiffs had disclosed the 
process in a patent specification filed for the purpose of obtaining patent protection. 
Publication of the process destroyed the secrecy thereof, and therefore the 
application failed. 
The courts have with increasing frequency40 stated the secrecy requirement by 
saying that the information which is sought to be protected must not be in the "public 
domain". In the seminal case, Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering 
Co Ltd, 41 the secrecy requirement was expressed as follows: 42 
"The information, to be confidential, must... have the necessary quality of 
35 Cf Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] RPC 349; Terrapin Ltd v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd 
[1967] RPC 375 389-391; Gurry 67; Reid 19. 
36 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 1-2; Bainbridge 226; Gurry 90-97; LAW COM No 110 9. Vitoria 20-21 
points out that the cases are silent on this matter, but declares that there can be little doubt that it is 
an element of "an English trade secret". She finds support for this submission in the use of the word 
trade in the term trade secret itself: "it is a secret of a trade, trade meaning business or industry". In 
Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251 260 Staughton LJ stated expressly that "it must be 
information used in trade or business". 
37 Cf in general Bainbridge 225-226; Coleman Trade secrets 5ff; Coleman Intellectual property 10-
11; Cornish 220ff; Gurry 65ff; Reid 17ff; Turner 11 ff; Vitoria 12ff; LAW COM No 110 27ff. 
38 Cf LAW COM No 110 28; Vitoria 14-16. 
39 [1963] RPC 41. 
4° Cf LAW COM No 110 28. 
41 (1948) 65 RPC 203, later also reported in [1963] 3 All ER 413. 
42 215. 
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confidence about it, namely, it must not be something which is public 
property and public knowledge." 
These words, or words to the same effect, have often been cited by the courts.43 
As a basic point of departure, therefore, the information must not be public 
knowledge, or, as it has also been formulated,44 the information must possess the 
attribute of inaccessibility. This general principle is, however, applied somewhat 
loosely and the concept "secrecy" is given a quite liberal construction. Absolute 
secrecy is not required - relative secrecy suffices.45 The relativity of the secrecy 
requirement manifests itself in various ways. First, it appears that secrecy will not 
necessarily be destroyed if, besides the plaintiff and the defendant, there are others 
who have knowledge of the alleged secret.46 Such persons might have learnt the 
secret from the owner,47 or they might have obtained the secret by independent 
43 Eg Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd [1962] RPC 97 104; Cranleigh Precision 
Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1964] 3 All ER 289 300; [1966] RPC 81; Under Water Welders & Repairers 
Ltd v Street and Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 506. 
44 Gurry 70. 
45 Cf in general Coleman Trade secrets 5ff; Cornish 222; Gurry 70 ff; LAW COM No 11 O 27 ff; 
Turner 15-20 71-86 102-106; Vitoria 12 ff. 
46 Eg Franchi et al v Franchi et al [1967] RPC 149 152-153: "Clearly a claim that the disclosure 
of some information would be a breach of confidence is not to be defeated simply by proving that there 
are other people in the world who know the facts in question besides the man as to whom it is said 
that his disclosure would be a breach of confidence and those to whom he has disclosed them ... It 
must be a question of degree depending on the particular case, but if relative secrecy remains, the 
plaintiff can still succeed." Cf Coleman Trade secrets 5; Cornish 222; LAW COM No 110 30. Turner 
16-17 writing on English and American trade secrets law, submits that secrecy may be found even 
though the knowledge is known to some other persons, perhaps more especially so if it is not known 
to the plaintiff's principal competitors. He adds that secrecy among potentially interested persons 
seems to be the material criterion and that the knowledge of the interested trade should be considered. 
Thus, differing degrees of precaution to maintain secrecy are appropriate in different industries. Where, 
for example, an industry is highly complex and competitive, and several research departments are 
employed to analyze all the technical literature and competitors' products, insufficient secrecy will 
usually exist if the alleged secret can be discovered with certainty by chemical analysis of observation 
of products on the market. If, on the other hand, the trade or industry concerned is less highly 
organized, the fact that the secret could have been discovered by an astute competitor, will not 
necessarily deprive it of protection, if it has not in fact been so discovered. Turner also points out the 
importance of obligations of confidence (cf par 2.2.2 below) imposed by the plaintiff on those to whom 
he has disclosed his alleged trade secret. Thus, it is likely that the "secret" will be regarded as too 
ephemeral to warrant further protection if it is known to sixty out of a hundred members of the trade, 
free of any bonds of confidence. But if the sixty who know it are bound by confidence, then the court 
might well regard the information as sufficiently secret to be protected. Turner's submissions are 
quoted with approval by Vitoria 13 fn 4, 14 fn 5. 
47 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 5; Cornish 222. 
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means, 48 or by reverse engineering, that is, by analysing a marketed product in 
which the secret has been embodied.49 
Second, information can be secret even though the "component parts of which [it] is 
composed"50 are in the public domain, provided that the assembled information as 
a whole is not readily available. 51 The principle was stated as follows in the Saltman 
case:52 
"The information, to be confidential, must... have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it, namely, it must not be something which is public 
property and public knowledge. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible 
to have a confidential document, be it a formula, a plan, a sketch, or 
something of that kind, which is the result of work done by the maker 
upon materials which may be available for the use of anybody; but what 
makes it confidential is the fact that the maker of the document has used 
his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced by 
somebody who goes through the same process. "53 
The test is thus whether the information can only be reproduced at the cost of time, 
labour, and effort, in which case it will be confidential, even though its "constituent 
parts" may be in the public domain.54 To cite an example: although all the names 
on a customer list may be obtainable from public directories, the list as a whole can 
still be confidential if it can only be reproduced by substantial effort, and is not 
otherwise available. 55 
48 Cf James v James (1872) 13 LR Eq 421 424; Gurry 48. 
49 Cf Estcourt v Estcourt Hop Essence Co [1875] 1 O Ch App 276; Gurry 48. 
50 Wording borrowed from Gurry 71. 
51 Cf in general Coleman Trade secrets 6-7; Gurry 71-72; LAW COM No 110 29-30. 
52 (1948) 65 RPC 203 215. 
53 In Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 47 it was formulated as follows: "Something 
that has been constructed solely from materials in the public domain may possess the necessary 
quality of confidentiality: for something new and confidential may have been brought into being by the 
application of the skill and ingenuity of the human brain. Novelty depends on the thing itself, and not 
upon the quality of its constituent parts." 
54 Cf also Gurry 70-71. 
55 Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 1; cf Gurry 71. Cf further LAW COM No 110 137 where the following 
recommendations regarding the secrecy requirement are made: "(i) To be capable of enjoying the 
protection of an action for breach or feared breach of confidence, the information must be information 
which is not in the 'public domain'. We do not think that it would be desirable to define this beyond 
saying that information is in the public domain when, having regard to its nature and the circumstances 
of its disclosure, it is generally available to the public. (ii) Information should not be treated as being 
18 
This "labour and effort" test led to the adoption of the so-called "springboard 
doctrine",56 which has since given rise to complications in the interpretation of the 
secrecy requirement.57 The origin of the "springboard doctrine" was the famous 
footnote in Terrapin Ltd v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd:58 
"[A] person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to 
use it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made 
the confidential communication, and springboard it remains even when all 
the features have been published or can be ascertained by actual 
inspection by any member of the public... [T]he possessor of such 
information must be placed under a special disability in the field of 
competition to ensure that he does not get an unfair start." 
These words have been quoted in numerous cases, 59 and their frequent application 
has led Vitoria60 to conclude that non-secret information may nevertheless be 
confidential by virtue of contractual provisions (express or implied) or by virtue of the 
relationship of the parties and the circumstances under which the second party 
learned the information. Such information may then be protected by the action for 
in the public domain where it is only accessible to the public after a significant contribution of labour, 
skill or money has been made." 
56 Cf in general Bainbridge 228; Cornish 222; LAW COM No 110 33-38; Gurry 245-252; Reid 52-55; 
Vitoria 33ff 163ff. 
57 Cf LAW COM No 110 33. 
58 [1960] RPC 128 130, [1967] RPC 375 391-392; emphasis added. 
59 Eg Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd [1962] RPC 97 104; Peter Pan Manufacturing 
Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] RPC 45 54; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] RPC 349 367; 
Under Water Welders & Repairers Ltd v Street and Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 506. 
60 21: "It cannot be emphasized enough to the reader that since the decision rendered in 1948 in 
the Saltman case, the orientation of the English case law in this area has changed. Instead of 
examining whether or not a trade secret exists, most of the cases since 1948 are based upon claims 
for breach of confidence; and the initial issue with which the English courts must grapple is: is the 
information involved in this case confidential information[?]. Thus, the term 'confidential information' 
has taken on juridical significance"; further 23ff. According to Vitoria's analysis, confidential information 
differs from trade secrets in the following ways: (a) confidential information need not be capable of 
industrial or commercial application (23); (b) it need not be secret; not even relative secrecy is required 
(24ff). All that is required is that it be confidential. She explains at 24: "The term 'confidential' should 
not be confused with the term 'secret'. From the cases, it must be information which (1) the parties 
expressly agree orally or in writing (ie by contract) is to be treated as confidential; or (2) the possessor 
confided or entrusted (in confidence) to the recipient without any contractual accord; or (3) was 
available or accessible to the recipient because of his relationship of trust and confidence to the 
possessor. In other words, information may be confidential by virtue of contractual provision, express 
or implied; or by virtue of the relationship of the parties and the circumstances under which the second 
party (disclosee) learned the information. Information which is confidential may generally not be 
disclosed and/or used for one's own or another's purposes without the consent of its owner, unless 
a contract provides otherwise." 
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breach of confidence even though it may be in the public domain. Vitoria's 
contentions need to be investigated, since they render the requirement of secrecy 
uncertain. Thus some of the cases cited by Vitoria in support of her postulate of non-
secret confidential information are considered here.61 
The logical starting point is the famous footnote in the Terrapin case itself. Much 
misunderstanding seems to have arisen as a result of the footnote being quoted out 
of context, as pointed out by the Law Commission.62 An analysis of the facts and 
a reading of the footnote in its context throw an entirely new light on those frequently 
quoted words. The parties were in a contractual relationship, in terms of which the 
defendants manufactured portable buildings according to the design of the plaintiffs. 
To that end, the defendants had received confidential information from the plaintiffs. 
After termination of the contract, the defendants used the confidential information to 
market portable buildings. The plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction. The 
defendants argued that they had been released from their obligation of confidence, 
because the features of the buildings had been made public by the plaintiffs' selling 
the buildings, and publishing descriptions thereof in brochures. This argument was 
rejected by the court, and the interlocutory injunction was granted. 
Taken on face value, the famous passage in the judgment certainly seems to imply 
that published information - which according to Mustad v Dosen63 cannot be secret -
may be protected. However, the court found64 that the brochures would not enable 
anybody to see exactly how the portable building units were constructed. The 
brochures only revealed the features of the units, not their design. A competitor to 
whom the design had not been imparted would still have to prepare plans and 
conduct tests or determine the design by means of reverse engineering. 65 Seen in 
this light, the tons et origo of the springboard doctrine does not cast any doubt on the 
secrecy requirement. 66 
61 The majority of cases cited do not support her thesis unequivocally - cf eg Peter Pan 
Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] RPC 45; Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 
RPC 349; Under Water Welders & Repairers Ltd v Street and Longthorne [1968] RPC 498; Industrial 
Furnaces v Reaves [1970] RPC 605. Only the most important cases that do, on the face of things, 
seem to offer substantiation for Vitoria's contentions are considered below. 
62 LAW COM No 110 34; cf the editorial comment in [1967] RPC 375 376 (in the original report only 
an extract from the judgment of the court a quo was reported in a footnote - which was later quoted 
out of context - [1960] RPC 128 130). 
63 [1963] RPC 41. 
64 [1967] RPC 375 391. 
65 391-392. 
66 Cf Gurry 247-250. 
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Furthermore, the Law Commission67 did not regard the springboard doctrine to 
be in conflict with the public domain principle. It was of the opinion that an injunction 
could only be issued after information had entered the public domain, if the purpose 
thereof was to eliminate the unfair head-start obtained by the infringer's breach of 
confidence before the information had entered the public domain. 
In Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant68 the first defendant had developed 
special methods of constructing an above-ground swimming pool. In his capacity as 
managing director of the plaintiff company, he learnt that a Swiss patent (the Bischoff 
patent) for an essentially similar pool had already been issued. Not disclosing this 
information to the plaintiff company, he left its employ, and secured for himself the 
United Kingdom rights in the Swiss patent. He then proceeded through the second 
defendant, a company which he had formed, to market a pool manufactured by the 
methods he had developed while still employed by the plaintiff. An injunction was 
sought restraining the defendants from inter alia exploiting their knowledge of the 
patent. The plaintiff's case was summarized by the court69 as follows: 
67 LAW COM No 110134-135. Because of the cogency of its reasoning, the relevant passage is 
quoted in full: "[W]e do not think that doctrine is in principle inconsistent with the requirement as to 
public domain; nor, indeed, do we think that acceptance of the doctrine necessitates any major 
modification of the requirement as to public domain. Once information is in the public domain, it should 
cease to have the quality of secrecy necessary for a successful breach of confidence action, whether 
it was put into the public domain by the plaintiff himself, by the person who was subject to an obligation 
of confidence regarding it, or by a third party. It follows that even a person who puts information into 
the public domain, when himself subject to an obligation of confidence, should not be enjoined for all 
time from using the information, although we should emphasize that he will be liable in damages for 
his initial breach of confidence in disclosing the information to the public. The purpose of the 
'springboard doctrine' is to protect the plaintiff, not to punish the defendant; and we think that the 
interest of the plaintiff which the doctrine seeks to protect can be protected by a qualification of, or 
perhaps more accurately by a gloss on, the 'public domain' principle. Suppose that a person in breach 
of confidence has used certain information with a view to exploiting it commercially; he may, for 
example, have tooled up his factory to make the product to which the information relates or have 
organized in advance a special sales system to market it. The information thereafter comes into the 
public domain (whether or not as a result of the defendant's breach of confidence). Unless restrained, 
such a person would, vis-a-vis the person to whom the publication of confidence was originally owed, 
be in a more favourable position than any of the latter's trade competitors: he would have obtained a 
'head start' over those who could only begin to make preparations for exploiting the information when 
it had entered the public domain. His advantage would continue until that point in time when 
manufacturers in general, relying on the public release of the information, could reasonably be 
expected to reach the stage in the exploitation of the information which he had in fact already reached 
when the information became public. The gloss on the principle of public domain to which the 
springboard doctrine gives rise may be expressed as follows: objection cannot be taken to a claim for 
an injunction in proceedings for breach of confidence in respect of the use of the information on the 
sole ground that the information in question is in the public domain, so long as, by reason of the 
defendant's having use of the information in breach of confidence before it entered the public domain, 
he would, unless restrained, enjoy an advantage over those who have had to obtain the information 
through its public release." 
68 [1966] RPC 81, [1965] 1 WLR 1293. 
69 81. 
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"[l]t was not what appeared in the Bischoff specification itself which was 
confidential. It was the knowledge of the possible effect to and upon the 
plaintiffs of the existence and publication of this specification which was 
confidential in the hands of the one person who was in a position to 
assess its true significance because of the knowledge which he, as the 
plaintiff's managing director, possessed of all the facts of the plaintiffs' 
swimming pool and of their business connected therewith." 
The defendants, relying on Mustad v Dasen, contended that everything in the Bischoff 
specification was public property by virtue of its publication. Therefore there could be 
nothing confidential about any aspect of the Bischoff specification, either as such or 
in its effect on the plaintiffs. If there were an inconsistency between the Terrapin and 
Mustad cases, they argued, the decision of the House of Lords in the Mustad case 
had to prevail. The court held that the judgment in Terrapin correctly stated the law, 
and that there was no inconsistency between the Terrapin and Mustad cases. 
However, in deciding the case before him, Roskill J distinguished Mustad on the 
ground that in that case the plaintiffs themselves had published the confidential 
information in the patent specifications, whereas in the Cranleigh case publication had 
been made by a third party.70 
In so far as the Cranleigh case can be taken as authority that information may still 
be protected after publication by someone other than the owner thereof, it certainly 
offers support for the proposition that information may in certain instances be in the 
public domain and yet be capable of protection by the action for breach of 
confidence.71 However, this aspect of the judgment has been criticized by the Law 
Commission72 and commentators.73 It has been suggested74 that the decision 
10 In Speed Seal Ltd v Paddington [1985] 1 WLR 1327 1332 the Cranleigh case was interpreted 
as follows: "Now the Cranleigh case ... shows that the mere fact that publication has been made by a 
third party does not necessarily release from his obligations a person who previously owed a duty not 
to disclose. The purpose of an injunction is protection. Whether a plaintiff, in circumstances such as 
the present, needs protection might depend upon the state of the market. If, for example, the only 
traders seriously competing in the market are the plaintiff and the defendant (the latter being a person 
who, in breach of duty to the plaintiff, wrongfully published the information to the world) it may be a 
matter of continuing importance to the plaintiff that the defendant should not continue to get the benefit 
of the wrongdoing. If, on the other hand, the publication has produced a market with a large number 
of traders, the elimination of one trader (the defendant) might not be of consequence." 
71 Vitoria cites it (47-51) in support of her thesis. 
72 LAW COM No 11O36-37: "Notwithstanding the view of Mustad taken by Ros kill J ... it is doubtful 
whether an obligation of confidence, as distinguished from any express or implied contractual obligation 
which may exist between the parties, can persist after the information in question has reached the 
public domain, irrespective of the way in which it has come into the public domain. Suppose an 
inventor has given particulars of a certain device to a draughtsman who accepts an obligation in 
respect of that information. The draughtsman passes on the information to a third party, who knows 
that he is obtaining the information in breach of the draughtsman's obligation of confidence. 
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should have been based on breach of a corporate fiduciary duty, rather than on the 
misappropriation of confidential information.75 
Another case that does seem to support the concept of non-secret confidential 
information is Suhner & Co v Transradio Ltd.76 In that case Plowman J, after 
hearing the defendants contend that the alleged confidential information in issue was 
in fact "free and available elsewhere",77 said the following:78 
"A great deal of the defendant's evidence seems to me to be really beside 
the point, first of all, because the confidential nature of the document is 
not dependent on whether the information which it contains is available 
elsewhere; but, on the question of whether it contains useful information 
which has been compiled by the plaintiffs for a particular purpose and, if 
it does contain such information and if it has been compiled and handed 
over to the defendants for a particular purpose, then, as I understand the 
law, that document is confidential and the defendants are not entitled to 
use it for another purpose." 
The court cited the Saltman case as authority. This statement in Suhner appears to 
be an unusually liberal interpretation of the Saltman case: as noted above, that case 
is normally understood to signify that if the information in question can only be 
reproduced at the cost of time, labour, and effort, it will be confidential, even though 
its "constituent parts" may be in the public domain. The information "as a whole" 
must, according to the more generally accepted interpretation of the Saltman case, 
Subsequently all the details of the device are independently published in a trade journal. Is the third 
party thereafter subject to indefinite restraint in making and marketing the device at a time when any 
of his trade rivals are free to exploit the information in the article?" 
73 Cf Braithwaite 1979 MLR 95 fn 17; Cornish 223 fn 55 221 (on the Speed Seal case - fn 70 
above). 
74 Braithwaite 1979 MLR 95 fn 17; Cornish 223 fn 55. 
75 Cf, however, Jones 1970 LOR 468-470 who agrees with the Cranleigh case; and Gurry 78 who 
formulates the following rule based on the Cranleigh and similar cases: "While the general rule is that 
information must be inaccessible in order to be confidential, in certain cases information which is 
generally available may be considered as confidential between two parties because of the context in 
which it occurs. In these cases, confidentiality inheres not so much in the information itself, but in the 
association of the information with a particular context which the parties know attaches a special 
significance to the information." It should be noted that this type of confidential information recognized 
in the Cranleigh case could not be a trade secret of the employer, since the latter was not even aware 
thereof, let alone had the will to keep it secret - cf par 2.2.1.2.4 below. 
76 [1967] RPC 329. 
77 332. 
78 333. 
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still be not easily accessible, and thus (relatively) secret. 
Another case that may also have a bearing on the issue of non-secret confidential 
information is Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle,79 in which four elements are 
tentatively proposed to assist with the identification of confidential trade information 
that will be protected by the courts: 
(a) the information must be information the release of which the owner 
believes would be injurious to him or advantageous to his rivals or 
others; 
(b) the owner must believe that the information is confidential or secret, 
in other words that it is not already in the public domain. Some or all 
of his rivals may already have the information, but as long as the 
owner believes it to be confidential he is entitled to try and protect it; 
(c) the owner's belief under the two previous heads must be reasonable; 
and 
(d) the information must be judged in the light of the usage and practices 
of the particular industry or trade concerned. 
Implicit in this test is the possibility that information which is objectively in the public 
domain, may be confidential if the owner believed it to be so, and his or her belief in 
this regard was reasonable. The subjectivity of this four-element test of confidentiality 
has been criticized by Bainbridge.80 He suggests that only information that is -
judged objectively81 - not in the public domain, can be protected. 
Finally, in the context of contracts of employment, information which is not a trade 
secret may be regarded as confidential. This aspect will be dealt with below.82 
In conclusion it may be said that some judicial support exists for the proposition that 
non-secret information may be confidential and protectable by the action for breach 
of confidence, but that few commentators appear to agree with this, and that the bulk 
of case law requires the information to be (to a certain degree at least) not in the 
79 [1978] 3 All ER 193 209-210. 
80 226: "According to this test, a certain amount of subjectivity is allowed on the part of the owner 
of the information but this is restricted by the requirement that the owner's beliefs must be reasonable. 
On this basis, it is possible that a duty of confidence could arise and attract legal remedies even if the 
information is actually in the public domain if the owner's contrary belief is reasonable. However, this 
is going too far and the author is not aware of any cases where information already in the public 
domain has been held to be confidential. Ultimately, the test must be objective." Cf Coleman Trade 
secrets 7-8; Reid 22. 
81 Cf Hull 1986 E/PR 321. 
82 Par 2.4.1. 
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public domain, and thus secret. 
2.2.1.2.4 The owner's/possessor's will to preserve secrecy 
Trade secrets also have a subjective element. This has already been touched upon 
in the discussion of the Thomas Marshall case. 83 As noted,84 that case is open to 
the interpretation that the subjective belief of the person trying to protect his or her 
alleged trade secret may actually be the overriding factor in establishing secrecy; this 
notion has, however, been criticized. The better view is that secrecy must be 
established objectively, but that a subjective element is added to the inquiry in the 
sense that the owner of the trade secret must also have the animus to keep the 
relevant information out of the public domain.85 Such an animus can be deduced 
from the steps taken by the owner to preserve the secrecy of the relevant 
information.86 Thus in Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler87 the Court of Appeal held 
that one of the factors to be taken into account when deciding whether information 
was a trade secret or not, was whether the confider (in the context of the case the 
employer) had impressed on the confidant (employee) the confidentiality thereof. 
Although an employer could not prevent use or disclosure of information merely by 
telling the employee that it was confidential, the attitude of the employer towards the 
information could provide evidence which might assist in determining whether the 
information was a trade secret or not. In Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr88 Staughton LJ 
expressed the opinion that for information to qualify as a trade secret, the owner 
should limit the dissemination thereof, or at least not encourage or permit widespread 
publication. 
This requirement will probably often be applied in a negative way, in the sense that 
the court will refuse protection if the evidence shows that the owner was careless as 
to whether the information remained secret or not. 89 
83 [1978] 3 All ER 193. 
84 Par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
85 Cf Bainbridge 226; Coleman Trade secrets 7-8; Reid 22; Vitoria 20; Hull 1986 EIPR 321; 
Underwater Welders & Repairs Ltd v Street and Longthorne [1968] RPC 498 505-506. 
86 Cf Hull 1986 EIPR 321. 
87 [1986] 1 All ER 617 (CA) 627; cf Coleman Trade secrets 26. 
88 [1991] 1 WLR 251 260. 
89 Cf Yates Circuit Foils v Electrofoi/s [1976] FSR 345. 
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2.2.1.2.5 Economic value 
Whereas economic value is arguably a characteristic of all trade secrets,90 it does 
not receive much attention in English case law or commentaries. However, some 
dicta may be found indicating that economic value is indeed a constitutive element 
of a trade secret. 91 This element may also be expressed in terms of either a 
competitive advantage to the owner of the trade secret,92 or significant harm which 
can be caused to the owner by unauthorized disclosure of the secret to 
competitors. 93 
2.2.2 ORIGIN AND BREACH OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE 
To invoke the protection of the action for breach of confidence, an obligation of 
confidence must exist, and there must have been a breach or feared breach of that 
obligation. 94 
2.2.2.1 ORIGIN OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE 
An obligation of confidence will be found to exist if confidential information is imparted 
by a confider to a confidant tor a limited purpose, and the confidant will be under an 
obligation not to use the information for any purpose other than that for which it was 
disclosed. This is the test commonly employed by the courts to determine whether 
an obligation of confidence exists.95 In Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd96 it was 
stated that an obligation of confidence would arise whenever a reasonable man 
standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would realize on reasonable 
9° Cf par 1.1 above. 
91 Cf eg Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink PLC [1987] 1 IRLR 499 502: 
"Somebody may hit upon the combination of two ingredients after many years of research, which 
produce an immensely valuable result wholly unknown to anybody else" (emphasis added). Cf 
Coleman Trade secrets 1; Eisenschitz 1984 EIPR 92; Purvis and Turner 1989 EIPR 4; Vitoria 11. 
92 Cf Gurry 7. 
93 Cf eg Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251 260 270. 
94 Cf in general Bainbridge 231 ff; Chandler and Holland 23ff; Coleman Trade secrets 29ff; Coleman 
Intellectual property 12ff; Cornish 226ff; Gurry 111 ff; LAW COM No 110 18ff. 
95 Cf Gurry 113-114 and the extensive list of authorities cited; Coleman Intellectual property 13; 
Coleman Trade secrets 33-34. 
96 [1969] RPC 41 48; cf Coleman Trade secrets 32; Chandler and Holland 25. 
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grounds that the information was being given to him in confidence.97 98 Various 
sources of obligations of confidence can be discerned, and these will now be 
examined. 
2.2.2.1.1 Contract 
Contract is one of the most frequent sources of an obligation of confidence.99 Two 
situations can be distinguished, namely express and implied contractual obligations 
of confidence. 
2.2.2.1 .1.1 Express contractual obligation of confidence 
In principle the courts will enforce express contractual terms imposing an obligation 
of confidence. 100 Such provisions are frequently contained in contracts between 
business organizations, between consultants and businesses consulting them, and 
between employers and employees.101 
Express contractual provisions protecting trade secrets frequently take the form of 
covenants in restraint of trade, that is, agreements restricting the ability of the 
97 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 32-33 who contrasts this test with the importance of the subjective 
perceptions of the trade secret owner in the Thomas Marshall case [1978] 3 All ER 193 209-21 O (par 
2.2.1.2.3 above): "[The Thomas Marshall test concentrates on the views of the 'owner' of the 
information, whereas the Coco test delineating the circumstances in which an obligation of confidence 
will be imposed, concentrates on the views of the recipient of the information. This shift in emphasis 
from the 'owner' of the information to the recipient [note, however, that the Coco case was the earlier 
of the two decisions] reflects the bilateral nature of the obligation of confidence. The 'owner' is in the 
best position to assess whether information amounts for example to a trade secret, but if the recipient 
is to be bound by an obligation to respect its confidentiality, the information must be conveyed in 
circumstances in which he ought reasonably to realise his liability. Any other test would not reflect the 
practicalities of the situation." 
98 The Law Commission has recommended the following test to determine whether an obligation 
of confidence has been created (LAW COM No 110 106): "[A]n obligation of confidence should come 
into existence where the recipient of the information has expressly given an undertaking to the giver 
of the information to keep confidential that information, or a description within which it falls, or where 
such an undertaking is, in the absence of any indication to the contrary on the part of the recipient, 
to be inferred from the relationship between the giver and the recipient or from the latter's conduct." 
See further par 2.2.2.1.3 below. 
99 Cf Turner 183-261 who regards contract as the most frequent source; cf LAW COM No 110 86 
where this distinction is given to equity. Cf in general Coleman Intellectual property 15ff. 
10° Cf in general Bainbridge 232-233 237-238; Coleman Trade secrets 37-44; Coleman Intellectual 
property 15-18; Gurry 28-29; Reid 30-31; Turner 259-261; LAW COM No 110 18 27 fn 140 30-31; 
Stewart 1989 EIPR 92-94. 
101 Cf Bainbridge 232; Coleman Trade secrets 37-38. 
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covenantor to compete with the covenantee following termination of the contract. 102 
Such agreements are in principle contrary to public policy and therefore void. 103 
Especially in context of employment contracts, public policy favours the continuing 
ability of the employee to use his or her skills and knowledge after termination of the 
contract. 104 Only restraints of trade that are reasonable between the parties and not 
contrary to the public interest will be enforced by the courts. 105 Restraints may not 
prohibit competition per se106 - they may only protect the covenantee's legitimate 
business interests, of which trade secrets are recognized as an example. 107 
Restraints which are too wide in terms of the time during which and area within which 
the covenantor may not seek employment with competitors of the covenantee or may 
not compete with the latter himself, will not be enforced. 108 
In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fow/er109 the Court of Appeal suggested obiter that only 
trade secrets or their equivalent could be protected by a restraint in trade and that 
other information which the employee must treat as confidential during the 
subsistence of the employment contract,110 could not. This suggestion has been 
criticized by commentators111 as being unduly restrictive and was not followed in 
102 See in general Mehigan and Griffiths 1ff. 
103 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 41-42. 
104 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 42; Gurry 28-29; Mehigan and Griffiths 56ff. 
105 Cf Bainbridge 237; Coleman Trade secrets 42. 
106 Cf Bainbridge 237. 
107 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 43. 
108 Cf Bainbridge 237; Coleman Trade secrets 43. 
109 [1986] 1 All ER 617 (CA). 
110 See par 2.4.1 below on the distinction between such information and trade secrets. 
111 Cf Bainbridge 238: "[M]ost business organizations possess information that would harm them 
or benefit others if divulged even though that information is not a trade secret"; Chandler and Holland 
46ff; Cornish 230; LAW COM No 110 (published before the Faccenda Chicken case) 27 fn 140: 
"Theoretically there is no reason why a person should not by contract bind himself regarding matters 
which are common knowledge or easily ascertainable. But (i) a contract restricting a former employee's 
disclosure or use of an employer's 'trade secrets' will be construed to exclude what is generally known; 
(ii) express cover of matters which are generally known may amount to an unreasonable restraint on 
trade or may contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty ... ; (iii) in the unusual case where such a contract 
would be binding what is being secured is merely the silence of the other party, not the secrecy of the 
information"; Purvis and Turner 1989 EIPR 3: "The Court is apparently saying that nothing which is not 
a genuine trade secret is protectable by a restrictive covenant, and genuine trade secrets do not need 
a restrictive covenant to protect them. One is forced to question whether this can really represent the 
law. What is the point of an employer having a restrictive covenant at all when he has to show that the 
information was protected at common law before it can be enforced?"; Hull 1986 EIPR 322. 
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Balston Ltd v Headline Filters. 112 
2.2.2.1.1.2 Implied contractual obligation of confidence 
The courts will frequently imply a term imposing an obligation of confidence into an 
existing contractual relationship. 113 The courts have even on occasion implied a 
contractual obligation of confidence in a case where there was no existing contractual 
relationship between the parties to a disclosure of confidential information. In 
Mechanical and General Inventions Co Ltd and Lehwess v Austin and The Austin 
Motor Co Ltd,114 the parties entered into negotiations with a view to a future 
business arrangement which did however not come to fruition. In the course of the 
negotiations the plaintiffs disclosed certain confidential information to the defendants. 
The defendants later applied for a patent based on that information. Damages were 
awarded to the plaintiffs for breach of a contract that was implied on account of the 
disclosure of the information and the implied promise of the defendants to use the 
information only for the limited purpose of considering whether to enter into a 
business agreement with the plaintiffs or not. However, when faced with a similar 
situation in Seager v Copydex Ltd, 115 the court preferred to base its judgment on 
equity, rather than on an implied contract.116 
Gurry1 17 undertakes an interesting investigation of the relationship between express 
and implied obligations of confidence. He poses the question whether an express 
contractual term imposing an obligation of confidence is exhaustive of a confider's 
rights to protect confidential information disclosed pursuant to a contract, or whether 
the express term merely provides minimum protection to the confider that can be 
supplemented by an implied term. The general principle of English contract law in this 
regard is that if the parties have included an express term in a contract dealing with 
a certain matter, there is no room for implying further terms dealing with the same 
matter. The express term is then exhaustive of the parties' rights and duties in 
112 [1987] FSR 330 - an interlocutory hearing. Cf Bainbridge 238; Chandler and Holland 50. 
113 Cf in general Bainbridge 233-236; Coleman Trade secrets 44-45; Coleman Intellectual property 
18-20; Gurry 29-35; Reid 31-32; Turner 237-258; LAW COM No 110 18-19. 
114 [1935] AC 346. Cf Gurry 29; Turner 239-241. 
115 [1967] RPC 349. Cf Gurry 29 fn 30. 
116 Cf also Nichrotherm Electrical Co Ltd v Percy [1957] RPC 207; Gurry 29 fn 30; Turner 220-222 
239. 
117 30-35. 
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respect of that matter.118 Dicta in Potters-Ballotini Ltd v Weston-Baker119 seemed 
to apply this principle to the law relating to breach of confidence. An injunction was 
refused inter alia because an express contractual term restricted the protection of the 
relevant information to a specified period of time, which period had at the time of the 
proceedings just about expired. 
However, Gurry points out, 120 a contrary line of cases exists, holding that in this 
area of the law, the courts are free to imply an obligation of confidence which either 
supplements or replaces an express obligation of confidence. Thus, in British 
Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson121 the court was prepared to imply an obligation 
of confidence that outlasted an express obligation coupled to a time limit. And in the 
Thomas Marshall case, 122 where an express term prohibited disclosure of certain 
confidential information, the court was willing to imply a duty of fidelity and good faith 
prohibiting both disclosure and use of the information.123 
2.2.2.1.2 Non-contractual confidence 
Examples can be found in English case law of situations where an obligation of 
confidence is found to exist independently of contract, express or implied. In such a 
situation the obligation of confidence is almost always based on equity.124 The locus 
classicus is the Saltman Engineering case. 125 In that case there were three sets of 
plaintiffs, of whom only the third stood in a contractual relationship with the 
defendants. The first plaintiffs planned to manufacture leather punches. Under 
agreement with them the second plaintiffs prepared drawings for the manufacture of 
certain tools required to make the leather punches. An order to make the tools was 
placed with the third plaintiff, but he handed the drawings to the defendants and 
118 Cf Gurry 30. 
119 [1977] RPC 202 205. 
120 31. 
121 (1939) 56 RPC 271 277; cf Gurry 32 fn 40. 
122 [1978] 3 All ER 193. 
123 Cf further case law cited by Gurry 34-35. Gurry 35 concludes: "The courts seem prepared ... to 
use the contractual jurisdiction in a way which enables them to implement the underlying policy of 
enforcing confidences by giving the confider the benefit of the full obligation of confidence as it may 
exist at law. This policy appears to take precedence over the demands of doctrinal purity." 
124 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 45-47; Coleman Intellectual property 14-15; Gurry 36-39; LAW COM 
No 11019-21. 
125 (1948) 65 RPC 203, later also reported in [1963] 3 All ER 413; cf par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
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asked them to make the tools. The defendants used the confidential drawings to 
make leather punches and sold them for their own profit. The Court of Appeal based 
its decision solely on the relationship between the first plaintiffs and the defendants, 
and found that there had been a breach of the duty of confidence owed in the 
circumstances by the defendants to the first plaintiffs. The court stated expressly126 
that an obligation of confidence is not limited to cases where the parties are in a 
contractual relationship. A factor that weighed heavily with the court was the 
defendants' knowledge of both the confidential quality of the drawings, and the limited 
purpose for which they had been placed in possession of the drawings.127 
In Seager v Copydex Ltd, 128 where confidential information was disclosed during 
abortive pre-contractual negotiations, the defendants were held liable in equity for 
exploiting the information for their own benefit. As noted, 129 in the similar Austin 
case130 the court preferred to base its judgment on implied contract rather than on 
equity. 
In Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd, 131 which also dealt with a disclosure made in 
the course of unsuccessful pre-contractual negotiations, the following test was 
proposed132 to determine whether an equitable obligation of confidence should be 
imposed: 
"It may be that that hard-worked creature, the reasonable man, may be 
pressed into service once more; for I do not see why he should not labour 
in equity as well as law. It seems to me that if the circumstances are such 
that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the 
information would have realized that upon reasonable grounds the 
information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice 
to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, 
where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a 
business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such 
as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, 
I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to 
126 212. 
127 Saltman case 213 216. Cf, however, Turner 225-230. 
128 [1967] RPC 349; cf Coleman Trade secrets 46; Gurry 126; LAW COM No 110 20. 
129 Par 2.2.2.1.1.2 above. 
130 [1935] AC 346; cf Gurry 125-126. 
131 [1969] RPC 41. Cf Coleman Trade secrets 45; LAW COM No 110 20-21. 
132 48. 
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repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence." 
However, the information in Coco was found not to be confidential, and it has been 
suggested133 that the proposed reasonable person test was an obiter dictum. The 
test has furthermore been criticized as placing a too heavy burden on recipients of 
unsolicited, allegedly confidential, information to avoid liability.134 
2.2.2.1.3 Situations in which an obligation of confidence will arise 
From the case law a number of situations in which obligations of confidence will 
typically arise, can be identified. 135 When confidential information is disclosed for 
the purpose of a business relationship, the courts will, in the absence of clear 
indications to the contrary, generally assume an obligation on the confidant to use the 
information only for the limited purposes of that relationship. Examples are: 136 a 
manufacturer disclosing confidential information to a sub-contractor; parties to pre-
contractual negotiations disclosing confidential information; an employer disclosing 
confidential information to an employee; confidential information disclosed in licensing 
and distributor agreements. Obligations of confidence may also rest on parties to a 
fiduciary relationship, 137 like company directors. Where statute138 makes 
disclosure of confidential information compulsory, an obligation of confidence may be 
imposed on the state or its agencies receiving the information.139 It is uncertain 
whether English law recognizes obligations of confidence arising solely by virtue of 
confidential information being acquired by improper means - such as industrial 
espionage. This question is dealt with below.140 
133 LAW COM No 110 21; cf however Coleman Trade secrets 32-33 45. 
134 See LAW COM No 11 O 87 on the objections received in this regard by the Law Commission. 
135 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 31-32; Gurry 122-176. 
136 Gurry 122-143 and authorities cited. 
137 Cf Gurry 158-162 and authorities cited; Cornish 227-228. 
138 Gurry 175-176 225-238; cf Reid 103-141. 
139 Obligations of confidence are also frequently imposed on persons who receive confidential 
information in their professional capacity, eg bankers and legal advisers. More often than not, such 
information will be of a personal rather than a commercial nature, but trade secrets may also be 
disclosed in such a context. Cf Gurry 143-158. 
140 Par 2.4.2. 
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2.2.2.2 BREACH OF AN OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE 
The final requirement for the action for breach of confidence is that there must have 
been a breach of the obligation of confidence to the detriment of the confider. 141 
The breach may consist of an unauthorized use of the information by the confider, 
that is, use for a purpose other than the limited purpose for which the last-mentioned 
received it.142 The breach may also consist of an unauthorized disclosure of the 
information.143 An anticipated breach may be sufficient to found the action.144 
Unauthorized use of a "material part" of the confidential information is sufficient to 
constitute a breach - it is not required that the secret in its entirety be utilized.145 
Awareness on the part of the confidant that he or she was using the confidential 
information is not necessary to constitute a breach of the obligation of confidence. If 
the confidant believes that he or she is not using the confidential information, but his 
or her mind is so "saturated"146 with it that he or she utilises it subconsciously, the 
courts will find that the obligation has been breached.147 148 
An obligation of confidence can only be breached by the person on whom the 
obligation rests, 149 and only as against the person to whom the obligation is 
owed.150 
141 Cf authorities cited in par 2.2.2 above. 
142 Cf Bainbridge 241-242; Coleman Trade secrets 4; Gurry 4-5 256-266; Reid 49-60; LAW COM 
No 110127. 
143 Cf Bainbridge 241; Coleman Trade secrets 4; Vitoria 162-163; LAW COM No 110 127. 
144 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 4; LAW COM No 11 O 71-82; Vitoria 162-163. 
145 Amber Size and Chemical Co Ltd v Menzel [1913] 2 Ch 239; Gurry 258. 
146 Terrapin Ltd v Builders Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375 390. 
147 Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] RPC 349; Terrapin Ltd v Builders Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] 
RPC 375; National Broach & Machine Co v Churchill Gear Machines Ltd [1965] RPC 61; cf however 
Paul v Southern Instruments Ltd [1964] RPC 118. See Gurry 261-265. 
148 Although it is not required that the confidant realizes he or she is breaching the obligation, 
awareness or knowledge of the confidential nature of information is, however, an important factor 
indicating the existence of an obligation of confidence. Cf par 2.2.2.1; 2.2.2.1.2 above and Gurry 261. 
149 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 82; LAW COM No 110 22-26 88-89. 
15° Coleman Trade secrets 34-35; Gurry 121; LAW COM No 110 26; Vitoria 171-173 and authorities 
cited. 
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2.3 REMEDIES 
The following remedies may be available in an action for breach of confidence: 151 
2.3.1 DAMAGES 
If a breach of confidence also constitutes a breach of contract, 152 damages 153 
may be awarded according to normal common law principles.154 If the liability arises 
only in equity, damages may be awarded in substitution of or in addition to an 
injunction.155 Where, in a given case, the only likely breach of confidence is a past 
one, it is doubtful whether damages in equity may be given, since there is then no 
case for an injunction to which they may be a substitute or addition.156 
The assessment of the quantum of damages to be awarded for a breach of 
confidence is a very difficult exercise.157 Nevertheless, although such assessment 
would frequently be at best a rough estimate, the courts will not for this reason refuse 
an award of damages.158 The practice is not for the court to assess the damage 
itself, ·but to order an enquiry as to damages to be done by an official. 159 
As regards the quantum of future damages in lieu of an injunction, it was held in 
Seager v Copydex Ltd (No 2)1 60 that damages were to be assessed at the market 
value of the misused confidential information, which in turn depended on the nature 
151 See in general Bainbridge 242-243; Cornish 236-239; Gurry 363-451; LAW COM No 110 64-82; 
Reid 178-189; Vitoria 371-431. 
152 Or a tort such as inducing breach of contract; cf Cornish 238. 
153 See in general Bainbridge 242-243; Cornish 238-239; Gurry 428-451; LAW COM No 110 64-70; 
Reid 184-186; Vitoria 408-427. 
154 Cf Cornish 238; Gurry 430-431. 
155 In accordance with Lord Cairns' Act - the Chancery Amendment Act 1858; cf Cornish 238; Gurry 
431. 
156 Cf Cornish 239, who criticizes such a view as being 'narrowly historical'. 
157 Gurry 442: "[l]nformation is such an elusive concept that any attempt to quantify the loss 
consequent on its misuse will be hazardous"; cf in general Plibersek 1991 EIPR 283ff. 
158 Cf Gurry 442-443; Vitoria 413; in respect of intellectual property in general Cornish 43. 
159 Cf Vitoria 413 fn 131; Gurry 431. Cf in general Blanco White and Jacob 327; Copinger and 
Skone James 343-344; Wadlow 580. 
160 [1969] RPC 250 256. 
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of the information. If there was nothing very special about it, that is, if it involved no 
particular inventive step, but was the sort of information which could be obtained by 
employing any competent consultant, the value thereof was the fee which a 
consultant would charge. On the other hand, if the information was something special, 
as for instance if it involved an inventive step or something so unusual that it could 
not be obtained by just going to a consultant, then the value would be the price which 
a willing buyer - desirous of obtaining it - would pay for it. If the information was very 
special, its value might be assessed on a royalty basis. The court could not give a 
royalty by way of damages, but it could give an equivalent by a calculation based on 
a capitalization of a royalty, thus arriving at a lump sum. 161 
"Exemplary" or "punitive" damages (that is damages additional to compensation) may 
be awarded in breach of confidence cases if government servants have acted in an 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional way, or if the defendant's conduct was 
calculated to give him or her a profit likely to exceed the compensation payable to the 
plaintiff .162 
2.3.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS 
The purpose of an account of profits 163 is to recover from the defendant the profits 
he or she has made. In this respect it differs from an action for damages, which is 
aimed at compensating .the plaintiff for the loss he or she has suffered. 164 An 
account of profits and an action for damages are always alternative remedies. 165 
Practical difficulties have' made the account of profits an unpopular remedy. 
Apparently it is often just as difficult to establish the quantum of the infringer's profits 
as it is to establish the plaintiff's loss. The main problem is frequently to determine 
what part of the profit arose from the breach of confidence, since many other factors 
may contribute to the total profit in the defendant's hands.166 However, situations 
161 Some commentators (Bainbridge 243; cf LAW COM No 110 66-67) interpret this decision as 
making provision for two classes of confidential information; while others (Gurry 443-444; Vitoria 416-
417) find three classes mentioned in the same passage. 
162 Cf LAW COM No 11 O 69-70 and authorities cited; Cornish 42-43. 
163 Cf in general Bainbridge 237; Gurry 417-427; LAW COM No 110 70-71; Reid 186-189; Vitoria 
427-428; Plibersek 1991 EIPR 286-287. 
164 Gurry 417; LAW COM No 110 70. 
165 Gurry 417; LAW COM No 110 70. 
166 Cf Gurry 418; LAW COM No 11 O 70-71; in respect of copyright law Prime 239. 
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may arise where it will be a relatively simple matter to assess the defendant's liability, 
for instance where he or she would have made no profits had he or she not misused 
the plaintiff's confidential information.167 Where the defendant's profits are only 
partially attributable to the misused information, an apportionment will have to be 
made. In such cases, it has been suggested, 168 the courts may exercise their 
discretion not to award an account of profits, and to award damages instead. 169 
It has been submitted, 170 by analogy of the use of this remedy in trade marks law, 
that if an account of profits is ordered it should commence only from the date on 
which the defendant became aware that he or she was infringing the plaintiff's 
intellectual property rights. 
2.3.3 INJUNCTIONS 
The injunction is a remedy of considerable importance in breach of confidence cases, 
since it provides an effective way of preserving the secrecy of confidential 
information. 171 It may be awarded in two forms - as a temporary remedy in the form 
of an interlocutory injunction, or as final relief in the form of a final (or perpetual) 
injunction. 
2.3.3.1 INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS 
The interlocutory injunction may be granted either before any breach of confidence 
has taken place in order to prevent an apprehended breach, or after an actual breach 
but before trial to restrain any further breach pending the outcome of the 
litigation.172 The granting of the interlocutory injunction is in the discretion of the 
court. 173 The court "must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in 
167 As in Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] RPC 45; cf Gurry 
422-425; LAW COM No 110 70-71; Reid 187-188; Vitoria 428. 
168 Gurry 422-423 426. 
169 Cf further in general Prime 239-241; Bently 1990 EIPR 106; Bently 1991 EIPR 5. 
170 Gurry 421; cf Vitoria 427. 
171 See in general Bainbridge 242-243; Cornish 236-238; Gurry 376-41 O; LAW COM No 110 71-81; 
Reid 165-170 181-183; Vitoria 372-394 398-406. 
172 Reid 165-166. 
173 Cf Vitoria 379; LAW COM No 110 71; Cornish 38. 
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other words, that there is a serious question to be tried" .174 175 If the plaintiff (the 
applicant for the interlocutory injunction) has satisfied this standard of proof, the court 
will then decide on a "balance of convenience" whether the injunction should be 
granted or not.176 In this regard, a number of principles have been formulated. 177 
If damages awarded at the trial would adequately compensate the plaintiff and the 
defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction 
should normally be granted. If damages would not provide an adequate remedy for 
the plaintiff in the event of his or her succeeding at the trial, the court should consider 
whether the defendant would be adequately compensated by the plaintiff's cross-
undertaking as to damages 178 should the plaintiff be unsuccessful at the trial. If 
damages under such an undertaking would be adequate and the plaintiff would be 
in a financial position to pay them, an interlocutory injunction would be granted. 
Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages 
available to either party or to both, any factor which may affect the balance of 
convenience - and there is no closed list of such factors - is brought into account. 179 
Where such factors appear to be evenly balanced, it is prudent to preserve the status 
quo. If the balance remains more or less even, it may not be improper to take into 
account, in tipping the balance, the relative strength of each party's case as revealed 
by the affidavit evidence adduced on the hearing of the application. This should be 
done only where it is apparent upon the facts disclosed by evidence as to which there 
is no credible dispute that the strength of one party's case is disproportionate to that 
of the other party. 
2.3.3.2 FINAL INJUNCTIONS 
Like the interlocutory injunction, the final injunction 180 is a discretionary remedy, and 
174 American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 407 (not a trade secret case, but the most 
authoritative case on interlocutory injunctions). Cf Gurry 377-395; LAW COM No 110 71-79; Reid 166-
168; Vitoria 379-381. 
175 Earlier dicta in the case law that the applicant must make out a prima facie case are now 
doubtful authority. See eg Reid 166. 
176 Cf Cornish 39; Gurry 377; Reid 166. 
177 In the American Cyanamid case 408-409. Cf Gurry 386-395; LAW COM No 110 72-73; Reid 
167-169; Vitoria 380-381. 
178 An interlocutory injunction will normally only be granted to the plaintiff if he or she gives a cross-
undertaking to make good any damage suffered by the defendant as a result of the injunction, should 
the plaintiff be the unsuccessful party at the trial - cf eg Cornish 38. 
179 Cf Cornish 39. 
18° Cf in general Bainbridge 242-243; Cornish 41 238; Gurry 398-410; LAW COM No 110 79-81; 
Reid 181-183; Vitoria 398-406. 
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will not be lightly granted if a sufficient remedy in damages exists. 181 However, an 
injunction is often the only remedy with which the secrecy of information can 
effectively be protected.182 Factors which may influence the courts in the exercise 
of their discretion to grant an injunction are: 183 
(a) the nature of the information - trivialities will not lightly be protected 
by way of an injunction; 
(b) publication of the information will be an important factor influencing 
both the applicability and the duration of the injunction; 184 
(c) the extent of the contribution of the appropriated information to the 
activity that the applicant is trying to restrain - if the contribution was 
considerable, an injunction will be appropriate; if it was relatively 
insignificant, damages would be more appropriate; 
(d) good faith and change of position - where the user was unaware that 
he or she was infringing another's intellectual property, and he or she 
has substantially changed his or her position (for instance by 
commencing costly manufacturing and marketing processes), 
damages may be more appropriate than an injunction; and 
(e) certainty in the terms of the injunction - the confidential information 
to which it relates must be sufficiently clearly identified so as to 
enable the party enjoined by it to know precisely what he or she may 
and may not do. 
The correct view seems to be that it is not necessary to establish detriment before 
an injunction may be granted.185 
2.3.4 ORDERS FOR DELIVERY UP OR DESTRUCTION 
In proper cases the courts will order the defendant to deliver up or destroy any 
materials in which the plaintiff's confidential information is embodied.186 This is an 
181 Cf Bainbridge 242-246; Gurry 396-398; LAW COM No 110 79-81. 
182 Cf Cornish 236; Gurry 397-398; Reid 181. 
183 This list is based on the analysis by Gurry 398-41 O; cf Cornish 238; LAW COM No 110 79-81; 
Reid 182-183. 
184 See par 2.4.4 below. 
185 See Gurry 407-408. 
186 Cf in general Bainbridge 243; Cornish 41-42 236; Gurry 411-416; LAW COM No 110 81-82; 
Reid 183-184; Vitoria 406-408. 
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equitable remedy and thus a discretionary one. 187 An order for delivery up or 
destruction is normally made in cases where the court has awarded an injunction 
against the defendant.188 
If the materials to be delivered up or destroyed are in the nature of documentary, 
audio tape or photographic recordings of the plaintiff's confidential information, no 
special problems arise. If, on the other hand, the objectionable materials are things 
like production machinery or completed products, an order for destruction may prove 
socially wasteful, and in such circumstances the courts will not exercise their 
discretion lightly.189 Gurry190 identifies three factors that may influence the courts 
in this regard: 
(a) knowledge on the part of the defendants of their obligation of 
confidence will make it easier for the courts to order destruction; 
(b) if the plaintiff's confidential information played a major part in the 
manufacture of the articles, the courts will be more readily inclined to 
order destruction; and 
(c) the court will be reluctant to order the destruction of production 
machinery or completed products if an award of damages can be a 
suitable remedy. 
If the plaintiff's confidential information is embodied only in certain components of the 
defendant's machinery, and it is practicable to sever them from the complete units, 
the potentially wasteful effect of an order for destruction may be minimized by 
ordering removal and destruction of only those objectionable components. 191 
2.3.5 ANTON PILLER ORDERS 
The so-called Anton Piller order192 is an order applied for in camera and without 
notice to the defendant, to inspect premises on which a plaintiff suspects an 
infringement of his or her intellectual property is taking place, and to seize, copy or 
187 Cf Bainbridge 243; Cornish 41; Gurry 411; LAW COM No 110 81. 
188 Cf Cornish 41; Gurry 411; Vitoria 407. 
189 Cf Gurry 413-415; Reid 184. 
190 414-415. 
191 Cf Gurry 415-416 and authority cited. 
192 After Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] RPC 719; cf in general Cornish 47-
50; Adams 1985 EIPR 92; Hoyle 1988 EIPR 112. 
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photograph material relevant to the alleged infringement.193 The purpose of the 
order is to take the defendant by surprise, in order to prevent destruction or removal 
of evidence of such an infringement. More frequently granted in copyright 
infringement cases, it is nevertheless also available in cases where misuse of 
confidential information is suspected.194 
Requirements for the granting of an Anton Piller order are the following: 195 
(a) there must be an extremely strong prima facie case; 
(b) there must be clear evidence that the defendant has in his or her 
possession incriminating documents or objects; 
(c) the circumstances must be such that the normal processes of the law 
would be frustrated if the order was not granted; there must therefore 
be a real danger that evidence would be destroyed or removed if the 
defendant was forewarned; and 
(d) the plaintiff must show that the actual or potential damage is very 
serious to him or her. 
The order may be granted at any stage of the relevant action.196 If granted before 
service of the writ on the defendant (as would normally be the case in order to 
preserve the element of surprise), the court will not allow the order to be misused as 
purely a means of gathering evidence to decide what kind of action can be brought 
against the defendant.197 The courts will grant Anton Piller type orders on terms 
limiting to a certain degree the inroads inevitably made into the interests of the 
defendant by the execution of such an order. 198 
2.4 SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
There are a number of situations in which the owner of a trade secret may experience 
difficulties if he or she wishes to protect his or her confidential trade information in the 
English courts. Sometimes, but not necessarily always, these situations could 
193 Cf Cornish 47. 
194 Cf Cornish 48; Gurry 366-367; Reid 170-172. 
195 Cf Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1876] RPC 719; Cornish 47; Gurry 368-371 
and authorities cited. 
196 Gurry 371-372. 
197 Gurry 371-372 and authorities cited. 
198 Cf Gurry 372-375; Hull 1989 EIPR 382; Russell 1992 EIPR 243. 
40 
arguably point towards inadequacies in English trade secrets law. A number of 
situations posing special problems are examined in the following paragraphs. 
2.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Employees often have access to confidential business information of their employers. 
They may receive it directly from their employers, or from other employees, or from 
outside sources, or they may themselves generate confidential information in the 
course of their employment. The employer-employee relationship is therefore one with 
an inherent potential for breach of confidence, especially in these days of increasing 
labour mobility.199 Two situations can be distinguished - first, where the employee 
is currently employed by the employer, and second, where the employee has left the 
employ of the (former) employer. 
It is the unauthorized use or disclosure of confidential information by the ex-employee 
after termination of the contract of employment that presents special difficulties. Here 
the courts must weigh the interest of the employer in maintaining confidence, and the 
employee's conflicting interest that he or she should be free to use his or her skill and 
knowledge to earn a living elsewhere. 20° Conflicting policy considerations enter the 
picture - on the one hand the policy in favour of maintaining confidences, on the other 
hand policies favouring mobility of labour, free flow of information, and free 
competition.201 
The main problem is the difficulty, in many situations, to distinguish between the trade 
secrets of the ex-employer - which the former employee is not allowed to use or 
divulge; and the employee's acquired general skill and knowledge - which his or her 
former employer cannot restrain him or her from using.202 203 In Printers and 
199 Cf in general Bainbridge 233-236; Chandler and Holland 37-58; Cornish 228-231; Coleman 
Trade secrets 52-64; Coleman Intellectual property 21-25; Gurry 177-224; LAW COM No 110 39-41; 
Reid 35-42; Rideout 96-101; Turner 115-159; Vitoria 77-78 191-261; Stewart 1989 EIPR 88ff. 
20° Cf Bainbridge 233-234. 
201 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 59. 
202 Cf in general Bainbridge 234; Coleman Trade secrets 9-14 59-61; Gurry 198-202; LAW COM 
No 110 39-41; Reid 38-42; Turner 115-159; Vitoria 218-228 and authorities cited. 
203 The Law Commission (LAW COM No 110 137), recognizing that a very fine distinction must 
sometimes be drawn between protectable information and personal skills and knowledge, has 
nevertheless considered it best to leave it to the courts to draw that distinction where necessary in the 
light of the circumstances of each individual case. The Commission did venture the opinion that "any 
test be formulated in broad terms so that account can be taken both of changing views on the 
employment relationship and of technical developments". 
41 
Finishers Ltd v Hol/oway2-04 an ordinary person test is formulated to distinguish 
between the employer's trade secrets and the employee's skill and knowledge: 
"If the information in question can fairly be regarded as a separate part of 
the employee's stock of knowledge which a man of ordinary honesty and 
intelligence would recognise to be the property of his old employer, and 
not his own to do as he likes with, then the court, if it thinks that there is 
a danger of the information being used or disclosed by the ex-employee 
to the detriment of the old employer, will do what it can to prevent that 
result by granting an injunction. "205 
An important exposition of applicable principles was made in Faccenda Chicken Ltd 
v Fowler. 206 In the court a quo Goulding J said207 that the information acquired 
by an employee in the course of his employment fell into three categories: 
(a) information which, because of its trivial character or its easy 
accessibility from public sources, cannot be regarded as confidential 
at all; 
(b) information which the employee must treat as confidential, either 
because he is expressly told it is confidential, or because from its 
character it obviously is so, but which once learned remains in the 
employee's head208 and becomes part of his own skill and 
knowledge applied in the course of his employer's business; and 
(c) specific trade secrets. 
204 [1965] RPC 239 255 .. 
205 Cf LAW COM No 110 39-41. Gurry 11 criticizes this test as "a very difficult test to apply and 
it also makes it hard to predict the outcome of a given case". 
206 [1985] 1 All ER 724 (ChD), [1986] 1 All ER 617 (CA). Cf Bainbridge 234-236; Chandler and 
Holland 45-57; Coleman Trade secrets 11-14 60-61; Coleman Intellectual property 23-24; Cornish 229-
231; Reid 39-42; Rideout 98-101. 
207 [1985] 1 All ER 724 731-732; cf Coleman 1984 EIPR 172ff. 
208 Note that the mere fact that the information is "carried away in the employee's head" is not a 
criterion by which this class of information is to be distinguished from true trade secrets, since 
Goulding J makes it clear that even though an employee has learnt information by heart, it remains 
protectable as a trade secret if it is of a sufficiently high standard of confidentiality. Cf the cogent 
reasoning of Parker LJ in Johnson & Bloy (Holdings) Ltd v Wolstenholme Rink PLC [1987] 1 IRLR 499 
502: "The matter may be tested very simply. Somebody may hit upon the combination of two 
ingredients after many years of research, which produce an immensely valuable result wholly unknown 
to anybody else. An employee would have no difficulty in holding that knowledge in his head and 
inevitably carrying it away with him. But it cannot... be regarded as part of the ordinary skill and 
experience of the particular employee. It is a secret, whether or not it is carried away in his head"; cf 
Chandler and Holland 51. 
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The employee, said Goulding J, 209 could not - during subsistence of the 
employment relationship - use or disclose information in the second category contrary 
to the purpose for which it had been imparted, without infidelity and therefore breach 
of contract. After termination of the contractual relationship, on the other hand, the 
employee was allowed to use his full skill and knowledge for his own benefit in 
competition with his former employer. If an employer wanted to protect information 
of this kind, he could do so by a reasonable express agreement in restraint of trade. 
However, information in the third category - specific trade secrets - could not, even 
though they might have been learned by heart and even though the employee might 
have left the service, lawfully be used for anyone's benefit but the employer's. 210 
In the Court of Appeal Neill LJ formulated the applicable principles as follows: 211 
(a) where the parties are, or have been, linked by a contract of 
employment, the obligations of the employee are to be determined by 
the contract between him and his employer; 
(b) in the absence of any express term, the obligations of the employee 
in respect of the use and disclosure of information are the subject of 
implied terms; 
(c) while the employee remains in the employment of the employer his 
obligations are included in the implied term which imposes a duty of 
good faith or fidelity212 on the employee. The extent of the duty of 
209 731-732. 
21° Coleman Trade secrets 12 makes the following comments: "The term trade secrets had been 
used regularly in English law and in Commonwealth jurisprudence, but arguably it had never before 
acquired the status of a term of art, merely being used to describe commercial confidential information, 
in contradistinction to other categories of confidences protected by obligations of confidence, such as 
personal secrets, or the secrets of the state. Quite what Goulding J envisaged as amounting to 
confidential information in a commercial context but not to a trade secret is unclear, and one cannot 
necessarily rely on an interpretation of [Goulding J's] second category as being exactly synonymous 
with the old category of [the employee's own] knowledge and skill, even if that notion was certain, 
which it was not. If Goulding J did mean knowledge and skill, why did he not say so[?] Why did he call 
it something different, unless he meant it to be different?" Cf Purvis and Turner 1989 EIPR 3. 
211 [1986] 1 All ER 617 625-627. 
212 The duty of good faith is much broader than the duty to respect confidentiality, and also covers 
the duties to act honestly, not to make a secret profit, and not to compete with the employer during 
subsistence of the employment contract - cf Coleman Trade secrets 57; Gurry 179; Mehigan and 
Griffiths 58ff; Hull 1986 EIPR 321; Stewart 1989 EIPR 88-89. During subsistence of the employment 
contract, a precise analysis and classification of information received by the employee is therefore 
strictly not necessary. Cf Rideout 97: "It is unnecessary to explain the duty of an existing employee, 
as regards information he has received, in terms of confidentiality. His duty of faithful service will 
prevent him using, during his employment, a wide range of information concerning his employer's 
business other than for the purposes of that business. That duty obviously ceases when the 
relationship of service, from which it derives, ceases. The duty to respect confidentiality, or as it has 
always been expressed in the law of employment, not to disclose trade secrets, continues after the 
employment has ended." 
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good faith will vary according to the nature of the contract. The duty 
of good faith will be broken if an employee makes or copies a list of 
the customers of the employer for use after his employment ends, or 
deliberately memorizes such a list, even though, except in special 
circumstances, there is no general restriction on an ex-employee to 
canvas or do business with his former employer's customers; 
(d) the implied term which imposes an obligation on the employee after 
the termination of the employment, is more restricted in its scope than 
that which imposes a general duty of good faith during subsistence 
of the employment relationship. The obligation not to use or disclose 
information may cover secret manufacturing processes such as 
chemical formulae, designs, special construction methods, and other 
information which is of a sufficiently high degree of confidentiality as 
to amount to a trade secret. The obligation does not extend, however, 
to cover all information which is given to or acquired by the employee 
while in his employment, and in particular may not cover information 
which is only 'confidential' in the sense that an unauthorized 
disclosure of such information to a third party while the employment 
subsisted would be a clear breach of the duty of good faith; 
(e) to determine whether information is a trade secret - which may not be 
used or disclosed by an employee after his employment has ended -
all the circumstances of the case must be considered. Factors which 
must be taken into account are: 
(i) the nature of the employment;213 
(ii) the nature of the information itself - in this regard Neill LJ 
disagreed with Goulding J's suggestion that an employer could 
protect the use of information in his second category by means 
of a restrictive covenant; 214 
213 Employment in a capacity where confidential material is habitually handled may impose a high 
obligation of confidentiality, because the employee can be expected to realize its sensitive nature to 
a greater extent than if he were employed in a capacity where such material reaches him only 
occasionally or incidentally. 
214 626-627: "[l]nformation will only be protected if it can properly be classed as a trade secret or 
as material which, while not properly to be described as a trade secret, is in all the circumstances of 
such a highly confidential nature as to require the same protection as a trade secret eo nomine ... We 
must... express our respectful disagreement with the passage in Goulding J's judgment where he 
suggested that an employer can protect the use of information in his second category, even though 
it does not include either a trade secret or its equivalent by means of a restrictive covenant... It is 
clearly impossible to provide a list of matters which will qualify as trade secrets or their equivalent. 
Secret processes of manufacture provide obvious examples, but innumerable other pieces of 
information are capable of being trade secrets, though the secrecy of some information may be only 
short-lived. In addition, the fact that the circulation of certain information is restricted to a limited 
number of individuals may throw light on the status of the information and its degree of confidentiality." 
See the criticism of commentators noted in par 2.2.2.1.1.1 above. 
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(iii) whether the employer impressed on the employee the 
confidentiality of the information;215 and 
(iv) whether the relevant information can be easily isolated from 
other information which the employee is free to use or 
disclose.216 
Another interesting aspect of the Faccenda Chicken case is Neill J's raising, but then 
preferring to leave open, the question whether additional protection should be 
afforded to an employer where the ex-employee is not seeking to earn his living by 
using his skill, knowledge and experience acquired in the course of his career, but 
by selling - that is, disclosing - to a third party information which he acquired in 
confidence in the course of his former employment.217 
Some commentators218 have come to the conclusion that for confidential information 
to be protected, a higher level of confidentiality is required in the context of 
employment than in other cases - in other words, that the courts apply a different, 
stricter, definition of confidential information in employment cases. Others219 
observe that while the principle that a distinction must be drawn between the 
employee's acquired skill and knowledge and the employer's special trade secrets 
does not appear to add anything to the ordinary requirement that information must 
be confidential before the courts will grant protection to it, it nevertheless seems that 
the courts subject claims against former employees to closer scrutiny because of the 
conflicting policy issues at stake. Whether these analyses will prove accurate in the 
long term, will probably depend on the content that the courts will give to the term 
"trade secret" in the employment context. Already there are indications that the courts 
may be giving a wider interpretation to the term than might have been expected from 
215 Although an employer cannot prevent use or disclosure of information merely by telling the 
employee that it is confidential, the attitude of the employer towards the information provides evidence 
which may assist in determining whether or not the information is a trade secret or not. Cf par 2.2.1 .2.4 
above. 
216 The separability of the information in question is not conclusive, but the fact that the alleged 
'confidential' information is part of a package and that the remainder of the package is not confidential, 
is likely to throw light on whether the information in question is really a trade secret. 
217 627. Cf Coleman Trade secrets 14-15 who questions the validity of such a distinction; cf 61: "[l]s 
there really a difference between earning one's living from using information, and living off the 
proceeds of a one-off sale? Perhaps the latter is seen to be morally more akin to espionage. The ex-
employee is not using his knowledge to earn his daily bread. It enables him to sit on the beach at 
Torremolinos. A rather harsh view, and one the present author would not wish to adopt." Cf also 
Coleman Intellectual property 23-24. 
218 Coleman Trade secrets 10 13-14 59-61; cf Cornish 231. 
219 Gurry 199. 
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a first reading of the Faccenda Chicken cases.220 To cite two examples: the names 
and preferences of clients may be sufficiently confidential to be protected as trade 
secrets; and information which can be "carried away in the employee's head" will not 
be disqualified for protection as a trade secret solely on that account.221 
Furthermore, highly confidential information of a non-technical or non-scientific nature 
may also qualify as trade secrets.222 Such developments could be an indication that 
the employer-employee relationship is not giving birth to a concept of trade secrets 
narrower than the trade secret concept employed in other contexts. 
2.4.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS 
A situation in which the protection afforded to confidential information by the English 
law is arguably inadequate, or at best very uncertain, is where the information is 
acquired by improper means in the absence of a relationship of confidence between 
the parties. In the field of trade secrets, this is the problem encountered particularly 
in the case of industrial espionage. 223 The root of the problem is stated succinctly 
by Coleman:224 
"[T]he emphasis of the English action is on breach of an obligation of 
confidence. In cases where there is an obligation to respect confidentiality, 
there are few problems in founding liability, providing all the other 
elements of the action are present... But where there is no obligation of 
confidence, there can be no breach and no action. This causes problems, 
for example, where a spy gleans a secret from reading a confidential 
document, tapping a telephone, or gaining unauthorised access to a 
computer network. The spy cannot, without a high degree of artificiality, 
be said to have voluntarily undertaken an obligation to respect the 
confidentiality of the information he has improperly acquired.225 Any 
obligation must be imposed involuntarily by the law, but here English law 
22° Cf Chandler and Holland 50-51. 
221 Cf f n 208 above. 
222 Cf Chandler and Holland 50. 
223 Cf in general Bainbridge 223 240; Cornish 233-234; Coleman Trade secrets 82-91; Coleman 
Intellectual property 31-33; Gurry 162-168; LAW COM No 110 22-25 88 113-123; Vitoria 366-370; ct 
29-30. 
224 Trade secrets 82. 
225 Cf Gurry 164-165 who does not appear to experience any difficulty with this allegedly artificial 
construction .. 
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seems remarkably reluctant to intervene." 
There are a couple of cases containing dicta to the effect that the publication or use 
of information improperly obtained may be restrained, but these relate to copyright 
infringement226 or documents improperly obtained for use in legal proceedings,227 
and are not directly applicable to the action for breach of confidence. 228 
A case that is directly relevant to the action for breach of confidence (but only 
indirectly to trade secrets, dealing as it does with confidential information of a 
personal, rather than a commercial, nature) is Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner. 229 The case dealt with the tapping of a telephone, the plaintiff 
instituting civil proceedings against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and arguing 
inter alia that he had a right of confidentiality in respect of the conversations on his 
telephone lines. Megarry VC accepted230 that to found the action for breach of 
confidence the information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confidence. He thus drew a distinction between misuse of information 
by, on the one hand, a person to whom the information was intended to be 
communicated, and, on the other hand, by someone to whom the plaintiff had no 
intention of communicating anything. Referring to the latter category, to which the 
"unknown overhearer" belonged, Megarry VC said231 that he did not see why 
someone who had overheard some secret in such a way should be exposed to legal 
proceedings if he used or divulged what he had heard. A person who used a 
telephone to give confidential information to another could do so in such a way as to 
impose an obligation of confidence on that other person, but Megarry VC did not see 
how it could be said that such an obligation was imposed on a person overhearing 
the conversation, whether by tapping or other means. 
The Malone case has been lamented by commentators. Thus, Coleman232 finds it 
regrettable that Megarry VC did not distinguish between those who deliberately set 
out to acquire secret information, and those who came across it accidentally. She 
226 Eg Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303 2378-2379; cf Coleman Trade secrets 83. 
227 Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 475; ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] 
Ch 431; cf Coleman Trade secrets 83. 
228 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 82-83; LAW COM No 110 23. 
229 [1979] Ch 344. 
230 375-376. 
231 376. 
232 Trade secrets 84. 
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argues that someone who acquires information accidentally, and then makes use 
thereof without knowing that it is secret, should not be liable, at least for use prior to 
receiving notice of the secrecy. On the other hand, someone who deliberately sets 
out to acquire trade secrets by improper means should be liable, regardless of 
whether such a person is under a pre-existing obligation of confidence or not.233 
The Law Commission234 came to the conclusion that it is very doubtful to what 
extent, if at all, information becomes impressed with an obligation of confidence by 
reason solely of the reprehensible means by which it has been acquired, and 
irrespective of some special relationship between the person alleged to owe the 
obligation and the person to whom it is alleged to be owed. In its preliminary Working 
Paper235 the Commission suggested in this regard that an obligation of confidence 
should arise where the person from whom the information has been obtained without 
his authority could reasonably expect that the information would not be so obtained, 
and where the acquirer of the information knows or ought to know that in receiving 
it he is defeating the reasonable expectations of the original holder.236 However, in 
233 Cf further Coleman Trade secrets 85: "[nhere is all the difference in the world between 
accidental overhearing and deliberate telephone tapping, and within the latter category, a distinction 
should be drawn between on the one hand, legitimate telephone tapping by the police, and on the 
other hand, industrial espionage ... [nhe Vice-Chancellor failed to draw any of these distinctions ... He 
did however state that he was only dealing with a case of authorised tapping by the police in 
connection with the detection of crime. Thus, tapping by others ... could be treated differently, but the 
judgment does remain disturbingly general in its treatment of secret information (a) acquired by those 
who are not under a pre-existing obligation of confidence; and (b) acquired by improper or surreptitious 
means. If anything, Malone took English law further away from establishing liability for improper 
misappropriation of confidential information in the absence of a pre-existing obligation of confidence. 
A better approach ... would have been to apply a principle ... granting the courts a power 'to restrain the 
publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained' [quotation from Ashburton 
v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 475]. Then to state that there are exceptions to that principle, one of which 
is the acquisition of information in the public interest, for example, as in Malone's case, by the police 
acting under the relevant authority to tap telephones in connection with the detection of crime." Cf, in 
a similar vein, Gurry 166-167: ''[nhe principle on which the case was decided seems to me regrettably 
wide and to grant a licence to tap telephone conversations without incurring civil liability (assuming no 
tort, such as trespass, to have been committed). The path was open to the court to hold that the 
tapping was a breach of confidence and yet to excuse the action of the police on the defence of just 
cause or excuse - which, as a secondary measure, Megarry V.-C. did. If one cannot claim breach of 
confidence because of a public awareness that telephones are liable to be tapped - a known risk 
inherent in the circumstances of communication - then why is it that employers, who are certainly 
aware that some employees are prone to infidelity, can claim breach of confidence against an 
employee who surreptitiously acquires confidential information which has been made available within 
the employment context?... It would be preferable if the Malone principle applied only where the 
circumstances of communication are such as to show that the confider's attitude to the confidentiality 
of the information leads others to believe that there is nothing confidential about the communication." 
234 24; cf 88 where reference is made to the "glaring inadequacy of the present law" in this regard. 
235 No 58. 
236 Cf LAW COM No 110 114. 
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the final report, 237 the Commission preferred not to adopt such a general principle, 
but rather to specify a number of situations in which the acquirer of information 
should, by reason of the way in which he has acquired it, be treated as subject to an 
obligation of confidence in respect thereof.238 
Coleman239 concludes that the present English law concerning the improper 
acquisition of confidential information leaves "a huge gap in the protection of 
confidential information", and that there is an obvious need for reform. 240 She points 
237 LAW COM No 110114. 
238 The complete recommendations in respect of information improperly obtained are as follows 
(LAW COM No 110 122-123): 
"(i) A person should owe an obligation of confidence in respect of information acquired in the 
following circumstances: 
(a) by unauthorised taking, handling or interfering with anything containing the 
information; 
(b) by unauthorised taking, handling or interfering with anything in which the matter 
containing the information is for the time being kept; 
(c) by unauthorised use of or interference with a computer or similar device in which 
data is stored; 
(d) by violence, menace or deception; 
(e) while he is in a place where he has no authority to be; 
(f) by a device made or adapted solely or primarily for the purpose of surreptitious 
surveillance where the user would not without the use of the device have obtained 
the information; 
{g) by any other device (excluding ordinary spectacles and hearing aids) where he 
would not without using it have obtained the information, provided that the person 
from whom the information is obtained was not or ought not reasonably to have 
been aware of the use of the device and ought not reasonably to have taken 
precautions to prevent the information being so acquired. 
(ii) An obligation of confidence shall be imposed on a person who jointly participates in the 
acquisition of information if, though he did not use any of the improper means listed in 
paragraph (i) above, he personally acquired the information and he is, or ought to be, 
aware that the information was acquired by the use of any such improper means by his 
fellow participator. 
(iii) An obligation of confidence should not arise in accordance with paragraph (i) above where 
the information has been obtained by a person in the course of the lawful exercise of an 
official function in regard to the security of the State or the prevention, investigation or 
prosecution of crime or by a person acting in pursuance of any statutory provision so far 
as the information has been disclosed or used for those purposes or for any purpose 
expressly or impliedly authorised by a statutory provision." 
239 Trade secrets 87. 
240 Others have struck a more optimistic note, arguing that in exercising their equitable jurisdiction, 
the courts may well be able to deal satisfactorily with the matter. Cf Jones 1970 LOR 463 482-483: 
"It would be rash ... to conclude that the stranger who sells information obtained ... from the use of 
electronic bugs cannot be enjoined and is not liable to make any recompense or account for his profits 
to the plaintiff. Equity, to borrow a metaphor, should not be past the age of child-bearing. A defendant 
who has taken good care not to enter any relationship of any sort with the plaintiff and who has 
obtained confidential information by reprehensible means should be in no better position than a 
defendant who is given and deliberately breaches the plaintiff's confidence... The formula, 
reprehensible means, should be sufficiently flexible to enable the court to balance the equities of each 
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out that the recommendations of the Law Commission - which have in any case never 
been enacted - do not attach liability to the improper acquisition of confidential 
information itself. Rather, they recommend that the person who has acquired the 
information by improper means "owe an obligation of confidence" in respect thereof, 
which will mean that unauthorized use and disclosure may be restrained. 
Coleman241 is of the opinion that the earlier in the chain of activity the liability 
attaches, the better. She argues that where a spy engaged in industrial espionage is 
discovered before he has time to use or disclose a secret, not only should an 
injunction be granted to prevent anticipated use or disclosure, but damages should 
be available for the very fact of improper acquisition. The civil remedy should 
furthermore be backed up by appropriate criminal offenses. 
2.4.3 THIRD PARTIES 
The question under consideration here is whether a third party, that is a person who 
has received confidential information without having any direct communication with 
the owner thereof, can be restrained from using or divulging the information. 242 
According to Vitoria such third parties can be categorized in six classes: 
(a) a person learning the information from someone who, in breach of 
contract or confidence, imparts it to him; 
(b) a person who learns the information by procuring or inducing 
another's breach of contract or confidence; 
(c) a person learning the information from someone who did not breach 
contract or confidence in obtaining the secret or in imparting it to him; 
case ... I know of no English authority which holds that a defendant who uses reprehensible means to 
obtain confidential information should be liable in equity to make restitution. But I do not think the 
courts will be reluctant to impose such a liability." Cf Gurry 164-165: "The problem ... is that the right 
to preserve the confidentiality of information only operates against those in whom a confidence has 
been reposed by the communication of the confidential information. The confider has not deliberately 
communicated any information to the spy, so how can it be said that the spy is abusing a confidence? 
The spy has, however, used means to force an unwanted communication, or, at least, transmission, 
of the information on the confider. Because of those means he has placed himself in the position of 
one who receives confidential information, and the means also indicate that he is aware that the 
confider wishes to keep the information confidential - otherwise, he would not have needed to employ 
the means but could have asked the confider for the information. He should, therefore, be attributed 
with the obligation of confidence which is imposed on a confidant who receives confidential information 
knowing and recognizing that the confider wishes to preserve its confidentiality. The problem of 
espionage can thus be accommodated within the action for breach of confidence without doing violence 
to the way in which the action has developed, nor to the notion of confidence which lies at the heart 
of the action." 
241 Trade secrets 86. 
242 See in general Bainbridge 239-240; Cornish 231-233; Coleman Trade secrets 49-51; Gurry 269-
289; LAW COM No 110 25-26 125-127; Reid 57-60; Turner 401-413; Vitoria 333-370. 
50 
(d) a person learning the information in bad faith but not through any 
intermediary who breached contract or confidence to the plaintiff - this 
is the case of industrial espionage; 
(e) a person who learns the information accidentally without any 
intermediary at all; and 
(f) the independent developer, that is the person who, whilst under no 
obligation of confidence to the plaintiff, independently develops the 
same trade secret as that of the plaintiff. 
As far as the second category is concerned, the inducement of another to breach a 
contract or confidence is a recognized tort in English law, and this situation does not 
pose any particular problems.243 English law does not seem to attach liability to 
third parties in the third, fifth, or sixth categories.244 The position of the person who 
gains access to another's trade secrets by reprehensible means such as industrial 
espionage - the fourth category - has already been discussed.245 
In the case of a third party in the first category, that is a person who learns the 
confidential information from someone who imparts it to him or her in breach of 
contract or confidence, two possible situations may be distinguished. If the receiver 
of the information knows, or should reasonably have known, that it has been 
disclosed to him or her in breach of an obligation of confidence, he or she will as a 
general rule be bound to respect the confidentiality of that information in the same 
way that the informant should have respected it.246 
If, on the other hand, the receiver does not have knowledge - actual or 
constructive247 - of the breach, the position is more problematical. The general rule 
seems to be that such a person is not liable for breach of confidence if he or she 
uses or discloses the information,248 but once he or she acquires knowledge of the 
confidential character of the information, he or she becomes liable from that time 
243 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 49; Cornish 232; Vitoria 364-365. 
244 See Vitoria 365-366 370.1. 
245 Par 2.4.2 above. 
246 Cf Bainbridge 239-240; Coleman Trade secrets 49; Gurry 271-275; LAW COM No 110 25; 
Vitoria 335-342 and authorities cited. 
247 Cf Coleman Trade secrets 49; LAW COM No 110 25. 
248 This immunity of the so-called innocent recipient has been branded the "Achilles' heel" of the 
law of breach of confidence by Bainbridge 223; cf 239: "This is the one fundamental weakness of the 
law of breach of confidence - innocent parties are largely unaffected by this area of law." 
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onwards for any subsequent use or disclosure.249 250 
It is not clear whether the above-mentioned principles apply where the third person 
is a bona fide purchaser for value of the secret information, or if he or she has in 
good faith altered his or her position in reliance on the information, for example by 
making substantial changes to production lines in order to implement a new 
production process, or whether bona fide purchase for value or substantial change 
of position may be raised as a defence.251 
Commentators252 have advocated a flexible approach in terms of which bona fide 
purchase for value or substantial change of position are not absolute defences, but 
rather factors to be taken into account when the court must decide whether to grant 
249 Cf Bainbridge 239; Cornish 232; Coleman Trade secrets 49; Gurry 275; LAW COM No 11 O 25. 
Contra Vitoria 342-343: "[E]ven the third party who, at the time he receives the disclosure of the secret 
or confidential information, does not and should not reasonably have known that the information 
belongs to the plaintiff and that the party disclosing to him was breaching contract or confidence in 
doing so, or that the disclosing party had acquired it illegally, may be enjoined from using or making 
further disclosure. Also, he may incur liability for damages if he uses the information after he has 
received notice of the true state of facts." Most of the cases cited by Vitoria do not seem to support 
her position unequivocally - an exception being Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1965] RPC 239 
257: ''[nhe case of Prince Albert v Strange (1850) 1 M.&G., 41 E.R. 1171 shows that an injunction 
may be granted against someone who has acquired - or may acquire - information to which he was 
not entitled without notice of any breach of duty on the part of the man through whom he obtained it." 
See, however, Gurry 276-277 who remarks that in the type of situation encountered in the Holloway 
case "the instigation of the action itself will, of course, bring the breach to the attention of the third 
party". Cf also Turner 401-406. 
250 This is also in substance what the Law Commission recommended in this regard (LAW COM 
No 110 271 ): "[A] person who acquires information already impressed with an obligation of confidence, 
however created, should become subject to that obligation as soon as he has both acquired the 
information and knows or ought to know that the information is so impressed." 
251 Cf Cornish 232-233; Gurry 275-281; Coleman Trade secrets 49-50; LAW COM No 110 25-26. 
252 Cf Jones 1970 LQR 479: "The application of a flexible notion of change of position may ... 
balance more effectively than an absolute defence of bona fide purchase the competing equities of the 
honest purchaser and the ... plaintiff"; Gurry 280-281: "The matter really falls ... to be decided as a 
question of principle. This being the case, one must ask: what is the basis of the court's intervention 
against the third party who receives confidential information from an errant confidant? Here, two things 
can be said. First, the court is seeking to protect a confider from the further abuse of a confidence 
which has been created by the limited communication of information. Given the mobility of information, 
effective relief can only be granted to the confider by adopting a severe attitude to the third party, who 
has in his hands the power to destroy permanently the confidence, and who has been made aware, 
by notice, of that power. On the other hand, however, it must also be said that the basis of the court's 
intervention against the third party is an exercise of the equitable jurisdiction, and equitable remedies 
are discretionary. Once the discretionary nature of the remedies which the court will order against a 
third party are brought to mind, then it is a question, not of absolute defences ... , but of factors which 
the court will take into account in determining what relief should be granted against the innocent third 
party." See further Cornish 232-233. 
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an injunction against an innocent third party recipient or not. Gurry253 argues that 
the importance of bona fide purchase should not be stressed, since it is primarily a 
matter between the third party and the confidant and, if the court is seeking to protect 
the confider from an abuse of confidence, it should not be overswayed by the fact 
that the confidant has also deceived the third party in circumstances in which the third 
party may have an action against the confidant. He emphasizes that the court should 
furthermore consider all the other circumstances which may be relevant to the 
granting of an injunction against a confidant who is in breach of duty. In particular, 
the conduct of the parties must be considered - whether the confider has delayed in 
bringing the action or whether proceedings are commenced in time,254 and whether 
the third party has behaved with propriety after being informed of the breach of 
confidence. 
The Law Commission was also of the opinion255 that an absolute rule was 
undesirable, and that it was better to leave a discretion with the courts to decide on 
the circumstances of each individual case whether to grant an injunction or damages 
in lieu thereof. The Law Commission also proposed in their unenacted draft bill256 
an adjustment order to compel a plaintiff who has successfully applied for an 
injunction against a third party who has - before acquiring knowledge of the breach 
of confidence - incurred expenditure in reliance on the confidential information, to 
make such a contribution towards that expenditure as deemed just and equitable by 
the court.257 
2.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION 
An obligation of confidence may come to an end in different ways. In the first place, 
if the obligation has been created by a contract, the contract may also stipulate when 
the obligation will come to an end.258 As noted,259 the courts may regard the 
express contractual obligation as providing only a minimum protection, reading in 
253 280-282. 
254 Quoting Stephenson Jordan & Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans (1952) 68 RPC 190 195. 
255 LAW COM No 110 126. 
256 Cl 15, LAW COM No 110 218. 
257 An approach hailed by Coleman Trade secrets 51 as "the most sensible solution of the 
otherwise almost intractable problem of innocent third party acquirers of trade secrets". 
258 Gurry 252-254; LAW COM No 110 143. 
259 Par 2.2.2.1.1.2 above. Cf Gurry 253-254. 
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implied contractual protection that outlasts the express contractual protection. 
Secondly, if the information falls into the public domain, the obligation of confidence 
comes to an end.260 The better view seems to be that this will also be the case 
where the period of protection has been expressly stipulated in a contract -
contractual protection of "confidential" information should not continue after the 
information has fallen into the public domain.261 If the person bound by the 
obligation of confidence himself caused the information to fall into the public domain, 
he or she may be liable for destroying its confidential character.262 Thirdly, the 
obligation of confidence may come to an end if the person to whom it is owed 
expressly or impliedly releases the confidant from its application.263 
The greatest source of problems in connection with the duration of the legal 
protection of trade secrets, is probably the application of the so-called springboard 
doctrine, since - as noted264 - it could possibly be interpreted as subjecting a 
defendant who has breached an obligation of confidence, to an indefinite prohibition 
on use of the relevant information - even after it has passed into the public domain. 
This apparent impasse has already been dealt with above.265 In the light of the 
recognition of the courts that the head-start obtained by misuse of confidential 
information may often be of a temporary nature,266 the logical remedy to neutralize 
the head-start would appear to be an injunction limited in duration to the period for 
which the unfair advantage may reasonably be expected to continue.267 Relatively 
recently,268 the courts have approved such an approach, also in interlocutory 
26
° Cf Gurry 245; LAW COM No 110 143. 
261 Cf Gurry 253; LAW COM No 110 143-144. On the position regarding the contractual protection 
of information which is from the outset not secret, see again par 2.2.2.1.1.1; 2.4.1 above. 
262 LAW COM No 110143-144. 
263 Cf Gurry 241-244; LAW COM No 110143-144. 
264 Par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
265 Par 2.2.1.2.3 above; cf especially fn 67. 
266 Cf Potters-Bal/otini Ltd v Weston Baker [1977] RPC 202 206: "the springboard does not last 
forever"; 206-207: "a time may come when so much has happened that [the person subject to the 
obligation of confidence] can no longer be restrained"; Harrison v Project and Design Co (Redcar) Ltd 
[1978] FSR 81 87. 
267 Cf Hull 1981 E/PR 261. 
268 Cf Hull 1982 EIPR 242; Hull 1981 EIPR 261. 
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proceedings. 269 270 
2.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN ENGLISH 
LAW 
After examining the scope of protection of trade secrets afforded by the English law 
concerning breach of confidence, it may be of value to give some thought to the 
possible legal bases of this protection. As commentators271 have pointed out, the 
case law does not present a clear picture in this regard. Authority can be found for 
all of the following: 
2.5.1 CONTRACT 
A very substantial percentage of trade secret protection is undoubtedly founded in 
contract, either express or implied, as discussed above.272 The relationship between 
the express contractual base and the implied contractual base has also been touched 
upon.213 
269 Cf Fisher-Karpark Industries Ltd v Nichols [1982] FSR 351; Roger Bulivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] 
FSR 172 184: ''[nhe injunction should not normally extend beyond the period for which the unfair 
advantage may reasonably be expected to continue"; Hull 1982 EIPR 242; Hull 1981 EIPR 261; 
Goulding 1995 Industrial LJ 152. 
270 A dictum in the Roger Bulivant case [1987] FSR 172 188 may be interpreted as suggesting that 
injunctions with time limits are only appropriate in the case of information which employees need only 
treat as confidential during the subsistence of the employment contract (par 2.4.1 above), and not in 
the case of true trade secrets: "[A] distinction can and should be drawn between information sought 
to be used by ex-employees to the detriment of their previous employers which can properly be 
described as comprising trade secrets on the one hand and that which is merely confidential on the 
other ... [l]n relation to that type of information, as distinct from that concerning real trade secrets, the 
court should be concerned that it does not, in granting such an injunction give the injured party more 
protection than he realistically needs and in particular discourage or prohibit what in the course of time 
becomes legitimate competition. I think that in cases where 'springboard' interim injunctions in respect 
of confidential information are sought the judge should ask himself whether any injunction should be 
subject to a time limit other than the usual 'until trial or further order', which is usually appropriate to 
injunctions in respect of true trade secrets, and if so, for what period such an injunction should be so 
limited." On the other hand, the use of the word "usually" - as highlighted by the italic print added in 
the quotation - may indicate that the Appeal Court did not intend to be prescriptive on this issue, and 
that time-limited injunctions may sometimes be appropriate in the case of true trade secrets as well. 
271 Eg Coleman Trade secrets 37; Gurry 25; Jones 1970 LOR 463; LAW COM No 110 86. 
272 Par 2.2.2.1.1. 
273 Par 2.2.2.1.1.2 above. 
55 
2.5.2 EQUITY 
Equity274 is, as noted above,275 another major jurisdictional base for trade secret 
protection. 
Gurry276 examines the relationship between the equitable and contractual bases of 
obligations of confidence. He points out that equity clearly has a role in the breach 
of confidence action where there is no possibility of relief in contract, either because 
the immediate parties to a confidence are not in a contractual relationship, or 
because the person against whom relief is sought is a third party not privy to a 
contractual disclosure. Beyond these situations, the boundaries between equity and 
contract are indistinct. Thus it is possible that the same facts could give rise to a 
contractual or an equitable obligation of confidence. Two types of situations can be 
discerned here: 
(a) a confidant can be held liable in respect of the same conduct for 
breach of both an equitable and a contractual obligation of 
confidence;277 and 
(b) the courts will sometimes proceed on the equitable basis alone, even 
though an obligation of confidence might exist in contract.278 
Gurry concludes279 that a broad notion of confidence underlies the action for breach 
of confidence, in respect of which the legal bases of protection are of secondary 
importance. The courts will ensure that this confidence is respected to the full extent, 
and in so doing, they will feel free to draw on all the available jurisdictional sources 
available. 
2.5.3 PROPERTY 
An interesting possibility is that of regarding confidential information as a species of 
274 On equity in general, and its place alongside the common law in the English legal system, see 
David and Brierley 339ff. 
275 Par 2.2.2.1.2; cf Plibersek 1991 EIPR 283ff. 
276 39-46. 
277 Eg Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315; Nichrotherm Electrical Co Ltd v Percy [1957] RPC 207; 
Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd [1962] RPC 97. 
278 Eg Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] RPC 45; cf Cranleigh 
Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1966] RPC 81; Stewart 1989 EIPR 89. 
279 45-46. 
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property. 
Dicta can be found in the case law supporting the idea that confidential information 
is property. The decision in Exchange Telegraph Co (Ltd) v Howarcf80 may be cited 
as an example.281 The plaintiff was a news agency that collected information on 
scores at cricket matches and supplied it to subscribers. The defendant surreptitiously 
acquired this information and supplied it to its customers. The court granted 
injunctions restraining the defendant from obtaining the information and disseminating 
it to others, substantiating its judgment as follows: 282 
"The plaintiffs carry on the business of collecting and distributing 
information. The knowledge of a fact which is unknown to many people 
may be the property of a person in that others will pay the person who 
knows it for the information as to that fact. In unpublished matter there is 
at common law a right of property, or there may be in the circumstances 
of the case. The plaintiffs here sue, not in copyright at all, but in respect 
of that common law right of property in information which they had 
collected and which they were in a position to sell. Their case is that the 
defendant has stolen their property, that he has surreptitiously obtained 
that which belonged to them, and used it in rivalry with them." 
On the other hand, dicta may also be found explicitly denying that confidential 
information can be property. Thus in Phipps v Boardman it was said: 283 
"In general information is not property at all. .. The true test is to determine 
in what circumstances this information has been acquired. If it has been 
acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to 
disclose it to another then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from 
communicating it to another. In such cases such confidential information 
is often and for many years has been described as the property of the 
donor ... But in the end the real truth is that it is not property in any normal 
280 (1906) 22 TLR 375. 
281 Cf Gurry 50-51. See also the cases cited by Vitoria 109-128. 
282 375. 
283 1967 2 AC 46 127 per Lord Upjohn (interestingly, Lords Hodson (107) and Guest (115) 
disagreed with him on this point); see also the cases cited by Gurry 54-56; eg Nichrotherm Electrical 
Co Ltd v Percy [1957] RPC 207 209: "[A] man who thinks of a mechanical conception and then 
communicates it to others for the purpose of their working out the means of carrying it into effect does 
not, because the idea was his (assuming that it was), get proprietary rights equivalent to those of a 
patentee. Apart from such rights as may flow from the fact, for example, of the idea being a secret 
process communicated in confidence or from some contract of partnership or agency or the like which 
he may enter into with his collaborators, the originator gets no proprietary rights out of the mere 
circumstance that he first thought of it." 
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sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to another in breach of 
some confidential relationship." 
Commentators differ widely in their opinions on this matter, although the majority 
seem to think that information cannot be property, at least not in a traditional 
sense. 284 Some285 furthermore deny any advantage in a view that confidential 
information can be property, since the property concept is allegedly too restrictive a 
basis for the problems peculiar to the field of confidential information to be 
satisfactorily dealt with. Others286 are of the opinion that property could provide a 
valuable extension of the action for breach of confidence, in so far as it could furnish 
a basis upon which trade secrets may be protected against acquisition by improper 
means, such as industrial espionage. 
2.5.4 TORT 
Tort does not seem to play a major role in the protection of trade secrets in English 
284 Cf Vitoria 128-134; Turner 12; Eisenschitz 1984 E/PR 92; Wright 1993 EIPR 237ff. 
285 In this camp is, inter alia, Coleman Trade secrets 48-49: "The main problem with the property 
approach is that it is too limiting. Information in general and confidential information in particular has 
characteristics which cannot be accommodated by the concept of property, or at least not by straining 
it beyond its traditional boundaries. For instance, information 'taken' is often information shared. What 
is 'lost' in trade secrecy cases is exclusivity and the economic advantage that [it] gives in the market-
place, not possession. When information is shared, there is also no permanent deprivation, again only 
a loss or reduction of market advantage and market power. .. The matter is one of balancing a complex 
web of public and private interests, for which a traditional property-based analysis is ill-equipped." 
286 Cf Gurry 53-54: "The property jurisdiction could ... provide a valuable extension of the breach 
of confidence action. The role of contract and equity may be confined to circumstances in which there 
is a relationship of confidence between a confider and a confidant, or a proven breach of such a 
relationship which results in the passing of the information to a third party. Property can supplement 
this jurisdiction by providing relief against those who obtain confidential information, not as a result of 
a broken relationship of confidence, but by surreptitious means. Thus, it would provide an answer to 
the problems raised by modern technology, which has produced the means of acquiring information, 
by tapping telephone wires or by using electronic surveillance devices, in circumstances which do not 
involve either a breach of a confidential relationship or a tort, such as trespass. Nevertheless, the right 
in property does not appear to be a conventional one which operates against the whole world. There 
is authority to support the right of a person to use confidential information which he has discovered 
by independent means [citing James v James (1872) 13 LR Eq 424], or by analysing a marketed 
product [citing Estcourt v Estcourt Hop Essence Co (1875) 1 O Ch App 276]. Property would seem 
confined to conferring a right of action against those who surreptitiously acquire information, or acquire 
it by use of 'reprehensible means'." See further the distinction Gurry 47-56 draws between the 
metaphorical and literal use of property in confidential information cases. Gurry 54 does, however, 
admit that the "existence of a proprietary right in confidential information ... has a very tenuous foothold 
on authority". 
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law.287 Its main role in this regard is a subsidiary one in that it provides a number 
of ancillary remedies which can be utilised to protect confidential information.288 
Torts which may, depending on the circumstances of each case, be applicable 
include interference with contractual relations, conspiracy, conversion, and passing 
off.289 
Tort has been proposed as a vehicle for law reform. In 1981 the Law Commission 
recommended290 that a new tort of breach of confidence be created by statute to 
replace the existing action for breach of confidence. As noted, 291 the Law 
Commission's draft bill292 on breach of confidence has never been enacted. 
However, some commentators293 still regard tort as a suitable base for reform of the 
287 Coleman Trade secrets 47; Gurry 56. Vitoria 162ff, in an aberrant classification, includes her 
discussion of the action for breach of confidence under the heading of "Tort law aspects of trade 
secrets" (151 ), but concedes (157) that hers is not a traditional use of the term "tort" and that "perhaps 
a more accurate term than 'tort' would be 'a broad equitable principle of good faith"'; cf Bainbridge 219 
who characterizes breach of confidence as a "tort which lies in the domain of equity". See in general 
on the scope of English tort law Hepple in Butler and Kudriavtsev (eds). English textbooks on tort often 
do not refer to breach of confidence at all (cf Rogers), or if they do, it is referred to as a 'doubtful tort' 
(cf Baker 398 399-400; Winfield and Jolowicz 590-591), or only in so far as it relates to privacy (cf 
Markesinis and Deakin 611 ). Exceptions are Clerk and Lindsell, who include (for the first time in the 
16th edition) a short chapter on breach of confidence, and Salmond and Heuston who state (in the 
twentieth edition) 38 that breach of confidence "is now recognised as a distinct tort". Cf Street 6: 
"[B]reach of confidence, as yet an embryonic and even disputed tort, protects a patient's right to 
confidentiality from his doctor as much as a multinational company's right to protection of their trade 
secrets"; 166: "An action for damages has been found to lie even in circumstances where neither 
breach of contract nor harm to tangible or intangible property is established. Nevertheless the precise 
nature of the action for breach of confidence remains unclear. Criteria used to determine the measure 
of damages indicate a judicial perception of the action as an emergent tort. The duty of confidentiality 
is discussed in terms reminiscent of the more familiar duty of care... The Law Commission has 
proposed clarification of the issue by creating a statutory tort of breach of confidence. For the present 
though the better view remains that ' ... whatever the circumstances are which created the confidential 
relationship, the obligation to remain silent depends on a duty of good faith enforceable in equity'." See 
further Stanton 9; North 1972 JSPTL 149. An unspoken reason for the hesitation of English law to 
characterize the action for breach of confidence as a tort action, may be the half-hearted recognition 
of tortious liability for pure economic loss in that legal system in general. English courts prefer to base 
liability for pure economic loss on contract. Cf eg Furmston 2; Cane in Furmston 113ff. 
288 Cf Gurry 56-57. 
289 Cf Gurry 56-57; Vitoria 177-184.2. 
290 LAW COM No 110 103; cf Coleman 1982 EIPR 73ff; Eisenschitz 1984 EIPR 91-92; North 1971 
JSPTL 149. 
291 Par 2.1 above. 
292 LAW COM No 110 179-236. 
293 Eg Coleman Trade secrets 49: "Tort is an expanding medium for legal control, its main 
advantages being flexibility, and the fact that a new nominate tort can be formulated to regulate 
wrongful conduct without regard to historical antecedents, such as those which accompany a traditional 
notion such as property. Whatever the position in the past, tort is firmly in ascendance and property 
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law of breach of confidence. 
2.5.5 SYNTHESIS 
The uncertainty surrounding the legal basis of the action for breach of confidence has 
been regarded by some as unsatisfactory. Others, however, view this situation as an 
advantageous one, arguing that the courts should be free to adopt whatever legal 
basis is appropriate in the circumstances to enforce a confidence. According to this 
view, the action for breach of confidence is a sui generis one, and attempts to force 
it into a single legal foundation should be resisted. 294 
on the wane." 
294 Cf Gurry 25-28: "The jurisdictional basis of the action for breach of confidence has been a 
source of lingering uncertainty and controversy ... Most commentators have regarded this situation as 
unsatisfactory and as evidence of conceptual confusion on the part of the courts. In Argyll v Argyll 
[[1967] 1 Ch 332], Ungoed-Thomas J pointed the way to an alternative interpretation by saying that 
it is the policy of the law which is 'the basis of the courts' jurisdiction'. This policy, it has been 
observed, is to enforce confidences created by the communication of confidential information. 
Underlying all of the cases in which the courts have granted relief is a broad notion of confidence 
reposed by one party in another which the courts will enforce. Once this policy is brought to mind, it 
is possible to regard the jurisdictional sources on which the courts rely as merely secondary 
mechanisms which provide the means by which the courts can enforce a confidence. The courts' 
attitude to jurisdictional sources has thus been a pragmatic one. Their principal concern has been, not 
to classify the breach of confidence action into an existing conceptual category, but to use existing 
categories to enforce the more fundamental notion of confidence ... The action should properly be 
regarded, therefore, as sui generis, and attempts to confine it exclusively within one conventional 
jurisdictional category should be resisted. The present approach has the advantage of flexibility, giving 
the courts freedom to respond to the different social circumstances in which a confidence may arise, 
and it would be unwise to sacrifice this for conceptual neatness. Within the context of a given case, 
however, it may become important to identify the particular jurisdiction on which the court relies. The 
jurisdictional basis determines what remedies are available to the litigant. Thus, if relief is founded on 
contract, damages and an injunction will be the appropriate remedies. If the court relies on equity, then 
the available remedies will be an injunction, or damages in lieu of an injunction ... , or an account of 
profits. Finally, if the court proceeds on the basis of property, the appropriate remedies will be an 
injunction and damages. Even within this context, however, the significance of the jurisdictional basis ... 
should not be over-emphasized. In the first place, there is some authority to suggest that traditional 
relationships between jurisdiction and remedies have been ignored by the courts in this area ... The role 
of the jurisdictional basis in limiting the availability of remedies is further diminished by the courts' 
adroitness in switching from one basis to another where the action demands." 
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CHAPTER 3 
AMERICAN LAW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the United States of America the protection of trade secrets is regulated by the 
laws of the various states, not by federal law.1 This means that each state is free to 
develop its own trade secrets law, provided that it does not conflict with federal 
intellectual property law policy. However, the trade secrets laws of the various states 
exhibit a large degree of similarity because of two major unifying influences - the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts of 1939 and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 
1979.2 
Originally the trade secrets law of England was adopted and further developed by the 
American courts, each state thus gaining its own body of judicial precedent 
constituting its common (non-statutory) trade secrets law. 3 Under these 
circumstances a measure of inconsistency among the laws of the various states was 
inevitable. The (first) Restatement of the Law of Torts, produced by the American Law 
Institute in 1939, contained sections defining trade secrets and dealing with the 
unauthorized use and disclosure of trade secrets. The Restatement was not binding 
law, but was rather meant to be of persuasive value in order to promote uniformity 
among the laws of the various states.4 In respect of trade secrets it succeeded to a 
substantial degree, being cited widely by the courts and leading to a greater 
consistency of authority and terminology among the court decisions of the various 
states.5 6 
1 See eg Lupo and Tanguay 79. 
2 Chisum and Jacobs 3.6; Coleman Trade secrets 18-26; Dorr and Munch 7-9; Dratler 4.3 4.7-4.8; 
Jager Vol 1 3.1-3.56; Lupo and Tanguay 73-80; Milgrim Vol 1 1.3-1.67. 
3 Chisum and Jacobs 3. 7-3.11. 
4 Chisum and Jacobs 3.11; Coleman Trade secrets 19. 
5 Chisum and Jacobs 3.12; Coleman Trade secrets 19-22; cf Milgrim Vol 1 1.4. 
6 The second Restatement of Torts (1978) omitted trade secrets because it was felt that trade 
secrets law had grown too important in its in own right to be included in a restatement of the general 
law of torts. An updated restatement dealing with trade secrets law was however never produced. Cf 
Chisum and Jacobs 3.13; Coleman Trade secrets 21-22; Milgrim Vol 1 1.22-1.23. 
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In 1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law published 
a Uniform Trade Secrets Act that could be adopted and enacted by the state 
legislatures to promote uniformity. The Act has had a high degree of success and has 
been enacted in well over half of the states.7 However, in many states it has been 
enacted in an amended form, and therefore there is still no absolute uniformity, even 
among those states which have adopted it.8 Court decisions pre-dating the adoption 
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act usually retain interpretive value in the particular 
state unless they are expressly contradicted by the Act.9 
3.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
In American law two broad requirements must be met before there can be legal 
intervention to protect trade secrets: 10 
(a) there must be a trade secret; and 
(b) the trade secret must be misappropriated. 
3.2.1 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS 
3.2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY 
3.2.1.1.1 Defining trade secrets 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts 11 provides a comprehensive definition 12 of 
7 Chisum and Jacobs 3.13; Coleman Trade secrets 22. See Milgrim Vol 1 1.44ff for a list of states 
that have adopted the Act. 
8 Coleman Trade secrets 22; Dorr and Munch 7; Samuels and Johnson 1990 Creighton LR 49ff. 
9 Chisum and Jacobs 3.14. 
1° Cf Dratler 4.27-4.28: "[Limited availability, economic value, and relative secrecy ... capture the 
essence of trade secrecy. Once information has met these three criteria, it constitutes a trade secret; 
then the viability of a tort claim depends upon whether it has been misappropriated"; Kintner and Lahr 
133: "Trade secrets have been a significant class of intellectual property accorded judicial protection 
broadly based on the twofold inquiry into (1) whether there really is a 'secret' in the first place and (2) 
whether there exists any duty on the part of the person who learned the secret not to use or disclose 
it"; Callmann Vol 2 14.8: "The threshold issue in every case is not whether there was a confidential 
relationship or a breach of contract or some other kind of misappropriation, but whether, in fact, there 
was a trade secret to be misappropriated." Field et al 17 .9: "Whether under the common law or the 
Uniform Act, most courts view trade secret misappropriation cases as having essentially three 
components: (1) Does the plaintiff have a trade secret? (2) Has the trade secret been misappropriated? 
(3) What is the proper remedy?"; Klitzke 1986 The Business Lawyer 564. 
11 Sec 757 comment (b). 
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trade secrets, portions of which have been quoted approvingly in virtually every 
state. 13 It provides inter alia: 
"A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation 
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or 
use it ... The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of 
public knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be 
appropriated by one as his secret." 
This description has been described14 as "without question, the closest thing to a 
universally accepted definition". 
Stressing that the secrecy need not be absolute, 15 and that it is impossible to 
provide an exact definition of a trade secret, the Restatement of Torts furnishes 16 
a list of factors to be considered when determining whether given information is a 
trade secret or not: 
(a) the extent to which the information is known outside the 
business; 
(b) the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in the business; 
(c) the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the 
information; 
(d) the value of the information to the proprietor and his 
competitors; 
(e) the amount of effort or money expended in developing the 
information; and 
(f) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others. 
The Restatement adds another requirement to its description of a trade secret, 
namely that only information which is in continuous use in a business can qualify as 
a trade secret, whereas information relating to single or ephemeral events in the 
12 It is rather more voluminous than a definition in the traditional sense, and is perhaps more aptly 
described by Coleman Trade secrets 19 as a 'working description of a trade secret'. 
13 Milgrim Vol 1 1.4; cf Lupo and Tanguay 75; Dratler 4.11; Field et al 17.16. 
14 Lupo and Tanguay 75. 
15 On the relativity of secrecy, see par 3.2.1.2.3 below . 
16 Sec 757 comment (b). 
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conduct of a business does not qualify as a trade secret. 17 However, this 
requirement has been ignored or rejected by the courts and disapproved of by 
commentators.18 19 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines20 a trade secret as follows: 
"Trade secret means information including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique or process that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy." 
Significantly, the continuous use requirement of the Restatement definition is omitted 
from this definition.21 Apart from this difference, the definitions are in material 
agreement, differing in terms of precision of formulation rather than in substance.22 
The definition in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been freely quoted and applied 
17 Thus it provides in sec 757 comment (b): "[A trade secret] differs from other secret information 
in a business ... in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of 
the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary 
of certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the 
announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a process 
or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of 
goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of an article. It may, however, relate 
to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining discounts, 
rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method 
of bookkeeping or other office management." 
18 Chisum and Jacobs 3.18-3.19; Coleman Trade secrets 20; Dratler 4.12-4.13. 
19 Confidential information relating to single events in a business could be protected under sec 759 
of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, which provides: "One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival 
business interest, procures by improper means information about another's business is liable to the 
other for the harm caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information." Although the 
protection in terms of sec 759 is not so wide as that under sec 757 (in so far as it only applies to 
information acquired by improper means for the purposes of advancing a rival business interest - see 
Coleman Trade secrets 21), it nevertheless considerably dilutes the practical importance of the 
'continuous use' requirement in sec 757 (Dratler 4.12-4.13). 
20 Sec 1(4). 
21 By and large, the courts also seem to ignore or disagree with the continuous use requirement, 
a notable exception being Lehman v Dow Jones & Co Inc 783 F 2d 285 (2d Cir 1986). See Chisum 
and Jacobs 3.18-3.19. 
22 Cf Dratler 4.12. 
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in the courts of the states which have adopted the Act.23 However, even in some of 
those states the Restatement definition is still treated as authoritative and applied 
alongside the statutory definition in the Act.24 In some judgments other definitions 
of trade secrets have been formulated, but these rarely add something significant and 
do not normally purport to be comprehensive.25 
3.2.1.1.2 Know-how 
'Know-how' is a concept that is quite frequently encountered in case law and 
commentaries,26 but which seems to have no single, generally accepted meaning. 
It seems to be equally capable of application as a virtual equivalent of the term 'trade 
secret', a contrasting term denoting matter which cannot be characterized as trade 
secrets, and a broader generic term including both trade secrets and other matter.27 
23 Eg United Centrifugal Pumps v Cusimano 9 USPQ 2d 1171 1178 (WD Ark 1988); American 
Paper & Packaging Products Inc v Kirgan 183 Cal App 3d 1320; Technikon Data Systems Corp v 
Curtis 1000 Inc 224 USPQ 286 287-292 (Del Ch 1984); Mid-America National Agency v Albert H 
Wohlers & Co 8 USPQ 2d 1780 (D Kan 1988); Aries Information Systems Inc v Pacific Management 
Systems Corp 366 NW 2d 366, 226 USPQ 440 442 (Minn Ct App 1985). 
24 Eg Sheets v Yamaha Motors Corp 657 F Supp 319 326-327, 3 USPQ 2d 1856 (ED La 1987), 
7 USPQ 2d 1461 (5th Cir 1988); Engineered Mechanical Services Inc v Langlois 464 So 2d 329 333 
(La App 1984), 467 So 2d 531 (La 1985); Electro-Craft Corp v Controlled Motion Inc 332 NW 2d 890, 
220 USPQ 811 (Minn 1983); Wisconsin Electric Power Co v Public Services Commission 110 Wis 2d 
530, 329 NW 2d 178 180-181 (1983); Moore v American Barmag Corp 710 F Supp 1050 1059-1061 
(WDNC 1989), 902 F 2d 44 (Fed Cir 1990); Penetone Corp v Pa/chem Inc 627 F Supp 997, 228 
USPQ 497 503 (ND Ohio 1985); /mi-Tech Corp v Gagliani 691 F Supp 214 230 231, 6 USPQ 2d 1241 
(SD Cal 1986). Cf Milgrim Vol 1 1.26. 
25 Cf Milgrim Vol 1 1.4ff. 
26 See in general Callmann Vol 2 14.46-14.48; Ellis 220ff 293ff; Kintner and Lahr 140-141; Turner 
32-37. 
27 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.46: "mhe [Restatement] definition which is recognized for trade secrets 
is equally applicable to know-how ... Another generally accepted definition states that know-how 'may 
consist of inventions, processes, formulae, or designs which are either unpatented or unpatentable; 
it may be evidenced by some form of physical matter, such as blue-prints, specifications, or drawings ... 
[or] it may involve accumulated experience and skills which can best, or perhaps only, be 
communicated through the medium of personal services' ... One court ... limited the concept of know-
how to the experience of skills which result from applying certain techniques. An employee is not 
required to leave such experience behind when he moves on to another company. That kind of 
knowledge does not qualify as a trade secret"; Kintner and Lahr 140: "The term know-how ... can be 
used to describe practically any technical subject of a technical trade secret so that secret know-how 
is almost synonymous with 'trade secret' technology. On the other hand, technical know-how, not a 
trade secret, is a category of knowledge that any technical employee is free to take with him from one 
job to another"; Pooley 32 fn 11: "Know-how, which can be a trade secret, consists of general 
information used in a particular application, giving some commercial advantage. It is a collection of 
'lesser tricks"'; Turner 32: "The words 'know-how' are used by the layman to mean all the valuable 
knowledge which is accumulated by research workers, pilot-plant operators, and others who have 
produced a new process by means of experimentation and effort. Sometimes the words are used 
loosely to refer to the process itself, particularly if that process involves the use of a new machine. 
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28 
3.2.1.2 ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET 
The following elements of a trade secret protectable at American law may be 
extracted from the Restatement and Uniform Trade Secrets Act definitions of trade 
secrets:29 
(a) information; 
(b) commercial or industrial applicability; 
(c) secrecy; 
(d) the use of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy; and 
(e) economic value. 
From the case law and the commentaries a sixth element (or sub-element) may be 
added, namely: 
(f) concreteness. 
These elements will now be dealt with individually. 
3.2.1.2.1 Information 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines30 a trade secret as "information including a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process". 
Information is thus used as a collective term denoting the essence of all the various 
forms of trade secrets. 31 At first glance the Restatement definition does not appear 
to agree with this, as it states32 that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, 
However, the general usage encompasses valuable knowledge which is an adjunct to the use of a new 
invention." An example of a complex definition from the case law is the following from Myca/ex Corp 
v Pemco Corp 64 F Supp 420, 68 USPQ 317 (DC Md 1946), 159 F2d 907, 72 USPQ 290 (4th Cir 
1947) at 68 USPQ 322: "[F]actual knowledge not capable of precise, separate description, but which 
when used in an accumulated form, after being acquired as the result of trial and error gives to the one 
acquiring it an ability to produce something which he otherwise would not have necessary for 
commercial success"; cf Turner 35. 
28 Because of its ambiguity, 'know-how' is not used as a technical term in this study - cf par 
2.2.1.1.4 above; 7.2.8.2 below. 
29 Cf Dratler 4.12 who recognizes three 'key requirements': (a) limited availability; (b) consequent 
economic value; and (c) use of reasonable efforts to keep the secret. 
30 Sec 1 (4); see par 3.2.1.1.1 above. 
31 Cf Jager Vol 1 3.40. 
32 Sec 757 comment (b); see par 3.2.1.1.1 above. 
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pattern, device or compilation of information". The implication seems to be that a 
compilation of information is merely one of several forms that a trade secret may 
take, and that the other forms cannot accurately be characterized as information. 
However, the Restatement continues to say that a trade secret "differs from other 
secret business information",33 thus implying that a trade secret is secret business 
information too. It is submitted that the language used in the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act is more accurate, and that a trade secret always consists of information, albeit 
embodied in or pertaining to a formula, or a program, or a technique, or a process, 
and so on.34 35 
3.2.1.2.2 Commercial or industrial applicability 
Information must be capable of commercial or industrial application to qualify as a 
trade secret. This requirement is not normally stated in so many words in the case 
law or by the commentators,36 but may be regarded as trite and implicit in the 
concept trade secret itself. 37 
3.2.1.2.3 Secrecy 
If information is to qualify as a trade secret, it must be secret. 38 The Restatement 
of the Law of Torts states expressly39 that the subject matter of a trade secret must 
33 Cf par 3.4.1; 3.4.4; 3.5.1; 3.5.2 on the legal protection of confidential business information not 
qualifying as trade secrets. 
34 Cf eg the following definitions from the case law: McKay v Communispond Inc 581 F Supp 801 
807 (SONY 1983): "A trade secret has been defined as information known to only a few and not the 
general public ... "; El duPont de Nemours & Co v United States 288 F 2d 904 911, 129 USPQ 473 (Ct 
Cl 1961 ): "A trade secret is any information not generally known in a trade. It may be an unpatented 
invention, a formula, pattern, machine, process, customer list, customer credit list, or even news." Cf 
Chisum and Jacobs 3.14: "To qualify as a trade secret, information must be eligible for protection, be 
secret, and have commercial value"; Dorr and Munch 3: "From a practical viewpoint, trade secrets can 
comprise any information that gives a business a competitive edge over competitors"; Field et al 17.18: 
"[C]ourts have found that virtually any type of information which is capable of being used in a business 
to obtain a competitive advantage may qualify as a trade secret." 
35 See further par 2.2.1.2.1 above on the position in English law. The same considerations relevant 
there also seem to be applicable here. 
36 It is implicit in the Restatement definition of trade secrets where it is stated (sec 757 comment 
(b)) that a trade secret is "used in one's business". 
37 See also par 2.2.1.2.2 above. 
38 Cf in general Callmann Vol 2 14.52ff; Chisum and Jacobs 3.19ff; Dratler 4.27ff; Jager Vol 1 
5.46.5ff; Milgrim Vol 1 1.86ff. 
39 Sec 757 comment (b). 
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be secret, and adds that matters of public knowledge or general knowledge in an 
industry cannot be secret.40 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act requires41 that the 
information in question be not "generally known to, and not... readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure 
or use".42 The secrecy requirement has been singled out in a court decision43 as 
"the threshold issue in every case". 
Although there are cases that may be understood to require absolute secrecy,44 the 
better view is the far more generally supported one that relative secrecy is 
sufficient.45 The Restatement adopts46 a relative concept of secrecy by stating that 
the proprietor of the business may communicate his trade secret to employees 
involved in its use, or to others pledged to secrecy, without losing protection. 
Furthermore, secrecy will not be destroyed if others have discovered the secret by 
independent invention, provided they are also keeping it secret. What is required, is 
that a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of 
improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information.47 In a similar 
vein,48 the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines trade secrets as information that 
"derives ... economic value ... from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
4° Cf eg: Continental Data Systems Inc v Exxon Corp 638 F Supp 432 442-443 (ED Pa 1970); 
Metallurgical Industries Inc v Fourtek, Inc 790 F 2d 1195 1199-1200, 229 USPQ 945 (5th Cir 1986). 
41 Sec 1 (4). The Commissioners' comment on sec 1 explains that these words do not require "that 
information be generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the principal person 
who can obtain economic benefit from information is aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method 
of casting metal, for example, may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the 
foundry industry. Information is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books, 
or published materials. Often, the nature of a product lends itself to being readily copied as soon as 
it is available on the market. On the other hand, if reverse engineering is lengthy and expensive, a 
person who discovers the trade secret through reverse engineering can have a trade secret in the 
information obtained from reverse engineering." 
42 Cf eg Zoecon Industries v American Stockman Tag Co 713 F 2d 1174 1179 (5th Cir 1983). 
43 Microbiological Research Corp v Muna 214 USPQ 567 572 (Utah S Ct 1981 ); cf Callmann Vol 
2 14.8; Chisum and Jacobs 3.19. 
44 Eg Goldin v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co 22 F Supp 61 65, 37 USPQ 244 (SDNY 1938); Chicago 
Lock Co v Fanberg 676 F 2d 400 404 (9th Cir 1982); cf Milgrim Vol 1 1.314-1.315. 
45 Cf eg Dratler 4.30-4.34; Jager Vol 1 5.46.6; Kintner and Lahr 154-155; Milgrim Vol 1 1.315ff and 
case law cited. 
46 Sec 757 comment (b). 
47 Sec 757 comment (b). 
48 Lupo and Tanguay 78 are of the opinion that the Restatement requires a higher measure of 
secrecy than the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Other commentators do not share this view - cf Chisum 
and Jacobs 3.20; Dratler 4.29 4.37. 
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ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use". Independent invention, and reverse engineering49 of a 
product acquired by fair and honest means (such as purchase thereof on the open 
market), are identified as 'proper means'50 by which a trade secret may be 
discovered, which may result in more than one person having a trade secret in the 
same information.51 
The notion of relative secrecy is underscored by the bulk of the case law.52 How 
liberally secrecy may be interpreted, is demonstrated in Data General Corporation v 
Digital Computer Controls, Incorporated. 53 The plaintiff was the manufacturer of a 
highly successful computer. It was his practice to supply, with each computer, a set 
of drawings, revealing inter alia the logic circuitry of the computer, for maintenance 
purposes. The defendant obtained the drawings from a customer of the plaintiff's and 
used them to manufacture a substantially identical computer. At the time of trial, the 
plaintiff had allegedly supplied nearly six thousand copies of the drawings to his 
customers, whilst at the time of the misappropriation eighty copies had been 
distributed on that basis. Each set of drawings carried a notice claiming the drawings 
and specifications therein to be the property of the plaintiff, not to be copied or used 
without written permission. The court held that the distribution of the drawings for a 
limited purpose did not destroy the required secrecy, and granted an injunction 
restraining the defendant from using them.54 
The secrecy requirement is also relative in the sense that information may be 
49 See further Lupo and Tanguay 96; Milgrim Vol 1 1.173ff. 
50 Other instances of 'proper means' are discovery under a license from the owner of the trade 
secret; observation of an item in public use or on public display; and obtaining the trade secret from 
published literature - Uniform Trade Secrets Act sec 1 Commissioners' comment. 
51 Sec 1 Commissioners' comment: "Because a trade secret need not be exclusive to confer a 
competitive advantage, different independent developers can acquire rights in the same trade secret"; 
"Often, the nature of a product lends itself to being readily copied as soon as it is available on the 
market. On the other hand, if reverse engineering is lengthy and expensive, a person who discovers 
a trade secret through reverse engineering can have a trade secret in the information obtained from 
reverse engineering." 
52 Eg Drill Parts & Services Co v Joy Manufacturing Co 223 USPQ 521 526 (Ala S Ct 1983): 
"Absolute secrecy is not required; a substantial element of secrecy is all that is necessary to provide 
trade secret protection"; Jostens, Inc v National Computer Systems, Inc 214 USPQ 918 924 (Minn S 
Ct 1982): "Secrecy need not be total; depending on the circumstances, only partial or qualified secrecy 
will do"; El duPont de Nemours & Co v United States 288 F 2d 904 911, 129 USPQ 473 (Ct Cl 1961): 
"A plurality of individual discoverers may have protectable, wholly separate rights in the same trade 
secret"; see further Jager Vol 1 5.46.6-5.54; Milgrim Vol 1 1.315ff and case law cited. 
53 188 USPQ 276 (Del Cir Ct 1975). 
54 Cf Dratler 4.43; Jager Vol 1 5.51-5.52. 
69 
protected as a trade secret even if substantial portions thereof are in the public 
domain or are readily ascertainable, so long as the whole is not. This principle is 
particularly applicable to customer lists, but is not confined to them.55 
The case law frequently requires trade secrets to possess a degree of novelty.56 
This requirement was presumably borrowed from patent law,57 but has been given 
a different meaning in the context of trade secret law. 58 In fact, it seems to boil down 
to just another way of saying that information that is general knowledge or in the 
public domain cannot constitute a trade secret.59 Seen in this light, the novelty 
requirement is not an independent requirement. 
If the secrecy of a trade secret is lost, so is - as a general rule60 - the legal 
protection of that information.61 Secrecy may be lost in a variety of ways, amongst 
others the following - by the owner of the trade secret disclosing it without adequate 
safeguards or non-disclosure agreements;62 by the marketing of a product if the 
secret can be readily learned63 by scrutiny or inspection of that product;64 by 
55 Cf eg Heyman v Ar Winarick, Inc 325 F 2d 584 590 (2d Cir 1963); Zoecon Industries v American 
Stockman Tag Co 713 F 2d 117 4 1179 (5th Cir 1983); Superior Flux & Manufacturing Co v H&S 
Industries, Inc 210 USPQ 669 671 (ND Ohio 1980); Dratler 4.32-4.33. 
56 See Jager Vol 1 5. 77ff and authorities cited. 
57 Jager Vol 1 5.77. 
58 Cf the Restatement Sec 757 comment (b); Rohm and Haas Co v Adco Chemical Co 213 USPQ 
723 751 (DNJ 1981 ). 
59 See eg Alderman v Tandy Corp 720 F 2d 1234, 222 USPQ 806 807 (11th Cir 1983) where it was 
said that a trade secret must "possess at least that modicum of originality which will separate it from 
everyday knowledge"; Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp 416 US 470 476: "Novelty, in the patent law 
sense, is not required for a trade secret... However, some novelty will be required if merely because 
that which does not possess novelty is usually known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus 
implies at least minimum novelty." Cf Jager Vol 1 5.85 who, after a comprehensive discussion comes 
to the following conclusion: ''[nhe novelty requirement for trade secrets is difficult to differentiate from 
the secrecy requirement. Often, it appears that the courts are rationalizing their decision that an idea 
is not sufficiently secret, because it is in the public domain, by saying that it therefore lacks the 
necessary 'novelty'. Nevertheless, this requirement of at least a slight advance over common 
knowledge is well established in the trade secret common law. It can be rationalized as a further 
attempt by the courts to prevent matters in the public domain from being withdrawn in the future by 
cloaking matters of common knowledge with secrecy." 
60 Exceptions may be found in the trade secret laws of some states. See par 3.4.4; 3.5.2 below. 
61 Milgrim Vol 1 1.86 and case law cited; cf Turner 266. 
62 Burten v Milton Bradley Co 592 F Supp 1021 1029-1037, 224 USPQ 391 (ORI 1984); Milgrim 
Vol 1 1.135ff 1 .153ff. 
63 This situation must be distinguished from the case of reverse engineering where a certain 
measure of time and expenditure must be invested to unravel the secret - see fn 41 above. 
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displaying an article in a manner permitting its secret to be known;65 and by 
publication in advertising material66 or technical literature.67 It must be borne in 
mind, though, that marketing a product or publishing features thereof will not 
inevitably result in a sufficient disclosure to terminate the secrecy and thus the 
protectability of a trade secret. In Tabor v Hoffman68 the plaintiff had manufactured 
and marketed a certain unpatented pump. The pump was made from a set of moulds 
which were in turn prepared from a set of patterns. The finished parts differed 
substantially from the moulds, due to shrinkage of the metal whilst cooling. The 
defendant surreptitiously obtained a duplicate set of patterns, and began to 
manufacture pumps from the duplicate patterns. An injunction was issued against the 
defendant restraining him from making pumps from the patterns, or using them in any 
other way. The court held that while the defendant was at liberty to reverse engineer 
the marketed pump, the patterns had not been placed on the market and he was 
therefore not entitled to use them. 
3.2.1.2.4 Use of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy 
A matter of considerable importance in American trade secrets litigation is the 
sufficiency or insufficiency of measures taken by the plaintiff to protect the secrecy 
of his alleged trade secret.69 In the Restatement of the Law of Torts the "extent of 
measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information" is listed70 as one of five 
factors to be used in deciding whether given information constitutes a trade secret. 
64 Sears, Roebuck & Co v Stiffel Co 84 S Ct 784 789; Mayer v Josiah Wedgwool & Sons 601 F 
Supp 1523, 225 USPQ 776 785(SONY1985); S/ Handling Systems, Inc v Heisly 753 F 2d 12441255, 
225 USPQ 441 (3d Cir 1985); AMP Inc v Fleischhacker 823 F 2d 1199 1203, 3 USPQ 1421 (7th Cir 
1987); see further Milgrim Vol 1 1.142ff. 
65 American Sign & Indicator Corp v Schulenburg 167 F Supp 20 27 (SED Ill 1958), 267 F 2d 388 
(7th Cir), 361 US 886 (1959); Skoog v McCray Refrigerator Co 211 F 2d 254, 101 USPQ 1 (7th Cir 
1954); Chun King Sales Inc v Oriental Foods Inc 136 F Supp 659 662, 108 USPQ 400 (SD Cal 1955), 
244 F 2d 909, 113 USPQ 404 (9th Cir 1957); see further Milgrim Vol 1 1.153. 
66 McKay v Communispond, Inc F Supp 801 807 (SONY 1983); Combustion Engineering, Inc v 
Murray Tube Works, Inc 222 USPQ 239 241 (ED Tenn 1984); but cf Penetone Corp v Pa/chem, Inc 
627 F Supp 997 (ND Ohio 1985); DeGette v Mine Company Restaurant, Inc 751 F 2d 1143, 224 
USPQ 763 (10th Cir 1985); see further Milgrim Vol 1 1.153ff. 
67 Struthers Scientific & Intl Corp v Rappl & Hoenig Co 453 F 2d 250 254 255 (2nd Cir 1972); 
Hurst v Hughes Tool Co 634 F 2d 895 897 (5th Cir), 102 S Ct 123 (1981 ); but cf Schalk v State 767 
SW 2d 441 446 (Tex App Dallas 1988); Penetone Corp v Pa/chem, Inc 627 F Supp 997 (ND Ohio 
1985); see further Milgrim Vol 1 1.157ff. 
68 118 NY 30, 23 NE 12 (1889); cf Milgrim Vol 1 1.160ff. 
69 Cf eg Pooley 25; Givens 152-153 155; Klitzke 1986 The Business Lawyer 555 561-563. 
10 Sec 757 comment (b); par 3.2.1.1.1 above. 
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The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines71 a trade secret explicitly as information that 
is, amongst other things, "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy". In order to establish his or her case, a plaintiff 
will therefore need to establish not only that his or her alleged trade secret is in fact 
(relatively) secret, but also that he or she has taken measures which are reasonable 
in the circumstances to maintain that secrecy.72 
The reasonableness of the measures taken to preserve secrecy must be judged with 
reference to circumstances like the size of the enterprise, 73 the number of 
employees, 74 and the potential and tempo of employees leaving the enterprise to 
seek employment elsewhere. 75 Thus in a small enterprise with only three 
employees, diagrams of electric circuitry were held to be trade secrets even though 
the employer kept them in an unlocked filing cabinet in the employee work area, did 
not require employees to sign confidentiality agreements and did not control the 
amount of copies made. In the circumstances it was sufficient that new employees 
were always informed of the confidentiality policy of the enterprise, that the office was 
always locked when the employees were not present, that customers were supplied 
only with portions of the diagrams which were marked confidential, and that the 
defendant was warned not to show the diagrams to outsiders.76 On the other hand, 
at a large plant reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy could include a fence, 
restricted access to gates, 'no trespassing' signs, fourteen guards, employee 
identification cards, screening of visitors, non-disclosure agreements in purchase 
orders, limiting the distribution of the operating manual to certain employees on a 
need-to-know basis, requiring salaried employees to sign non-disclosure agreements, 
71 Sec 1 (4); par 3.2.1.1.1 above. 
72 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.50 who introduces a more subjective angle by requiring an intention to 
maintain secrecy. Dratler 4.27-4.29 4.37ff refers to this requirement as the 'relative secrecy' 
requirement. What is referred to as the 'secrecy' requirement (which, as noted in par 3.2.1.2.3 above, 
is in fact a relative secrecy requirement) in this study, is characterized by Dratler as the 'limited 
availability' requirement. To establish in court that reasonable measures to maintain (alleged) secrecy 
have been taken, may, as a practical matter of evidence, be easier than to establish that certain 
information is in fact secret. The court may rely on satisfactory evidence establishing the former to 
decide that the latter has also satisfactorily been established. See Metallurgical Industries Inc v 
Fourtek, Inc 790 F 2d 1195 1199, 229 USPQ 945 (5th Cir 1986); cf Givens 155. 
73 Kozuch v Cra-Mar Video Center, Inc 478 NE 2d 110 113 (Ind App 1985); cf Dratler 4.41 fn 84. 
74 Eg Bellboy Seafood Corp v Nathanson 410 NW 2d 349 353 (Minn App 1987); Televation 
Telecommunication Systems, Inc v Saindon 522 NE 2d 1359 1364-1366 (1988); cf Dratler 4.41 fn 83. 
75 Eg Electro-Craft Corp v Controlled Motion, Inc 332 NW 2d 890 902; cf Dratler 4.41 fn 85. 
76 Televation Telecommunication Systems, Inc v Saindon 522 NE 2d 1359 1364-1366 (1988); cf 
Dratler 4.41 fn 83. 
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and subjecting hourly employees to comprehensive written rules and regulations. 77 78 
Also relevant when determining whether measures taken to maintain secrecy are 
reasonable, is the expense involved.79 The courts do not require the plaintiff to take 
extremely expensive measures to guard against every ingenuity that industrial spies 
can come up with.80 Thus in El duPont de Nemours & Company, Incorporated v 
ChristopherB1 the plaintiff was not expected to build an otherwise unnecessary 
enclosure over his uncompleted chemical plant to protect his trade secrets from aerial 
photography. 
3.2.1.2.5 Economic value 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act states explicitly82 that a trade secret is information 
that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use". In the Restatement a trade 
secret is described83 as giving "an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it". The "value of the information to the trader 
and his competitors" is also included in the list of factors enumerated in the 
Restatement84 to be considered when determining whether given information is a 
trade secret or not. 85 
The economic value requirement is normally not difficult to satisfy. The majority of 
alleged trade secrets which become the subject of legal dispute satisfy the 
77 CPG Products Corp v Mego Corp 214 USPQ 206 207-208 (SD Ohio 1981); cf Dratler 4.41 fn 
86; Jager Vol 1 5.61-5.62. See further Coca-Co/a Bottling Co v The Coca-Cola Co 107 FRD 288 289 
294, 227 USPQ 18 (D Del 1985); cf Jager Vol 1 5.63-5.64; par 1.1 above. 
78 For suggested precautions, cf Givens 158-160; Jager Vol 1 5.71-5.77; Phillips 1987 The 
Business Lawyer 1048-1050. 
79 Dratler 4.42; Uniform Trade Secrets Act sec 1 Commissioners' comment. 
80 Uniform Trade Secrets Act sec 1 Commissioners' comment. 
81 431 F 2d 1012 1016-1017 (5th Cir). 
82 Sec 1(4). 
83 Sec 757 comment (b). 
84 Sec 757 comment (b). 
85 A contrary view exists, viz that economic value, in the sense of a competitive advantage, is 
merely a factor pointing to compliance with the secrecy requirement - cf Field et al 17.106-17.109 and 
authority cited. 
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requirement simply because the plaintiffs deem them worth the effort and expense 
of litigation.86 A plaintiff may prove the economic value of his or her alleged trade 
secret by direct or circumstantial evidence.87 In respect of the former, he or she may 
for example prove that he or she has paid for the information,88 or that others have 
paid for use of the information,89 or that the information has resulted in 
demonstrable lower production costs90 or more effective marketing.91 As far as 
circumstantial evidence is concerned, the plaintiff may sh~w the amount he or she 
has invested in his or her alleged trade secret,92 or the defendant's successful use 
of the alleged secret.93 Even showing the defendant's intention of using the alleged 
secret without authorization may serve as circumstantial evidence of the economic 
value thereof.94 A trade secret need not be in current use to satisfy the economic 
value requirement.95 The secret must have an economic value - a purely spiritual 
or religious value will for instance not satisfy this requirement.96 
86 Dratler 4.35. 
87 See Dratler 4.35-4.36 and authorities cited. 
88 Eg Plant Industries, Inc v Coleman 287 F Supp 636 643 (CD Cal 1968); see further Dratler 4.35 
fn 54. 
89 Eg in the case of Aries Information Systems, Inc v Pacific Management Systems Corp 366 NW 
2d 366 368 (Minn 1985) the fact that a computer software system had generated $2 million in sales 
revenue over a four year period showed economic value. Cf Dratler 4.35 fn 55. 
90 Televation Telecommunication Systems, Inc v Saindon 169 Ill App 3d 8, 522 NE 2d 1359 1365 
(1988); cf Dratler 4.36 fn 56. 
91 Eg Zoecon Industries v American Stockman Tag Co 713 F 2d 1174 1179 (5th Cir 1983); cf 
Dratler 4.36 fn 57. 
92 This is one of the factors listed by the Restatement sec 757 comment (b) for consideration when 
determining whether information is a trade secret. Cf Hayes-Albion v Kuberski 421 Mich 170, 364 NW 
2d 609 615 (1984); see further Dratler 4.36 fn 58. 
93 Eg Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc v Miller 87 Cal App 3d 458 (1978); cf Dratler 4.36 fn 59. 
94 Surgidev Corp v Eye Technology, Inc 828 F 2d 452 456 (8th Cir 1987); cf Dratler 4.36 fn 60. 
95 In Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc v Tsuetaki 701 F 2d 677 683, 219 USPQ 962 (7th Cir 1983) the court 
rejected a contention that a trade secret must be in actual use (based on the Restatement sec 757 
comment (b) definition of a trade secret as information 'which is used in one's business'), holding 
instead that the proper test is that it must be of value to its owner. Cf Jager Vol 1 5.88. The Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act is clear on this matter, providing that a trade secret must have an economic value, 
actual or potential. 
96 Religious Technology Center v Wollersheim 796 F 2d 1076 1090-1091 (9th Cir 1986); cf 
Religious Technology Center v Scott 10 USPO 2d 1379 (9th Cir 1989); Dratler 4.36-4.37; Jager Vol 
1 3.16.4-3.16.5. 
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3.2.1.2.6 Concreteness 
Information is often required to attain a certain level of concreteness in order to 
qualify as a trade secret. The notion is that a trade secret must be more concrete 
than a mere "idea, theory, possibility or emotion, and relatively specific in its intended 
implementation".97 In the Restatement of the Law of Torts, this requirement may be 
regarded98 as implicit in its formulation99 of the 'continuous use' requirement, 
whereby a trade secret is described as "a process or device for continuous use in the 
conduct of the business". The Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not require 
concreteness, 100 from which some commentators have deduced that it is left to the 
discretion of the courts whether to apply or reject this "traditional requirement" .101 
Others seem to be of the opinion 102 that some measure of concreteness will 
(almost) always be required, but that the degree of concreteness required will depend 
on the facts and circumstances and may therefore vary quite considerably from case 
to case. 
The courts phrase the concreteness requirement in various ways. Thus it has been 
stated that "an idea must be reduced to concrete form to qualify as the subject of a 
protectable property interest"; 103 or that an "idea [must] be sufficiently concrete in 
its development to be usable"; 104 or that an idea must be translated into a "useful 
form" .105 By way of contrast, a "vague mental conception"106 or a "tentative 
97 Chisum and Jacobs 3.16. 
98 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.16. 
99 Sec 757 comment (b). 
100 Nor does it perpetuate the 'continuous use' requirement, as noted in par 3.2.1.1.1 above. 
101 Chisum and Jacobs 3.16. 
102 Cf Jager Vol 1 5.87: "The cases provide no definitive line of demarcation between an abstract 
and a concrete idea ... [S]uch a decision will depend upon all the facts and circumstances of a case, 
and will be made by the courts on a case-by-case basis. It is clear, however, that the courts are 
extremely reluctant to grant legal protection, under the trade secret law, for a nebulous concept. An 
unspoken but apparent reason is the inherent difficulty in framing and enforcing judicial relief for 
abstractions. Accordingly, a trade secret owner should stress the finite character or concreteness of 
his idea in court"; Field et al 17.20. 
103 John W Shaw Advertising Inc v Ford Motor Co 112 F Supp 121 123, 98 USPQ 186 187 (ND 
Ill 1953); cf Carneval v William Morris Agency, Inc 124 NYS 2d 319, 98 USPQ 84 (NY S Ct 1953); see 
further Jager Vol 1 5.86-5.86.1. 
104 Wilson v Barton & Ludwig, Inc 220 USPQ 375 377 (Ga Ct App 1982); cf Jager Vol 1 5.86.1. 
105 Richter v Westab, Inc 529 F 2d 896 902, 189 USPQ 321 326 (6th Cir 1976); cf Jager Vol 1 
5.86. 
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exploration"107 could not satisfy the concreteness requirement. That absolute 
concreteness is not required, is demonstrated clearly in Jones v Ulrich. 108 The 
plaintiff had invented a fertilizer spreader and orally disclosed the idea to the 
defendant, who later disputed that the information was concrete enough to constitute 
a trade secret. The court held that an idea must be concrete to a degree to be 
protectable, but that it is not necessary that it be "tangible and in a material 
form". 109 The defendant's ability to construct the fertilizer spreader within twenty-
four hours of receiving the information, showed that it was not a mere theory, but 
sufficiently concrete to merit protection.110 
3.2.2 MISAPPROPRIATION 
Once it has been established that the information in question is a trade secret, the 
plaintiff needs to establish that there is a misappropriation (real or imminent) thereof 
to invoke the intervention of the law. 111 
Actions that may constitute a misappropriation are described in the first Restatement 
of the Law of Torts and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The Restatement112 lists the 
following acts as giving rise to liability: 
(a) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without a privilege to do 
. so, by someone who discovered the secret by improper means; 
(b) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without a privilege to do 
so, in circumstances where the disclosure or breach constitutes a 
breach of confidence reposed in him by the owner of the secret in 
disclosing it to him; 
(c) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without a privilege to do 
so, by someone who learned the secret from a third person with 
notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third person had 
discovered it by improper means, or that the third person's disclosure 
106 Lamson v Martin 159 Mass 557, 35 NE 78 81 (Mass 1893); cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.16. 
107 Progressive Engineering, Inc v Machinecraft, Inc 169 F Supp 291, 122 USPQ 201 206 (D Mass 
1959); cf Jager Vol 1 5.86 fn 194. 
108 342 Ill App 16, 95 NE 2d 113, 87 USPQ 331 (Ill App Ct 1950). 
109 87 USPQ 331 337. 
110 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.16; Jager Vol 1 5.86.2-5.86.3. 
111 See par 3.2 above. 
112 Sec 757. 
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to him was in another way a breach of his duty to the owner of the 
secret; or 
(d) disclosure or use of another's secret, without a privilege to do so, by 
someone who learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was 
a secret and that the disclosure was made to him by mistake. 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines113 misappropriation as consisting of the 
following: 
(a) acquisition of another's trade secret by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means; 
(b) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without express or implied 
consent to do so, by a person who used improper means to acquire 
knowledge of the secret; 
(c) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without express or implied 
consent to do so, by a person who at the time of the disclosure or 
use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade 
secret was derived from or through a person who had utilised 
improper means to acquire it; 
(d) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without express or implied 
consent to do so, by a person who at the time of the disclosure or 
use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade 
secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; 
(e) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without express or implied 
consent to do so, by a person who at the time of the disclosure or 
use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade 
secret was derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the 
plaintiff to maintain the secrecy of the information or to limit its use; 
or 
(f) disclosure or use of another's trade secret, without express or implied 
consent to do so, by a person who, before a material change of his 
or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret 
and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
The most striking difference between the Restatement and the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act is that in terms of the former misappropriation can only consist of disclosure or 
use of a trade secret, whereas in terms of the latter the mere acquisition of a trade 
113 Sec 1(2). 
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secret may already constitute a misappropriation.114 
A key concept in both definitions is improper means. In the Restatement the following 
are listed115 as examples of improper means: breach of contract, abuse of 
confidence, impropriety in the means of procurement, use of physical force to take 
a secret formula from another's pocket, breaking into another's office to steal a 
formula, fraudulent misrepresentation to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone 
wires, eavesdropping, and other forms of espionage. The Restatement states that in 
general improper means "fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial 
morality and reasonable conduct". In the Uniform Trade Secrets Act improper means 
are defined116 as including theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement 
of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 
means. Neither the Restatement117 nor the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines 
improper means exhaustively, thus enabling the courts to expand the list of improper 
means as circumstances and policy may dictate.118 
An interesting example (from the pre-Uniform Act era) of the application of the 
"improper means" concept by the courts is provided by the celebrated decision in El 
duPont de Nemours & Company v Christopher. 119 The defendant was hired by an 
unknown third person to photograph the plaintiff's uncompleted plant from an 
aeroplane in order to learn the plaintiff's secret process for making methanol. The 
defendant's defence was that he had used public airspace without violating any 
government aviation standard, that he had not breached any relationship of 
114 Dratler states (4.62) that "[b]y itself, the use of unlawful means to acquire a trade secret does 
not create legal liability. There must be evidence of actual or threatened disclosure or use of the 
secret"; cf Jager Vol 1 5.24-5.27. These statements do not seem to accurately reflect the position, at 
least not in those states which have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in so far as the Act states 
explicitly that acquisition may be misappropriation (sec 1 (2)(i)), and that misappropriation may be 
enjoined (sec 2(a)). Cf Coleman Trade secrets 89: "Liability is wider under the [Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act], for here not only can use or disclosure be restrained, but also the acquisition of a trade secret 
by improper means. Thus, in those states which have adopted the [Uniform Trade Secrets Act], liability 
can arise earlier in the normal sequence of events, that is, it can attach before actual or threatened 
use or disclosure of the secret"; Chisum and Jacobs 3.30: "The Restatement definition of conduct 
triggering liability and the Uniform Act definition of misappropriation are substantially identical, with one 
exception. The Restatement includes disclosure or use as an essential element. The Uniform Act 
provides that mere wrongful acquisition - without use or disclosure - can be a misappropriation." 
115 Sec 757 comments (b) and (f). 
116 Sec 1 (1 ). 
117 Sec 757 comment (f). 
118 Dratler 4.58. 
119 431 F 2d 1012, 166 USPQ 421 (5th Cir 1970), 400 US 1024, 401 US 967 (1971). Cf Jager Vol 
1 4.20; Kintner and Lahr 182-183. 
78 
confidence, and that he did nothing fraudulent or illegal. The court rejected these 
contentions, relying on the rule in the Restatement120 that "[o]ne who discloses or 
uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if ... he 
discovered the secret by improper means". The court held explicitly that a breach of 
confidence was not a requirement to found an action for obtaining another's trade 
secret by improper means. To obtain knowledge of a process without investing the 
time and money needed to discover it independently, was held to be improper, unless 
the holder of the secret voluntarily disclosed it or failed to take reasonable 
precautions to maintain its secrecy. The duPont case is endorsed in the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act comment, 121 where it is stated that "[i]mproper means could 
include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances". 
By way of contrast, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act comment122 lists the following 
as examples of proper means: 
(a) discovery by independent invention; 
(b) discovery by reverse engineering, which is defined as "starting with 
the known product and working backward to find the method by which 
it was developed". The reverse engineering will only be lawful if the 
product was acquired by fair and honest means, for instance 
purchasing it on the open market; 
(c) discovery under a licence from the owner of the trade secret; 
(d) observation of an item in public use or on public display; and 
(e) obtaining the secret from published literature. 
3.3 REMEDIES AND PRESERVATION OF SECRECY DURING 
LITIGATION 
The Restatement provides 123 that one who has a right to a trade secret may 
(a) recover damages for past harm; or 
(b) be granted an injunction against future harm by disclosure or adverse 
use; or 
(c) be granted an accounting of a wrongdoer's profits; or 
(d) have the physical things embodying the secret surrendered by the 
120 Sec 757. 
121 Sec 1 Commissioners' comment, citing as an example the duPont case; cf Chisum and Jacobs 
3.42. 
122 Sec 1 Commissioners' comment. 
123 Sec 757 comment (e). 
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wrongdoer for destruction; 
and he may have two or more of these remedies in the same action. 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has separate sections dealing with injunctive 
relief124 and damages, 125 and another dealing with the awarding of attorneys' 
fees.126 
3.3.1 DAMAGES 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts provides127 that one who has right to a trade 
secret may recover damages for past harm. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
provides 128 that a complainant may, in addition to 129 or independent of130 
injunctive relief, recover damages for the actual loss caused by misappropriation. The 
Uniform Act comment states 131 that an award of damages is, like injunctive relief, 
appropriate only for the period during which the information is entitled to protection 
as a trade secret, plus the additional period, if applicable, during which the 
misappropriator retained an advantage over 'good faith competitors' as a result of his 
misappropriation.132 It is during this time alone that misappropriation causes actual 
124 Sec 2. 
125 Sec 3. 
126 Sec 4. The general rule in American courts is that parties must pay their own attorneys' fees 
(cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.51 ), but the Act provides that reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded 
to the prevailing party if (a) a claim of misappropriation was made in bad faith; (b) a motion to 
terminate an injunction was made or resisted in bad faith; or (c) there was wilful and malicious 
misappropriation. 
127 Sec 757 comment (e). 
128 Sec 3(a). 
129 Cf case law cited by Milgrim Vol 3 15.209 fn 102. 
13° Cf case law cited by Milgrim Vol 3 15.212 fn 103. 
131 Sec 3 Commissioner's comment. 
132 Cf Milgrim Vol 3 15.214: "The period for which damages are assessable ... probably terminates 
after the expiration of the head-start advantage gained by the misappropriator [citing inter alia 
Structural Dynamics Research Corp v Engineering Mechanics Research Corp 401 F Supp 1102 1119-
1120 (ED Mich 1975); Telex Corp v International Business Machines Corp 367 F Supp 258 320-326 
358-359 363, 179 USPQ 777 (ND Okla 1973), 510 F 2d 894, 184 USPQ 521 (10th Cir), 423 US 802 
(1975)], although there is authority supporting the view that the head-start concept has relevance only 
to the duration of an injunction [citing inter alia Sikes v McGraw-Edison Co 665 F 2d 731 736-737 (5th 
Cir), 671 F 2d 150 (1982); Organic Chemicals, Inc v Carroll Products, Inc 211 USPQ 628 633-634 
(WD Mich 1981 ); Goldberg v Medtronic, Inc 686 F 2d 1219 1229, 216 USPQ 89 (7th Cir 1982)]." 
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damage to the complainant and unjust benefit to the misappropriator. 133 On the 
other hand, damages may be available even though an injunction is no longer 
available - for instance for wrongful use prior to a public disclosure of the secret. 134 
While a claim for actual damages and net profits may be combined with a claim for 
injunctive relief, if both claims are granted, the injunctive relief will usually preclude 
a monetary award for the period during which the injunction is effective. 135 
The Uniform Act further provides 136 that a complainant may also recover, in addition 
to his actual loss, the unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation that is not 
taken into account in computing damages for actual loss.137 
The quantum of the damages may be computed with reference to either the 
complainant's loss or the misappropriator's profits, but not to both. 138 In the 1985 
amendments to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, provision was made139 for yet 
another alternative measure of the amount of damages, namely the imposition of a 
reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade 
133 The Commissioners' comment thus appears to align itself with the so-called Conmar rule, rather 
than the so-called Shel/mar rule - see par 3.4.4 below. 
134 Milgrim Vol 3 15.213. As will be seen in par 3.4.4 below, injunctive relief may in appropriate 
circumstances be granted even after secrecy has been destroyed. 
135 Uniform Trade Secrets Act sec 3 Commissioners' comment. 
136 Sec 3(a). 
137 The Commissioners' comment explains that this is an adoption of a trend in the case law to 
allow recovery of both a complainant's actual losses and a misappropriator's unjust benefit caused by 
the misappropriation (citing Tri-Tron International v Ve/to 525 F 2d 432 (Ca 1975); cf Chisum and 
Jacobs 3.49 fns 26 27). The Act expressly forbids a double counting - that is, a counting of the same 
item as both a loss to the complainant and an unjust benefit to the misappropriator (citing Telex Corp 
v International Business Machines Corp 519 F 2d 894, 184 USPQ 521 (10th Cir 1975), 423 US 802 
(1975) as a case which may have sanctioned a double counting in the past). 
138 Milgrim Vol 3 15.216-15.222 and case law cited; Lupo and Tanguay 87; cf Callmann Vol 2 
14.170-171: "The measure of damages, it has been held, is determined by the difference between the 
plaintiff's position before and after the misappropriation of his secret. The plaintiff's probable loss may 
be a more significant indication of this difference than the defendant's actual gain. The injured plaintiff 
should not be denied relief because the defendant made no profits; the risk of the illegal venture 
should be borne by the defendant. Accordingly, the law will require the wrongdoer to pay a 'reasonable 
royalty' for the misappropriation. If the defendant has totally destroyed the secret, thus denying its 
benefit to the plaintiff, its value will be an appropriate measure of damages; but where the plaintiff still 
has some of the benefit of the secret, its total value to the plaintiff would be an inappropriate measure. 
The cost of legally acquiring the information by independent experimentation may be relevant on the 
issue of its value. But unless a specific injury to the plaintiff can be established, such as lost sales, the 
loss to plaintiff is not the proper basis for assessing damages. In such cases defendant's gain may 
serve as the point of proper reference in determining the extent of the plaintiff's loss." Cf, in similar 
vein, Kintner and Lahr 241-242. 
139 Sec 3(a); cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.50; Jager Vol 3 Appendix A 1.21ff. 
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secret. 140 
In the case of wilful and malicious misappropriation, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
authorizes 141 the court to award exemplary or punitive damages in addition to 
recovery of actual loss. The amount of such exemplary damages may not exceed an 
amount twice that of the amount awarded for actual loss. 
3.3.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts provides142 that one who has a right to a trade 
secret may be entitled to an account of profits. 143 With this equitable remedy the 
measure of compensation is established with reference to the defendant's profits 
rather than the plaintiff's losses (or damage).144 145 If the defendant has used and 
will continue to use the plaintiff's trade secret without authority, but the plaintiff is 
denied injunctive relief on policy grounds, the court order may provide for continuing 
accountings to appraise the value of continuing use.146 
3.3.3 INJUNCTIONS 
The injunction is often the only remedy with which the secrecy of a trade secret may 
effectively be preserved, and is therefore the most frequently sought after remedy in 
trade secret litigation.147 
140 According to Milgrim Vol 3 15.232ff a trend in the case law to compute the amount of damages 
with reference to a reasonable royalty, seems to have arisen as a result of analogy with patent law. 
141 Sec 3(b); cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.50. 
142 Sec 757 comment (e). 
143 Cf Milgrim Vol 3 15.248ff and case law cited; Julius Hyman & Co v Velsicol Corp 123 Colo 563, 
233 p 2d 977, 342 us 870, 342 us 895 (1951 ). 
144 Milgrim Vol 3 15.248-15.249. 
145 As noted (par 3.3.1 above), in American trade secrets law the defendant's profits may also be 
used as a basis for determining quantum in an action for damages. 
146 Republic Aviation Corp v Schenk 152 USPQ 830 835 (Sup Ct 1967), where injunctive relief was 
denied in the light of national defence considerations; cf Milgrim Vol 3 15.251. A remedy earmarked 
for this type of situation by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (sec 2(b); cf the Commissioners' comment) 
is an injunction making future use by the defendant conditional on the payment of a reasonable royalty; 
see par 3.3.3 below. 
147 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.47; Jager Vol 1 7.4-7.5; Kintner and Lahr 238; Lupo and Tanguay 87; 
Milgrim Vol 3 15.133ff; Lamb v Quality Inspection Services, Inc 214 USPQ 575 576 (La Ct App 1981 ). 
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The Restatement provides 148 that one who has a right to a trade secret may be 
granted an injunction against future harm by disclosure or adverse use. The Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act provides 149 that actual or threatened misappropriation may be 
enjoined. In respect of the duration of an injunction, the Act provides 150 that the 
injunction will be terminated - on application to the court - when the trade secret 
ceases to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable 
period to eliminate any commercial advantage that the misappropriator would 
otherwise have derived from the misappropriation. However, the duration of 
injunctions in trade secret cases has been one of the major points of contention in 
American trade secrets law, and therefore this matter will be examined in more depth 
below.151 
Furthermore, the Act originally provided152 that if it would be unreasonable to 
prohibit future use of a trade secret by the misappropriator, the court could issue an 
injunction making the misappropriator's future use of the secret conditional on the 
payment of a reasonable royalty. The Commissioners' comment gave two examples 
of situations where it could be unreasonable to prohibit future use. Firstly, an 
"overriding public interest" could militate against an injunction prohibiting future use. 
In Republic Aviation Corporation v Schenk,153 for instance, the court was of the 
opinion that an injunction prohibiting a misappropriator from supplying the United 
States with an aircraft weapons control system could have endangered military 
personnel in Vietnam. Secondly, it may be unreasonable to issue a prohibitory 
injunction against a third person who acquired a misappropriated trade secret in good 
faith and without reason to know of its prior misappropriation.154 This provision has 
since 155 been amended to provide that in exceptional circumstances, an injunction 
may condition further use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than 
the period of time for which use could have been prohibited. It is further added that 
"exceptional circumstances" include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial 
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation 
148 Sec 757 comment (e). 
149 Sec 2(a). 
150 Sec 2(a). 
151 Par 3.4.4. 
152 Sec 2(b). 
153 152 USPQ 830 (Sup Ct 1967). 
154 This matter is discussed in more depth in par 3.4.3 below. 
155 In 1985; see Jager Vol 3 Appendix A 1.17ff. 
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that renders a prohibitory injunction inequitable.156 
Injunctions may be granted in three basic forms. In the first place, a temporary 
restraining order may be sought. 157 The purpose of this remedy is to preserve the 
status quo pending a determination of the appropriateness of further preliminary 
injunctive relief. 158 If the trade secret owner can establish that he or she will suffer 
immediate and irreparable harm before the other party can be given an opportunity 
to oppose the restraining order, the application may even be brought ex parte. 
Because it does not conform with the general principle that a court will only act after 
all parties have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the courts will issue an ex 
parte temporary order with circumspection.159 
Secondly, a preliminary injunction may be granted to maintain the status quo between 
the parties pending the outcome of a trial. The applicant must prove the following to 
be granted a preliminary injunction: 160 
(a) the existence of a clear right which needs protection; 
(b) that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not granted; 
(c) that the remedy at law is inadequate; 
(d) that there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the case; and 
(e) that the preliminary injunction will not have an injurious effect on the 
general public. 
In many cases 161 a more lenient test has been used, namely whether the applicant 
has shown: 
(a) that irreparable harm will result if injunctive relief is not granted; and 
(b) either: (1) that there is a likelihood of success on the merits; or 
(2) that there are sufficiently serious questions going to 
156 The Commissioners' comment cites an "overriding public interest" on the Schenk case model 
as a further example of "exceptional circumstances". 
157 See in general Jager Vol 1 7.6-7.12. 
158 Jager Vol 1 7.9 and authority cited. 
159 See Jager Vol 1 7.7-7.9. 
16° Cf eg Scott & Fetzer Co v Khan 74111 App 3d 400, 393 NE 2d 102, 208 USPQ 362 365 (Ill App 
1979); American Can Co v Mansukhani 223 USPQ 97 104 (7th Cir 1984); FMC Corp v Varco 
International, Inc 677 F 2d 500, 217 USPQ 135 136 (5th Cir 1982); see further Jager Vol 1 7.14-7.15 
and case law cited; Lupo and Tanguay 87. 
161 Eg Sonesta International Hotels Corp v Wellington Associates 483 F 2d 247 250 (2nd Cir 1973); 
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co v ITT Continental Baking Co 526 F 2d 86 (9th Cir 1975); Litton 
Systems, Inc v Sundstrand Corp 224 USPQ 252 254 (Fed Cir 1984); see further Jager Vol 1 7.16-7.18 
and case law cited. 
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the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and 
that the balance of hardships tips decidedly towards 
the applicant. 
In trade secret cases an established threat of disclosure, destruction or dilution of the 
trade secret will generally constitute irreparable harm justifying injunctive relief .162 
In Ecolaire, Incorporated v Crissman 163 the unauthorized use of a former 
employer's trade secrets was found to constitute irreparable harm, because the value 
of the plaintiff's loss of long term investment in the trade secrets, and loss of goodwill, 
could not be measured merely in terms of money. The requirement that there must 
be a likelihood of success on the merits, will usually be satisfied if the applicant can 
show that he or she does possess a legally protectable trade secret. It is not required 
at this stage to make out a case which will justify relief at the final hearing.164 The 
public interest requirement has been given various interpretations. Thus it has been 
held165 to be in the public interest to prevent the acquisition of a trade secret by 
unfair means only through a former employee. In another case166 it was in the 
public interest to deny injunctive relief, where granting the injunction would have 
meant a delay in the completion of an important airport in Saudi Arabia. It has been 
held167 that the public interest element must relate to specific and concrete action 
rather than to abstract principles. 
Finally, a permanent injunction may be ordered by the court after a full trial. 168 As 
with the temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, the normal rules 
regarding injunctions apply.169 The major point of contention regarding injunctive 
relief in trade secret cases is its duration, and this issue is discussed in more depth 
elsewhere.170 
162 CPG Products Corp v Mego Corp 214 USPQ 206 214 (SD Ohio 1981); see further - also on 
variation in this regard among different jurisdictions - Jager Vol 1 7.18-7.25. 
163 542 F Supp 196, 215 USPQ 817 824 (ED Pa 1982); cf Jager Vol 1 7.22.2. 
164 MBL (USA) Corp v Diekman 112 Ill App 3d 229, 445 NE 2d 418 (1983); see further Jager Vol 
1 7.25-7.26. 
165 FMC Corp v Varco International 217 USPQ 135 139 (5th Cir 1982); cf Jager Vol 1 7.26.1. 
166 Litton Systems, Inc v Sundstrand Corp 224 USPQ 252 258 (Fed Cir 1984); cf Jager Vol 1 
7.26.2. 
167 Continental Group, Inc v Amoco Corp 614 F 2d 351 (3rd Cir 1980); cf Jager Vol 1 7.26.2-7.27. 
168 See in general Jager Vol 1 7.32.3-7.51. 
169 See eg Jager Vol 1 7.32.3. 
170 Par 3.4.4 below. 
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It is typical of trade secret cases to have an award made of an injunction combined 
with damages. The granting of injunctive as well as monetary relief in a trade secret 
case does not constitute 'double damages'. 171 
3.3.4 ORDERS FOR DELIVERY UP 
The Restatement states 172 that one who has right to a trade secret may have 
physical things embodying the secret, such as designs, patterns and so forth, 
surrendered by the wrongdoer for destruction. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
provides 173 that in appropriate circumstances affirmative acts to protect a trade 
secret may be compelled by a court order. The Commissioners' comment explains 
that the relevant section authorizes injunctions ordering a misappropriator to hand 
over the 'fruits of the misappropriation', like stolen blueprints or unauthorized 
photographs or recordings, to the plaintiff .174 
3.3.5 PRESERVATION OF SECRECY DURING LITIGATION 
A plaintiff trade secret owner may have to reveal his or her trade secret in court in 
order to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon him or her, or to give the 
defendant a fair opportunity to defend himself or herself. 175 To prevent such a 
disclosure during litigation from making the secret available to the plaintiff's 
competitors, the court may order the trial to proceed in camera. 176 The court may 
even prevent the disclosure of the secret to expert witnesses during the taking of 
testimony, unless they take an oath of secrecy. 177 The court may furthermore 
protect trade secrets from open discovery according to civil procedure rules by 
entering a protective order that a trade secret may not be disclosed or may only be 
disclosed in a designated way. 178 
171 Jager Vol 1 7.2 and case law cited; Lupo and Tanguay 87. 
172 Sec 757 comment (e). 
173 Sec 2(c). 
174 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.169; Chisum and Jacobs 3.51; Milgrim Vol 3 15.266-15.267. 
175 Callmann Vol 2 14.156; Jager Vol 1 5.93. 
176 Callmann Vol 2 14.67 14.156; Jager Vol 1 5.95. 
m Callmann Vol 2 14.156 and authority cited 14.158 fn 8. 
178 Jager Vol 1 5.95. 
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3.4 SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS 
3.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
During the subsistence of the employment relationship the employee is under a duty 
not to use or disclose the trade secrets of his or her employer. 179 This duty is not 
dependent on an express contractual provision between the parties - it may be 
implied in law.180 The employee's duty to respect the employer's trade secrets 
coincides with the farmer's general fiduciary duty towards the latter.181 However, the 
fiduciary duty goes beyond the protection of trade secrets - it prohibits the employer 
from using or divulging any confidential information concerning the employer's 
business, irrespective of whether it is a trade secret or not, to the detriment of the 
employer.182 
The unauthorized disclosure or use of the former employer's trade secrets by an ex-
employee after termination of the employment relationship poses special problems. 
The basic rule is that after termination of employment, the ex-employee is free to use 
his or her acquired general knowledge, experience and skill, as long as he or she 
does not use the former employer's trade secrets.183 The principle is clear and 
straight forward, but its practical application is notoriously difficult.184 Two conflicting 
interests, both supported by policy considerations, must be balanced. 185 On the one 
hand there is the interest of the employer to have his or her exclusive use of his or 
her trade secret protected by the law, supported by the policy consideration that 
reasonable legal protection will tend to encourage the development of new and better 
technology. On the other hand there is the interest of the former employee to use his 
or her acquired skills and knowledge to secure a favourable position in the market, 
supported by the public interest in healthy competition and the dissemination of ideas, 
processes and methods. The problem becomes especially acute when the former 
employee had a key post and was doing work of a confidential nature requiring a high 
179 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14. 78; Kintner and Lahr 164; Milgrim Vol 1 5.4-5.5. 
18
° Callmann Vol 2 14.78-14.79. 
181 Cf Kintner and Lahr 170; Milgrim Vol 1 5.4-5.5. 
182 Kintner and Lahr 170-174; cf Callmann Vol 214.80. The employee also has an implied duty not 
to compete with the employer during subsistence of the employment relationship; cf Milgrim Vol 1 5.29. 
183 See eg Callmann Vol 2 14.87; Dratler 4.19; Milgrim Vol 1 5.19 and case law cited. 
184 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.87: "This rather piously oversimplified principle is much easier to state 
than to apply." 
185 Cf eg Callmann Vol 2 14.87-14.88; Dratler 4.18; Kintner and Lahr 174ff; fns 189 191 below. 
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degree of specialized knowledge and skill. One commentator has suggested186 that 
any attempt, in such a case, to draw a line between the employee's general 
knowledge and skill and the employer's trade secrets will inevitably involve some 
injustice to one of the parties. 
Two examples from case law may serve to illustrate how the application of the 
mentioned principles to different sets of facts may lead to divergent results. 187 In 
El duPont de Nemours & Company v American Potash & Chemical Corporation188 
the plaintiff, duPont, was the only successful commercial manufacturer of titanium 
dioxide by a chloride process. Hirsch, in his capacity as former employee of duPont, 
played an important role in the research and development of the process. The 
American Potash & Chemical Corporation, which was interested in developing a 
chloride process for the manufacture of titanium dioxide and had previously 
unsuccessfully sought from duPont a licence for the process, employed Hirsch in a 
management position one day after he had resigned from duPont. DuPont was 
successful in obtaining a restraining order to prevent Hirsch from disclosing its trade 
secrets concerning the manufacturing process to Potash. 189 In Wexler v 
186 Callmann Vol 2 14.89: "The more important an employee's job, the more difficult will it be to 
separate the knowledge he is free to use from that which should be within the secret sphere of the 
business owner. Where the employee is an expert in a newly developed science, whose creative mind 
established a manufacturing department on the basis of his own plans and ideas, or is a man known 
to and desired by industry, any attempt to draw the line between his own intellectual equipment and 
that which he cannot use or divulge without a breach of confidence necessarily involves some injustice 
to one party. The problem is accentuated in modern industry, because in high technology companies 
inventors are often an important part of the management team." 
187 Cf Milgrim Vol 1 5.38ff. 
188 200 A 2d 428 (Del Ch 1964); cf Kintner and Lahr 175-176; Milgrim Vol 1 5.38-5.42. 
189 The court expressed its appreciation of the burden placed on the employee whose knowledge 
has become interwoven with the employer's trade secrets, and the policy issues at stake in the 
determination of the rights of the parties, as follows (437): "The court fully recognizes that this is a 
case of great social and industrial significance both on the question of the right to relief and, if 
established, the scope thereof. Among the substantial and conflicting policies at play in this situation 
are the protection of employers' rights in their trade secrets on the one hand, versus the right of the 
individual to exploit his talents, use matters of general knowledge, and pursue his calling without undue 
hindrance from a prior employer on the other. The law recognizes that trade secrets are entitled to 
reasonable protection regardless of the supporting legal label. Reasonable legal protection tends to 
encourage, as here, substantial expenditures to find or improve ways and means of accomplishing 
commercial and industrial goals. The protection of such efforts when translated into trade secrets tends 
to encourage such efforts and the result is beneficial to the employer and presumably to society. 
However, it is hard to ask a man to work in a trade secret area and thereby circumscribe his possible 
future liberty of action and the use of the knowledge of the trade secrets. The interests involved are 
as easy to state as they are difficult to protect, particularly in the face of the ever-increasing complexity 
of present day technology." 
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Greenberg, 190 Greenberg was a chemist formerly employed by the Buckingham 
Wax Company, for whom he developed new formulas by analysing and duplicating 
competitors' products. He later left Buckingham and sought employment with the Brite 
Products Company. Before Greenberg had left Buckingham, Brite's business had 
consisted solely of buying and distributing chemical products. Soon after Greenberg 
had joined Brite, however, Brite started manufacturing the same products that it used 
to purchase from Buckingham for distribution. The court found that since Greenberg's 
job with Buckingham had been to copy, rather than to invent, the results were the 
fruits of his own skills. The formulas were therefore part of his acquired knowledge 
and skill, which he could not be restrained from using. 191 
The Wexler and duPont cases have been distinguished on the grounds that Hirsch 
in the duPont case had done original and independent research and development, 
while Greenberg in the Wexler case had only reverse engineered the secrets of 
others; 192 and that du Pont had more to lose because he was the sole manufacturer 
of titanium dioxide by a chloride process, whereas the Buckingham Wax Company 
had already had competitors in the market.193 However, Milgrim has criticized194 
190 399 Pa 569, 160 A 2d 430 (1960); cf Kintner and Lahr 149 150 174-175; Milgrim Vol 1 5.48-
5.56. 
191 The court expressed the conflicting interests at stake as follows (434-435): "The burden the 
appellees must... meet brings to the fore a problem of accommodating competing policies in our law: 
the right of a businessman to be protected against unfair competition stemming from the usurpation 
of his trade secrets and the right of an individual to the unhampered pursuit of the occupations and 
livelihoods for which he is best suited. There are cogent socio-economic arguments in favor of either 
position. Society as a whole greatly benefits from technological improvements. Without some means 
of post-employment protection to assure that valuable developments or improvements are exclusively 
those of the employer, the businessman could not afford to subsidize research or improve current 
methods. In addition, it must be recognized that modern economic growth and development has 
pushed the business venture beyond the size of the one-man firm, forcing the businessman to a much 
greater degree to entrust confidential business information relating to technological development to 
appropriate employees. While recognizing the utility in the dispersion of responsibilities in larger firms, 
the optimum amount of 'entrusting' will not occur unless the risk of loss to the businessman through 
a breach of trust can be held to a minimum. On the other hand, any form of post-employment restraint 
reduces the economic mobility of employees and limits their personal freedom to pursue a preferred 
course of livelihood. The employee's bargaining position is weakened because he is potentially 
shackled by the acquisition of alleged trade secrets; and thus, paradoxically, he is restrained, because 
of his increased expertise, from advancing further in the industry in which he is most productive. 
Moreover. .. society suffers because competition is diminished by slackening the dissemination of ideas, 
processes and methods. Were we to measure the sentiment of the law by the weight of both English 
and American decisions in order to determine whether it favors protecting a businessman from certain 
forms of competition or protecting an individual in his unrestricted pursuit of a livelihood, the balance 
would heavily favor the latter." 
192 Cf Milgrim Vol 1 5.54-55. 
193 Cf Kintner and Lahr 176. 
194 Vol 1 5.55. 
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the Wexler case on the ground that there was no policy justification for allowing 
Greenberg to use his reverse engineering skills in the same field and be permitted 
to use the formulas he had reverse engineered for his former employer, if those 
formulas did in fact constitute trade secrets. If, on the other hand, the formulas did 
not really qualify as trade secrets, for instance because they were easily 
ascertainable from the marketed products (and therefore did not require true, skilled 
reverse engineering), the case had been correctly decided. 
The employer may furthermore protect his or her trade secrets by way of express 
contract - either in the form of agreements to preserve the secrecy thereof, or in the 
form of restrictive covenants by which the employee is bound not to compete with the 
employer after termination of the employment relationship. 195 
3.4.2 INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 
While industrial espionage is certainly a problem in the commercial and industrial 
sectors of American society, 196 the law seems to be adequately developed to 
protect the trade secret owner against the actions of industrial spies, provided the 
latter is caught.197 In terms of the (first) Restatement of the Law of Torts 198 use 
or disclosure of a trade secret by improper means give rise to liability. Protection 
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act199 is wider in so far as the improper 
acquisition of trade secrets already constitutes misappropriation that may be enjoined 
or for which an award of damages may be made. An obligation of confidence 
between the trade secret owner and the misappropriator is not a prerequisite for 
intervention by the law.200 In terms of the Uniform Act there is apparently no need 
195 Par 3.5.1 below. 
196 See eg Pooley (published 1987) who states (x) that the damage to American business from theft 
of trade secrets is estimated to exceed four billion dollars annually. Cf Milgrim Vol 1 7.138ff. 
197 This is in contrast to the position in English law, where as noted (par 2.4.2 above), the position 
can at best be described as uncertain - cf Coleman Trade secrets 87. 
198 As noted in par 3.2.2 above. 
199 As noted in par 3.2.2 above. 
200 Dratler 4.90-4.91: "Not only does tort law impose duties in the absence of an employee-
employer relationship; it may impose duties in the absence of any relationship at all. Even complete 
strangers may be liable to a trade secret owner for misappropriation, for example, by industrial 
espionage ... [TI he gist of trade secret misappropriation is the use of improper means to acquire the 
secret. While the term 'improper means' includes breach of contract and breach of confidence, it also 
includes a number of acts that have nothing to do with contracts or confidential relationships, such as 
theft, bribery, and industrial espionage. These acts require no prior relationship whatsoever between 
the victim of the misappropriation and the misappropriator - that is, the thief, briber or industrial spy." 
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for the trade secret owner to wait for actual or threatening disclosure or use of the 
trade secret by the spy or the person who received the secret from the spy - the mere 
acquisition by improper means already justifies legal intervention.201 The case law 
has furthermore proved the preparedness of the courts to protect trade secret owners 
against industrial espionage. 202 
3.4.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS 
As noted,203 in American law an obligation of confidence between a misappropriator 
and the owner of a trade secret is not a prerequisite for legal intervention. 
Consequently, a trade secret owner will in general not experience particular difficulties 
to obtain injunctive relief or an award of damages against a third person (that is, 
someone who has had no direct communication with the trade secret owner) who has 
misappropriated his or her trade secret.204 However, the position of the third person 
who has received the trade secret neither by breach of a confidential relationship nor 
by any other improper means, requires closer scrutiny. The Restatement of the Law 
of Torts provides205 that someone who has received another's trade secret from a 
third person without notice that it is a secret and that the third person's disclosure 
thereof was a breach of a duty to the trade secret owner, or who has learned the 
secret through a mistake without notice of the secrecy and the mistake, will not be 
liable to the owner for use or disclosure of the secret prior to receipt of such notice. 
After receipt of the notice he will be liable to the owner for unauthorized use or 
disclosure of the secret. However, if he has - before receiving the notice - in good 
faith paid value for the secret, or has so altered his position that it would be 
inequitable to hold him liable, the trade secret owner will have no redress against 
him. The Restatement does not require a particular form of notice, but states206 that 
the question is simply whether in the circumstances the recipient knows or should 
know that the information is the other's secret and that its disclosure has been made 
This is an important point of difference with English law - cf Coleman Trade secrets 90. 
201 Par 3.2.2 fn 114 above; cf Coleman Trade secrets 89. 
202 Eg El duPont de Nemours & Co v Christopher 431 F 2d 1012, 166 USPQ 421 (5th Cir 1970), 
400 US 1024, 401 US 967 (1971) - par 3.2.2 above; cf Callmann Vol 2 14.137-14.140; Milgrim Vol 1 
7.138-7.188 and case law cited. 
203 Cf par 3.4.2; 3.2.2 above; Dratler 4.90-4.91; Coleman Trade secrets 90. 
204 See, for instance, the position of the industrial spy, par 3.4.2 above. 
205 Sec 758; cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.42-3.43. 
206 Sec 757 comment G). 
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in confidence. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act the position is substantially the 
same,207 except in so far as the absolute immunity on third parties who have in 
good faith paid value or materially altered their positions before receiving notice that 
the secret has been misappropriated, is rejected. In such a case the Act confers208 
a discretion on the court to issue an injunction conditioning future use upon payment 
of a reasonable royalty to the owner of the secret.209 An award of damages may, 
however, not be made in such a case. 210 
3.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION 
In principle the legal protection of a trade secret can last so long as the secret can 
indeed be kept secret, and this may be a considerable period of time, spanning 
several generations.211 It may be stated that in principle trade secret protection may 
last for an indefinite period of time.212 A question that has caused major dissensus 
among the courts of the various states, is whether the legal protection of a trade 
secret may in given circumstances outlive the subsistence of the secret itself. This 
has been the subject of the Shel/mar-Conmar controversy. 213 
The so-called Shel/mar rule is named after the decision in Shel/mar Products 
Company v Allen-Qual/ey Company.214 In this case the defendant had by his 
wrongful conduct caused the plaintiff's trade secrets, disclosed to him in the course 
of negotiations which subsequently broke down, to be disclosed. The defendant was 
enjoined from using those secrets, despite the subsequent issuance of patents - fully 
207 See the definition of 'misappropriation' (sec 1 (2) - par 3.2.2 above) and secs 2 and 3 - par 3.3.3; 
3.3.1 above. The Commissioners' comment to sec 2 states explicitly that notice by the trade secret 
owner to the good faith third person that the last-mentioned has knowledge of a trade secret as a 
result of misappropriation by another, suffices to make the third person a misappropriator thereafter 
(under sec 1 (2)(ii)(B)(I)). 
208 Sec 2(b) (as amended) read with the Commissioners' comment. 
209 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.43. 
210 The 1985 amendments to sec 3(a) provides that a complainant is entitled to recover damages 
for misappropriation "except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to 
acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable"; 
cf Jager Vol 3 Appendix A1.21.ff. 
211 Eg the recipe of Coca-Cola - a trade secret for more than 100 years. Cf par 1.1 above. 
212 Restatement of the Law of Torts sec 757 comment (a); Dratler 4.3 4.56. 
213 See in general Barclay 1978 UCLA LR 203; Jager Vol 1 6.12-6.32 7.34-7.51. 
214 87 F 2d 104, 32 USPQ 24 (7th Cir), 301 US 695 (1937). 
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disclosing the trade secrets - to other parties. 
It has been pointed out215 that the Shel/mar decision was not concerned with a 
situation in which the publication or patenting of the trade secret resulted directly from 
the conduct of the trade secret owner or his agents. The initial disclosure of the 
secret was caused by the wrongful conduct of the defendant, and therefore he 
forfeited his right as a member of the general public to benefit from the later 
publication of the trade secret in a patent.216 That the Shel/mar rule concerned the 
situation where the defendant had made a wrongful disclosure, was also clearly 
stated in Syntex Ophthalmics, Incorporated v Tsuetaki. 217 However, the 
interpretation of the Shel/mar rule generally accepted by the courts was that 
publication of the trade secret, even by the trade secret owner, does not rule out 
injunctive relief against a defendant who learnt the trade secret in confidence before 
publication took place.218 
The Conmar rule is named after the decision in Conmar Products Corporation v 
215 Jager Vol 1 6.13. 
216 Cf the words used by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal of the Seventh Circuit (87 F 2d 110, 
32 USPQ 29): "It is quite true that Allen-Qualley's trade secrets have been disclosed to the world ... 
Appellant [ie the defendant] first made that disclosure in an unlawful manner, and because of that fact 
it cannot contend that it is a member of the public to whom it made the disclosure. To hold otherwise 
would be to permit appellant to profit by its own wrong. We are dealing here not with Allen-Qualley's 
right against the world, but with that company's right against appellant... [nhe reason for the injunction 
still exists and ... Allen-Qualley's right thereto has not been extinguished." 
217 701 F 2d 677 683, 219 USPQ 962 (7th Cir 1983): "[W)e held in ... Shel/mar ... that a wrongdoer 
who has made an unlawful disclosure of another's trade secrets cannot assert that publication to 
escape the protection of trade secret law. We believe that principle to be equally vital today. To hold 
otherwise would be to permit appellants to profit from their own wrong." Cf Jager Vol 1 6.14-6.15. 
218 In AO Smith Corp Petroleum Iron Works Co 73 F 2d 531, 24 USPQ 183 (6th Cir 1934), 74 F 
2d 934, 25 USPQ 29 (6th Cir 1935), the leading case relied on in the Shel/mar case, it had already 
been decided that the publication of a trade secret through the issuance of a patent by the owner of 
the trade secret, did not preclude injunctive relief against a defendant who had misappropriated the 
trade secret in breach of confidence before publication. Later cases have liberally interpreted Shel/mar, 
bringing it in line with the AO Smith case. Eg: Jones v Ulrich 87 USPQ 331 335 (Ill App 1950): 
"[D]efendant, being himself burdened with a prior confidential disclosure, may not now set up a 
subsequent publication or even abandonment of the invention to the general public to escape the 
consequences of his alleged violation of the confidential disclosure made earlier to him"; Franke v 
Wiltschek 209 F 2d 493 495, 99 USPQ 431 433 (2nd Cir 1953): "Plaintiffs do not assert, indeed cannot 
assert, a property right in their development such as would entitle them to exclusive enjoyment against 
the world. Theirs is not a patent, but a trade secret. The essence of their action is not infringement, 
but breach of faith. It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study of 
the expired patent and plaintiff's publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did not. Instead they 
gained it from plaintiff's confidential relationship, and in so doing incurred a duty not to use it to 
plaintiff's detriment. This duty they have breached"; Rohm and Haas Co v Adco Chemical Co 215 
USPQ 1081 1088 (3rd Cir 1982); Goldberg v Medtronic, Inc 216 USPQ 89 95: "[O]ne who breaches 
an obligation of confidence and uses confidential information to the owner's detriment is liable despite 
the fact that the information could have been lawfully obtained"; cf Jager Vol 1 6.15ff. 
93 
Universal Slide Fastener Company.219 An ex-employee of the plaintiff built a 
machine for the defendant that allegedly utilised trade secrets of the plaintiff. The 
trade secrets were later disclosed in patents issued to the plaintiff. Injunctive relief 
against the defendant was denied, and the Shel/mar rule expressly rejected.220 The 
import of the Conmar rule is that trade secret protection is 'cut off' by the issuance 
of a patent or other form of publication of the secret. Like the Shel/mar rule, this rule 
has been followed in many cases. 221 
The granting of a permanent injunction after publication of the relevant trade secret 
in terms of the Shel/mar rule has been criticized as being a punitive remedy.222 On 
the other hand, strict application of the Conmar rule has also been criticized as being 
unduly harsh.223 However, the alleged harshness of the Conmar rule has been 
tempered in some ways. In the first place, while the Conmar rule bars an injunction 
219 172 F 2d 150, 80 USPQ 108 (2nd Cir 1949). 
220 Jager has expressed the opinion (Vol 1 6.27) that an outright rejection of Shel/mar was 
unnecessary, and that the court in Conmar could have distinguished it on the facts: "In Shel/mar, the 
misappropriator participated in the allegedly fatal trade secret disclosure, whereas in Conmar the fatal 
disclosure was caused by the trade secret owner. In Shel/mar the wrongdoer was unable to benefit 
from his wrong, and was permanently enjoined. In Conmar, the plaintiff was unable to continue to claim 
that which he disclosed in a patent as a secret, and was accordingly denied the benefit of an 
injunction. Both cases are therefore consistent with standard principles of equity, and are not inherently 
inconsistent with each other. This analysis and approach would have prevented the development of 
a split of authority on this point. Nevertheless, a split did occur, and courts are often forced to choose 
between the Shel/mar and Conmar rules when evaluating the effect of a public disclosure which occurs 
after the confidential disclosure of a trade secret." 
221 Eg Timely Products Corp v Arron 523 F 2d 288, 187 USPQ 257 (2d Cir 1975); Forest 
Laboratories, Inc v Pillsbury Co 452 F 2d 621 624, 171 USPQ 731 (7th Cir 1971) (contra American 
Can Co v Mansukhani 223 USPQ 97 111 n 24 (7th Cir 1984); Rototron Corp v Lake Shore Burial Vault 
Co 712 F 2d 1214, 220 USPQ 169 170 n 2 (7th Cir 1983); M & T Chemicals, Inc v International 
Business Machines Corp 403 F Supp 1145 1149, 188 USPQ 568 (SONY 1975), 542 F 2d 1165 (2nd 
Cir), 429 US 1030 (1976); cf Jager Vol 1 6.28ff. 
222 See Barclay 1978 UCLA LR 211; cf Jager Vol 1 6.25 who concedes that in the case of 
publication of the trade secret by the trade secret owner, the Shel/mar rule is too harsh, but then 
proceeds to state: "[A]ny harshness of the Shel/mar rule dissipates when the publication fatal to the 
trade secret occurred at the hands of the misappropriator. In those situations there is little ground for 
sympathy for the trade secret violator who has attempted to terminate the trade secret with his own 
hand. Extensive, or perhaps permanent, injunctive relief should be available to the owner of the trade 
secret under those circumstances." The question might be asked, however, if damages would not be 
more appropriate in such a case. 
223 Cf Jager Vol 1 6.27-6.28: "[A]s strictly applied the Conmar rule bars any damages or injunctive 
relief after the trade secret is published by anyone. This rule can be harsh, and can produce unjust 
results, in some situations. One example would be where the misappropriator knew that the secret 
information would eventually be public, such as through knowledge of a pending patent application 
which is likely to issue as a patent. Armed with that knowledge, he could take steps which would give 
him a competitive advantage, and place the trade secret owner at a substantial disadvantage, 
immediately after the date of public disclosure. Courts sitting in equity should be able to respond to 
such a situation, even in jurisdictions which follow Conmar." 
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after publication of the secret, monetary relief may still be available in proper 
circumstances. For instance, if the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's trade secret has 
enabled the defendant to manufacture and market a product at an earlier date than 
would have been possible by means of independent research and development, 
damages and an accounting of profits resulting from the acceleration of the date 
when production was possible, may still be awarded. 224 
Secondly, what has been described225 as a 'middle ground' between Shel/mar and 
Conmar, has been found in decisions granting 'lead time' injunctions. In Winston 
Research Corporation v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company226 the 
plaintiffs took four years to develop a precision tape recorder. Using trade secrets of 
the plaintiff, the defendant needed only fourteen months to develop a rival tape 
recorder. The defendant was enjoined from using or disclosing the plaintiff's secrets 
(which were soon to be disclosed by the plaintiff in announcements, demonstrations 
and sales of the tape recorders) for a period of two years. Similarly in K-2 Ski 
Company v Head Ski Company, 227 'lead-time' injunctions were granted, the lengths 
of which were chosen as the periods needed by the defendant to lawfully develop the 
products by reverse engineering or independent development. 228 229 
224 Eg Schreyer v Casco Products Corp 97 F Supp 159, 88 USPQ 515 (D Conn), 190 F 2d 921, 
90 USPQ 271 (2nd Cir 1951), 342 US 913 (1952); Engelhard Industries, Inc v Research Instrumental 
Corp 324 F 2d 347 353, 139 USPQ 179 (9th Cir 1963), 377 US 923 (1964); Epstein v Dennison 
Manufacturing Co 314 F Supp 116 125, 164 USPQ 291 (SONY 1969); cf Jager Vol 1 6.30-6.31. 
225 Jager Vol 1 7.35. 
226 350 F 2d 134, 146 USPQ 422 (9th Cir 1965); cf Jager Vol 1 7.42-7.43. 
227 506 F 2d 471 474, 183 USPQ 724 726 (9th Cir 1974); cf Jager Vol 1 7.43. 
228 Also eg SI Handling Systems, Inc v Heisley 753 F 2d 1244, 225 USPQ 441 (3rd Cir 1985); 
Sigma Chemicals Co v Harris 32 PTCJ 309 (8th Cir 1986); cf Jager Vol 1 7.44-7.49. 
229 Thought-provoking comments on certain practical ramifications of lead-time injunctions are made 
by Dratler 4. 75-4. 77: "The notion of a head start period makes good sense with respect to reverse 
engineering, for the time it would take to reverse engineer a particular product is eminently susceptible 
to proof by expert testimony. The notion is more problematic, however, as applied to independent 
development. It is one thing to estimate the time required by competent engineers to extract a known 
secret from a designated product, but it is quite another to estimate the time required to discover the 
secret in the abstract, particularly when the secret is one that no one had ever before discovered or 
used... If the secret required ingenuity, insight, or invention to develop, or if the plaintiff's and 
defendant's resources and capabilities are disparate, then any estimate of the time required for the 
defendant to develop the same secret from scratch may be nothing more than a shot in the dark. Yet 
despite the difficulty of estimating the time required for independent development, some courts have 
attempted to do so, at least in cases involving departing employees. In cases like these, the duration 
of the injunction is often the focus of an unspoken compromise between conflicting policies of 
employee mobility and free competition on the one hand, and encouraging innovation by protecting 
business' investment in it on the other. Though messy and usually imprecise, a compromise of this sort 
allows courts to balance employers' efforts and investment in their secrets and the egregiousness of 
employees' breaches of confidence against employees' contributions to the secrets, the ease of 
95 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides230 that an injunction shall on application 
to the court be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the 
injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to 
eliminate the commercial advantage that would otherwise be derived from the 
misappropriation. If the court finds that it would be unreasonable to prohibit further 
use, an injunction may be issued making future use conditional on the payment of a 
reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have been 
prohibited.231 The Act may thus be said to have adopted a Conmar rule tempered 
by the possibilities of granting 'lead-time' injunctions or ordering the payment of 
reasonable royalties for future use.232 
3.4.5 CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS LAW AND FEDERAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
It has been said233 that there are two paradigms of intellectual property law in the 
United States - protection based on the Copyright Clause of the United States 
discovering the secrets by improper means, and the extent to which an injunction would curtail 
desirable competition in the industry. There are two dangers, however, in using an estimate of 
independent development time to compromise conflicting policies. First, such an estimate may require 
speculation and conjecture to an extent unacceptable in a courtroom. Second, relief based on such 
an estimate may deprive the trade secret owner of the potentially infinite duration of trade secret 
protection, which is a significant part of its attraction vis-a-vis patents. To reduce these dangers, courts 
should give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt in determining the duration of injunctive relief based 
on independent development, and should be reluctant to estimate independent development time at 
all without good evidence that independent development is imminent or that the necessary information 
would be available from a combination of published sources and reverse engineering." 
230 Sec 2(a). 
231 Sec 2(b); see par 3.3.3 above. 
232 This is made very clear in the Commissioners' comment to sec 2, in which the position as 
formulated in the K-2 Ski case is expressly adopted. It is further stated: "The general principle of 
section 2 ... is that an injunction should last for as long as is necessary, but no longer than is 
necessary, to eliminate the commercial advantage or 'lead time' with respect to good faith competitors 
that a person has obtained through misappropriation. Subject to any additional period of restraint 
necessary to negate lead time, an injunction accordingly should terminate when a former trade secret 
becomes either generally known to good faith competitors or generally knowable to them because of 
the lawful availability of products that can be reverse engineered to reveal a trade secret. For example, 
assume that A has a valuable trade secret of which B and C, the other industry members, are originally 
unaware. If B subsequently misappropriates the trade secret and is enjoined from use, but C later 
lawfully reverse engineers the trade secret, the injunction restraining B is subject to termination as 
soon as B's lead time has been dissipated. All of the persons who could derive economic value from 
use of the information are now aware of it, and there is no longer a trade secret under section 1 (4)." 
233 Dratler 1 . 76. 
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Constitution,234 and protection based on other sources of legal authority. The first 
is characterized by strong protection of exclusivity, but for a limited period of time -
the province of patent and copyright laws. The second, to which the protection of 
trade secrets belongs, is characterized by a weaker protection, but for a potentially 
unlimited period of time. Protection under the 'strong' paradigm is afforded by federal 
statutory law, while protection under the 'weak' paradigm is largely a matter of state 
law. If protection under state law overlaps with protection under federal law, a 
potential for conflict is created and the possibility of federal pre-emption arises. 
In the Sears235 and Compco236 cases, the Supreme Court held that federal policy 
pre-empted state unfair competition laws that purported to prevent the copying of 
articles unprotected by federal patent or copyright laws.237 The question as to 
whether state trade secret laws were pre-empted by federal patent law,238 was 
authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Company v Bicron Oil 
Corporation.239 The court stated that the policy objective of patent law was to 
promote progress of science and the useful arts by offering for a limited time a right 
of exclusion to the inventor, in exchange for a complete disclosure of the invention. 
The objectives of trade secrets law were the maintenance of standards of commercial 
ethics and the encouragement of invention. In the case of subject matter known to 
be unpatentable, no conflict between patent and trade secret laws could arise, while 
trade secret protection in this field could be beneficial to society by encouraging minor 
inventions, deterring unethical commercial practices and facilitating licensing. In the 
case of trade secrets of doubtful patentability, the court found that the deleterious 
effects on society and patent policy of abolishing trade secret protection could not be 
balanced out by the speculative gain which might result from inventors with inventions 
of doubtful patentability coming forward to apply for patents. In the case of clearly 
234 Art 1 sec 8 cl 8. 
235 Sears, Roebuck & Co v Stiffel Co 376 US 225, 140 USPQ 524 (1964). 
236 Compco Corp v Day-Brite Lighting, Inc 376 US 234, 140 USPQ 528 (1964). 
237 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 1.11; Jager Vol 2 10.1-10.2. 
238 Cf Painton & Co v Bourns, Inc 422 F 2d 216, 169 USPQ 528 (2nd Cir 1971 ); Servo Corp v 
General Electric Co 337 F 2d 716, 143 USPQ 85 (4th Cir 1964), 383 US 934 (1966); Water Services, 
Inc v Tesco Chemicals, Inc 410 F 2d 163, 162 USPQ 321 (5th Cir 1969); Winston Research Corp v 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co 350 F 2d 134, 146 USPQ 422 (9th Cir 1965); Dekar Industries, 
Inc v Bissett- Berman Corp 434 F 2d 1304, 168 USPQ 71 (9th Cir 1970), 402 US 945 (1971 ); Alelman 
1967 JPOS 713; Doerfer 1967 Harvard LR 1432. 
239 416 US 470, 181 USPQ 673 (1974); cf Chisum and Jacobs 1.14-1.18; Jager Vol 1 3.17-3.18, 
Vol 2 10.2-10.4. See further Bonito Boats, Inc v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc 9 USPQ 2d 1847 (US Sup 
Ct 1989); cf Jager Vol 2 10.4-10.5. 
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patentable inventions, where "the federal interest in disclosure is at its peak",240 the 
court was of the opinion that trade secret protection was not a sufficiently attractive 
option to deter many inventors of such inventions from seeking patent protection.241 
The court accordingly held that there was no justification for either complete or partial 
pre-emption of trade secrets law by patent law.242 
The Kewanee decision has, however, not eliminated all the possible conflicts between 
trade secret and patent laws. An important issue that remains unresolved relates to 
the situation where a patent is issued on an invention that is already the subject of 
a trade secret held by another person.243 Who has the superior right to the 
invention - the first inventor who elected to keep it secret, or the second inventor who 
chose to apply for a patent? In these circumstances, the trade secret and the patent 
cannot co-exist, because when a patent is issued, there is public disclosure and 
consequently secrecy is destroyed.244 A juxtaposition of the decisions in Gillman v 
Stern245 and Dunlop Holdings v Ram Golf Corporation246 suggests247 that the 
outcome must depend on whether the public had the benefit of the trade secret or 
not. Thus, where only the first inventor had the benefit of the secret, the second 
inventor would prevail and would be able to sue the former for infringement if he or 
she continued to use the (former) secret after the latter had obtained the patent. This 
240 416 us 489. 
241 The court pointed out (490) that patent protection was "attractively stronger" than trade secret 
protection, because the latter did not preclude discovery by fair means (like reverse engineering or 
independent development) and the appreciable risk of misappropriation of a trade secret in a manner 
not easily susceptible of discovery or proof. Chisum and Jacobs 1.18 brand this analysis as "strained", 
"because it is common knowledge that inventors and companies do commonly forego patent protection 
on at least some otherwise patentable inventions when trade secrets are a less costly option". They 
opine that it might have been because the court sensed this, that it also cited (493) the acquiescence 
of Congress in the long history of patent-trade secret co-existence. 
242 Cf Aronson v Quick Point Pencil Co 440 US 257, 201 USPQ 1 (1979). Cf further Christianson 
v Colt Industries Operating Corp 609 F Supp 1174 (DC 1111985), 822 F 2d 1544, 3 USPQ 1241 (Fed 
Cir 1987). The decision in the district court has been singled out by Jager Vol 2 10.8.4 as "the most 
serious collision to date between the state trade secret laws and the patent disclosure requirements ... " 
However, on appeal the decision was reversed and it was held explicitly (822 F 2d 1563) that there 
was "no basis for the district court's rulings that non-compliance with [patent law disclosure 
requirements] preempt[ed] state trade secret law ... ". See further Jager Vol 2 10.5-10.6.1 10.8.3-10.8.4; 
cf Burk 1993 Seton Hall LR 560ff. 
243 Cf Bennet 1975 JPOS 7 42; Burke 1981 Albany LR 1060 - reprinted in Milgrim Vol 4 Appendix 
K3; Jager Vol 2 10.6.2-10.8. 
244 Burke in Milgrim Vol 4 K3.15. 
245 114 F2d 28 (2nd Cir 1940). 
246 524 F 2d 33 (7th Cir 1975), 424 US 958 (1976). 
247 See Burke in Milgrim Vol 4 K3.16ff. 
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would be the case where for instance the secret related to a process whereby a 
known product could be manufactured faster or cheaper, but the product was not 
marketed at a lower price.248 If, on the other hand, the public had reaped the benefit 
of the trade secret, the first inventor would be able to invalidate the second inventor's 
patent on the ground of the farmer's prior use. This would be the case where for 
instance the secret was embodied in - but not readily apparent from - a marketed 
product, resulting in a product superior to its rivals (or without rivals) being made 
available to the public.249 
The position was unsatisfactory. In the first of the two scenarios sketched above, 
there is clearly no protection of the rights of the first inventor-trade secret owner. In 
the second scenario, both parties are prejudiced. The second inventor has his or her 
patent invalidated, while the first inventor's trade secret was destroyed by publication 
when the (now invalidated) patent was issued.250 A more satisfactory solution, and 
one that does not require a distinction to be drawn between cases where there was 
benefit to the public or not, has been proposed by the American Bar Association. 251 
This proposal entails the statutory enactment of a right of the first inventor-trade 
secret user to continue to use his or her invention regardless of the subsequently 
issued patent, while also allowing the second inventor to exploit his or her patent and 
to enforce its exclusivity against all parties except the first inventor.252 253 
248 Cf the Gillman case. 
249 This has been termed 'non-informing public use'. Cf Burke in Milgrim Vol 4 K3.17. 
25° Cf Bennett 1975 JPOS 7 42; Burke in Mi lg rim Vol 4 K3.19ff. 
251 1982 Summary of Proceedings, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law (ABA Chicago 
Illinois 1982) resolution 206.1. 
252 A similar solution was proposed by Burke in Milgrim Vol 4 K3.23-K3.24 in 1981: "In order to 
protect both patents and trade secrets from mutual destruction in the face of a conflict, legislative 
action should be taken ... [A] possible solution would be to let the patent stand in the face of prior trade 
secret use, whether non-informing or otherwise. Once the patent issues, the trade secret holder would 
not be allowed to further license or expand the use of the trade secret, as that would infringe on the 
rights of the patentee, but he may continue to use it to the extent that it has been used before the 
patent issues. In this way, the rights of both parties would be accommodated. The patentee would 
receive his legal monopoly and the trade secret user would receive somewhat of a bonus. Since his 
secret is always subject to independent discovery, the trade secret user cannot complain when, after 
the patent expires, the invention is available to the public. However, by virtue of the patent having been 
issued on the same invention, the trade secret holder, under this proposal, could practice his invention 
to the exclusion of all others, except of course, for the patentee and those licensed by him, because 
the use of the invention by any other independent developer would constitute infringement of the 
patent." 
253 Cf, however, WL Gore & Associates, Inc v Garlock, Inc 220 USPQ 303 310 (Fed Cir 1983) 
where the court indicated in an obiter dictum that in a conflict between the interests of a first inventor-
trade secret holder and a second inventor-patentee, the law favours the latter. Cf Jager Vol 2 10.8. 
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A partial overlap can also occur between protection under trade secrets law and 
copyright law, and raises the question whether trade secrets law may be pre-empted 
by the Copyright Act.254 255 The Act explicitly pre-empts256 state laws purporting 
to provide equivalent rights in respect of works of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. Subject matter like computer software springs to mind as 
potentially qualifying for both copyright and trade secret protection. Does the 
application of trade secrets law to such subject matter purport to provide rights 
equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright law? As generally interpreted by the 
courts,257 it does not, and trade secret and copyright protection are in principle 
allowed to co-exist in respect of the same subject matter.258 Since trade secret 
254 Copyright Act of 1976. 
255 See in general Dratler 1.81-1.83; Heller in Milgrim Vol 3 Appendix B.1 B; Jager Vol 2 10.9-10.20; 
Kintner and Lahr 242-243; Langer in Milgrim Vol 3 Appendix B.1 A. 
256 Sec 301. Cf eg Dratler 1.81. 
257 Eg Warrington Associates, Inc v Real-Time Engineering Systems, Inc 522 F Supp 367 368 (ND 
Ill 1981): "An analysis of the interests secured by copyright and trade secret law makes plain that the 
claims are not 'equivalent' as intended by Congress. It is well-settled that copyright protection extends 
not to an idea itself, but rather to the particular expression used by its author. .. In contrast, the 
protection provided by the common law of trade secret misappropriation extends to the very ideas of 
the author, subject of course, to the requirement that the idea has some originality and is as yet 
undisclosed or disclosed only on the basis of confidentiality ... The practical distinction between the two 
interests is manifest. While disclosure of the expression does not vitiate rights secured by copyright 
law, that same disclosure may well strip the underlying idea of trade secret. To a certain degree the 
two respective rights in intellectual property interact. To the extent a work has been copyrighted and 
published, the chances of unprivileged disclosure may increase. But the mere fact that an expression 
is copyrighted does not, in and of itself, disclose the trade secret or eliminate its mantle of 
confidentiality"; M Bryce & Associates, Inc v Gladstone 215 USPQ 81 87: "The line of demarcation 
between trade secret and copyright protection is clear. Trade secret law protects content irrespective 
of form of expression, copyright law protects form of expression but not the underlying ideas"; Brignoli 
v Balch, Hardy & Scheinman, Inc 645 F Supp 1201 1205-1206 (SONY 1986); Vault Corp v Quaid 
Software Ltd 655 F Supp 750 763 (ED La 1987), 847 F 2d 255 (5th Cir 1981 ); Foresight Resources 
Corp v Pfortmiller 719 F Supp 1006 1011 (D Kan 1989). Cf, however, Videotronics, Inc v Bend 
Electronics, Inc 564 F Supp 1471, 223 USPQ 296 (D Nev 1982) where the court found that trade 
secret protection for copyrightable computer software was pre-empted; Avco Corp v Precision Air 
Parts, Inc 210 USPQ 894 (MD Ala 1980), 676 F 2d 494, 216 USPQ 1086 (11th Cir 1982) where the 
district court stated (210 USPQ 896 898) that trade secret rights would not be pre-empted as long as 
the cause of action contained elements such as "invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or 
confidentiality that are different in kind from copyright infringement". Since such elements had not even 
been alleged, the court found pre-emption in a summary judgment motion. See further Jager Vol 2 
10.15-10.17; Dratler 1.82 fn 50. 
258 Cf also the Final report of the National Commission on the New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (July 31 1978) Library of Congress (1979) 18: "The availability of copyright for 
computer programs does not... affect the availability of trade secret protection. Under the act of 1976 
only those state rights that are equivalent to the exclusive rights granted therein (generally, common 
law copyright) are preempted. Any decline in use of trade secrecy might be based not upon preemption 
but on the rapid increase in the number of widely distributed programs in which trade secret protection 
could not be successfully asserted." This report resulted in enactment of the Computer Software 
Protection Act of 1980, which rewrote sec 117 of the Copyright Act of 1976 to clarify copyright 
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protection cannot be given to published information, only unpublished copyrightable 
works may qualify for this dual protection.259 
3.4.6 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
The Freedom of Information Act260 grants any member of the public a right of 
access to information held by federal government agencies. Intended to promote 
clean administration, 261 the perception exists that many businesses are exploiting 
it as a mechanism by which information of rivals can be obtained.262 Certain 
categories of information are exempted from the disclosure requirements of the Act, 
amongst others "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or confidential".263 However, in Chrysler Corporation v 
Brown264 it was held that the exemption was not mandatory, and the agencies still 
had a discretion to reveal information falling in an exempted category. Disclosure in 
terms of the Freedom of Information Act may be a major threat to trade secrets filed 
with federal agencies.265 
3.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN AMERICAN 
LAW 
Authority can be found in case law and the writings of commentators for several legal 
protection for computer software; further the 1980 House Report of Congress (HR Rep No 96. 1307 
96th Cong 24 Sess (1980) 23-24. Cf Jager Vol 2 10.11-10.12. 
259 Cf eg Heller in Milgrim Vol 3 81 B.1ff; Jager Vol 2 10.17-10.20; Warrington Associates, Inc v 
Real-Time Engineering Systems, Inc 522 F Supp 367 368 (ND Ill 1981 ). 
260 Of 1966: 5 USC sec 552. 
261 Cf HR Rep No 92.1419 92nd Cong 2nd Sess 1 (1972); Jager Vol 2 12.6. 
262 Because of extensive involvement of the federal government with business concerns from the 
private sector, a considerable body of commercially valuable information on private businesses is 
contained in agency files. Jager Vol 2 12.6-12.6.1; Schapiro in Milgrim Vol 4 Appendix E; cf Conelly 
1981 Wisconsin LR 209-210 who states that fears of industrial espionage by means of the Freedom 
of Information Act mechanisms are greatly exaggerated. 
263 Sec 552(b)(4). 
264 441 US 281 (1979); cf Callmann Vol 2 14.176-14.177; Jager Vol 2 12.41-12.42. 
265 Literature on the topic includes Callmann Vol 2 14.176-14.182; Dorr and Munch 31-32; Jager 
Vol 2 12.1-12.52; Arnold 1976 Juris Doctor 17; Casey, Marthinsen, and Moss 1984 AIPLA Q J 76; 
Conelly 1981 Wisconsin LR 207; O'Reilly 1984 AIPLA Q J 13; Phillips 1980 JPOS 652; Schapiro in 
Milgrim Vol 4 Appendix E. 
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bases of trade secret protection. 
3.5.1 CONTRACT 
Contract is raised most frequently as a basis for trade secret protection because of 
the existence of an express contract. 266 Express contractual provisions may protect 
trade secrets either directly in the form of non-disclosure or so-called confidentiality 
agreements, or indirectly in the form of restrictive covenants not to compete. 267 The 
various states differ in respect of their policies regarding the enforceability of 
restrictive covenants.268 In the majority of the states non-competition covenants 
which are reasonable in respect of subject matter, time and territory will be 
enforced.269 The courts usually require the restrictive covenant to be ancillary to a 
legitimate business purpose or agreement, and to protect a legitimate business 
interest, of which a trade secret is a recognized example.270 
A contract regulating trade secrets may also be implied from the facts. In such a case 
the court looks for the existence of a factual situation to support the existence of a 
contract based on the implied understanding of the parties.271 Trade secrets may 
also be protected on the strength of a quasi-contract, or contract implied in law. This 
type of contract has been described as a legal fiction used to explain the desirable 
result of affording legal protection.272 273 
Contract is an important base of trade secret protection because of the general 
practice of big corporations to include in their employment agreements express 
266 Cf Dratler 4.81; Jager Vol 1 4.1; Kintner and Lahr 214. However, it does not follow that if a 
contract exists, a claim for trade secret protection will inevitably be a contractual one - a claim 
sounding in tort may also be appropriate. See Dratler 8.81. 
267 Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.24-14.26; Chisum and Jacobs 3.39-3.41; Dratler 4.91 ff; Jager Vol 2 13.1 ff; 
Milgrim Vol 1 4.2ff; Pooley 79ff. 
268 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.40; Dratler 4.98ff; Pooley 82. 
269 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.40; Dratler 4.99; Milgrim Vol 1 4.65ff; Pooley 82. 
27° Chisum and Jacobs 3.40; Jager Vol 2 13.4-13.5. 
271 Jager Vol 1 4.2-4.3. 
272 Jager Vol 1 4.3. 
273 Interestingly, the obligation of an employee not to misappropriate his employer's trade secrets 
may be typified by some decisions as implied-in-fact (see Turner 287-293) and by others as implied-in-
law contracts (see Turner 293-296). Implied-in-law contracts to protect trade secrets do not arise only 
in employer-employee relationships. See Jager Vol 1 4.5. 
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contractual provisions to protect their trade secrets.274 It is nevertheless clear that 
contract is not a prerequisite in American law for the protection of trade secrets.275 276 
Conversely, contract may also be used to protect information that is not a trade 
secret.277 
3.5.2 TORT 
Tort is by far the most popular theory of trade secret protection. 278 As noted,279 
the protection of trade secrets was dealt with in the first Restatement of American law 
in the section on Torts. The misappropriation of trade secrets is also frequently 
characterized, explicitly or implicitly, as a tort in the case law280 and by 
commentators.281 Tort also seems to be the main basis of trade secret protection 
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.282 
274 Dratler 4.81; Kintner and Lahr 214 218. 
275 Callmann Vol 2 14.1 O; Dratler 4.81; Kintner and Lahr 214. 
276 However, a contract will be a requirement for trade secret litigation against the United States 
government, the reason being that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for torts -
cf Radioptics, Inc v United States 204 USPQ 866 880 (Ct Cl 1979); Jager Vol 1 4.2 4.11. 
277 Cf Dratler 4.91-4.93, who points out that this may especially be the case where the owner of 
the information has not taken reasonable steps to keep the information confidential, but the information 
is still not readily available to all and sundry; Milgrim Vol 1 4.29ff and case law cited. Sec 7(b) of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act specifically provides that the Act does not affect contractual relief that is 
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret. 
278 Jager Vol 1 4.8. 
279 Par 3.1 above. 
280 Eg Northern Petrochemical Co v Tomlinson 484 F 2d 1057 1060, 179 USPQ 386 388 (7th Cir 
1973); American Can Co v Mansukhani 216 USPQ 1094 1099 (ED Wisc 1982), 220 USPQ 167 (7th 
Cir 1983). 
281 It is formulated very strongly by Dratler 4.81: "Trade secret protection in the United States arises 
under tort law. As in other fields of tort law, the common law or relevant statutes impose general duties 
on individuals and legal entities to protect other's trade secrets, whether or not any contract also 
imposes similar obligations. Courts sometimes refer to the duties that tort law imposes as implied in 
law, or even as implied contracts. More commonly, however, courts simply refer to these duties as 
arising out of confidential relationships. Yet however they are described, these duties owe their origin 
to the law of torts." Cf Callmann Vol 2 14.2-14.4; Jager Vol 1 4.8ff. 
282 Cf sec 7 which provides that the Act displaces "conflicting tort, restitutionary and other law ... 
pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret", but does not affect contractual or other 
civil liability that is not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret. 
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The tort theory of trade secret protection is often more or less equated283 with a 
breach of confidence theory of trade secret protection.284 However, as noted,285 
protection of trade secrets in American law is definitely not limited to cases where a 
relationship of confidence exists between the plaintiff and the defendant. If 
misappropriations which occur outside the sphere of a confidential relationship (for 
instance industrial espionage) also give rise to tortious liability, the tort base of trade 
secret protection is surely wider than actions for breach of confidence, 286 and the 
equation between the two may therefore be misleading. 
Some courts following the tort theory of trade secret protection, and perhaps more 
specifically those of a breach of confidence persuasion,287 are inclined to attach a 
lesser significance to the nature of the subject matter that is sought to be protected, 
and strongly emphasize, on the other hand, the relationship and the conduct of the 
parties. These courts will sometimes, in the face of the existence of a relationship of 
confidence or impropriety of conduct on the part of the defendant, protect commercial 
information that does not fully qualify as trade secrets. 288 Thus perpetual injunctions 
283 Cf Jager Vol 1 4.8ff (especially 4.12); Kintner and Lahr 209-212. 
284 This is interesting, because in English law the action for breach of confidence does not seem 
to be generally characterized as tortious liability - cf par 2.5.4 above. 
285 Par 3.2.2; 3.4.2; 3.4.3 above. 
286 A commentator who makes this very clear in his analysis of tort law aspects of trade secret 
protection, is Dratler 4.81ff. On 4.90 he states clearly: "Not only does tort law impose duties in the 
absence of an employee-employer relationship; it may impose duties in the absence of any relationship 
at all. Even complete strangers may be liable to a trade secret owner for misappropriation, for 
example, by industrial espionage" (citing El duPont de Nemours & Co v Christopher 431 F 2d 1012, 
166 USPQ 421 (5th Cir 1970), 400 US 1024, 401 US 967 (1971) and Tabor v Hoffman 118 NY 30, 
23 NE 12 (1889). 
287 Cf Dratler 4. 71. 
288 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.27-3.29; Dratler 4. 71; Jager Vol 1 4.9-4.11; Franke v Wiltschek 209 
F 2d 493 495, 99 USPQ 431 433 (2nd Cir 1953): "Plaintiffs do not assert, indeed cannot assert, a 
property right in their development such as would entitle them to exclusive enjoyment against the 
world. Theirs is not a patent, but a trade secret. The essence of their action is not infringement, but 
breach of faith. It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study of the 
expired patent and plaintiff's publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did not. Instead they 
gained it from plaintiff's confidential relationship, and in so doing incurred a duty not to use it to 
plaintiff's detriment. This duty they have breached" (emphasis added); cases cited by Chisum and 
Jacobs 3.28-3.29; and fn 289 below. It seems that such protection of non-secret information is outside 
the scope of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, since the Act only deals with the misappropriation (as 
defined in sec 1 (2)) of trade secrets (as defined in sec 1 (4)) - par 3.2.1; 3.2.2 above. Sec 7(a) 
specifically provides that the Act displaces conflicting tort law pertaining to civil liability for 
misappropriation of trade secrets. However, sec 7(b) provides that the Act does not affect civil liability 
or relief that is not based upon misappropriation of trade secrets. If particular states have granted legal 
protection to information that is not trade secrets, such protection is thus probably not excluded by the 
Act - cf Chisum and Jacobs 3.29. 
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may, for instance, be granted even though the misappropriated trade secrets have 
largely become public knowledge.289 The Restatement has probably been influential 
in this development290 by denying the existence of a property right in trade 
secrets291 and by expressly making provision for the protection of non-secret 
business information. 292 
Unfair competition is a corollary base for the protection of trade secrets.293 Again 
the focus often falls sharply on the unfair tactics of the misappropriator or on the 
violation of a confidential relationship. 294 
3.5.3 PROPERTY 
A question that crops up frequently in the case law, and which most commentaries 
discuss at some length,295 is whether trade secrets are property. In the 
Restatement296 and some cases297 a negative answer is given. Case law denying 
289 Eg Franke v Wiltschek 209 F 2d 493 496 499 500 (2nd Cir 1953); Shel/mar Products Co v 
Allen-Qualley Co 87 F 2d 104, 32 USPQ 24 (7th Cir), 301 US 695 (1937); Richardson v Suzuki Motor 
Co 868 F 2d 1226 1244 (Fed Cir 1989); Bryan v Kershaw 366 F 2d 497 (5th Cir 1966). See further 
Dratler 4. 71 fn 80; Jager Vol 1 4.10 fns 39.1-39.3 and cf par 3.4.4 above. 
290 Cf eg Crocan Corp v Sheller-Globe Corp 385 F Supp 251 (ND Ill 1974) 254 where the court 
relied expressly on the Restatement for the following statement: "[l]mproper means used to gain 
information is a separate basis of liability, regardless of whether the information constitutes a technical 
trade secret in the narrow sense of the word"; Chisum and Jacobs 3.27-3.28. 
291 Sec 757 comment (a); see par 3.5.3 fn 296 below. 
292 Sec 757 comment (b): "Although given information is not a trade secret, one who receives the 
information in a confidential relation or discovers it by improper means may be under some duty not 
to disclose or use that information"; sec 759: "One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business 
interest, procures by improper means information about another's business is liable to the other for the 
harm caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information"; sec 759 comment (b): "The rule 
stated in this Section applies to information about one's business whether or not it constitutes a trade 
secret... Examples of information, other than trade secrets, included in this Section are: the state of 
one's accounts, the amount of his bid for a contract, his sources of supply, his plans for expansion or 
retrenchment, and the like." 
293 Cf Jager Vol 1 4.12; Klitzke 1986 The Business Lawyer 556-558. Some states (eg California 
and Louisiana) have unfair competition statutes that apply to trade secrets; see Jager Vol 1 4.12. 
294 Jager Vol 1 4.12. 
295 Eg Callmann Vol 2 14.8-14.19; Dratler 4. 70-4. 72; Jager Vol 1 4.13-4.26; Kintner and Lahr 206-
209; Milgrim Vol 1 2.1ff; Turner 12. 
296 Sec 757 comment (a): "The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of 
his trade secret because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and 
rejected. The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a general duty of good 
faith and that the liability rests upon breach of this duty; that is breach of contract, abuse of confidence 
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the existence of a property right in trade secrets frequently relies on the following 
famous remarks in El duPont de Nemours Powder Company v Masland: 298 
"The word 'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an 
unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary 
fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant 
knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he 
accepted. The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. 
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property ... , but 
that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs ... "299 
However, other decisions300 have quoted the Mas/and case, whilst nevertheless 
maintaining that trade secrets are property. In Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 
Company3°1 the Supreme Court held302 that a trade secret is property, and stated 
explicitly303 that the decision in Mas/and did not deny the existence of a property 
interest in a trade secret. 
or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret." Cf, however, Chisum and Jacobs 3.12: "In 
fact, the theory that has prevailed in the post-Restatement era is that a property right in a trade secret, 
although terminable by public disclosure, will be upheld against misappropriators and protected in a 
variety of contexts." 
297 Eg Monolith Portland & Midwest Co v Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp 407 F 2d 288 293 (9th 
Cir 1969); Northern Petrochemical Co v Tomlinson 484 F 2d 1057 1060, 179 USPQ 386 (7th Cir 
1973):"[A] trade secret, unlike a patent or a copyright, has no proprietary dimension. A suit to redress 
the theft of a secret is one grounded in tort .. ."; Rosenthal v Goldstein 183 NY Supp 582 584 (Supp 
Ct 1920); Franke v Wiltschek 209 F 2d 493 495, 99 USPQ 431 433 (2nd Cir 1953) - see quotation in 
fn 218 above; Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz AG, Kain v Hewitt-Robins Division 486 F Supp 283, 203 
USPQ 631 (DC D SC 1978). 
298 244 US 100 102, 37 S Ct 575 576, L Ed 1016 (1917). 
299 Prominent commentators seem to either disagree with the Mas/and decision, or to interpret it 
in a way that does not rule out the view that trade secrets are property. See Callmann Vol 2 14.9; 
Jager Vol 1 4.15-4.16; Milgrim Vol 1 2.4ff; cf however Ellis 12; Turner 12. 
300 Eg International Indus v Warren Petroleum Corp 99 F Supp 907 913 915 917, 91 USPQ 198 
(D Del 1951), 298 F 2d 696 (3rd Cir 1957); AO Smith Corp v Petroleum Iron Works Co 73 F 2d 531 
539 (6th Cir 1934), 74 F 2d 934 (1935); see further Milgrim Vol 1 1.5 fn 8 and case law cited; Kintner 
and Lahr 207. Cf also National Starch Products, Inc v Polymer Industries, Inc 273 AD 732, 79 NYS 
2d 357 (1st Dept), 274 AD 822, 81 NYS 2d 278 (1948); and the commentary by Milgrim Vol 1 2.5-2.7. 
301 467 US 986 (1984); cf Jager Vol 1 4.13-4.15. 
302 1002-1003. 
303 1004 n 9; cf Jager Vol 1 4.16: "The debate on the meaning of Mas/and is brought to a close by 
Monsanto." See further Van Products Co v General Welding & Fabricating Co 419 Pa 248 268, 213 
A 2d 769 780, 147 USPQ 221 (1965); Anaconda Co v Metric Tool & Die Co 485 F Supp 410, 205 
USPQ 723 (ED Pa 1980). 
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The majority view of the case law is that trade secrets do constitute a type of 
property,304 and leading commentators strongly support this view.305 It is 
furthermore supported by the legal practice that trade secrets may be assigned,306 
licensed,307 constitute trust property,308 pass by way of testate or intestate 
succession,309 subjected to insolvency laws,310 and taxed as personal 
property.311 Trade secrets may also be regarded as property for the purpose of 
304 See the case law cited by Milgrim Vol 1 2.4ff; Callmann Vol 2 14.9 fns 6-13; Kintner and Lahr 
206. 
305 Eg Callmann Vol 2 14.8: "The threshold issue in every case is not whether there was a 
confidential relationship or a breach of contract or some other kind of misappropriation, but whether, 
in fact, there was a trade secret to be misappropriated"; 14.9: "Happily, under the majority view, a 
trade secret, whether it be a secret formula, process, pattern, device, compilation of information or 
otherwise, is held to be property, and the owner has 'power to make use of it to the exclusion of the 
world,' or, like the owner of any property, to deal with it as he pleases"; 14.10: "If trade secrets are 
property, ... relief should be granted against anyone 'who has obtained the secret by unfair means,' and 
the owner of the trade secret should be protected against such activity even in the absence of an 
underlying contract or confidential relation, or if the contract is unenforceable. In such an instance, the 
property concept may be indispensable"; cf, however, 14.12: "Where a relationship between the parties 
does exist, however, the property concept is not an essential of the cause of action because relief is 
also available for breach of contract or betrayal of confidence. It does, however, provide an additional 
cause of action, and may also enlarge the range of available remedies. The relationship aspect of the 
case, however, overshadows the property aspect in such a case and the famous statement... in ... 
Mas/and is most applicable to that type of situation"; Milgrim Vol 1 2.4: "The unifying principle here is 
that the very property right that permits one to use and to disclose to others subject to restrictions on 
use and disclosure underlies any cognizable trade secret claim, be it for breach of contract or of 
confidential relationship. It is only because the trade secret possessor has the right to so use and 
disclose a trade secret that the possessor can claim that any person using the information is engaging 
in wrongdoing. Stated simply, the property right is the implicit mechanism that permits a court to 
recognize any remedy, be it for breach of a contract or confidential relationship. Property used with 
respect to trade secrets denotes 'the group of rights inherent in the citizen's relation to the physical 
thing, is the right to possess, use and dispose of it'. A property view is a fundamental intellectual 
starting point. The property right in anything is always a relational right, ie, the right that an owner may 
have vis-a-vis the world. The right to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure by one standing in a 
contractual or confidential relationship to the owner is the fundamental property right." See further the 
commentators mentioned in Milgrim Vol 1 2.11 fn 20. Cf, however, Ellis 12; Turner 12; Correa 1963 
Bus Law 531; Samuelson 1989 Gath UL Rev 365; Stedman 1962 Ohio St LJ 21. 
306 Milgrim Vol 1 2.22-2.27; Kintner and Lahr 208. 
307 Milgrim Vol 2 9.13ff. 
308 Milgrim Vol 1 2.32-2.34. 
309 Milgrim Vol 1 2.35-2.36. 
310 Milgrim Vol 1 2.36-2.44. 
311 Jager Vol 1 4.15; Kintner and Lahr 208-209; Milgrim Vol 2 11.3ff. 
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protection under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.312 However, there is 
recognition that the property 'label' cannot always be applied to trade secrets and 
other forms of property in a uniform manner. Some cases and commentators313 
refer to limitations which trade secrets are, but other forms of property are not, 
subject to - for instance discovery (with the concomitant potential destruction314 of 
the property interest) by fair means.315 Others316 label trade secrets expressly as 
a form of intellectual property. 
Recognition of property rights in trade secrets usually leads to close scrutiny of the 
nature of the information sought to be protected, and to an unpreparedness on the 
part of the courts to protect information that is not secret.317 318 
312 Whether or not trade secrets are property and hence subject to the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment, flows from the characterizations under the controlling state law - Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 
Co 467 US 986, 104 S Ct 2862, 81 L Ed 815 (1984); cf Milgrim Vol 1 2.3 fn 5. 
313 Eg Eastman Kodak Co v Reichenbach 20 NY Supp 110 (Sup Ct 1892), 79 Hun 183, 29 NY 
Supp 1143 (Sup Ct 1894): "The word 'property,' as applied to trade secrets ... , has its limitations; for 
it is undoubtedly true that when an article manufactured by some secret process, which is not the 
subject of a patent, is thrown upon the market, the whole world is at liberty to discover, if it can by any 
fair means, what that process is, and, when discovery is thus made, to employ it in the manufacture 
of similar articles. In such a case, the inventor's or manufacturer's property in his process is gone ... "; 
cf Kintner and Lahr 207. This phenomenon of 'disappearing property' has been used as basis for an 
(unconvincing) argument that there can be no property rights in trade secrets (eg Stedman 1962 Ohio 
St LJ 21 ); see the comments of Milgrim Vol 1 2.8ff. See further fn 314 below. 
314 Note that if another person acquires a trade secret by fair means, the secrecy thereof - and thus 
the property therein - is not inevitably destroyed - see again par 3.2.1.2.3 above. 
315 Cf par 3.2.1.2.3 above. 
316 Eg Ferroline Corp v General Aniline and Film Corp 207 F 2d 912 922 (7th Cir 1953): "We are 
dealing with a type of intellectual property - in effect, a property right in discovered knowledge." Cf 
Kintner and Lahr 206; Jager Vol 1 4.17. 
317 Cf eg National Starch Products, Inc v Polymer Industries, Inc 79 NYS 2d 357 (NY App Div 
1948) where the court first emphasized (360) the existence of a property right in a trade secret, and 
then made the following statement (361 ): "[T]here is no betrayal of confidence unless there is a secret 
to be imparted." 
318 Cf the juxtaposition in two commentaries of the property approach and breach of confidence 
approach to trade secret protection - Chisum and Jacobs 3.4-3.5: "Courts base trade secrets doctrine 
on two distinct principles: (1) a property interest in secret business information; and (2) a duty to 
respect the confidentiality of information. In applying the property principle, courts examine whether 
particular information is sufficiently secret and valuable to be considered private property. In applying 
the duty principle, courts put primary emphasis on the circumstances under which an alleged 
misappropriator obtained the information and may impose a duty to avoid its use or disclosure if it was 
obtained through a confidential relationship or improper means - even if its secrecy has not been 
definitely established ... In some situations, a case outcome may depend on which principle the court 
emphasizes. For example, if information's secrecy is not clearly established but a defendant acquired 
information through improper means, a court emphasizing the property principle would find no 
protectable trade secret; a court emphasizing the duty principle would penalize the defendant. Trade 
secret law's equitable nature and ethical roots invite emphasis on the duty principle when a defendant's 
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3.5.4 UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Unjust319 enrichment, also known as quasi contract, is a theoretical base 
infrequently relied on for trade secret protection.320 In Matarese v Moore-
McCormack Lines321 the relevant principle was formulated as follows:322 
"The doctrine of unjust enrichment or recovery in quasi-contract... applies 
to situations where as a matter of fact there is no legal contract, but where 
the person sought to be charged is in possession of money or property 
which in good conscience and justice he should not retain, but should 
deliver to another." 
The plaintiff in the Matarese case was a man of little education, employed by the 
defendant as a stevedore. He had invented and demonstrated to an agent of the 
defendant a device that would greatly facilitate the loading and unloading of cargo 
and would thus save the defendant money. The defendant did some tests and put 
several of the plaintiff's devices into operation. Despite promises of remuneration, the 
defendant was later discharged without having been compensated. Instituting action 
against the defendant, the plaintiff was unable to prove the existence of a contract 
between himself and the defendant, and consequently he averred that the latter had 
been unjustly enriched by using the devices without compensating him. Finding that 
the defendant's use of the device had paid off with substantial savings, the court 
settled the unjust enrichment issue in the plaintiff's favour. 
The unjust enrichment theory of trade secret protection often goes hand in hand with 
a breach of confidence situation. 323 
conduct offends the court's notions of fairness and morality"; Dratler 4.71: "Sometimes the relief 
granted turns on the somewhat metaphysical distinctions between protection based on property and 
protection against breach of faith. Courts of the 'breach of faith' persuasion may grant permanent, 
perpetual injunctions even though the misappropriated secrets have largely become public knowledge 
through patent disclosures, while courts relying on concepts of property generally deny relief altogether 
under similar circumstances." 
319 More generally referred to as 'undue' or 'unjustified' enrichment in South African law. 
32
° Kintner and Lahr 212; cf sec 3(a) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act - par 3.3.1 above. 
321 158 F 2d 631, 71 USPQ 311 (2nd Cir 1946); cf Kintner and Lahr 212-213. 
322 634. 
323 See Kintner and Lahr 213-214 and case law cited. They also point out that although the court 
in the Matarese case mentioned only unjust enrichment as the basis of protection, the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, being one of employee and employer, was one of confidence. 
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3.5.5 PRIVACY OF A BUSINESS ORGANISATION 
After stating324 that the Christopher case325 suggests that the owner of a trade 
secret may obtain protection even against a stranger solely in reliance on his property 
right in the secret and the unfair tactics of the defendant in obtaining it, Callmann also 
offers326 an alternative theoretical explanation of the decision. He suggests that in 
addition to any contractual, confidential, or competitive relationships, trade secrets law 
arguably also protects the "right of privacy of a business organisation".327 He 
submits that the combination of true trade secrets, and confidential information which 
does not qualify as trade secrets in the strict sense, constitutes the 'secret sphere' 
of a business. This secret sphere, he argues, merits protection as a whole, and 
should be recognized as property.328 
324 Callmann Vol 2 14.11. 
325 Par 3.2.1.2.4 above. 
326 Vol 214.11-14.12. 
327 14.11: "If there is such a right where business, as opposed to personal, secrets are concerned, 
then no reason appears why it should not serve in place of the [mentioned] relationships as a 
protectable interest which in itself is sufficient to justify the protection of trade secrets in an otherwise 
appropriate case. This would explain why the plaintiff won in duPont v Christopher; notwithstanding 
the absence of a contract, a confidence, or even a clear indication that the defendant photographer 
had been hired by a competitor of the plaintiff." 
328 14.12: "There may be some trade secrets in which there is no property right, because they do 
not meet the requirement of uniqueness; ie these secrets usually pertain to information concerning 
business techniques which are generally known in the industry, but the use of which by a particular 
business should be kept concealed simply because it is not wise to allow competitors too detailed a 
view of internal operations. Secrets of this kind may not even be reduced to tangible form, and 
because of this fact plus their lack of uniqueness they may even be incapable of transfer. Such 
secrets, when combined with all the other secrets of a business in which property does exist - eg, 
technological secrets - or in which the property right of a person unassociated with the business is 
recognized - eg, secrets licensed to the business owner - form what may be referred to as the 'secret 
sphere' of the business. This sphere, however, is an integral part of the whole business unit; and, since 
the 'going concern' value of the business as a whole is generally recognized as property entitled to 
protection, this integral part should be protected with the whole ... Moreover, there is no valid reason 
why the secret sphere of the business should not be recognized independently as property, much as 
its goodwill is. Goodwill is commonly considered a property value, although it is only a part of the 
business ... The secret sphere is no less important an element of the business, for it is the means by 
which internal efficiency is insured, and the prospects for retaining goodwill thereby enhanced. The 
secret sphere and goodwill are both vulnerable to attack and unlawful encroachment; if one enjoys 
protection independently as a property right, the other is equally entitled to such protection." Cf 
Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp 416 US 470 (197 4) 487: "A most fundamental human right, that of 
privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable"; Bonito Boats, Inc 
v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc 109 S Ct 971 (1989) 980; 'Note' 1974 Harvard LR 828. 
110 
3.5.6 SYNTHESIS 
The co-existence of several theories of trade secret protection in the various 
jurisdictions of the United States seems to be at times a harmonious and at times an 
uneasy one. In principle the tort and contract theories appear to be equally valid and 
seem to supplement each other. The available remedies will be determined by the 
form of the action - whether it is founded in contract or in tort.329 The property 
theory seems to overlap with both the tort and contract theories, to be capable of 
harmonious co-existence with them, 330 and to contribute to a better understanding 
of the subject matter protected by trade secrets law. Indeed this appears to be the 
position in many jurisdictions.331 However, in some jurisdictions upholding the tort 
theory, and perhaps more particularly those with a strong breach-of-confidence 
orientation, the property theory of torts may be doubted or denied. The unjust 
enrichment theory may sometimes offer the most comfortable explanation of trade 
secret protection in a particular situation.332 The 'privacy of a business' theory 
provides an interesting alternative theoretical explanation of certain instances of trade 
secret protection.333 
329 See eg Lupo and Tanguay 87: "The remedies available to the trade secret plaintiff depend on 
the underlying theory of liability. In appropriate circumstances, the plaintiff can receive both an 
injunction and money damages under either the contract or tort theory but cannot get punitive damages 
for a breach of contract." 
330 In respect of property and breach of confidence, the case is ably argued by Dratler 4. 71-4. 72: 
"From a modern perspective ... [the] debate between the 'property' and 'breach of confidence' schools 
of trade secret jurisprudence appears to miss the point. Although trade secrets do not enjoy the same 
strong protection as patented inventions, this does not mean they are not 'property'... If property is 
defined as the right to exclude, then trade secrets fall within that definition; the law gives their owners 
a limited exclusionary right: the right to exclude others from taking illegitimate shortcuts to their 
acquisition or use. Thus, trade secret protection constitutes a limited proprietary right - to prohibit 
breaches of confidence and other 'improper means' to acquire the secret - and the 'property' and 
'breach of confidence' branches of trademark [surely trade secret?] doctrine coalesce. As long as 
information is not so readily available that it fails to qualify as a trade secret at all, it should merit 
protection under either theory. Then the remedy can account nicely for the relative ease or difficulty 
of acquiring the trade secrets by proper means." In a similar way the property in trade secrets may be 
protected by contract, express or implied. See Milgrim Vol 1 2.4 4.2ff. 
331 Cf Jager Vol 1 4.20; Kintner and Lahr 209; Burk 1993 Seton Hall LR 589. 
332 See par 7.3.4 below for an evaluation of the relevance of this basis of protection in South 
African law. 
333 See par 7.4.4.3 below for an evaluation of the relevance of this theory for South African law. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GERMAN LAW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In German law the protection of trade secrets is regulated comprehensively by 
statutory laws, 1 the most important of which is the German Unfair Competition Act, 
the Gesetz gegen den un/auteren Wettbewerb. 2 Furthermore, in German law the civil 
law protection of trade secrets is to a certain extent a corollary of the criminal law 
protection of trade secrets, making it impractical to discuss the former without copious 
references to the latter.3 
4.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
In the most important statutory provisions protecting trade secrets, certain types of 
conduct are defined to which criminal sanctions are attached and which may entitle 
the prejudiced party to specified forms of civil law relief. These statutory provisions 
refer to commercial and industrial secrets4 without defining them. Civil law protection 
may also be based on statutory provisions dealing with unlawful competition in 
general,5 in which no mention of trade secrets is made. The characteristics of 
protectable trade secrets have, however, crystallized in case law and commentaries 
interpreting the codes. Therefore, if the codes are viewed together with interpretive 
cases and commentaries, the requirements for the protection of trade secrets relate 
basically to the following: 
(a) the nature and characteristics of trade secrets; and 
(b) conduct constituting misappropriation. 
1 For a historical perspective on these statutory provisions, see Nastelski 1957 GRUR 2-4. 
2 Abbreviated UWG. 
3 Cf Wise 4.51. 
4 Geschafts- oder Betriebsgeheimnis (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb sec 17), 
translated by Wise 4.9 as commercial and industrial secrets. See par 4.2.1.1 below. 
5 See par 4.2.2.5 below. 
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4.2.1 NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADE SECRETS 
4.2.1.1 TERMINOLOGY 
In the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, the composite term Geschafts-
oder Betriebsgeheimnis is used,6 which may be translated as 'commercial or 
industrial secret'. 7 The distinction between commercial and industrial secrets seems 
to be a purely factual one with little legal significance.8 The English term 'know-how' 
also crops up in commentaries and cases, but there is no unanimity concerning its 
content.9 
4.2.1.2 ELEMENTS OF A TRADE SECRET 
The following elements of a trade secret protectable at German law are apparent from 
commentaries and the case law: 
(a) information; 
(b) commercial or industrial applicability; 
(c) secrecy; 
6 Sec 17. 
7 See Wise 4.9. 
8 Wise 4.17 fn 58. (However, later in his text Wise is contradicted in this regard by the authors he 
quote - some of them he reports to be of the opinion that industrial secrets are property (4.27ff), 
whereas he reports all of them to be virtually unanimous that commercial secrets are not property 
(4.46)). Baumbach-Hefermehl 1299 do not even distinguish between commercial and industrial secrets 
for the purpose of supplying practical examples from the case law (whereas Wise 4.16-4.17 does). Von 
Gamm 987 supplies typical examples of commercial and industrial secrets respectively, but adds that 
the concepts overlap to a certain extent, and that - in view of their equal treatment by the law - there 
is barely any need to make a strict distinction between the two types of secrets. Nastelski 1957 GRUR 
1 says that for the purposes of sections 17ff UWG the two types of secrets are treated equally, but that 
the distinction may be of practical importance for other statutory provisions: "Das UWG spricht, soweit 
es sich mit dem Geheimnisschutz ausdrOcklich BefaBt, also in den §§ 17 bis 21, von Geschafts- und 
Betriebsgeheimnissen und behandelt beide Arten vollig gleich ... Fur die Auslegung der §§ 17 - 21 
UWG ist die Unterscheidung von Geschafts- und Betriebsgeheimnissen infolge der rechtlichen 
Gleichbehandlung belanglos. Soweit es sich aber um die Anwendung allgemeiner Vorschriften wie 
insbesondere der §§ 1 UWG, 826, 823 Abs. 1 BGB [cf par 4.2.2.5] handelt und ebenso de lege 
ferenda kann die Unterscheidung sehr wohl Bedeutung gewinnen, obwohl es hier wiederum letzten 
Endes weniger darauf ankommt, ob im Einzelfalle ein Geschafts- oder ein Betriebsgeheimnis gegeben 
ist, als darauf, welche wirtschaftliche und wettbewerbliche Bedeutung das Geheimnis fOr das 
Unternehmen hat. Aber - diese Bedeutung ist ebenzumeist bei Betriebsgeheimnissen ergeblich gr6Ber 
als bei den bloBen Geschaftsgeheimnissen." 
9 Cf Wise 4.18-4.19: "The writers and the few cases referring to know-how are in conflict as to 
whether know-how encompasses both secret and non-secret data, and whether it covers commercial 
and business organizational information, as well as technical and technological data. Some writers 
consider that know-how in German law has the same meaning as industrial and commercial trade 
secrets ... Others attribute a broader scope to it." See further Wise 4.18-4.25 for a discussion of cases 
and commentaries referring to 'know-how' and the various meanings given to it; cf Pfister 9-10. 
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(d) Geheimhaltungswil/e - a will to preserve secrecy; 
(e) 
(f) 
Geheimhaltungsinteresse - an interest in the secrecy; and 
concreteness potential. 
4.2.1.2.1 Information 
According to German law, a trade secret consists of information.10 11 It is an 
intangible product of the human mind.12 While the trade secret may be embodied 
in a tangible object like a document or a machine, destruction of the latter will not 
necessarily destroy the secret as well. 13 
4.2.1.2.2 Commercial or industrial applicability 
The information must stand in association with a particular enterprise or industry.14 
4.2.1 .2.3 Secrecy 
To qualify as a trade secret, the relevant information must not be obvious or manifest 
(nicht offenkundig). 15 It must be known by only a limited number of people, 16 17 
10 This is implicit in the characterization of trade secrets by German commentators as facts 
(Tatsachen) exhibiting certain characteristics - see Baumbach-Hefermehl 1297-1298; Emmerich 137; 
Gloy 380-383; Hubmann 305; Metzler 10; Nordemann 222; Von Gamm 987. Cf Wise (American 
commentator writing on German trade secrets law) 4.9-4.10 who specifically refers to 'secret 
information'. 
11 Pfister 11-15 points out that knowledge (Kenntnis) of a technical secret is not synonymous with 
the secret itself. Knowledge of the secret is a subjektive Potenz that cannot be separated from the 
person, whereas the technical secret itself has an objective existence independent of the person with 
knowledge thereof. 
12 See eg Baumbach-Hefermehl 1294: "Es ist ein... unkorperliches Rechtsgut, das einen 
selbstandigen Vermogenswert darstellt... "; Pfister 1 (cf 11 ): "Das technische Geheimnis gehort zu den 
unkorperlichen, geistigen Gegenstanden ... ". 
13 Cf eg Pfister 30: "Die rechtliche Qualifikation eines geistigen Gutes als auBersubjektiven 
Gegenstand betrifft das geistige Gut als solches und nicht seine konkrete Gestalt, in der es in die Welt 
tritt... Wird zB die einzige Skizze einer Erfindung vernichtet, hat aber der lnhaber die Erfindung noch 
im Kopf, so verliert sie nicht ihre Qualitat als auBersubjektiver Vermogensgegenstand." (The author 
is dealing here with an invention as subject of a technical secret). 
14 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Emmerich 137; Gloy 380-381; Metzler 10-11; Nordemann 222; Von 
Gamm 987. 1 
15 Cf eg Baumbach-Hefermehl 1297-1299; Emmerich 137; Gloy 381; Metzler 11-13; Von Gamm 
987-990; Wise 4.10ff. 
16 BGH GRUR 55 424 425 (Mabe/paste); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1297-1298; Emmerich 137; Gloy 
381-382; Hubmann 305; Von Gamm 987; Nordemann 222. 
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which may include some of the owner's competitors, as long as those with knowledge 
of the secret are few in number and are not his or her most important rivals. 18 To 
other parties the information must be inaccessible or not easily accessible.19 If a 
specialist in the field (Fachmann) will only through laborious research be able to 
uncover the information, it is accessible with a sufficient degree of difficulty to qualify 
as a trade secret.20 If, on the other hand, any interested party can easily acquire the 
alleged secret by fair means - for instance by examining a marketed product - the 
information is offenkundig and does not qualify as a trade secret.21 
It should be clear from the above-stated principles that German law upholds a 
relative, rather than an absolute, concept of secrecy.22 This relativity is also 
manifested in other ways. Thus it is not required that an alleged trade secret be 
secret in its entirety - it is sufficient if only certain important details thereof are 
inaccessible or accessible only with difficulty.23 Even the fact that an entrepreneur 
uses a well-known process and obtains good results with it, can be a trade secret as 
long as that utilisation is kept secret. 24 The relativity of the secrecy concept is also 
apparent from the possibility of another person acquiring the secret by fair means, for 
instance by independent research and development. 25 
Secrecy will be destroyed by inter a/ia the following: disclosure of the information to 
so many people that it is impractical to keep it secret;26 by publication (even in a 
17 It is not possible to lay down an exact number of persons who may know the information without 
disqualifying it as a trade secret. It has been suggested (cf Gloy 381; KraBer 1977 GRUR 179) that 
the deciding factor is whether the owner of the trade secret exercises control over the number of 
persons. 
18 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298. 
19 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298-1299; Hubmann 305. 
2° Cf OOGH GRUR 30 450; RGZ 149 329 331; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Gloy 381; Wise 4.11. 
21 Cf RG GRUR 39 733 735 (Fettsaure); BayOBLG GRUR 91 694 (Geldspielautomat); Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1299; Emmerich 137; Nordemann 222; Von Gamm 988; Wise 4.11. 
22 Cf Pfister 26-27. 
23 RG GRUR 36 575; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298. 
24 BGH GRUR 55 424 425 (Mabe/paste); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Von Gamm 990; Wise 4.11 
4.13. Cf Pfister 7-8. 
25 Cf Pfister 15 who characterizes this situation as Doppelerfinfdung (double invention). 
26 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298. 
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technical journal with a limited readership);27 and by publication of specifications 
when filing an application for a patent or registered design covering the essential 
aspects of the secret. 28 
4.2.1.2.4 Geheimhaltungswille - owner's will to preserve secrecy 
The owner of the alleged trade secret must manifest a recognizable will to keep it 
secret.29 This will may be made known expressly, or may be deduced from the 
circumstances.30 In an employment context, the test as to whether an average 
employee would have understood the employer to have such a will, has been 
employed.31 The subjective Geheimhaltungswille may also be deduced from the 
clear existence of a Geheimhaltungsinteresse - that is, an objective interest in the 
secrecy of the information.32 In some instances33 there is a rebuttable presumption 
in favour of the presence of the Geheimhaltungswille. Some commentators34 say 
that a Geheimhaltungswille is not a requirement for the existence of a trade secret 
as such, but rather for criminal liability for the unauthorized disclosure of a trade 
secret ( Geheimnisverrat). 
27 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298, disagreeing with RGSt 40 406 407 (whether publication in a 
technical journal ends secrecy depends on the size of the readership); Nastelski 1957 GRUR 2; Von 
Gamm 989; Wise 4.10. 
28 Cf Nastelski 1957 GRUR 2; Von Gamm 989; Wise 4.10. The publication of a patent application 
in a foreign country is likely to prevent the contents thereof to be a protectable trade secret in 
Germany; cf Wise 4.14. 
29 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Emmerich 137; Gloy 382-383; Hubmann 305; Nordemann 222; Von 
Gamm 990-991; Wise 4.14-4.15. 
30 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Gloy 382; Von Gamm 991; Wise 4.14. 
31 Cf RGSt 29 430; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Wise 4.14. 
32 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; cf par 4.2.1.2.5. 
33 Eg in the case of very complicated machines - RG 149 329 333 (Stiefeleisenpresse); Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1298; Von Gamm 991. Such presumptions appear to be particularly prevalent in employer-
employee relationships - Wise 4.14; cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Von Gamm 991. 
34 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Gloy 382. Cf further Pfister 27-28 who argues that a 
Geheimhaltungswil/e is not required for a technical secret to be a patrimonial asset 
(Vermogensgegenstand). So long as it remains inaccessible to others, the technical secret remains 
a Vermogensgegenstand, and the inventor may always later change his mind and decide to keep it 
secret and exploit it to the exclusion of others. Pfister concludes that the Geheimhaltungswille is a 
prerequisite for the legal protection of the secret, but not for its existence. 
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4.2.1.2.5 Geheimhaltungsinteresse - a legally protectable economic interest in the 
secrecy of the information 
The owner of the alleged trade secret must have a legally protectable economic 
interest in the secrecy of the information. 35 This will be the case if the secret 
information enhances the competitiveness of the owner's enterprise.36 Thus the 
owner will have a protectable economical interest in the continued secrecy of any fact 
that could, on its disclosure, profit his or her competitors or prejudice his or her own 
enterprise.37 Commentators38 have suggested that in deciding whether the 
Geheimhaltungsinteresse requirement has been met, the courts should not adopt an 
unduly strict approach. 
On the one hand the objective Geheimhaltungsinteresse requirement serves as a 
check on the subjective Geheimhaltungswille requirement, ensuring that information 
will not be protected merely because the owner professes a desire to keep it secret, 
where no objective economical merit to do so exists. 39 40 On the other hand the 
35 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298; Emmerich 137; Gloy 383; Hubmann 305; Nordemann 222; Von 
Gamm 990; Wise 4.15. Cf, however, Pfister 27-28 who maintains that a technical secret is an asset 
in the patrimony of the inventor even without a Geheimhaltungsinteresse. He argues that a protectable 
economical interest is a requirement only for defending the secret against others. But even before a 
Geheimhaltungsinteresse can be demonstrated, the secret can eg form part of the inventor's estate 
for the purposes of insolvency proceedings or succession. 
36 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298: "Der lnhaber muB ein schutzwurdiges wirtschaftliches lnteresse an 
der Geheimhaltung haben. Dies ist der Fall, wenn das Geheimgehaltene fUr die Wettbewerbsfahigkeit 
des Unternehmens Bedeutung hat..."; Gloy 383: "Das berechtigte lnteresse dart ... nicht engherzig 
beurteilt werden ... lmmer dort, wo die Geheimhaltung einer Tatsache eine spurbare Auswirkung aut 
die Wettbewerbsfahigkeit des Betriebes hat, ist das Geheimhaltungsinteresse zu bejahen"; Von Gamm 
990: "Das zu schutzende lnteresse ist das 'des Unternehmens an der Erhaltung seiner lndividualitat 
entsprechenden, gerade ihm eigentUmlichen Wettbewerbsfahigkeit'. Konkreter ausgedruckt: Das 
Unternehmen hat ein schutzenswertes lnteresse daran, daB keine geheimen Tatsachen bekannt 
werden, wenn das Bekanntwerden geeignet ist, den Wettbewerb des Konkurrenten zu steigern oder 
sonst den eigenen Betrieb zu schadigen." 
37 Von Gamm 990; Wise 4.15. 
38 Gloy 383; Von Gamm 990. 
39 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1297-1298; Gloy 383; Von Gamm 990. There is indeed support for a 
Willenstheorie, according to which a trade secret is any information or fact that is not offenkundig, 
stands in association with a commercial or industrial enterprise, and in respect of which the owner has 
a Geheimhaltungswil/e. On the other hand, there is an lnteressentheorie, which requires a legally 
protectable economic interest for the protectability of a trade secret. The prevailing view today holds 
that both Geheimha/tungswille and Geheimhaltungsinteresse must be present. This is sometimes 
called the Vereingigungstheorie (Metzler 16). See BGH GRUR 55 424 425 (Mabe/paste); Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1297; Metzler 14-18; Wise 4.9 fn 2; cf Nastelski 1957 GRUR 2; Tiedemann 1974 ZStW 
1029ff. 
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objective presence of a Geheimhaltungsinteresse may help establish that the owner 
did indeed have a Geheimhaltungswil/e in circumstances where he or she did not 
expressly articulate it.41 
4.2.1.2.6 Concreteness potential 
According to Pfister42 a technical secret can only be a patrimonial asset 
(Vermogensgegenstand) if it can be embodied in a concrete form, for instance by 
means of writing or sketches, so that it may lead a separate existence from the 
person on whose ideas it is based.43 It is not required that the secret be in fact 
embodied in a concrete form - the possibility of its being so concretized is 
sufficient. 44 
4.2.2 MISAPPROPRIATION 
The various statutory provisions protecting trade secrets in German law define 
specific forms of conduct which, in the first instance, give rise to criminal liability. Civil 
(delictual) liability is also attached to these defined forms of conduct. Although 
delictual liability is not limited entirely to these instances, their significance is such 
that they need to be examined in some depth. 
40 The need for such an objective control is heightened by the fact that the UWG in the first place 
provides for criminal liability in the case of trade secret misappropriation. Cf Glay 383: "Gerade im 
Hinblick auf den strafrechtlichen Charakter der §§ 17, 18 und 20 UWG ist damit ein Korrektiv 
geschaffen, welches eine objektive Oberprufung des Geheimhaltungswillens ermoglicht. Dieses 
Merkmal hat jedoch im wesentlichen die Funktion eines Willkurausschlusses. Der Unternehmer soll 
nicht berechtigt sein, aus willkurlichen subjektiven Erwagungen die Geheimhaltung verlangen, wenn 
dafUr schlechthin kein begrundetes lnteresse gegeben ist. Das berechtigte lnteresse dart jedoch nicht 
engherzig beurteilt werden"; Von Gamm 990: "Damit ist der strafrechtliche Schutz letzten Endes van 
objektiven, dem Willen des Unternehmensinhabers entruckten Gesichtspunkten abhangig, die im 
ProzeB der Richter unter alleiniger Verantwortung zu prufen hat." 
41 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298. 
42 11-15 28-31 . 
43 Eg 13: "Eine Erfindung ist also dann ein auBersubjektiver Gegenstand, wenn sie in irgend einer 
Weise auBerhalb des Menschen durch Buchstaben, Ziffern, Skizzen usw. wiedergegeben und aufgrund 
der Darstellung so rezipiert werden kann, daB sie auch nach dem Tade des Erfinders weiter bestehen; 
der Erfinder kann sie weitergeben und vererben." 
44 Pfister 30. He points out that should factual concretization be required, it would be too easy to 
prevent a secret invention from falling into an estate for insolvency proceedings. By eg simply 
destroying the only sketches in which the secret has been embodied, its existence as patrimonial asset 
would thus be terminated, only to be just as easily resurrected at a more convenient stage by re-
embodiment in a concrete form. 
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4.2.2.1 SECTION 17 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWER/345 
4.2.2.1.1 Section 17(1) UWG 
An employee, worker or apprentice/trainee who, during the subsistence of an 
employment relationship, communicates, without authorization, a commercial or 
industrial secret - entrusted or made accessible to him on the strength of that 
employment relationship - to someone for the purpose of competition, for the first-
mentioned's own benefit (aus Eigennutz), for the benefit of a third person, or with the 
intention of causing harm to the owner of the business, commits a criminal act 
according to section 17(1 ). Such a person may be subjected to imprisonment of up 
to three years or to a fine. 
Any employee can commit this crime46 - it does not matter whether he or she 
renders important or modest services, or whether he or she is remunerated or not.47 
Company directors may also be liable in terms of this subsection.48 The legal rather 
than the factual duration of the employment relationship is decisive. The perpetrator 
will therefore not be able to evade liability by divulging the secret during vacation, sick 
45 The complete text of sec 17 UWG reads as follows: 
"(1) Mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe wird bestraft, wer als Angestellter, 
Arbeiter oder Lehrling eines Geschaftsbetriebs ein Geschafts- oder Betriebsgeheimnis, das ihm 
vermoge des Dienstverhaltnisses anvertraut warden oder zuganglich geworden ist, wahrend der 
Geltungsdauer des Dienstverhaltnisses unbefugt an jemand zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbs, aus 
Eigennutz, zugunsten eines Dritten oder in der Absicht, dem lnhaber des Geschaftsbetriebes Schaden 
zuzufOgen, mitteilt. 
(2) Ebenso wird bestraft, wer zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbs, aus Eigennutz, zugunsten eines Dritten 
oder in der Absicht, dem lnhaber des Geshaftsbetriebs Schaden zuzufOgen, 
1. sich ein Geschafts- oder Betriebsgeheimnis durch 
a) Anwendung technischer Mittel, 
b) Herstellung einer verkorperten Wiedergabe des Geheimnisses oder 
c) Wegnahme einer Sache, in der das Geheimnis verkorpert ist, 
unbefugt verschafft oder sichert oder 
2. ein Geschafts- oder Betriebsgeheimnis, das er durch eine der in Absatz 1 bezeichneten 
Mitteilungen oder durch eine eigene oder fremde Handlung nach Nummer 1 erlangt oder sich sonst 
unbefugt verschafft oder gesichert hat, unbefugt verwertet oder jemandem mitteilt. 
(3) Der Versuch ist strafbar. 
(4) In besonders schweren Fallen ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fOnf Jahren oder Geldstrafe. Ein 
besonders schwerer Fall liegt in der Regel var, wenn der Tater bei der Mitteilung weiB, daB das 
Geheimnis im Ausland verwertet werden soll, oder wenn er es selbst im Ausland verwertet." 
46 Which has been dubbed Geheimnisverrat by German commentators - cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 
1299ff; Emmerich 137ff; Glay 384ff; Hubmann 305ff; Nordemann 224ff. 
47 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301-1302; Glay 384. 
48 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1298. 
119 
leave or whilst staying away from work without reason. 49 There can be no criminal 
liability after termination of the employment relationship, even if this has been caused 
by breach of contract on the part of the employee.50 In exceptional cases delictua/ 
protection of trade secrets may survive the termination of the employment relationship 
despite the unambiguous wording of section 17(1).51 
The requirement that the secret must have been confided or become accessible to 
the employee52 does not necessarily require conduct on the part of the employer,53 
but the employment relationship must in some way have been the cause of the 
farmer's knowledge of or access to the secret.54 It is furthermore not required that 
the perpetrator must have been expressly subjected to a duty of secrecy. He or she 
must, however, have known that the relevant information was secret.55 No liability 
is attached in the case of knowledge coincidentally obtained of the secret, but only 
if the coincidence would also have led to the same knowledge in the absence of any 
employment relationship. 56 
The secret must be communicated to someone, even to an agent of the employer,57 
or to another employee - even one in a leading position - provided the last-mentioned 
had no access to it.58 This communication or disclosure may also take place by way 
of omission, where the employee - in breach of a contractual duty - neglects to 
prevent others from learning the secret.59 The secret is communicated for the 
49 RGSt 50 131; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300; Emmerich 138; Gloy 385; Hubmann 305; Metzler 24; 
Von Gamm 995. 
50 BGH GRUR 55 402 (AnreiBgerat); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301; Von Gamm 995. 
51 Cf par 4.4.1 below. 
52 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300; Emmerich 138; Gloy 385; Hubmann 305; Nordemann 225; Von 
Gamm 993-994. 
53 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300. 
54 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300. 
55 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300. 
56 RGSt 33 354; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300. 
57 Originally sec 17(1) forbade communication to others (an andere). The courts regarded 
communication to an agent of the employer not as communication to others, but rather as 
communication to the employer himself (RGSt 61 274). The text was altered to forbid communication 
to somebody (an jemand) to close the loophole - see Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
58 RG JW 36 2081; RGSt HRR 38 500; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
59 Gloy 385; Von Gamm 995. 
120 
purposes of section 17(1) if it has been shared with another in a way that makes its 
exploitation possible, and a partial disclosure may be sufficient.60 The receiver must 
be able either to use the secret himself or to make it known to somebody else. In the 
latter case it is not necessary that he or she understands the secret, provided he or 
she can pass it on to another.61 It is not required that the receiver must already have 
used the secret or disclosed it to someone else - he or she must only be in a position 
to do so.62 
The disclosure must be unauthorized63 - if the employer has consented thereto, or 
if there was statutory justification or another ground of justification,64 no liability will 
ensue.65 
Furthermore, a subjective element pertaining to the aims of the perpetrator must also 
be present.66 Four alternative possibilities are listed in section 17(1 ). The first is 
disclosure of a trade secret for the purpose of competition. It does not matter whether 
the betrayal immediately enhances the competitive position of the receiver,67 or 
whether the trade secret is used to compete with the business from which it was 
taken. 68 Nor does it matter whether the competition itself is permissible, 69 or 
whether apart from the competitive purpose the perpetrator also wants to further other 
purposes, for instance scientific ones.70 Secondly, a disclosure for the perpetrator's 
own benefit (aus Eigennutz) may also give rise to liability. Any benefit, not necessarily 
60 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
61 RGSt 51 184-189; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
62 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
63 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301-1302; Gloy 386; Von Gamm 996. 
64 Gloy 386; Von Gamm 996. 
65 An example of statutory justification is the duty to inform of planned crime according to sec 138 
of the German criminal code - see Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
66 See in general Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302; Emmerich 139; Gloy 386; Hubmann 305; Metzler 25-
26; Nordemann 225-226; Von Gamm 996-997. 
67 RGSt 57 12; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302; Von Gamm 997. 
68 Von Gamm 997. 
69 RGSt 51 187; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
70 RGSt MuW 29 18; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
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a financial one, may qualify.71 It is sufficient if the perpetrator subjectively 
experiences his or her position as improved - an objective improvement is not 
required.72 In the third place, a disclosure for the benefit of a third party can fall foul 
of section 17(1 ), even in the absence of a competitive purpose, the perpetrator's own 
benefit, or a motive to harm the owner of the secret. An example could be an 
ideologically motivated disclosure of a trade secret, with the aim to benefit another 
state.73 Lastly, divulging a trade secret with a motive to harm the owner thereof, is 
also criminal conduct according to section 17(1). The intended harm need not be of 
a financial nature - it can also be an injury to interests of personality.74 
Criminal liability can only follow if the perpetrator commits the forbidden act with 
intention.75 This inter alia implies that the perpetrator must have knowledge of all the 
essential elements of the crime - mistake concerning one of them will exclude 
liability. 76 
The forbidden act is completed as soon as the receiver obtains knowledge of the 
secret.77 
4.2.2.1.2 Section 17(2) UWG 
According to section 17(2) the following constitute criminal acts: 
(1) the unauthorized obtaining or securing of trade secrets by 
(a) employing technical means; 
(b) making a physically embodied rendering of the secret; or 
(c) removal of an article in which the secret is embodied, 
for the purpose of competition, for the perpetrator's own benefit, for the 
benefit of a third person, or with the intention to harm the owner of the 
business; and 
(2) the unauthorized using or disclosing to someone else of a trade 
secret obtained by a disclosure according to section 17(1 ), or by the 
71 Consent to sexual intercourse may eg qualify as a personal benefit for the purposes of sec 17(1) 
- see RGSt 9 166; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302; Nordemann 225. 
72 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
73 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
74 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
75 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302; Gloy 386; Von Gamm 996. 
76 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302; Gloy 386. Do/us eventualis is sufficient - see Von Gamm 996. 
77 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1302. 
122 
perpetrator's own or another's conduct according to section 17(2)(1 ). 
4.2.2.1.2.1 Section 17(2)(1) UWG 
Section 17(2)(1) forbids the surreptitious acquisition of trade secrets78 in certain 
defined forms. Industrial espionage in general is not prohibited. 79 Use of the trade 
secret is not an element of this crime.80 On the other hand, the mere unauthorized 
acquisition of a trade secret is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute the forbidden 
conduct81 - it must be performed in one of three specified ways. In the first place, 
if such acquisition is effected by the employment of technical means, it will give rise 
to liability. Examples are the use of 'bugging' devices, cameras, photocopiers, tape 
recorders, etcetera.82 Secondly, trade secrets may not be obtained or secured by 
the making of physically embodied renderings thereof that would make it possible to 
divulge the secret - in part or in its entirety - to another person.83 Examples are the 
making of photocopies, photos, audio tapes, drawings, etcetera.84 In the third place 
the removal of an article, in which the secret is embodied, is visited by criminal 
sanction. This provision pertains to any conduct by which the perpetrator gains 
control over a physically embodied trade secret in order to use it or pass it on to 
another person.85 
For criminal liability to follow, the obtaining or securing of the secret must be 
unauthorized, that is, it must take place against the will of the owner of the trade 
secret.86 If the owner's consent - for instance to remove an article in which the 
secret is embodied - has been procured by deviousness, the conduct of the 
perpetrator will still be regarded as unauthorized.87 
78 The crime created by this subsection has been dubbed verbotenes Ausspahen by German 
commentators - cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Emmerich 139; Hubmann 306; Metzler 27; Von Gamm 
998. 
79 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Emmerich 140. 
80 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303. 
81 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303. 
82 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Von Gamm 999; Harte-Bavendamm 1990 GRUR 662. 
83 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303. 
84 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Harte-Bavendamm 1990 GRUR 662. 
85 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303. 
86 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Von Gamm 998. 
87 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303. 
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The same subjective element that must be present in the case of disclosure of trade 
secrets, is also required for the surreptitious acquisition of trade secrets - it must be 
committed either with a competitive purpose, or for the perpetrator's own benefit, or 
for the benefit of a third party, or with the motive of harming the trade secret owner. 
Intention must be present and must cover all the elements of the prohibited 
conduct.BB Any person, including an employee during the term of his or her 
employment, can commit this crime.B9 
4.2.2.1.2.2 Section 17(2)(2) UWG 
Section 17(2)(2) prohibits the unauthorized use or disclosure of a trade secret which 
has been obtained by an unauthorized communication by an employee (as defined 
in section 17(1)) or by espionage (as defined in section 17(2)(1 )), by either the 
perpetrator himself or another person.90 Any person, including an employee, can 
commit this offence.91 It is not required that the perpetrator knows the secret, nor 
that he or she commits the defined conduct with a competitive purpose, for own 
benefit, for the benefit of a third person, or with the motive of harming the trade 
secret owner. 92 Whether the use or disclosure of a trade secret is unauthorized, 
must be determined with reference to circumstances extant at the time when the 
secret has been obtained. If the obtaining was unauthorized at that time, any further 
use or disclosure will also be unauthorized.93 This will, however, not be the case if 
the secret has become public without the perpetrator's conduct having in any way 
contributed thereto. 94 
In the first situation dealt with in section 17(2)(2), that is the unauthorized use or 
disclosure of a trade secret which has been obtained by an unauthorized 
communication by an employee during the latter's term of employ, the actions of two 
persons combine to constitute the prohibited conduct. The communicating of the 
secret by the betraying employee must comply with all the elements of section 17(1 ), 
88 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304. 
89 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1303; Glay 387. 
90 See in general Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304ff; Emmerich 139ff; Hubmann 306; Metzler 30; 
Nordemann 226ff; Von Gamm 999ff. 
91 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304. 
92 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304. 
93 RG 114 52 (Hosentragerband); GRUR 36 573 579 (Albertus Stehfix); Baumbach-Hefermehl 
1304. 
94 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304. 
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and the receiver of the secret must know this or at least consider the possibility 
thereof, if not when he or she receives the information, then at the latest when he or 
she uses or discloses it.95 
The second situation envisaged in section 17(2)(2) is the unauthorized use or 
disclosure of a trade secret which has been surreptitiously acquired either by the 
user/discloser's own conduct or by that of another person. It does not matter whether 
the secret is obtained directly from the business where it is in use, or via a third 
person, for instance someone who has bought a machine that is subject to a trade 
secret.96 Obtaining the secret process by which a certain machine was 
manufactured by buying and reverse engineering the machine, in order to use the 
secret for identical copying of the machine, has been held to be a violation of this 
provision.97 If a secret has been obtained in a fortuitous or blameless manner, there 
is no liability in terms of this subsection.98 
The secret must have been obtained or secured without authority. Use of a trade 
secret that has been obtained by authorized means, is not punishable in terms of this 
provision.99 Obtaining a secret will be unauthorized if it has been acquired in one 
of the ways described in section 17(2)(1 ), but is not confined to such instances. 
Unauthorized obtaining of a secret in violation of other statutory norms or general 
legal norms 100 can also qualify. Examples of the former could be theft or 
duress.101 Examples of the latter are the obtaining of a trade secret by surreptitious 
means or under false pretences, or by researching it with means that are contra 
bonos mores.102 103 In the final analysis the question remains simply whether the 
95 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304. Von Gamm 1001 requires only intention on the part of the employee, 
and not the additional motive as required for liability under sec 17(1 ). 
96 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1304-1305. 
97 RG 149 329 (Stiefeleisenpresse); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
98 RGSt 30 251; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
99 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
100 le when the conduct by which the secret is obtained is either gesetzeswidrig (in contravention 
of an act), or sittenwidrig (contra bonos mores) - cf Glay 390; Von Gamm 1001. 
101 Glay 390; Von Gamm 1001-1002. 
102 Von Gamm 1002. 
103 The unauthorized acquisition of trade secrets in a manner that is contra bonos mores is of 
special importance in the case where an ex-employee is involved. See Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305; 
Von Gamm 1002 and par 4.4.1 below. 
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secret has been obtained with authority or not, 104 and any secret acquisition of the 
relevant information will be unauthorized. 105 
If a third person gets access to a trade secret by employing an ex-employee of the 
trade secret owner, it must be independently established that the third person has 
obtained the secret in an unauthorized manner.106 It is not required that the ex-
employee must have obtained the trade secret in an unauthorized way. Whether the 
conduct of the third party is unauthorized must be established with reference to all 
the circumstances. 107 It would be unauthorized to obtain a competitor's trade 
secrets by systematically questioning his or her ex-employees, in order to use the 
secret to the competitor's detriment.108 This would also be the case if an employer 
orders his or her own employees to spy on the premises of a competitor. 109 
Someone who has a right to know a trade secret (for instance a partner who has 
such a right in terms of the partnership agreement) does not obtain the secret in an 
unreasonable way for the purposes of this provision, even if he or she obtains it in 
an illegal manner.110 If in such a case the owner of the secret suffers patrimonial 
loss, there is no unlawfulness for the purposes of this provision. 111 112 
The crime is constituted by the unauthorized use or disclosure of the trade secret. 
Before the secret has been used or divulged, there can be no liability in terms of this 
provision.113 Use is any commercial exploitation of the trade secret. 114 A purely 
intellectual exploration of the application possibilities of a trade secret does not 
104 Cf Von Gamm 1002. 
105 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
106 RG GRUR 39 308 312; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
107 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
108 RG GRUR 37 559; RG GRUR 39 308 313; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
109 RG GRUR 43 256; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
110 OOGH OBL 72 73 74; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
111 BayObLG GRUR 88 634; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
112 If, however, there has been a breach of confidence it may be punished in terms of sec 18, or 
it may be contrary to competition policy in terms of sec 1 UWG. Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1305. 
113 If a surreptitious acquisition of the secret took place, it may be punishable in terms of sec 
17(2)(1) - cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306. 
114 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306; Hubmann 306; Von Gamm 1004; RGSt 40 406; RGSt 63 207. 
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constitute use, nor do steps taken to maintain or secure the secret.115 The use must 
be unauthorized. This does not mean that the use must conflict with a (statutory) 
legal norm. What is required, is that the use must conflict with the owner's interest 
to keep the information secret.116 
For criminal liability in terms of section 17(2)(2), intent must be present. This requires 
the perpetrator to have been aware of, or to have foreseen the following: the 
existence of the trade secret; that it has been obtained by an unauthorized disclosure 
in terms of section 17(1) or espionage in terms of section 17(2)(1) or a similar 
unauthorized manner; and that the use or divulging thereof was unauthorized.117 
4.2.2.2 SECTION 18 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB118 
Unauthorized use or disclosure to someone else - for the purpose of competition or 
for own benefit - of designs or instructions of a technical nature119 confided to the 
perpetrator in the course of trade dealings (particularly drawings, models, templates, 
clothes patterns, recipes), constitutes a crime in terms of section 18 of the German 
Unfair Competition Act. 120 A contravention of this section may be punished by 
imprisonment of up to two years or by a fine. 
The designs protected by this provision are any material serving as examples for the 
manufacture of new items, while instructions of a technical nature are written or oral 
instructions for technical processes (and thus excluding instructions in respect of, for 
instance, the pricing of goods or services).121 The drawings, models, templates, 
clothes patterns, and recipes enumerated in section 18 are examples, and not an 
exhaustive list of possibilities. 122 Other items protected by section 18 include patent 
115 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306. 
116 le, his Geheimhaltungsinteresse - cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306. 
117 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307. 
118 The complete text of sec 18 UWG reads: "Mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit 
Geldstrafe wird bestraft, wer die ihm im geschaftlichen Verkehr anvertrauten Vorlagen oder 
Vorschriften technischer Art, insbesondere Zeichnungen, Madelle, Schablonen, Schnitte, Rezepte, zu 
Zwecken des Wettbewerbes oder aus Eigennutz unbefugt verwertet oder an jemand mitteilt." 
119 
"Technical nature" is generally understood to refer only to "instructions", and not to "patterns"; 
cf Glay 398. 
120 This crime has been named Vorlagenfreibeuterei - design piracy - by commentators - cf 
Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312ff; Emmerich 142; Glay 398; Kruger 151; Wise 4. 77ff. 
121 RGSt 45 385; KG GRUR 88 702; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
122 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
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descriptions,123 furniture sketches, 124 and computer programs.125 Technical 
instructions will normally pertain to scientific works, but may also pertain to artistic 
works like the scripts of plays or films. 126 
Section 18 does not deal with the relationship between employers and employees -
it requires a relationship between an enterprise and an outside party. 127 Case 
law128 has limited the application of this section to relationships between different 
enterprises or business concerns. Commentators 129 criticize this limitation. They 
argue that an individual who divulges designs or technical instructions confided in him 
by a business concern should also be subject to the provisions of section 18. He 
should not be exonerated merely because he acts in his own private capacity and not 
as part of a business concern. 
Designs or technical instructions are confided to another party if they are entrusted -
contractually or extra-contractually130 - to that party with the express or tacit 
obligation to utilise them solely in the interest of the confider. 131 The confider may 
be the owner of the designs or instructions, or a third party to whom the owner has 
entrusted them. 132 
Section 18 does not expressly require the designs or technical instructions to be trade 
secrets - the only requirement is that they must have been confided to someone in 
the course of trade dealings. The early case law133 has accordingly proceeded on 
the assumption that the designs and technical instructions of section 18 need not be 
trade secrets as understood in terms of section 17 - however, they could also not be 
123 BGH GRUR 60 554 (Handstrickverfahren); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
124 RGSt 48 76. 
125 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
126 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313; Gloy 398. 
127 RG GRUR 39 308; RG GRUR 44 46; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313; Metzler 38-39. 
128 RGSt 48 78; cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
129 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1313. 
130 An example of extra-contractual confidence could be the case where patterns or technical 
instructions are confided to someone in the course of pre-contractual negotiations, but where there is 
a breakdown of the negotiations and no contract is concluded - cf Gloy 399. 
131 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1314; Metzler 38. 
132 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1314. 
133 Eg RGZ 83 384 386; see further Von Gamm 1006 fn 198. 
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public knowledge (offenkundig). The Bundesgerichtshof 34 has left the question 
open as to whether trade secrets are required, but again it has been decisive that 
designs which were offenkundig could not be confided to someone.135 Gloy136 is 
of the opinion that section 18 will almost always be protecting trade secrets, but that 
in exceptional cases the owner's Geheimhaltungswille137 may be absent, without 
the protection of section 18 being forfeited. Nordemann 138 asserts that the designs 
protected by section 18 need not be trade secrets. He observes that the wrong 
prohibited by section 18 is a breach of confidence, and ventures the opinion that such 
a breach may be committed by a contractual party even if the relevant design has 
been described in a technical journal, is in use overseas, or is in some way too widely 
known to be described as a secret. In a similar vein, Arians139 and Kruger140 state 
that while the designs and technical instructions may not be offenkundig, it does not 
follow that the Geheimhaltungswil/e and Geheimhaltungsinteresse requirements have 
been met. The material protected by section 18 will therefore not necessarily be trade 
secrets for the purposes of section 17. Metzler, 141 on the other hand, argues that 
designs and technical instructions will not be capable of protection under section 18, 
unless they also qualify as trade secrets for the purposes of section 17. He maintains 
that the requirements of absence of offenkundigkeit, and the presence of 
Geheimhaltungsinteresse and Geheimhaltungswille, must all be met before protection 
in terms of section 18 will be warranted. 
Only unauthorized use or disclosure for competitive purposes or for own benefit are 
mentioned as constituting violations of this section - use or disclosure with the motive 
134 BGH GRUR 58 297 298 (Petromax 1); BGH GRUR 64 31 32 (Petromax 2); cf Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1314; Metzler 38; Von Gamm 1006. 
135 BGH 17 41 52 (Kokil/enguB); BGH GRUR 60 554 (Handstrickverfahren); BGHZ 82 369 372 
(StraBendecke); cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1314; Von Gamm 1006. 
136 399. Cf BGH GRUR 64 31 (Petromax 2). 
137 Par 4.2.1.2.4 above. 
138 223-224. Nordemann maintains that Offenkundigkeit has different meanings when referring to 
trade secrets and designs respectively: "Man nennt einerseits Geheimnisse, die nur einem eng 
begrenzten Personenkreis bekannt sind, 'nicht offenkundig' [referring to BGH GRUR 61 40 43 
(Wurftaubenpresse)], wahrend man bei Vorlagen unter 'offenkundig' nur solche Tatsachen versteht, 
die 'bereits in einer Weise an die Offentlichkeit gelangt sind, die sie jedermann zuganglich machen"' 
[with reference to BGH GRUR 58 297 298 (Petromax /)]. 
139 In Oehler 369ff. 
140 163. 
141 39-41. 
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to harm somebody else is not referred to. 142 It is also not required that the 
perpetrator use the designs or instructions in their entirety or identically. Partial use, 
or use of the designs or instructions in a modified form, will suffice. 143 
The perpetrator can be any person, except for the employees of the complainant, 
because there are no trade dealings between employer and employee. The purpose 
of section 18 is protection against unlawful competition by outsiders. 144 The 
employee of another employer can thus be a perpetrator where he or she breaches 
a confidence placed in him or her by the complainant. 145 
The criminal law protection afforded by section 18 lasts as long as the duration of the 
relationship of confidence between the owner of the designs or technical instructions 
and the person confided in.146 In cases where the confidence arose in a contractual 
context, the discharge of the contract will not necessarily terminate the obligation of 
confidentiality. The view of eminent commentators 147 is that the capacity of disposal 
over confidential and non-public designs or technical instructions remains solely the 
prerogative of the right-holder in respect thereof. If the designs or instructions become 
public due to the conduct of someone other than the person confided in, the latter is 
under no further obligation to respect the confidentiality.148 Apart from the 
requirement that the designs or instructions must (objectively) not be in the public 
domain, Baumbach-Hefermehl also emphasize149 that the right-holder must 
(subjectively) have the will to protect them (Bewahrungswille). 150 
142 It may, however, be a violation of sec 826 BGB (par 4.2.2.5 below). Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 
1314. 
143 Cf BGH GRUR 60 554 (Handstrickverfahren); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1314. 
144 Fn 127 above; RGSt 44 152; RGSt 48 12 13; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1315. 
145 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1315. 
146 RG JW 14 251; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1315. 
147 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1315; cf Glay 398. 
148 Glay 399. 
149 1315. 
150 The parallel with the requirements for objective secrecy and a subjective Geheimhaltungswille 
in the case of trade secrets for the purpose of sec 17 is obvious. 
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4.2.2.3 SECTION 20 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB. 151 
Section 20 of the German Unfair Competition Act attaches criminal law sanctions to 
four distinct types of conduct: 152 
(a) attempted inducement of another to contravene section 17 or 18; 153 
(b) the making of an offer to contravene section 17 or 18; 154 
(c) the acceptance of such an offer; 155 or 
(d) declaring oneself willing to comply with a request to contravene 
section 17 or 18.156 
All these acts must be committed for competitive purposes (zu Zwecken des 
Wettbewerbes) or for the perpetrator's own benefit (aus Eigennutz) to be punishable. 
4.2.2.4 SECTION 20a GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB 
Section 20a makes section 5(7) of the German Criminal Code applicable to crimes 
committed in contravention of sections 17, 18 and 20. Section 5(7) of the 
Strafgesetzbuch157 provides that German criminal law will apply in the case of 
certain infringements of trade secrets (Betriebs- oder Geschaftsgeheimnisse) taking 
place in foreign territories. The secrets must be those of an enterprise or business 
concern situated in Germany or with its seat in Germany, or of an enterprise with its 
151 The complete text of sec 20 UWG reads as follows: 
"(1) Wer zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes oder aus Eigennutz jemand zu einem Vergehen gegen die 
§§ 17 oder 18 zu verleiten sucht oder das Erbieten eines anderen zu einem solchen Vergehen 
annimmt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
(2) Ebenso wird bestraft, wer zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes oder aus Eigennutz sich zu einem 
Vergehen gegen die §§ 17 oder 18 erbietet oder sich auf das Ansinnen eines anderen zu einem 
solchen Vergehen bereit erklart. 
(3) § 31 des Strafgesetzbuches gilt entsprechend." 
152 See the exposition by Baumbach-Hefermehl 1316; cf Emmerich 135; Metzler 43ff; Hubmann 
307; Von Gamm 1011ff. 
153 Sec 20(1 ). 
154 Sec 20(2). 
155 Sec 20(1 ). 
156 Sec 20(2). 
157 Sec 5(7) StGB reads as follows: 
"Das deutsche Strafrecht gilt, unabhangig vom Recht des Tatorts, tur folgende Taten, die im Ausland 
begangen werden: ... [subsecs 1-6] ... 7. Verletzung von Betriebs- oder Geschaftsgeheimnissen eines im 
raumlichen Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes liegenden Betriebs, eines Unternehmens, das dort seinen 
Sitz hat, oder eines Unternehmens mit Sitz im Ausland, das von einem Unternehmen mit Sitz im 
raumlichen Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes abhangig ist und mit diesem einen Konzern bildet..." 
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seat in a foreign country, but which is dependent on and forms a consortium with a 
parent concern seated in Germany.158 
4.2.2.5 SECTION 19 GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB AND 
THE PRIVATE LAW PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
Section 19159 creates a base for civil law, and more specifically delictual, liability for 
trade secret infringement. It provides that contraventions of sections 17 and 18 give 
rise to an obligation to compensate the damage caused thereby. The section also 
makes provision for more than one debtor to be treated as joint wrongdoers. 
Commentators 160 have opined that section 19 is both incomplete and superfluous. 
If the infringement took place with a competitive purpose, an action for damages may 
also be founded on section 1 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb. 161 
Section 1 is a general clause providing for an action for damages and/or an interdict 
against someone who - in the course of business dealings and for competitive 
purposes - commits an act that is contra bonos mores. 162 This section does not 
require a specific form of fault, and either intent or negligence may be proved.163 
In the absence of a competitive purpose, an action may be founded on section 826 
of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (the German Civil Code),164 which is a general 
delictual clause providing for an action for damages against someone who 
intentionally causes damage to another in a way that is contra bonos mores. 165 An 
action for damages may also lie in terms of section 823(1) of the German Civil 
Code, 166 which provides that anyone who wrongfully and intentionally or negligently 
158 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1319. 
159 Sec 19 UWG reads as follows: "Zuwiderhandlungen gegen die Vorschriften der §§ 17, 18 
verpflichten auBerdem zum Ersatze des entstandenen Schadens. Mehrere Verpflichtete haften als 
Gesamtschuldner." 
160 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1316 1309; Metzler 9; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 2. 
161 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1309 1316; cf in general 362ff; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 4. 
162 Sec 1 UWG reads: "Wer im Geschaftlichen Verkehre zu Zwecken des Wettbewerbes 
Handlungen vornimmt, die gegen die guten Sitten verstoBen, kann auf Unterlassung und 
Schadensersatz in Anspruch genommen werden." 
163 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1309. 
164 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1309. 
165 Sec 826 BGB provides: "Wer in einer gegen die guten Sitten verstoBenden Weise einem 
anderen vorsatzlich Schaden zufOgt, ist dem anderen zum Ersatze des Schadens verpflichtet." 
166 This matter was left open by the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH 38 392 395 (/ndustriebOden), but 
there seems to be general agreement among commentators that sec 823 could found a civil action for 
trade secret infringement. Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1309; Wise 4.110. Nastelski 1957 GRUR 4. See 
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interferes with or violates the life, physical person, health, freedom, property or other 
similar right (sonstiges Recht) of another, shall be liable for damages. 167 The right 
at stake in the case of a trade secret infringement is generally taken to be the right 
to the business enterprise (das Recht am (eingerichteten und ausgeubten) 
Gewerbebetrieb),168 which could qualify as a sonstiges Recht for the purposes of 
section 823(1 ). Furthermore, the criminal provisions of sections 17 and 18 are so-
called Schutzgesetze - protective laws - that could form a basis for private law 
protection in terms of section 823(2) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch. Section 823(2) 
provides that someone who infringes the protection granted to another by a protective 
law, is under an obligation to compensate the damage caused thereby. 169 In special 
circumstances, use of a trade secret that does not violate the provisions of section 
17 or 18 may also give rise to delictual liability.170 An employee who - after 
termination of his or her service - uses or discloses trade secrets obtained in an 
unobjectionable manner during the subsistence of the employment relationship, may 
in special circumstances be held delictually liable, even though such conduct does 
not constitute a crime under sections 17 or 18.171 Delictual liability in terms of 
section 823 of the Civil Code could furthermore be attached to a merely negligent 
wrongdoing, and need not be limited to intentional wrongs like the criminal provisions 
of the Unfair Competition Act.172 The private law protection of trade secrets is thus 
wider than the criminal law protection afforded by sections 17 and 18 of the Unfair 
Competition Act.173 
4.2.2.6 SUMMARY 
It can broadly be stated that the German Unfair Competition Act protects trade 
further par 4.4.1; 4.5.2; 4.5.5.1; 4.5.5.2 below. 
167 Sec 823(1) BGB provides: "Wer vorsatzlich oder fahrlassig das Leben, den Karper, die 
Gesundheit, die Freiheit, das Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen widerrechtlich verletzt, 
ist dem anderen zum Ersatze des daraus entstehenden Schadens verpflichtet." 
168 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1309; see par 4.5.5.2 below. 
169 Sec 823(2) BGB reads: "Die gleiche Verpflichtung [to compensate damage] trifft denjenigen, 
welcher gegen ein den Schutz eines anderen bezweckendes Gesetz verstozt. 1st nach dem lnhalte des 
Gesetzes ein Verstoz gegen dieses auch ohne Verschulden m6glich, so tritt die Ersatzpflicht nur im 
Falle des Verschuldens ein." Cf BGH GRUR 66 152-153; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1308; KraBer in 
Jehoram (ed) 40; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 4. 
170 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1308ff. 
171 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1308 131 Off; par 4.4.1 below. 
172 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1310. 
173 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1308-1312; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 4-5; Wise 4.109-4.112. 
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secrets against the following: 
(a) unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets by serving employees in 
certain specified circumstances (section 17(1 )); 
(b) the unauthorized obtaining or securing of trade secrets in certain 
specified ways (section 17(2)(1 )); 
(c) unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets which have been 
obtained or secured in specified unauthorized ways (section 17(2)(2)); 
and 
(d) the unauthorized use or disclosure of certain specified types of trade 
secrets in breach of a relationship of confidence (section 18). 
Additionally, in cases not covered by the above-mentioned sections, protection may 
be sought under more general sections in the German Unfair Competition Act (section 
1) and the German Civil Code (sections 823 and 826). To invoke the protection of 
these sections, the conduct complained of must either be contra bonos mores, or 
infringe a special right, or violate the protection afforded by a protective law, 
depending on the requirements of each specific section. 
4.3 REMEDIES 
4.3.1 DAMAGES 
An action for damages will usually be appropriate when the danger of trade secret 
infringement cannot be averted any more and injunctive relief can thus serve no 
purpose.174 As noted,175 an action for damages in the case of a trade secret 
infringement may be based on section 19 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb read in conjunction with sections 17 or 18; section 1 of the Gesetz gegen 
den unlauteren Wettbewerb; or sections 823(1 ), 823(2) or 826 of the BtJrgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, provided the specific requirements of the particular sections have been 
met. If the claim for damages is based on section 823(1) or 823(2) of the 
BtJrgerliches Gesetzbuch, proof of negligence on the part of the wrongdoer is 
sufficient - intent is not required. 176 Where more than one person is involved in the 
same trade secret infringement, section 19 provides that they are to be treated as 
174 Cf Ostertag and Ostertag 55-56: "1st das Unheil nicht mehr gutzumachen, das 
Betriebsgeheimnis also durch einen Dritten widerrechtlich bekannt geworden, so ist - bei Verschulden -
der Dritte zum Ersatz des Schadens verpflichtet. Der Schaden entsteht daraus, daB der lnhaber des 
fruheren Betriebsgeheimnisses seine faktische Monopolstellung verloren hat." 
175 Par 4.2.2.5 above. 
176 Cf Nastelski 1957 GRUR 5. 
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joint wrongdoers. 
As is the case with statutory intellectual property rights like patents or copyright, the 
computation of damages in the case of trade secret infringement may be approached 
in three different ways. 177 Firstly, the quantum of the actual damage may be 
proved. 178 In the second place, the quantum may be computed on the same basis 
as payment for a licence to use the trade secret.179 In such a case, it must be 
objectively - and abstractly - established what amount a reasonable licensor and 
licensee would have agreed upon. 180 Thirdly, the infringer's profits may be used as 
a basis for computing the damages suffered by the trade secret owner. 181 Ratio for 
the threefold method to compute damages, and especially the second method, is the 
peculiar difficulty to prove the quantum of damages in cases of this nature.182 
4.3.2 INTERDICT 
Injunctive relief may take two forms: Unterlassung and Beseitigung. Fault is not a 
requirement for an interdict in any of its forms. 183 
177 Baumbach-Hefermehl 258ff 1309; cf 1315; BGH GRUR 77 539 542 (ProzeBrechner). 
178 See Baumbach-Hefermehl 258. 
179 See Baumbach-Hefermehl 258. 
180 Baumbach-Hefermehl 258. 
181 See Baumbach-Hefermehl 259-260. 
182 Baumbach-Hefermehl 258. 
183 Cohn 162-163; Wise 4.116-4.117. Wise 4.117 voices the opinion that fault will normally be 
present. What the intended relevance of this remark is, is unclear, since it is established law that fault 
is not required for injunctive relief - see eg Cohn 162-163. Nastelski 1957 GRUR 4 makes the following 
remarks concerning an interdict as civil remedy: "Der Unterlassungsanspruch setzt nur ein objektiv 
rechtswidriges Handeln voraus. Er ist daher auch dann gegeben, wenn dem Tater kein Verschulden, 
also weder Vorsatz noch Fahrlassigkeit zur Last fallt. Ebensowenig ist das BewuBtsein der 
Rechtswidrigkeit erforderlich. Wenn daher beispielsweise ein Angestellter wahrend der Dauer des 
Dienstverhaltnisses einem anderen Unternehmer ein Betriebsgeheimnis mitteilt und der andere 
Unternehmer es verwerten will oder verwertet, so ist gegen den Unternehmer die Unterlassungsklage 
gegeben, auch wenn er nicht gewuBt hat, daB im Zeitpunkt der Mitteilung das Dienstverhaltnis des 
Angestellten noch nicht beendet war. Es fehlt in diesem Falle der zur Bestrafung nach § 17 Abs. 2 
erforderliche Vorsatz, und strafrechtlich ist es auch unerheblich, wenn der Unternehmer nachtraglich 
den wahren Sachenverhalt erfahrt. GegenOber der Unterlassungsklage kann er sich damit jedoch nicht 
verteidigen." 
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4.3.2.1 UNTERLASSUNG 
The purpose of the Unterlassungsanspruch184 is to prevent future wrongful 
infringements.185 Thus it is typically employed in two situations: (a) where an 
infringement has already taken place, and a danger exists that the same infringement 
will be repeated (Wiederholungsgefahr); 186 and (b) where a threatening infringement 
is expected for the first time (Erstbegehungsgefahr). 187 The basis for this type of 
injunctive relief against threatening trade secret infringement - as a species of unfair 
(unlawful) competition (unlauterer Wettbewerb) - is section 1 of the German Unfair 
Competition Act, which provides that a civil action for damages and/or an interdict 
shall lie against anyone who commits an act which is contra bonos mores for 
competitive purposes.188 An Unterlassungsanspruch may also be based on section 
1004(1)2 of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch.189 
4.3.2.2 BESE/T/GUNG 
The purpose of an Beseitigungsanspruch 190 is to ward off a wrongful infringement 
that has already begun. 191 It is aimed at the elimination of the source of the 
infringement, in order to prevent a continuation of the infringement.192 Although no 
mention is made of a Beseitigungsanspruch in the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, it may be regarded as included in the Unterlassungsanspruch 
authorized in section 1.193 Alternatively, an application for Beseitigung could 
probably be based on section 1004(1) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch.194 If the 
wrongdoer has objects and materials in his possession making wrongful interference 
184 Cf in general Baumbach-Hefermehl 209ff; Emmerich 339ff; Nordemann 276ff. 
185 Baumbach-Hefermehl 210. 
186 Baumbach-Hefermehl 212ff. 
187 Baumbach-Hefermehl 224ff. 
188 Cf BGH 16 173 (DOcko-Geheimverfahren); BGH 38 292-293 (Jndustrieboden); RG 144 41-52 
(Hosentragerband); GRUR 39 733 735 (Farbsaure); Baumbach-Hefermehl 211 1308; Wise 4.115-
4.116. 
189 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 211. 
190 See in general Baumbach-Hefermehl 226ff; Emmerich 350ff; Nordemann 282. 
191 Baumbach-Hefermehl 226. 
192 Baumbach-Hefermehl 226. 
193 Baumbach-Hefermehl 226. 
194 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 226. 
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with the applicant's trade secrets possible, the removal, disposal, or handing over 
thereof to the applicant will often be ordered.195 In theory two independent forms 
of relief, in practice an order for Beseitigung will frequently accompany an order for 
Unterlassung .196 
4.3.2.3 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Section 25197 of the German Unfair Competition Act gives the courts a discretion 
to issue temporary restraining orders in unfair competition cases. 198 The courts are 
given a considerably greater discretion in unfair competition cases than in other types 
of litigation, in so far as section 25 provides that a temporary restraining order may 
be issued even if the provisions of sections 935 and 940 of the German Civil 
Procedure Act (ZivilprozeBordnung) do not apply. Section 935 provides that a 
temporary order may be issued when there is cause for concern that by virtue of a 
change in the existing circumstances, a party's right may be frustrated or made 
substantially more difficult to establish. Section 940 provides that a temporary order 
may be issued with the purpose of resolving a temporary situation with regard to a 
disputed legal relationship, so long as such a resolution appears necessary to avert 
substantial harm in a continuing relationship, or to prevent threatened force, or for 
other reasons. The effect of section 25 of the Unfair Competition Act is thus that a 
temporary restraining order may be issued in unfair competition cases even if the 
applicant cannot show that one of these two recognized grounds for relief is present. 
The court must nevertheless find sufficient justification to issue the order, carefully 
weighing up the interests of the parties, and with consideration to their conduct, and 
the practical effects of the order. 199 200 According to section 945 of the 
ZivilprozeBordnung an applicant may be liable to the defendant for damages if the 
latter proves that the temporary restraining order was not a justifiable remedy at the 
time it was issued.201 
195 Wise 4.116. 
196 Wise 4.116; cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 226. 
197 Sec 25 UWG reads: "Zur Sicherung der in diesem Gesetze bezeichneten AnsprOche auf 
Unterlassung k6nnen einstweilige VerfOgungen erlassen werden, auch wenn die in den §§ 935, 940 
ZivilprozeBordnung bezeichneten Voraussetzungen nicht zutreffen." 
198 Cf in general Baumbach-Hefermehl 1348ff; Wise 4.135ff. 
199 Cf Wise 4.137. 
200 Thus where it was apparent that the applicant was wilfully protracting the litigation the court 
refused the application - 55 GRUR 434; cf Wise 4.137 fn 213. 
201 Cf Wise 4.139. 
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4.4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
4.4.1 EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
During the subsistence of the employment relationship, the employee is subject to 
several provisions of the Unfair Competition Act. As noted,202 Section 17(1) 
specifically prohibits the disclosure of trade secrets by serving employees in certain 
specified circumstances. Sections 17(2)(1) and 17(2)(2) are aimed at a wider class 
of potential wrongdoers, that may include employees. In terms of these subsections 
the obtaining or securing of trade secrets, and the use or disclosure thereof, are 
respectively prohibited, again. in certain specified circumstances.203 204 Read in 
conjunction with section 19,205 these subsections provide a basis for civil relief 
against serving employees infringing the trade secrets of their employers. Civil law 
relief may, however, go wider than the ambit of section 17, as noted.206 Thus, while 
negligent infringement of trade secrets is not covered by section 17 (to name one 
example), it may fall foul of section 823(1) of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch. 207 
The position after termination of the employment relationship is more problematic. 
Two main scenarios can be distinguished here. The first is where the ex-employee 
has obtained the trade secrets of his or her former employer in a reasonable way in 
the course of his or her employment relationship with the ex-employer. The second 
is the case where the employee has obtained the trade secrets in an unreasonable 
way. 
After the employer has left the employ of his or her employer, there is in principle no 
obligation on him or her to keep secret or abstain from using for his or her own 
benefit the knowledge and experience he or she has gained in a reasonable way in 
the course of his or her employment. 208 This principle also applies to matter in 
202 Par 4.2.2.1 above. 
203 Par 4.2.2.1 above. 
204 Section 18 is not applicable to employees infringing the trade secrets of their own employers -
par 4.2.2.2 above. 
205 Par 4.2.2.5 above. 
206 Par 4.2.2.5 above. 
207 Par 4.2.2.5 above. 
208 BGH GRUR 55 402 (AnreiBgerat); BGH GRUR 55 424 (Mabe/paste); BGH GRUR 58 553 
(Saugrohr); RG 65 333; GRUR 39 706 (Sperrholzlatten); RAG GR 44 46; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300; 
Mes 1979 GRUR 585. 
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respect of which the former employer has the highest interest in continued 
secrecy.209 Even if the termination of the employment relationship has been caused 
by breach of contract on the part of the employee, the employee will in general not 
be criminally liable for subsequent breaches of secrecy.210 In exceptional cases211 
delictual protection of trade secrets obtained in a reasonable manner in the course 
of employment, may survive the termination of the employment relationship.212 As 
a general rule, an ex-employee's use of a trade secret obtained in an unobjectionable 
way will not constitute a violation of section 1 of the Unfair Competition Act or section 
826 of the Civil Code,213 but a number of special circumstances that may render 
the use of a reasonably obtained trade secret a violation of one or both of the two 
sections, have been identified in case law. These are the following:214 
(a) Abuse of a position of confidence. As a general rule the relationship of 
confidence that may exist between employer and employee does not survive the 
termination of the employment contract, and can therefore not serve as a basis 
for obliging the ex-employee to continue respecting the confidentiality of the 
former employer's trade secrets.215 However, if the ex-employee has served 
in an unusually high position of confidence, his or her later use of trade secrets 
obtained in an unobjectionable way may violate competition policy216 and be 
wrongful.217 This will especially be the case if the importance of his position 
is reflected in high remuneration.218 All the circumstances must be considered 
and a careful weighing of the interests of the concerned parties is required to 
establish whether the utilisation of a trade secret obtained in an unobjectionable 
way constitutes a violation of section 1 of the Gesetz gegen den Unlauteren 
209 RG JW 38 118; Baumbach-Hefermehl 1300. 
210 BGH GRUR 55 402 (AnreiBgerat); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
211 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301 131 O; Emmerich 143-144. 
212 Baumbach-Hefermehl 131 O; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 5. 
213 BGH GRUR 63 367 (lndustriebOden); BGH GRUR 64 31 32 (Petromax II); BGH GRUR 64 215 
(Milchfahrer); Baumbach-Hefermehl 131 O; cf Emmerich 143-144. 
214 This discussion is based on the classification and analysis of Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311-1312. 
215 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311; Von Gamm 985-986. 
216 Such use will be wettbewerbswidrig - Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
217 RG GRUR 36 573 578 (Albertus Stehfix); RG GRUR 38 906 (Faltenrohrmaschine); Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1311. 
218 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
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Wettbewerb. 219 The following factors220 are to be considered here: the 
duration of the employment, the position of the employee in the enterprise, the 
employee's in-service training, the competitive importance of the secret to the 
enterprise of the employer, the employee's personal contribution to the 
development of the secret, and the worthiness of protection of the employee's 
interest to utilise the secret. If the employee has served for a short period of 
time, his or her interest in utilisation of the secret will generally be rated lower 
than the interest of a long-serving employee.221 Thus - to cite an example 
from the lndustrieboden case222 - the cumulative presence of the following 
circumstances would justify a duty of secrecy continuing after termination of the 
employment contract: where a leading employee, entrusted with an unusually 
high position of confidence, left the employer's enterprise after a relatively short 
period of time; and then used a trade secret which was extremely important for 
the competitive position of the employer; which trade secret had become 
accessible to him purely as a result of his confidential position; and where he 
neither contributed to the development of the secret in any way, nor had a 
reasonable interest in the utilisation of the secret for the development of his new 
career. 
(b) Specific hostile measures. The conduct of an employee who, whilst still in an 
employment relationship, prepares a competitive enterprise which he or she 
intends pursuing after leaving his current employer, is not per se contra bonos 
mores.223 The following examples from case law give an idea of situations 
where civil relief could, however, be in order: where an employee in a leading 
position made preparations for the creation of a competitive enterprise long 
before leaving the service of his employer, and for this purpose appropriated -
on the strength of his position of confidence - all the new experience of his 
219 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. Mes 1979 GRUR 587 emphasizes the difficulty of this weighing-up 
process by pointing out that two main conflicting interests involved here are both granted protection 
by the German Constitution: "DaB diese Abwagung besonderes Gewicht hat und besondere 
Schwierigkeiten mit sich bringen kann, zeigt sich allein daran, daB RechtsgOter van hohem Rang 
miteinander in Konflikt stehen, die beide mit Verfassungsrang ausgestattet sind. Das Grundgesetz 
garantiert sowohl in Artikel 14 das Eigentum [see par 4.5.4 below], als auch in Artikel 2, Abs 1 das 
Recht zur freien Personlichkeitsentfaltung und insbesondere in Artikel 12 das Recht der Berufsfreiheit." 
22° Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
221 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
222 BGH GRUR 63 367 370; cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311; Von Gamm 985-986. 
223 BGH GRUR 52 582 (Sprechstunden); BGH GRUR 55 402 405 (AnreiBgerat); RG 144 41 49 
(Hosentragerband); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
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employer's enterprise;224 where a leading salesperson started to construct a 
prototype machine for an important customer whilst still himself in an 
employment relationship, the more so because in the process the salesperson 
used his employer's trade secret and induced other employees to commit 
breach of contract;225 where an employer had provoked the untimely ending 
of the employment relationship with the purpose of exploiting his former 
employer's trade secret which he had obtained in an unobjectionable way;226 
and where an employee took almost the entire clientele of his employer -
knowledge of which he had obtained in the course of employment - with him on 
leaving the latter's employ, thus destroying the economical foundation of the 
latter's enterprise.227 228 
(c) Contractual regulation. The employer and employee can contractually agree 
that the employee will respect the confidentiality of specific trade secrets after 
termination of the employment relationship.229 As long as such contractual 
obligations pertain only to specific trade secrets, such agreements will not be 
impermissible restraints of trade.230 Wider contractual obligations, which 
effectively make it impossible for the ex-employee to pursue his or her chosen 
calling, will be subject to section 7 4 of the Handelsgesetzbuch. This section 
requires agreements in restraint of trade between an employer and a departing 
employee to be in writing, and obliges the employer to pay, for the duration of 
the restraint of trade, compensation to the ex-employee amounting annually to 
at least half the amount of his remuneration last payable according to the 
employment contract.231 232 
224 RG GRUR 36 573 578 (Albertus Stehfix); cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
225 BGH GRUR 83 179 181 (Stapelautomat); cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1311. 
226 BGH GRUR 55 402 405 (AnreiBgeriit); cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312. 
227 BGH GRUR 64 215 (Milchfahrer); cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312. 
228 In alt these instances, the appropriation of a trade secret appears to be only a co-determinant -
and, on the face of things, possibly one of lesser importance - of the reprehensibleness of the 
employee's conduct. 
229 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312. 
23° Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312. 
231 Sec 74 HGB reads as follows: 
"(1) Eine Vereinbarung zwischen dem Prinzipal und dem Handlungsgehilfen, die den Gehilfen tor die 
Zeit nach Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses in seiner gewerblichen Tatigkeit beschrankt 
(Wettbewerbsverbot), bedarf der Schriftform und der Aushandigung einer vom Prinzipal 
unterzeichneten, die vereinbarten Bestimmungen enthaltenden Urkunde an den Gehilfen. 
(2) Das Wettbewerbsverbot ist nur verbindlich, wenn sich der Prinzipal verpflichtet, tor die Dauer des 
Verbots eine Entschadigung zu zahlen, die tor jedes Jahr des Verbots mindestens die Halfte der van 
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Interestingly, some eminent German commentators233 regard the Anglo-American 
distinction234 between general knowledge and special knowledge - that is, in this 
context, trade secrets - as of no practical value for determining the ambit of the 
possible civil liability of an ex-employee for using trade secrets obtained in a 
reasonable way whilst still in the employ of his or her former employer. 
In the second scenario to be considered in the post-employment context, use or 
disclosure of a trade secret will constitute a transgression of section 17(2)(2) where 
the employee has used one of the unreasonable means of obtaining a trade secret 
enumerated in that section (read with sections 17(1) and 17(2)(1 )). As noted,235 this 
section does not deal specifically with employment relationships; it follows that its 
protection is independent of any such relationship. In a case where an employment 
relationship was involved, the protection of trade secrets afforded by section 17(2)(1) 
will thus outlast the duration of the relationship.236 The crucial point is that the trade 
secret must have been obtained in an unreasonable way during the existence of the 
employment relationship, if later use thereof is to be actionable in terms of section 
17(2)(2).237 In such a situation, commentators have pointed out,238 an ex-
employee will more often than not raise the defence that he or she has obtained the 
secret reasonably in the course of his or her employment and that he or she is 
therefore free to utilise it. This gives rise to the difficulty of establishing a dividing line 
between the reasonableness and unreasonableness of the acquisition of trade secrets 
during the subsistence of an employment relationship. The general principle 
applicable appears to be that the ex-employee is free to exploit the secrets which 
have remained in his or her memory as a result of conduct which he or she was 
dem Handlungsgehilfen zuletzt bezogenen vertragsmaBigen Leistungen erreicht." 
Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312; Glanegger Niedner Ren kl RuB 31 Off. 
232 Gaul 1988 WRP 217 advocates a time limit of five years on these agreements, and bases his 
proposition inter alia on sec 12 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz), that guarantees a basic right 
to occupational freedom (Berufsfreiheit). Baumbach-Hefermehl 1312 point out that since there is no 
time limit to the general protection of trade secrets, a time limit on a contractual obligation to respect 
the confidentiality of trade secrets seems out of place. 
233 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1310. For an opposite view, see eg Mes 1979 GRUR 591-592. 
234 Par 2.4.1; 3.4.1 above. 
235 Par 4.2.2.1.2.2 above. 
236 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1301. 
237 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307; Mes 1979 GRUR 585-586. 
238 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306. 
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permitted to do in his or her capacity as employee. 239 Here circumspection in 
assessment is needed,240 since individuals vary widely in their capacity to 
remember.241 If the employee has surreptitiously made notes to aid his or her 
memory, the subsequent use of the secret may be unauthorized.242 The making of 
notes is not per se an indication of unreasonableness,243 and is therefore not 
always impermissible, even if the notes are clearly intended for later use. Decisive 
in this regard will be whether the making of notes was permissible in terms of the will 
of the employer, regardless of whether his or her will was expressly stated (for 
instance in the terms of the employment contract) or was nevertheless clear by 
implication.244 Tracing drawings of machinery will be unauthorized even if the 
employee is permitted to view the drawings, the reason being that such drawings are 
made accessible for the purpose of utilisation in the course of employment, and not 
for copying. 
In conclusion, it may be said that even though the delictual protection of trade secrets 
is in principle wider in ambit than the criminal protection provided for by section 17 
of the German Unfair Competition Act, section 17 nevertheless exerts a strong 
limiting influence on the scope of delictual protection. The basic point of departure 
that the ex-employee should in principle be free to use the knowledge he or she has 
accumulated in the service of his or her previous employer, will only in special 
circumstances be departed from in cases where civil liability is sought. 245 This 
239 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307. 
24° Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306: "Hier muB die Richter die Lebenserfahrung sprechen lassen. 
Freilich sind Begabung und Gedachtnis sehr verschieden." 
241 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1306-1307 and examples cited. 
242 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307. 
243 BGH GRUR 60 294 (KaltflieBpreBverfahren); Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307. 
244 Baumbach-Hefermehl 1307. 
245 Cf the following remarks by Emmerich 143-144: "Das Problem konzentriert sich heute var allem 
auf die Frage nach der Anwendbarkeit der Generalklausel (§ 1 UWG) auf einen 'Geheimnisverrat' 
durch Arbeitnehmer nach ihrem Ausscheiden bei dem Arbeitgeber jenseits der Falle des § 17 11 UWG. 
In diesen Fallen ware es jedenfalls unzulassig, auf dem Wege i.iber § 1 UWG in der Frage des 
zivilrechtlichen Geheimnisschutzes die dem § 17 UWG zugrundeliegenden gesetzgeberischen 
Wertungen zu i.iberspielen. Wie schon ausgefi.ihrt ... beruht namlich die gesetzliche Regelung auf der 
Entscheidung des Gesetzgebers, daB samtliche Beshaftigten nach ihrem Ausscheiden in der 
Verwertung ihrer Kenntnisse im lnteresse ihres beruflichen Fortkommens grundsatzlich frei sein sollen, 
sofern sie ihre Kenntnisse nicht gerade auf unredliche Weise erlangt haben (§ 17 II UWG). Daraus 
folgt, daB einem Arbeitnehmer jenseits der Falle des § 17 UWG eine Verwertung seiner Kenntnisse 
nach seinem Ausscheiden aufgrund des § 1 UWG nur auf Grund besonderer, zusatzlicher Umstande 
verboten werden dart." See further KraBer in Jehoram (ed) 42-43; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 5-8. 
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situation has been lamented by some authors, 246 who are of the opinion that (for 
the purposes of civil law protection at least)247 the ex-employee is overprotected 
and the trade secret owner underprotected. The problem of an ex-employee utilising 
the trade secret of his or her former employer is essentially a classical conflict of 
interests. On the one hand, there is the employer's interest in the continued secrecy 
of his or her trade secret - on the other the ex-employee's interest in furthering his 
or her new career with all the knowledge and skill at his or her disposal.248 Where 
the employee has obtained the secret in an unreasonable way, the scale is tipped in 
favour of the employer. Where the employee has obtained the secret in a reasonable 
way, German criminal law clearly favours the employee.249 However, Nastelski 
argues250 persuasively that the interest of the ex-employee to further his or her 
chosen calling and the interest of the ex-employer in the continued secrecy of his or 
her trade secrets are not the only interests at stake. He admonishes that sight should 
not be lost of all the other employees remaining in service, who may all be adversely 
affected if damage is done to the employer's business by the departing employee. 
There are thus, Nastelski argues, apart from considerations of fairness, also 
economical and social reasons for extending the protection of trade secrets against 
departing employees beyond current limits. 
246 Cf Nastelski 1957 GRUR 5: "Die zunachst bestechende Formel des [Reichsgerichts], daB der 
Angestellte Ober redlich erworbene Kenntnisse nach Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses grundsatzlich 
frei verfugen k6nne und daran nur dann gehindert sei, wenn besondere Umstande gegeben seien, die 
eine solche Verfugung als sittenwidrig erscheinen lieBen, dart nicht daruber hinwegtauschen, daB ihre 
praktische Bedeutung gering ist... Praktisch ist... der Angestellte nach der Rechtsprechung des 
[Reichsgerichts] trotz jenes Vorbehalts nach Beendigung des Dienstverha.ltnisses in der Verfugung 
Ober die in einwandfreier Weise zu seiner Kenntnis gelangten Betriebsgeheimnisse frei. Ein gewisser 
Ausgleich wird nur durch die uberaus scharfen Anforderungen geschaffen, die das [Reichsgericht] 
hinsichtlich der Redlichkeit der Kenntnis stellt. Jedes Festhalten von Kenntnissen auf einem den 
Zwecken des Arbeitgebers nicht dienlichen und nicht ublichen Wege, zum Beispiel durch 
Aufzeichnungen, durch Auswendiglernen von Rezepten oder Formeln oder durch genaues Einpragen 
des Bildes oder der Bauart von Modellen wird schon als unredliches Verhalten angesehen, das die 
spatere Verwertung des Geheimnisses hindert. Aber auch damit ist nur in Ausnahmefallen zu helfen. 
Zumeist wird es dem Betriebsinhaber nicht einmal moglich sein, den ihm obliegenden Beweis tur ein 
solches unredliches Verhalten des Angestellten zu tuhren. Die Frage, ob das Problem der zeitlichen 
Dauer der Geheimhaltungspflicht durch die Rechtsprechung des [Reichtsgerichts] fUr das Zivilrecht 
eine befriedigende Losung gefunden hat, muB daher ... verneint werden. Es sind zahlreiche Fa lie 
denkbar, in denen die Verwertung eines Betriebsgeheimnisses durch einen Angestellten nach 
Beendigung des Dienstverhaltnisses als hochst unbillig empfunden wird, auch wenn sie nicht infolge 
'besonderer Umstande' als geradezu sittenwidrig erscheint"; Mes 1979 GRUR 588-589 who points out 
that in this respect the legal protection of trade secrets in Germany lags behind the position in the 
Benelux states, France, Italy, Britain and the United States of America. 
247 Cf Nastelski 1957 GRUR 7-8. 
248 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 131 O; Mes 1979 GRUR 587 (see fn 219 above). 
249 Cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1310. 
250 1957 GRUR 7. 
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4.4.2 INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 
The original text of the Gesetz gegen den un/auteren Wettbewerb did not attach 
criminal sanctions or delictual liability to industrial espionage. Section 17 dealt with 
only two types of trade secret infringements - betrayal by employees and use or 
disclosure by a wider category of possible wrongdoers. 251 This position was 
changed in 1986 by the Zweites Gesetz zur Bekampfung der 
Wirtschaftskriminalitat, 252 inserting the present section 17(2)(1 ), which prohibits the 
surreptitious acquisition of trade secrets in certain specified ways.253 This section 
appears to adequately cover industrial espionage in its most common forms. 
However, if the spy obtains knowledge of a trade secret and is able to retain it in his 
or her memory without using some technical means or without securing it in some 
concrete form, 254 he or she will not be criminally liable. This will obviously only be 
possible in cases of either fairly uncomplicated trade secrets or exceptionally gifted 
spies, but points to a weakness in the legal protection against industrial espionage. 
4.4.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS 
As noted,255 intention is a requisite for criminal liability in terms of the various 
sections of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb protecting trade secrets, 
whereas for delictual liability negligence suffices. This raises the question of relief 
against a third party who innocently, but contrary to the will of the owner, acquires 
knowledge of a trade secret. Since an interdict may be granted in the absence of 
fault, 256 it appears at first blush to be a suitable remedy for this type of situation. 
However, in an old case the Reichsgericht257 expressed the view, without holding 
so, that if a third party had been in good faith when he acquired the secret, an 
interdict would not be available against him when he later learned that it was the 
251 See eg Baumbach-Hefermehl (12th ed 1978) 1441. For an in-depth analysis of arguments 
offered in favour of law reform under the old dispensation, see Kruger 103ff. For a discussion of 
protection against industrial espionage under the old dispensation, with the accent on matters of 
criminal procedure, see Kragler 1982 DB 98, and for a more comprehensive treatise Kragler 1ff. See 
further Tiedemann 197 4 ZStW 1029ff. 
252 15 5 1986 (BGBI I 721). 
253 As noted in par 4.2.2.1.2.1 above; cf Metzler 8. 
254 Cf par 4.2.2.1.2.1 above. 
255 Par 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.4 above. 
256 Par 4.3.2 above. 
257 RG GRUR 39 308 (Filtersteine); cf Wise 4.121-4.122. 
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owner's secret. Henkels258 has suggested that a recipient in good faith could not 
be interdicted during the time he was unaware that he had acquired knowledge of the 
owner's trade secret, but once he had learned the true state of affairs an interdict 
could be issued against him. However, if he had incurred substantial expense in 
preparation for use of the secret whilst still in good faith, an interdict would not be 
available.259 260 
4.4.4 DURATION OF PROTECTION 
A question that remains unresolved is whether an interdict may be issued against a 
wrongdoer who has caused the trade secret to fall in the public domain against the 
will of the owner - this would imply that the legal protection of a trade secret can in 
certain circumstances outlast the existence of the secret itself. The 
Bundesgerichtshof61 has declined to express an opinion in this regard. Some 
German commentators262 are of the opinion that an interdict of limited duration may 
be appropriate - after a trade secret has fallen into the public domain - to deprive a 
misappropriator of the unfair competitive advantage gained. They seem to be of the 
opinion that the duration of the interdict should in such a case correspond with the 
length of time which the infringer would have required to prepare for the practical 
implementation of the relevant information, if he or she had not had unauthorized 
access thereto prior to its falling into the public domain.263 
It will be remembered that there is some measure of dispute as to whether section 
18 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb protects only designs that are 
trade secrets, or whether it also extends its protection to designs not strictly secret, 
258 Henkels 56-57; cf Wise 4.122-4.123. 
259 Wise 4.122 points out that Henkels refers only to interdicts restraining further use of trade 
secrets, and expresses the opinion that Henkels would probably have applied the same conclusion to 
interdicts prohibiting disclosure. Wise also comments on the similarity between Henkels' suggestions 
and first American Restatement sec 758 (cf par 3.4.3 above). 
260 By way of analogy, the opinion of Henkels seems to harmonize well with the strong protection 
afforded to good faith by the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch in the field of the law of things. (Secs 932-935 
provide that in certain circumstances ownership is conferred to a person who obtained possession of 
a thing in good faith, even though the person from whom he obtained possession was not in a position 
to transfer ownership of the thing. Cf eg Baur 464-483; Goldmann 683-685; Wieling 111-117 .) 
261 BGH GRUR 60 554 555 (Handstrickverfahren); ct Wise 4.124-4.125. 
262 Cf the authorities cited by Wise 4.125ff. 
263 Wise 4.128 comments that these views are reminiscent of the English "springboard doctrine" 
(par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.4.4 above). 
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but confided to the alleged wrongdoer in a relationship of confidence. 264 If the last-
mentioned possibility were the correct one, the implication would obviously be that 
an interdict issued to protect such a design might be protecting subject matter that 
was not strictly secret. 265 
An instance where injunctive relief may be awarded - after the secret has fallen into 
the public domain - against a party who was not responsible for the secret thus 
becoming public knowledge, is the case of identical or "slavish" copying (sklavische 
Nachahmung). In the Wurftaubenpresse266 case the Bundesgerichtshof stated that 
even if the machine copied was not subject of a trade secret (any longer), the 
identical imitation thereof would still be wrongful in terms of the general clause 
against unfair competition in section 1 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, and a plea for injunctive relief could be well founded in such a case. 267 
4.5 LEGAL BASE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN GERMAN 
LAW 
4.5.1 CRIMINAL LAW 
As noted,268 the protection of trade secrets in German law is primarily a function of 
criminal law. Nastelski explains269 the pre-eminence of penal protection in this field 
on two grounds. In the first place, he points out, trade secrets are particularly prone 
to infringement by employees, and since they may frequently be impecunious, claims 
for damages would often bring little relief to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the ephemeral 
nature of trade secrets means that they may easily be destroyed by disclosure. In the 
light of these two considerations, Nastelski argues, the protection of criminal law, with 
its deterrent value, is appropriate. 
264 Par 4.2.2.2 above. 
265 Cf Wise 4.128-4.133. 
266 BG GRUR 61 40; cf Wise 4.134. 
267 In such a case, trade secret misappropriation is not really the basis of liability - cf par 8.2.2.2.3.1 
below. 
268 Par 4.1; 4.2 above. 
269 1957 GRUR 2. 
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4.5.2 DELICT 
While it is abundantly clear that trade secret protection in German law is in the first 
instance a matter of criminal law, it is equally clear that trade secret protection is not 
confined to that sphere. The obvious private law corollary of the criminal law 
protection of trade secrets is the protection afforded by the law of delict. 270 As 
noted,271 such protection may be based either on section 19 (in conjunction with 
sections 17 or 18) of the Gesetz gegen den un/auteren Wettbewerb, or section 1 of 
the same Act, or on sections dealing with general delictual liability in the Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch. 
4.5.3 CONTRACT 
Section 17(1) of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb deals specifically with 
a contractual relati.onship, namely that of employer and employee. The section 
defines fairly exhaustively conduct constituting unlawful trade secret infringement in 
such a relationship, and does not leave room for the parties to the employment 
contract to vary those statutory provisions in their agreement. During subsistence of 
the employment contract, the protection of trade secrets may thus be typified as ex 
lege in origin, rather than ex contractu. However, after termination of the contract, the 
employee is in principle free to use the trade secrets he or she has learnt whilst in 
the employ of his or her former employer. 272 This is where a contractual agreement 
for the protection of those trade secrets may be of value to the employer who desires 
to ensure the continued secrecy of his or her trade secrets.273 As noted,274 such 
an agreement will be valid if it seeks to protect subject matter qualifying as trade 
secrets. An agreement that goes further to effectively hinder the ex-employee in 
practising his or her chosen calling, will be seen as a restraint of trade in terms of 
section 74 of the Handelsgesetzbuch, and will be void in the absence of agreed-upon 
compensation. 275 
27° Cf Emmerich 15; Von Gamm 66. 
271 Par 4.2.2.5 above. 
272 Par 4.4.1 above. 
273 Cf par 4.4.1 above; Nastelski 1957 GRUR 5. However, Mes 1979 GRUR 588 doubts the 
effectiveness of contractual protection in the light of statutory limitations on agreements in restraint of 
trade. 
274 Par 4.4.1 above. 
275 Cf par 4.4.1 above. 
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Outside the employment context, some sections of the German Act against 
Restriction of Competition - the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen - are 
applicable to contractual agreements concerning certain types of trade secrets. 276 
Section 21 provides that section 20 shall be applicable to agreements on the transfer 
and use277 of statutorily unprotected inventive efforts, processes of production, 
construction, other technical efforts enlarging the art, or unprotected efforts in the field 
of plant breeding, advancing plant cultivation, in so far as such efforts constitute 
industrial trade secrets (Betriebsgeheimnisse). Section 20(1) provides that 
agreements concerning the acquisition or use of patents, registered designs, or 
protected seed varieties are invalid in so far as they impose on the acquirer or 
licensee any restrictions in his business conduct which go beyond the scope of the 
protected right. Restrictions pertaining to the type, extent, quantity, territory or period 
of exercise of such a right shall not be deemed to exceed its scope. Section 20(2) 
lists five types of contractual restrictions on the licensee or assignee that will be valid 
in so far as they do not extend beyond the expiration of the right acquired or in 
respect of which a licence is granted.278 Section 20(3) provides that, on application, 
the cartel authorities may approve an agreement of the type described in section 
20(1 ), if the freedom of economic activity of the acquirer or licensee or other 
enterprises will not be unfairly restricted, and if competition in the market will not be 
substantially restrained. Lastly, section 1 of the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen may also be applicable to contractual agreements 
concerning trade secrets. The section provides that agreements made for a common 
purpose by enterprises or associations of enterprises, and decisions of associations 
of enterprises, are invalid in so far as by restraining competition, they are likely to 
influence production or market conditions with respect to trade in goods or 
commercial services.279 
276 Cf KraBer in Jehoram (ed) 47; Wise 4.143ff. 
m These provisions are thus particularly applicable to licensing agreements. On the licensing of 
trade secrets in general, cf Ostertag and Ostertag 69-70; Wise 4.253ff. 
278 These are the following: 
(a) restrictions imposed upon the acquirer or licensee in so far as and so long 
as they are justified by an interest of the seller or licensor in a technically 
satisfactory exploitation of the protected right; 
(b) obligations of the acquirer or licensee with regard to the price to be charged for 
the protected article; 
(c) obligations of the acquirer or licensee to exchange experience (know-how) or 
to grant licences for improvements on, or applied uses of, an invention, in so 
far as these obligations correspond to like obligations of the patentee or 
licensor; 
(d) obligations of the acquirer or licensee not to challenge the protected right; and 
(e) obligations of the acquirer or licensee relating to the regulation of competition 
in markets outside the jurisdiction area of the Act. 
279 Cf Wise 4.145. 
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As noted,280 section 18 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb is 
applicable to situations where a relationship of confidence exists. Such a situation 
may arise in a contractual relationship, but also in the absence of a contract, for 
instance during pre-contractual negotiations. As in section 17(1 ), the section 
describes exhaustively the wrongs that can be committed in respect of trade secrets 
in these situations, and contractual agreements to the contrary seem to be out of the 
question. 
4.5.4 PROPERTY 
For the purposes of an enquiry whether trade secrets constitute property in the 
German legal system, the term 'property' must, it seems, be understood to signify at 
least three distinct concepts: 
(a) property in its narrow, private law sense, that is, tangible things; 
(b) intellectual property (Jmmaterialguter); or 
(c) property for the purposes of the Constitution (Grundgesetz). 
The notion that a trade secret can constitute property in its narrow private law sense 
is easily refuted, since a trade secret is always an intangible asset, even though it 
may be embodied in a physical object.281 A property right in the sense of a real 
right (dingliches Recht), on the other hand, can in German law only exist in respect 
of tangible objects.282 
Whether a trade secret can constitute intellectual property, is dealt with below,283 
when the notion of an independent subjective right to the trade secret is considered. 
As to whether a trade secret can constitute property for the purposes of constitutional 
Jaw, no unambiguous answer is gained from case law or commentators. Authors284 
indicate that the protection of property (Eigentum) by the German Constitution285 
is wide enough in principle to cover trade secrets. However, doubts have been 
expressed whether the trade secret in all its various guises should be regarded as an 
280 Par 4.2.2.2 above. 
281 Par 4.2.1 above. 
282 Sec 90 BGB; Muller 6-7; Scwab and Prutting 1; Wise 4.29ff. 
283 Par 4.5.5. 
284 Cf Stadler 36-37; Pfister 46-47; Hauck 246ff; Mes 1979 GRUR 587. 
285 Sec 14(1) GG. 
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independent form of property for the purposes of constitutional law, and it has been 
suggested286 that it should rather be protected as an element of the business 
undertaking.287 
4.5.5 SUBJECTIVE RIGHT 
The question here is whether a trade secret may be the object of a subjective right. 
In the first place it must be considered whether a trade secret can be the object of 
an independent subjective right, that is, whether there is room in the German system 
of subjective rights for an independent right to the trade secret as such. In the second 
place it must be considered whether a trade secret may be indirectly protected as an 
element of an object of some other subjective right. 288 
4.5.5.1 SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET 
In the DOcko decision289 it was held that once the inventor of a secret process had 
made his intention of economically exploiting it manifest, the invention ceased to be 
(the object of) a right attached to the personality of its owner. Where the owner had 
thus revealed that he considered this invention as a property asset and exploited it 
as such, the secret process indeed formed part of the business property, regardless 
of whether it was based on a patentable invention or not. It would thus fall into a 
bankrupt estate, since it would then represent an alienable property right. 
In spite of the strong authority of the Ducko decision that trade secrets constitute 
property, this proposition does not appear to enjoy general acceptance among the 
courts and commentators.290 Gerlach,291 for instance, asserts that the Ducko 
286 Stadler 37-38. Pfister 83, on the other hand, stoutly maintains that technical secrets deserve 
protection independently of the business undertaking - see fn 304 below. 
287 On the trade secret as element of the business undertaking, see par 4.5.5.2 below. 
288 Cf Mes 1979 GRUR 584ff who appears to make out a strong case for subjective rights on trade 
secrets as such, but then remarks (592) that it does not really make a difference whether such a right 
is recognized, or whether trade secrets are considered to be part of the object of another right: "Es 
macht dabei keinen relevanten Unterschied, ob man das Betriebs- und Geschaftsgeheimnis als solches 
als ein 'sonstiges Recht' im Sinn des § 823 Abs 1 BGB ansieht oder ob man es als einen 
Teilausschnitt aus dem Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeubten Gewerbebetrieb behandelt, das in 
seiner Gesamtheit ebenfalls als sonstiges Recht im Sinn des § 823 Abs 1 BGB gilt." 
289 GRUR 55 388. Cf Wise 4.28-4.29. 
29
° Cf Wise 4.27. 
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decision did not imply that a trade secret could be the object of a subjective right 
when holding that the owner had an Aussch/uBrecht to the secret. While it is true that 
section 17 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb is a Schutzgesetz for the 
purposes of section 823(2) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, this does not necessarily 
imply that a trade secret can be object of an absolute right. A Schutzgesetz need not 
protect an absolute right - it could also protect interests of for instance an economic 
nature. According to Gerlach, the Ducko decision must be understood to say that a 
trade secret is only an element of the broader right of the proprietor of a business to 
the unhindered operation of that business,292 and not that the secret is itself object 
of an absolute right. He finds further support for his view in the fact that the first user 
of a trade secret cannot enjoin an independent discoverer of the same secret from 
using it. 
KraBer293 notes that the argument that trade secrets may be protected in terms of 
section 823(1) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, presupposes that (unauthorized) 
disclosure or use of a trade secret can be regarded as an infringement of a subjective 
right. However, he cautions, the legal nature of trade secrets has not been adequately 
developed in this regard. Recognition of such a subjective right does not necessarily 
follow from sections 17 and further of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb -
these provisions rather point only to a protected interest.294 If one should insist on 
talking of such a right, it should be clear that such an approach is a change in 
terminology rather than in substance, and cannot justify extension of the protection 
of trade secrets beyond that provided for in sections 17 and further. As regards the 
Ducko decision, KraBer says that although the court recognized an exclusive right to 
a secret process, the court has yet to apply this argument to establish protection of 
a secret itself. 295 
However, some authors argue persuasively in favour of the recognition of a subjective 
291 10-13. The summary of Gerlach's arguments set forth here is based on the discussion by Wise 
4.31ff. 
292 Cf par 4.5.5.2 below. 
293 In Jehoram (ed) 42-43; cf KraBer 1970 GRUR 587 594; Wise 4.43-4.44. 
294 1970 GRUR 594: "§§ 17 ff UWG zwingen nicht zur Annahme eines subjektiven Rechts; sie 
deuten nur auf ein geschutztes lnteresse, ein Rechtsgut hin." 
295 Cf further Knieper 60-67 (cf Wise 4.32ff): a trade secret is similar to other property to which 
subjective rights exist. However, the absence of one essential element stands in the way of recognizing 
a subjective right to a trade secret, namely formal rect:;gnition by the German legal order; Troller 1958 
GRUR (Aus/ und Int Tei/) 387: trade secrets are lmmaterialguter (intangible objects); but the possessor 
of such an intangible asset does not have a right thereto - he is rather in a factual situation to which 
the law attaches legal protection; Hauck 298ff; Stadler 40; Wise 4.27. 
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right to the trade secret. Mes, 296 for instance, is of the opinion that a 
"verdinglichung" of a right to the trade secret will contribute to a more comprehensive 
and at the same time a more flexible protection of trade secrets. He does not regard 
the vulnerability of trade secrets to independent discovery by others as fatal for the 
recognition of a sonstiges Recht for the purposes of section 823(1) of the Gesetz 
gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, citing examples from German copyright and 
patent law in support. 297 He cites the Ducko and KokillenguB298 decisions as 
characterizing a trade secret as a patrimonial right299 with an operation of 
exclusivity against other legal subjects (ein Vermogensrecht mit 
AusschlieB/ichkeitswirkung).300 Mes asserts that the case law employs a double 
measure - on the one hand there is a tendency to treat a trade secret as object of a 
sonstiges Recht,301 but on the other hand this is only the case, he says, where it 
is unnecessary to protect a trade secret against misappropriation by an ex-
employee. 302 
In a similar vein, Henkels303 states that a trade secret is intellectual property, that 
is, the object of an incomplete property right giving the holder the capacity to use the 
secret, dispose thereof, and prevent third parties from acquiring, disclosing or using 
the secret without authorization. The last-mentioned capacity is not absolute, since 
the holder cannot, except by contract, prevent a third party who independently 
develops the same secret from using or disclosing it. He can furthermore not prevent 
296 1979 GRUR 584. 
297 In respect of eg patent law, he points out (591) that before an inventor has obtained a patent, 
he has a right to his invention that is recognized as a sonstiges absolutes Recht for the purposes of 
sec 823(1) UWG, even though before issue of the patent he does not have the capacity to exclude 
third parties from using the invention. 
298 BGH 17 41. 
299 It would be more correct, it is submitted, to regard a trade secret as object of a patrimonial right 
rather than a right itself, but the German commentators do not seem to use the terminology in such 
a manner - cf the views of Hubmann and Pfister cited in fn 304 below. 
30° Furthermore, he is of the opinion that for the purposes of public competition law, the lawmaker 
has made a trade secret a patrimonial asset by section 21 of the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen. He also finds it significant that in eg the ProzeBrechner decision (BGH 
GRUR 77 539ff) a method to calculate damages normally used in cases dealing with gewerb/iche 
Aussch/ieB/ichkeitsrechte, viz the reasonable-payment-for-a-licence analogy (par 4.3.1 above), was 
used in a trade secret case. 
301 For the purposes of sec 823(1) BGB - par 4.2.2.5 above. 
302 In the final analysis, however, Mes says that it does not really matter whether an independent 
subjective right to the trade secret is recognized, or whether the trade secret is seen as an element 
of the right to an established and operating business enterprise - par 4.5.5.2 below. 
303 35ff; cf Wise 4.36ff. 
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use or disclosure by an ex-employee (except by contract) unless special 
circumstances are present.304 
4.5.5.2 TRADE SECRET AS ELEMENT OF THE OBJECT OF A SUBJECTIVE 
RIGHT 
The right to an established and operating business enterprise (Recht am 
eingerichteten und ausgeubten Gewerbebetrieb) is regarded as one of the 
miscellaneous rights referred to in section 823(1) of the Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch.305 The question arises whether a trade secret can be an element of 
the object of this right. The courts have not yet spoken the final word on this 
issue,306 but most commentators seem to agree that infringement of a trade secret 
constitutes an infringement of the right to an established and operating business. 307 
Baumbach-Hefermehl state308 that an action for damages for trade secret 
misappropriation may be based on section 823(1) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
because such misappropriation constitutes an infringement of the right to the 
business enterprise (das Recht am Gewerbebetrieb). They regard309 the recognition 
in the Ducko decision310 of an AusschluBrecht to a secret process 
304 Cf further Hubmann 305: A trade secret is to be regarded as an absolute right; Pfister 31 ff 93: 
A technical secret is [object of] a subjective right, and specifically a patrimonial right (Vermogensrecht). 
This right is a sonstiges Recht for the purposes of section 823(1) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (93 
167). As such, the technical secret deserves independent protection, and is not to be protected only 
in so far as it is employed in a business enterprise (83) - "Warum soil ein Geheimverfahren, nach 
Ansicht des Bundesgerichtshof ein "Verm6gensrecht", nur insoweit geschutzt werden, als es in einem 
Gewerbebetrieb verwendet wird[?] Ein Geheimverfahren kann doch ... von einem Unternehmen v611ig 
losgel6st eine eigene Existenz, ein eigenes Schicksal haben. Verdienen der Privaterfinder oder der 
Arbeitnehmererfinder weniger Schutz? 1st immerhin der allgemeine Sonderschutz des Unternehmens 
zu rechtfertigen, weil dadurch Werte geschutzt werden, die Nichtunternehmer nicht haben ... , so ist es 
nicht zu rechtfertigen, einen einzelnen, selbstandigen Vermogensgegenstand, der sowohl im Rahmen 
eines Betriebes als auch in der Hand eines Privaten einen erheblichen Wert darstellen kann, nur als 
Teil des Unternehmens zu schutzen. Dabei ist allerdings zuzugeben, daB technische Geheimnisse 
praktisch in der Regel im Unternehmen von Bedeutung sind." 
305 Baumbach-Hefermehl 77-78 80-82. 
306 The question was left open in the /ndustrieboden case (BGH 38 392 395); cf Baumbach-
Hefermehl 1309; KraBer in Jehoram (ed) 43. 
307 Cf KraBer in Jehoram (ed) 43, especially fn 73. 
308 1309. 
309 1310. 
310 Par 4.5.5.1 above. 
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(Geheimverfahren) as an exceptional case, denying emphatically311 that there is 
such a right to the trade secret giving the trade secret owner the capacity to exclude 
all third parties from using the secret. To determine wrongfulness when legal 
protection is founded on the trade secret as valuable element of the patrimony of the 
business enterprise, a balancing of interests is required.312 313 In the case of 
design piracy according to section 18 of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, 314 they say315 that the business undertaking is harmed in its 
reputation and clientele. The design piracy is an act of competition that is contra 
bonos mores because it is founded on a misuse of confidence. No right of personality 
or property right of the proprietor is infringed.316 
311 With reference to the Handstrickverfahren case (BGH GRUR 60 554 557) and KraBer 1977 
GRUR 177 189. 
312 1310: "[A]n einem Betriebs- oder Geschaftsgeheimnis besteht kein AusschluBrecht, das dem 
Erwerber ermoglicht, jedem Dritten die Benutzung des Geheimnisses zu verbieten... Fur den 
unternehmensrechtlichen Schutz des Betriebsgeheimnisses als wertvoller Bestandteil des 
Betriebsvermogens kommt es tor die Rechtswidrigkeit des Eingriffs auf eine lnteressenabwagung an, 
die bei einem frOheren Beschaftigen, dessen Fortkommensinteresse besonders zu berOcksichtigen ist, 
anders ausfallt als etwa bei einem ausgeschiedene Gesellschaffter oder einem Betriebsinhaber." 
313 See Baumbach-Hefermehl 7 4ff for further elucidation on the nature of the rights, interests and 
legal objects at stake in the German law of unlawful competition in general. They distinguish between 
a right to the undertaking (Recht am Unternehmen) and the right to an established and operational 
business enterprise (Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeiibten Gewerbebetrieb). The Unternehmen 
is a protected legal asset (ein geschiitztes Rechtsgut), but the right thereto is not an absolute 
subjective right, nor is it a sonstiges Recht tor the purposes of sec 823(1) BGB. The wrongfulness of 
an interference with the Unternehmen can only be determined by a weighing up of interests. The Recht 
am eingerichteten und ausgeiibten Gewerbebetrieb, on the other hand, is recognized by the courts 
as a sonstiges Recht tor the purposes of sec 823(1) BGB. A direct infringement of this right will always 
(presumably in the absence of a ground of justification) be wrongful, and the implication is apparently 
that in such a case a balancing of interests is not called for. However, when dealing with the 
infringement of a trade secret as element of the business enterprise, and more specifically in an ex-
employer-employee relationship, Baumbach-Hefermehl state (131 O) that wrongfulness for the purposes 
of sec 823(1) BGB - which, as has been seen, means that relief must be based on an infringement 
of the Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeiibten Gewerbebetrieb - will entail a weighing up of interests. 
314 Par 4.2.2.2 above. 
315 1313: "Durch die miBbrauchliche Verwendung einer Vorlage wird der Geschaftsinhaber nicht 
in seinem Personlichkeitsrecht verletzt. Es wird auch nicht ein Eigentums- oder AusschlieBlichkeitsrecht 
verletzt. Die Vorlagenfreibeuterei schadigt als Wettbewerbshandlung das Unternehmen an Ruf und 
Kundschaft. Diese Schadigung verst6Bt gegen die guten Sitten, weil sie auf einem MiBbrauch des 
Vertrauens Beruht." 
316 In a similar vein, Glay 402 states that trade secrets can be protected under section 823(1) of 
the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch as elements of the right to the business enterprise ("als Bestandteile des 
Rechts am Gewerbebetrieb"), adding that this protection does not have an absolute operation of 
exclusivity against all other legal subjects - rather a comprehensive balancing of interests is required 
in each particular case. Cf Metzler 186-187. 
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According to Von Gamm,317 the object of protection in section 17 of the Gesetz 
gegen den un/auteren Wettbewerb is the unhindered operation of the business 
enterprise (die ungest6rte Ausubung des Gewerbebetriebes). The protection afforded 
by this section serves in the first place the undertaking (das Unternehmen), but also 
serves the public interest in so far as it protects the economy that is increasingly 
dependent on the securing of know-how. Section 17(1) furthermore involves the duty 
of fidelity of the employee during the existence of the employment relationship. 
Section 18 also protects the ungest6rte Ausubung des Gewerbebetriebes in the 
individual interest of the proprietor as well as in the public interest. Here Von Gamm 
adds318 that section 18 forbids the striving to a competitive advantage by means of 
a breach of confidence.319 
Nastelski320 explains that whereas the courts initially only protected the (object of) 
the Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeubten Gewerbebetrieb in so far as there was 
a direct infringement of the business enterprise as such, protection was later also 
given against direct infringements of its various elements, to which the entire circle 
of competitive activities is regarded to belong. In this way trade secrets have also 
been brought under the protection of section 823(1) of the BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
It is noteworthy that both Mes321 and Nastelski322 regard the further development 
of the protection of the trade secret as (indirect) object of a subjective right in terms 
of section 823(1) of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, as the best way to remedy the 
unsatisfactory position of the trade secret owner as against his former employee in 
317 986 998. 
318 1005. 
319 See further Von Gamm 65-68 on the legal interests protected by the UWG in general. 
320 1957 GRUR 1 4: "Wahrend das [Reichsgericht] in seiner alteren Rechtsprechung das Recht am 
eingerichteten und ausgeubten Gewerbebetrieb durch § 823 Abs. 1 BGB nur vor Eingriffen schUtzte, 
die sich unmittelbar gegen den Bestand des Gewerbebetriebes richteten, hat es in spateren 
Entscheidungen tur das Gebiet des Warenzeichen- und Wettbewerbsrechts jede widerrechtliche 
Beeintrachtigung der gewerblichen Betatigung tur ausreichend erachtet, wenn sie einen unmittelbaren 
Eingriff in den Bereich des Gewerbebetriebes darstellte. Der [Bundesgerichtshof] hat sich dem 
bekanntlich angeschlossen und daruber hinaus angenommen, daB nach § 823 Abs. 1 BGB ... das 
Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeubten Gewerbebetrieb nicht nur in seinem eigentlichen Bestande, 
sondern auch in seinen einzelnen Erscheinungsformen, zu denen der gesamte gewerbliche 
Tatigkeitskreis rechne, vor unmittelbaren Storungen bewahrt bleiben musse. Von dieser Auffassung 
aus steht jedes Geshafts- oder Betriebsgeheimnis unter dem Schutz des § 823 Abs. 1 BGB und ist 
damit ebenso wie die dort genannten Rechtsguter und Rechte geschutzt. In der Ducko-Entscheidung 
[par 4.5.5.1 above] des [Bundesgerichtshofes] ist das auch ausdrucklich ausgesprochen worden." 
321 1979 GRUR 590ff. 
322 1957 GRUR 6-7. 
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German law.323 
4.5.6 SYNTHESIS 
In conclusion, the civil law protection of trade secrets in German law may be based 
either on delict (which is, to a certain extent, a by-product of criminal law provisions) 
or contract. There is some support in case law, as well as among commentators, for 
an independent subjective right to the trade secret, but according to the more 
generally accepted view, trade secrets are protected as an element of the business 
enterprise. 
323 As noted in par 4.5.5.1 above. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INTERNATIONAL GATT AGREEMENT 
ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS) 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into force in 19481 and 
is currently subscribed to by over a hundred countries. 2 It was borne out of a desire 
of economic policy-makers, after the second world war, to move away from economic 
nationalism toward international cooperation and interdependence.3 The GATT thus 
aims to liberalize world trade through the creation of a trading system based on open 
markets and fair competition secured through agreed multilateral rules. 4 It has been 
described as a contract through which nations exchange access to their own 
domestic markets in return for access to the domestic markets of other nations.5 The 
GATT operates in three ways, namely: 
(a) by determining the fundamental rules for trade governing the trade 
behaviour of governments through multilateral agreement; 
(b) as a forum for trade negotiations where the trade environment is 
liberalized, markets are opened and the rules themselves examined 
and/or extended; and 
(c) as a forum for the settlement of disputes between member states (as 
a type of international court).6 
Since the establishment of the GATT, eight rounds of multinational trade negotiations 
- the "GATT Rounds" - seeking to reduce tariff barriers and other measures inhibiting 
free trade, have taken place.7 At the conclusion in December 1993 of the latest of 
these rounds, the Uruguay Round, an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
1 Roper 1. 
2 Roper 17. 
3 Lortie viii. 
4 Roper 3. 
5 Roper 4. 
6 Roper 3. 
7 Roper 10. 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was adopted.8 
5.1 THE GATT TRIPS AGREEMENT 
Covering most recognized intellectual property rights,9 and subscribed to by 117 
signatory countries, 10 the GATT TRIPs agreement is probably the most far-reaching 
international agreement ever reached on intellectual property rights. 11 The TRIPs 
agreement is the first multilateral agreement of this nature in which trade secret 
protection is dealt with in some detail.12 
Part I of the TRIPs agreement sets forth general provisions and basic principles. The 
agreement is founded on three key principles: 13 
(a) Minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in signatory states are established. Signatory states 
are not prevented from enforcing higher standards, as long as these 
do not undermine the effect of the TRIPs agreement. 14 
(b) Each signatory country must protect nationals of other signatory 
countries by granting them the rights set forth in the Agreement. 15 
(c) Each signatory country must give nationals of other signatory countries 
treatment no less favourable than that given to its own nationals with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property.16 In this way the ideal 
of non-discrimination between foreigners and nationals in signatory 
countries is promoted.17 In addition, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity with regard to the protection of intellectual property 
granted by a signatory country to the nationals of any other country 
8 Cf Blakeney 1994 E/PR suppl iii; Correa 1994 EIPR 327; Worthy 1994 EIPR 195. 
9 Cf Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
10 Worthy 1994 EIPR 195. 
11 Cf Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
12 Worthy 1994 EIPR 197. 
13 Cf Worthy 1994EIPR195. 
14 Art 1(1) of the TR/Ps agreement; cf Worthy 1994 EIPR 195. 
15 Art 1 (3); cf Worthy 1994 E/PR 195. 
16 Art 3. 
17 Cf Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
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must be granted to the nationals of all other signatory countries.18 In 
this way the ideal of non-discrimination between nationals of different 
foreign countries is promoted. 19 
Part II of the Agreement deals with the various intellectual property rights in 
succession. Section 720 deals with the protection of undisclosed information. It 
provides21 that such information shall be protected in signatory countries in so far 
as: 
"Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing 
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, 
or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest 
commercial practices so long as such information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, 
by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it 
secret". 
"A manner contrary to honest commercial practices" is defined22 to mean 
"at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and 
inducement to . breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed 
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing 
to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition". 
Part Ill of the TR/Ps agreement sets forth the obligations of signatory countries to 
provide procedures and remedies under their national laws to ensure that intellectual 
property rights can be effectively enforced, by foreign right-holders as well as by their 
own nationals. 23 Remedies which must be available for intellectual property 
18 Art 4; cf Blakeney 1994 E/PR suppl iii; Correa 1994 EIPR 327; Worthy 1994 EIPR 195. 
19 Cf Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
20 Art 39. 
21 Art 39(2). Art 39(3) makes provision for the protection of test data submitted to governments or 
government agencies to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals. 
22 1nfn10. 
23 Cf Blakeney 1994 EIPR suppl iii; Worthy EIPR 197. 
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infringement must include injunctions,24 damages for infringement of an intellectual 
property right by "an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, 
engaged in infringing activity";25 costs;26 and orders for destruction of infringing 
items as well as materials and implements the predominant use of which has been 
the creation of infringing items.27 In addition, the judicial authorities of signatory 
countries must have the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures, 
inaudita altera parte where appropriate, to prevent infringement of any intellectual 
property right from occurring, or to preserve evidence in regard to alleged 
infringement. 28 
The TRIPs Agreement contains transitional provisions29 allowing developing 
countries to delay implementation of most of the TRIPs rules for up to five years.30 
Developed countries must comply with the provisions of the Agreement within one 
year of its coming into force. 31 A Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights will be established to monitor the operation of the Agreement and the 
compliance of signatory countries with their obligations thereunder.32 Non-
compliance may give rise to a dispute settlement procedure under the integrated 
GATT dispute settlement procedure rules, 33 and, ultimately, commercial retaliatory 
measures by the country whose nationals are affected by such non-compliance. 34 
24 Art 44. 
25 Art 45(1). 
26 Art 45(2); cf Worthy E/PR 197. Art 45(2) furthermore provides that "[i]n appropriate cases, 
Members may authorize the judicial authorities to order the recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-
established damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, 
engage in infringing activity". No indication is given what would amount to such "appropriate cases". 
27 Art 46. 
28 Art 50. 
29 Art 65. 
3° Cf Blakeney 1994 EIPR suppl iv; Correa 1994 EIPR 327; Worthy 1994 EIPR 198. 
31 Cf Blakeney 1994 EIPR suppl iv; Worthy 1994 EIPR 198. 
32 Art 68. 
33 Art 64; cf Blakeney 1994 EIPR suppl iv; Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
34 Cf Correa 1994 EIPR 327. 
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5.2 SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
The following significant aspects of trade secret protection as envisaged by the GA TT 
TRIPs Agreement deserve to be emphasized: 
(a) The requirements of protectable undisclosed information are: 
(i) secrecy, which is defined in terms of information not being 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within 
the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in 
question; 
(ii) commercial value as a result of its secrecy; and 
(iii) reasonable steps by the person lawfully in control thereof, to keep 
it secret. 
(b) The requirements for legal intervention are that (i) information meeting 
with the above-mentioned requirements, must be (ii) disclosed, used 
or acquired (iii) without consent of the person lawfully in control of the 
information (iv) in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices. 
A contractual or confidential relationship between the person in lawful 
control of the information and the infringer is not a prerequisite for 
liability. A "manner contrary to honest commercial practices" includes 
breach of contract, breach of confidence, and the acquisition of 
undisclosed information by third parties who knew, or were grossly 
negligent in failing to know, that such practices were involved in the 
acquisition. 
(c) Not only must the unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets be 
subjected to legal sanction, but right-holders must also be able to 
prevent the unauthorized acquisition of trade secrets. One practical 
consequence of this provision should be, it is submitted, that legal 
action against industrial espionage will be possible before any 
unauthorized use has been made of the secret and before disclosure 
thereof to others. 
(d) Damages must be available in the case of both intentional and 
negligent (and possibly even innocent35) infringements. 
(e) Orders for destruction must be capable of application not only to 
35 Cf fn 26 above. 
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infringing items, but also materials and implements used to produce 
such items. 
(f) Anton Piller-type orders must be available not only to preserve 
evidence, but also to prevent infringement from occurring. 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE GATT TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR TRADE 
SECRET PROTECTION UNDER THE NATIONAL LAWS OF 
SIGNATORY COUNTRIES 
The GATT itself, and agreements under its auspices, are agreements of member 
governments and member organisations inter se. Only members can enforce rights 
existing in terms of the GATT. Individuals and commercial enterprises cannot do so 
themselves.36 A trade secret owner whose trade secret has been misappropriated, 
will therefore not be able to rely directly on the provisions of the TR/Ps agreement in 
trade secret litigation. However, since the signatory countries have committed 
themselves to grant nationals of other territories the degree of trade secret protection 
provided for in the TR/Ps agreement, the trade secrets law of these countries - of 
which South Africa is one - should be adapted, where necessary, to provide (at least) 
the degree of trade secret protection agreed upon in the TR/Ps agreement.37 
36 Bucher 58; Roper 5. 
37 Cf in general Meng in Sacerdoti (ed) 69ff. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A COMPARISON OF ENGLISH, AMERICAN 
AND GERMAN TRADE SECRETS LAW 
AND THE GATT TRIPS AGREEMENT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous four chapters the protection of trade secrets in the positive law - with 
particular emphasis on private law - of three Western legal systems was outlined, as 
well as the trade secret protection required by the GA TT TRIPs agreement. Attention 
was also given to the various possible legal foundations of trade secret protection in 
the three legal systems surveyed. In this chapter some of the results of the previous 
four chapters are compared, with the purpose of establishing the common ground 
between the three systems on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, to expose 
the differences between them, in juxtaposition with the requirements of the GATT 
TRIPs agreement where applicable. This comparison is undertaken in the belief that 
it will lead to a better understanding of South African trade secrets law, and suggest 
ways in which South African trade secrets law may be improved.1 
6.2 THE NATURE OF TRADE SECRETS 
Different definitions and descriptions of trade secrets are to be found in the three 
legal systems, but if the requirements for the existence of a trade secret in the three 
systems are compared, a remarkable degree of commonality may be discerned. (i) 
In all three systems, as well as according to the definition employed in the TRIPs 
agreement, trade secrets consist basically of information with certain qualities.2 (ii) 
In all three systems trade secrets are information capable of commercial or industrial 
application.3 (iii) In all three systems and the TRIPs agreement, secrecy or 
confidentiality is required. 4 (iv) In American law, economic value is recognized as an 
1 Cf David and Brierley 6-8; Van Zyl Regsvergelyking 18-22; Zweigert and Kotz 13-27. 
2 Par 2.2.1.2.1; 3.2.1.2.1; 4.2.1.2.1; 5.1; 5.2 above. 
3 Par 2.2.1.2.2; 3.2.1.2.2; 4.2.1.2.2 above. 
4 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 5.1; 5.2 above. 
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element of trade secrets in so many words.5 In German law the same requirement is 
recognized, albeit under a different name. Thus the Geheimhaltungsinteresse 
requirement of German law means that the trade secret owner must have an 
economic interest - worthy of legal protection - in the secret.6 In the cadre of unfair 
competition law, this means that the secret must enhance the competitive position of 
the trade secret owner.7 In English law an economic value requirement is not given 
much prominence, probably because information without any economic value may 
also be protected by the action for breach of confidence. However, some dicta may 
be found indicating that economic value is a constitutive element of a trade secret.8 
The TRIPs agreement requires commercial value stemming from secrecy.9 (v) 
American law sets the further requirement that the relevant information be the subject 
of reasonable efforts on the part of the owner to maintain secrecy,10 while German 
law requires the owner to have a Geheimhaltungswille in respect of his secret. 11 Thus 
in American law the focus falls more sharply on the objectively observable conduct 
of the owner, 12 while the focus of German law is more on the subjective will of the 
owner, which may be made known expressly or may be deduced from the 
circumstances. Also in English law there is authority for a subjective requirement. 13 
Some dicta in English case law can even be understood to make the subjective belief 
of the owner (or other person trying to protect an alleged trade secret) the decisive 
factor to determine secrecy, which notion is open to criticism. 14 The TRIPs 
agreement, like American law, requires reasonable steps to keep the information 
secret.15 (vi) Concreteness or potential concreteness has also been required in 
American positive law16 and by a German· commentator. 17 By this requirement is 
5 Par 3.2.1.2.5 above. 
6 Par 4.2.1.2.5 above. 
7 Par 4.2.1.2.5 above. 
8 Par 2.2.1.2.5 above. 
9 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
10 Par 3.2.1.2.4 above. 
11 Par 4.2.1.2.4 above. 
12 Cf, however, Callmann Vol 2 14.50 who requires an intention to maintain secrecy. 
13 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.2.1.2.4 above. 
14 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.2.1.2.4 above. 
15 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
16 Par 3.2.1.2.6 above. 
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meant that a mere theory cannot be a trade secret - the idea must be sufficiently 
developed to be usable, or capable of embodiment in a tangible form, so as to exist 
separately from its owner. 18 
6.2.1 THE MEANING OF SECRECY 
Arguably the most fundamental element of a trade secret, namely secrecy, is also 
rather elusive in terms of its precise content in all three of the legal systems 
surveyed.19 In all three systems the content of secrecy is formulated negatively and 
rather vaguely. Thus in English law information is said to be secret if it is not in the 
public domain;20 in American law it is said that matters of public or general knowledge 
cannot be secret;21 while in German law information will be secret if it is nicht 
offenkundig (not public).22 The similarity is obvious. In all three systems secrecy has 
also been defined in terms of difficulty of access. 23 The TR/Ps agreement defines 
"secret" as 
"not... generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the 
circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question".24 
It is furthermore clear that in all three systems secrecy is a relative, not an absolute, 
concept. Thus secrecy will not necessarily be excluded if the relevant information is 
known to a limited number of people, which may include some of the alleged trade 
secret owner's competitors.25 It is generally acknowledged that a second person may 
discover the secret by fair means - for instance "double invention"26 - without 
secrecy being destroyed as a matter of course, depending amongst other things on 
17 Par 4.2.1.2.6 above. 
18 Par 3.2.1.2.6; 4.2.1.2.6 above. 
19 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3 above. 
20 Par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
21 Par 3.2.1.2.3 above. 
22 Par 4.2.1.2.3 above. 
23 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3 above. 
24 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
25 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3 above. 
26 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.5.3 fn 286; 3.2.1.2.3; 3.5.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 4.5.5.1 above. 
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whether the second person elects to keep it secret or not27 (and in English and 
American law, reverse engineering is recognized as a lawful way for such a second 
person to acquire access to a trade secret).28 In all three systems, as well as 
according to the TR/Ps agreement, secrecy need only pertain to the secret as a 
whole, and some of its elements or constituent parts may be public.29 
Again, the three systems are in agreement that a wide enough disclosure or 
publication of the trade secret destroys secrecy and usually terminates the existence 
of the trade secret as an asset susceptible of legal protection.30 Interestingly, in all 
three systems a study of the protection of trade secrets also results in encounters 
with the protection of non-secret information by related branches of the law. 31 
6.3 MISAPPROPRIATION 
In theory three categories of trade secret misappropriation are possible - unauthorized 
acquisition, unauthorized use and unauthorized disclosure. This does not mean that 
any conduct falling in one of these three categories will necessarily give rise to 
liability. Each legal system has its own particular positive law rules which must be 
complied with before an interference with a trade secret will be judged an actionable 
misappropriation. In English law, the parameters of liability are largely drawn by the 
requirements of the action for breach of confidence. 32 In American law, the ambit of 
protection is determined by the legal rules developed by the courts and, more 
recently, by the legislature concerning the tort of trade secret infringement.33 Lastly, 
in German law, liability is largely confined to specific forms of conduct exhaustively 
27 Par 3.2.1.2.3 above. 
28 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3 above. In German law, reverse engineering will usually fall foul of the 
provisions of sec 17(2)(1) UWG, and will then be unlawful - cf par 4.2.2.1 above. 
29 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 5.1 above. 
30 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3 above. 
31 Eg in English law the possible protection of non-secret information by the springboard doctrine 
(par 2.2.1.2.3), by contract (par 2.2.2.1.1.1), and in employment relationships (par 2.4.1); in American 
law the granting of perpetual injunctions in certain jurisdictions (par 3.4.4; 3.5.2), the wide ambit of the 
employee's duties during subsistence of the employment relationship (par 3.4.1), and the possible 
protection of information not amounting to a trade secret by contract (par 3.5.1 ); and in German law 
the granting of an interdict to prevent unlawful competition in the form of the slavish copying of a 
competitor's products (par 4.4.4), and (possibly) some applications of sec 18 UWG (par 4.2.2.2). 
32 Par 2.1 above. 
33 Par 3.1 above. 
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defined by statute, although the courts have some scope for extension of delictual 
liability beyond those confines. 34 
When comparing the factual situations of trade secret interference in which liability 
can currently arise in the three legal systems, a number of conclusions may be 
drawn. In the first place, parties to a contract may - within the parameters imposed 
by the contract laws and other applicable laws of the respective legal systems -
determine by agreement the circumstances under which unauthorized acquisition, 
use, or disclosure will be actionable. 35 The situations where liability will be imposed 
ex /ege, and irrespective of whether the parties are in a contractual relationship or 
not, may be systematized as follows: 
(a) Unauthorized acquisition of a trade secret, for instance by industrial 
espionage, can give rise to liability in American and German law 
under certain circumstances. In American law it is required that the 
acquisition took place by improper means, such as theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, inducement of breach of 
contract, or espionage. 36 In German law unauthorized acquisition by 
the employment of technical means, the making of a physically 
embodied rendering of the secret, or by the removal of a physical 
article in which the secret is embodied, will be actionable if 
accompanied by one of a closed number of subjective motives or 
intentions.37 In English law it is, at best, highly uncertain whether a 
mere unauthorized acquisition of a trade secret may give rise to 
liability.38 
(b) In all three legal systems, the unauthorized use or disclosure of a 
trade secret can give rise to liability under certain circumstances: 
(i) In English law, such use or disclosure will give rise to liability if 
an obligation of confidence was breached thereby.39 An 
34 Par 4.1; 4.2.2.5 above. 
35 Cf par 2.2.2.1.1; 2.5.1; 3.5.1; 4.5.3 above. 
36 This is the position in states that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act - par 3.2.2 above. 
See further par 3.4.2 above. 
37 Par 4.2.2.1; 4.4.2 above. 
38 Par 2.4.2 above. 
39 Par 2.2.2.2 above. 
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obligation of confidence may arise by way of express contract, 
implied contract or in equity.40 An obligation of confidence 
based on implied contract or equity may under special 
circumstanGes arise even in the absence of any contractual 
relationship between the parties. Typical examples of the latter 
are the case of unsuccessful pre-contractual negotiations, and 
the case where the infringer did not stand in direct contractual 
privity with the trade secret owner, but did stand in contractual 
privity with an intermediate person who stood in contractual 
privity with the trade secret owner.41 In the majority of cases the 
obligation of confidence will arise only if there was a contractual 
or fiduciary relationship between the parties.42 It is highly 
improbable that an obligation of confidence will be construed to 
arise simply because of the improper conduct of the alleged 
infringer, for instance in the case of industrial espionage.43 
(ii) In American law, unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets 
will give rise to liability in the following circumstances:44 
- where the secret has been obtained by improper means;45 
- where such use or disclosure will constitute a breach of confidence 
or a breach of a duty to keep the information secret or to limit its 
further use; 
- where the user or discloser has obtained the secret from 
someone who he or she knows, or has reason to know, has 
obtained it by improper means or in breach of a duty owed to the 
trade secret owner; or 
- where the user or discloser knows or has reason to know, 
before a material change in his or her position, that the relevant 
40 Par 2.2.2.1 above. 
41 Par 2.2.2.1.2 above. 
42 Par 2.2; 2.2.2.1.3; 2.4.2; 2.4.3 above. 
43 Par 2.4.2 above. 
44 Par 3.2.2 above. 
45 On the meaning of improper means, see again par 3.2.2 above. 
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information was a trade secret, and that it has been acquired by 
accident or mistake. 
(iii) In German law unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets will give 
rise to liability: 
- where the discloser is an employee who discloses his or her 
employer's trade secret during the existence of the employment 
relationship. 46 
Furthermore unauthorized use or disclosure will give rise to 
liability under the following circumstances: 
- where the user or discloser has obtained the secret by means 
of an unlawful disclosure by an employee;47 
- where the user or discloser has obtained the secret by the 
employment of technical means, the making of a physically 
embodied rendering of the secret, or by removal of a physical 
article in which the secret is embodied, or where he or she has 
obtained the secret from someone who has obtained it in such 
a manner;48 or 
- where the user or discloser is an ex-employee using or 
disclosing his or her former employer's secret (obtained in an 
unreasonable manner in the course of employment) after 
termination of the employment relationship; or in exceptional 
cases - if special circumstances are present - where the user or 
discloser is an ex-employee using or disclosing his or her former 
employer's secret (obtained in an unobjectionable manner in the 
course of employment) after termination of the employment 
relationship; 49 or 
- where designs or instructions of a technical nature are used or 
46 Par 4.2.2.1 above. 
47 Par 4.2.2.1 above. 
48 Par 4.2.2.1 above. 
49 Par 4.4.1 above. 
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disclosed in a breach of confidence.50 
In conclusion the position may be summarized as follows: (a) In all three legal 
systems trade secrets are protected against use or disclosure in breach of 
confidence. (b) American and German law furthermore clearly afford protection 
against unauthorized use or disclosure where the secret has been obtained by 
improper means in the absence of any relationship of confidence. (c) These two 
systems also protect trade secrets against unauthorized acquisition by improper 
means. If American law and German law are compared, the approach of American 
law is more flexible and generic in nature. Thus the Restatement and Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act refer to "improper means" in general, then adding open-ended lists of 
examples.51 The German Unfair Competition Act, on the other hand, lists a closed 
number of statutorily defined types of conduct that will give rise to criminal liability, 
and although in principle civil liability is wider, the statutory crimes do appear to have 
limiting effect thereupon.52 Finally, in all three systems, if an ex-employee who has 
obtained his former employer's secret in a reasonable way, uses or discloses the 
secret, he may be liable on the strength of the unreasonableness of the use or 
disclosure itself. The protection afforded by German law in this regard is decidedly 
narrower in scope - at least in principle if not in practice - than that of the English and 
American systems. 53 
The TRIPs agreement provides that secret information with commercial value shall 
be protected from unauthorized acquisition, use or disclosure in a manner contrary 
to honest commercial practices. "A manner contrary to honest commercial practices" 
is defined so as to include at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of 
confidence and inducement of breach, as well as the acquisition of undisclosed 
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, 
that such practices were involved in the acquisition.54 
6.4 REMEDIES 
In all three legal systems the interdict is an important remedy in trade secret cases, 
50 Par 4.2.2.2 above. 
51 Par 3.2.2 above. 
52 Cf par 4.2.2; 4.4.1 above. 
53 Par 4.4.2 above. 
54 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
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and may take the form of either a temporary or a permanent order. 55 In both the 
American and German systems special provisions facilitate the granting of interdicts 
in trade secret cases. Thus in American law, if it would be unreasonable to prohibit 
use by a potential infringer, an injunction may in exceptional circumstances be issued 
prohibiting use unless a reasonable royalty is paid to the trade secret owner.56 In 
German law, the strict requirements of the German Civil Procedure Act normally 
applicable to temporary restraining orders, are not applicable to such orders in unfair 
competition cases. 57 The TR/Ps agreement also provides that injunctive relief must 
be available.58 Furthermore, in all three systems, as well as according to the TR/Ps 
agreement, the trade secret owner may apply for an order for delivery up or 
destruction of materials enabling the potential infringer to commit an infringing act.59 
The Anton Piller type orders of English intellectual property law - that is, orders 
applied for in camera and without notice to the defendant, to inspect premises and 
seize, copy or photograph evidentiary material indicative of the misappropriation -
have furthermore been issued in trade secret cases.60 According to the TR/Ps 
agreement, prompt and provisional measures, inaudita altera parte where 
appropriate, shall be available to prevent infringement of trade secrets or to preserve 
evidence in regard to alleged infringement. 61 
Damages may be awarded in all three systems, and according to the TR/Ps 
agreement, for trade secret infringement.62 In both American and German law the 
quantum may be computed in terms of either the trade secret owner's loss, the 
infringer's profits or a reasonable royalty for use of the secret. 63 If the remedy known 
as an account of profits in English law64 is also taken into consideration here, it can 
be concluded that the position is effectively very similar in English law.65 
55 Par 2.3.3; 3.3.3; 4.3.2 above. 
56 Par 3.3.3 above. 
57 Par 4.3.2.3 above. 
58 Par 5.1 above. 
59 Par 2.3.4; 3.3.4; 4.3.2.2; 5.1; 5.2 above. 
60 Par 2.3.5 above. 
61 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
62 Par 2.3.1; 3.3.1; 4.3.1; 5.1; 5.2 above. 
63 Par 3.3.1; 4.3.1 above. 
64 Par 2.3.2 above. This remedy is also available in American law; see par 3.3.2 above. 
65 Cf par 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 above. 
172 
6.5 SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
In all three systems certain aspects of the legal protection of trade secrets present 
more practical or conceptual difficulties than others, and to a large degree the same 
problem areas manifest themselves in all three systems. This can probably be 
ascribed to the same factual problems confronting all three systems. The systems do, 
however, vary in the effectiveness with which they deal with these problems, some 
systems providing significantly more comprehensive protection than others. 
6.5.1 TRADE SECRET INFRINGEMENT BY FORMER EMPLOYEES AFTER 
TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
Probably the most common scenario for trade secret infringement, the situation where 
an ex-employee infringes the trade secret after termination of the employment 
contract, is also one causing special difficulties in all three legal systems.66 In all 
three systems, the root of the problem is identified as the conflicting interests of, on 
the one hand, the former employer to have his or her trade secrets protected, and on 
the other, the former employee to utilise all the knowledge gained during his or her 
previous employment in promoting his or her current career. 
In English and American law, the basic point of departure is that the ex-employee is 
not entitled to use or disclose the trade secrets of his or her former employer without 
authorization,67 while German law proceeds from the basis that the ex-employee is 
entitled to use the trade secrets that he or she has obtained in a reasonable manner 
during his or her employment.68 There can, however, be little doubt that many cases 
where ex-employees exploit their former employers' trade secrets, are instances 
where access to the secrets has been obtained in a reasonable manner, and it is 
clear that the Anglo-American systems provide a more comprehensive protection of 
trade secrets in this context. 69 German law does recognize exceptions to the stated 
general rule, and certain factors have been identified as indicative of a case where 
protection will be extended to a trade secret obtained in a reasonable way.70 
66 Par 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 4.4.1 above. 
67 Par 2.4.1; 3.4.1 above. 
68 Par 4.4.1 above. 
69 Par 4.4.1 fn 246 above. 
70 Par 4.4.1 above. 
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Thus English and American legal policy generally favours the trade secret owner, 
making exceptions in favour of the employee in certain cases; while German legal 
policy generally favours the employee, with the employer being protected in the 
presence of exceptional circumstances. In English and American law, most of the 
problems are generated by the rule requiring the drawing of a dividing-line between 
trade secrets (which are protected) and the former employee's general skill and 
knowledge acquired during his or her previous employment (which he or she is free 
to use). This rule is easily stated, but application thereof abounds with difficulties.71 
The TR/Ps agreement does not specifically refer to employment situations, but 
provides that acquisition, use or disclosure of undisclosed information contrary to 
honest commercial practices shall merit the intervention of the law.72 It remains to 
be seen whether, for instance, the unauthorized use of an ex-employee after 
termination of his or her employment of his or her former employer's trade secret, 
obtained in a reasonable way during the subsistence of the employment relationship, 
will be regarded as "contrary to honest commercial practices" or not. 
6.5.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS 
The position of the person who obtains a trade secret by reprehensible means, but 
who stands in no relationship with the trade secret owner, reveals a striking difference 
between the three legal systems. The adherence to the strict requirements of the 
action for breach of confidence in English law has meant that it is doubtful whether 
any relief can be obtained against such a person in that legal system.73 In German 
law, comprehensive anti-industrial-espionage provisions have been inserted in the 
Unfair Competition Act as late as 1986. These provisions attach liability to the mere 
acquisition of trade secrets under certain specified circumstances. However, because 
a closed number of different types of conduct giving rise to liability are defined in the 
Act, some loopholes in the protection exist.74 The most complete protection against 
industrial espionage and other forms of trade secret acquisition by reprehensible 
means is afforded by the American law. Creative interpretation and application of the 
law by the judiciary have provided authority for a flexible protection against trade 
secret acquisition by improper means. This position has been entrenched by the 
71 Par 2.4. 1 ; 3.4.1 above. 
72 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
73 Par 2.4.2 above. 
74 Par 4.4.2 above. 
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Uniform Trade Secrets Act.75 The TR/Ps agreement does not specifically refer to 
industrial espionage, but it does provide that the acquisition of trade secrets contrary 
to honest commercial practices - which would arguably cover acquisition by means 
of espionage - shall merit the intervention of the law.76 
6.5.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS 
The position of the person who receives a trade secret against the will of the owner, 
but not by way of a breach of confidence or (other) reprehensible means appears to 
be not quite resolved in English and German law. In English law, the basic rule 
seems to be that as long as such a receiver does not know, or should not have 
known, that the information has been disclosed to him or her in breach of confidence, 
no relief will be available against him or her. But once he or she acquires knowledge 
of the confidential character of the information, he or she becomes liable for 
subsequent use or disclosure thereof. If he or she has in good faith purchased the 
secret for value or substantially altered his or her position in reliance on the secret, 
commentators are in favour of a discretion on the part of the court to refuse relief 
against him or her. In the unenacted draft bill of the Law Commission an adjustment 
order was proposed to compel a trade secret owner, who has successfully obtained 
an injunction against such an bona fide receiver, to make a reasonable contribution 
to the latter's expenses.77 In American law, the position in terms of the first 
Restatement is that an innocent receiver is not liable for use or disclosure until he or 
she acquires knowledge that the information is another's trade secret and that it has 
been disclosed to him or her in breach of a duty towards the owner or by mistake. 
After receipt of this knowledge he or she may be liable for subsequent use or 
disclosure, unless he or she has in good faith paid value for it or materially altered 
his or her position, in which case the owner will have no redress against him or her. 
This position has largely been confirmed by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, except 
in so far as it confers a discretion on the courts to issue an injunction against the 
innocent receiver who paid value or substantially altered his position, conditioning 
future use on payment of a reasonable royalty to the trade secret owner.78 In 
Germany, case law suggests that an interdict will not be available against a person 
who acted in good faith when he or she received the secret. It has been suggested 
by a commentator that the position should be similar to that under the American 
75 Par 3.4.2 above. 
76 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
77 Par 2.4.3 above. 
78 Par 3.4.3 above. 
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Restatement.79 The GATT TRIPs agreement provides that in appropriate cases, 
members may authorize the judicial authorities to order the recovery of profits and/or 
payment of pre-established damages even where the infringer engaged in infringing 
activity without intention or negligence.80 While this provision does not seem to be 
mandatory - and no indication is given what would amount to "appropriate cases" -
it may conceivably be applied to innocent recipients of trade secrets. 
6.5.4 DURATION OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
In all three systems, the basic point of departure appears to be that legal protection 
lasts as long as the trade secret remains secret. However, the possibility of injunctive 
relief outlasting the secrecy - and by implication the very existence - of the trade 
secret, is known to English and American law, and possibly also German law. In 
English law the "springboard doctrine" enables the courts to issue injunctions to 
eliminate the head-start unfairly gained by a trade secret infringer over his or her 
competitors.81 In some of the American states the courts have issued permanent 
injunctions indefinitely outlasting the trade secrets themselves. In other states the 
granting of injunctive relief after publication has been ruled out completely. In yet 
others an intermediate position has been adopted, granting "lead-time injunctions" -
lasting only as long as is judged necessary to eliminate the infringer's unfair head-
start over his or her competitors. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has in essence 
endorsed the latter approach, also creating the possibility of an order making further 
use conditional on the payment of a reasonable royalty to the owner for a period no 
longer than the period for which the infringer's unfair competitive advantage could be 
expected to last.82 In German law, the position is unresolved. An interdict may, 
however, be granted against someone who reverse engineers a trade secret and then 
copies the product or performance in which it is embodied identically.83 The TRIPs 
agreement provides that persons lawfully in control of undisclosed information shall 
have the possibility of preventing acquisition, use or disclosure of such information 
so long as such information is secret. 84 It remains to be seen whether this provision 
79 Par 4.4.3 above. 
8
° Cf par 5.1 fn 26; 5.2 above. 
81 Par 2.4.4 above. 
82 Par 3.4.4 above. 
83 Which is not purely a case of trade secret infringement, but also involves the unlawful trade 
practice of parasitic slavish copying. Par 4.4.4 above. 
84 Par 5.1 above. 
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will be interpreted to exclude, for instance, lead-time interdicts.85 
6.6 THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
Authority can be found for various possible legal foundations of trade secret 
protection in the three systems. 
6.6.1 CONTRACT 
In all three systems, trade secrets may be protected by express contract. This 
protection will be subject to the general contract law of each system, for instance in 
respect of covenants in restraint of trade.86 Particularly in English law, trade secret 
protection is frequently based on implied contract.87 In some instances implied 
contract appears to be a somewhat artificial explanation for protection; for instance 
where implied contractual terms are used to supplement or even replace express 
contractual terms, or where implied contractual terms are used to justify protection 
even in the absence of any contractual relationship between the parties. The 
phenomenon that the courts sometimes base their decisions on implied contract and 
sometimes on equity when faced with similar types of situations, further strengthens 
the impression that in certain situations implied contract is an artificial ratio for duties 
imposed ex /ege on trade secret infringers. Protection based on implied contract is 
also known in American law, where authors have stated in so many words that 
contracts implied-in-law are really a legal fiction used to explain the desirable result 
of protection in certain situations. 88 
6.6.2 EQUITY 
In English law, protection is frequently based on equity. In certain types of situations 
it is used interchangeably with implied contract.89 
85 It is submitted that (temporary) lead-time interdicts to neutralize a temporary head-start gained 
by the unlawful acquisition or use of another's trade secret, will probably not be excluded by this 
provision of the TR/Ps agreement. 
86 Par 2.2.2.1.1; 2.5.1; 3.5.1; 4.5.3 above. 
87 Par 2.2.2.1.1.2 above. 
88 Par 3.5.1 above. 
89 Par 2.5.2 above. 
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6.6.3 DELICT 
In English law, trade secrets are only indirectly protected by certain torts. The action 
for breach of confidence is evidently not generally considered to be a tortious remedy. 
Tort has, however, been proposed as a vehicle of law reform by the Law 
Commission.90 In American law, tort is the primary foundation for trade secret 
protection.91 In German law trade secret protection is in the first place a function of 
criminal law, with delict the primary private law counterpart thereof.92 In comparison, 
the American tort law protection of trade secrets appears wider in scope, more 
flexible and more adaptable to novel situations than trade secret protection by delict 
in German law. This is probably attributable to the fact that German law employs 
norms describing with a large degree of precision specific types of conduct which give 
rise to liability, whereas American law employs more generally defined norms which 
are more flexible and capable of wider application. The nature of the German norms 
can be ascribed to the fact that they were in the first place intended to determine 
when an alleged wrongdoer is criminally liable and should be punished. As noted,93 
the delictual protection in German law is wider than the penal, but it appears that the 
penal norms nevertheless exert an inhibiting effect on the development of delictual 
protection. Especially in the case of the relationship between ex-employer and ex-
employee, underlying policy considerations also influence the scope of protection, 94 
again promoting a more all-embracing protection of trade secrets in American law.95 
In both American and German law, the delictual infringement of trade secrets is 
usually treated as a form of unlawful competition.96 American law knows exceptions 
indicating that trade secrets may also be protected outside the sphere of competition 
law,97 and at least one German commentator has argued that technical secrets 
should also be protected independently from the business enterprise.98 
90 Par 2.5.4 above. 
91 Par 3.5.2 above; cf Kutner 305ff. 
92 Par 4.5.1; 4.5.2 above. 
93 Par 6.3 above. 
94 Par 6.5.1 above. 
95 Par 6.5.1 above. 
96 Par 3.5.2; 4.1 above. 
97 Eg El duPont de Nemours v Christopher 431 F2d 1012, 166 USPQ 421 (5th Cir 1970), 400 US 
1024, 401 US 967 (1971) where there was no competitive relationship between plaintiff and defendant 
(par 3.2.2 above). 
98 Pfister 83 - see par 4.5.5.1 fn 304 above. 
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6.6.4 PROPERTY 
In all three systems there are dicta in the case law indicating that trade secrets may 
be regarded as a species of property, and authors advocating the recognition 
thereof.99 However, in both English and German law the prevalent view is that trade 
secrets are not property.100 In spite of strong dicta in the case law to the contrary, 
the most generally favoured view in American law appears to be that trade secrets 
are a type of property. 101 
Arguments in favour of the recognition of property rights in trade secrets may be 
divided into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are those that rely on the 
ways in which the positive law is already dealing with trade secrets; on the other 
hand, those that cite the advantages that will follow from the recognition of trade 
secrets as property. Examples of the former are reliance on the facts that trade 
secrets may be assigned and licensed, may constitute trust property, may be taxed 
as personal property, may devolve by way of testate and intestate succession, 
etcetera.102 In the latter group are, for instance, the arguments that recognition of 
property rights in trade secrets will (in English law) promote protection against trade 
secret infringement in the absence of a relationship of confidence, 103 or that it will 
(in German law) provide a basis for more satisfactory protection against infringement 
by an ex-employee.104 
6.6.5 THE TRADE SECRET AS OBJECT OF A SUBJECTIVE RIGHT 
Closely related to the question whether a trade secret constitutes a type of property, 
is the question whether it is the object of a subjective right. Some German 
commentators, in particular, argue eloquently in favour of the recognition of a 
subjective right to the trade secret, either directly, or indirectly in the sense that the 
trade secret forms an element of the business enterprise, which is the object of a 
generally recognized subjective right. It is asserted, among other things, that such a 
recognition will facilitate the development of the delictual protection of trade secrets, 
99 Par 2.5.3; 3.5.3; 4.5.4 above. 
100 Par 2.5.3; 4.5.4 above. 
101 Par 3.5.3 above. 
102 Cf par 3.5.3 above. 
103 Par 2.5.3 above. 
104 Cf par 4.5.4, together with 4.5.5, above. 
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independently from the penal provisions of the German Unfair Competition Act. 
However, the majority of authors do not find it possible to adopt this construction, due 
to the restrictions imposed by the existing norms and dogmatic foundations of the 
German legal system.105 
6.6.6 OTHERS 
Authority exists in American law for trade secret protection based on unjustified 
enrichment.106 It has also been suggested by a commentator on the American law 
that the privacy of the business concern could provide a foundation for trade secret 
protection.107 
105 Par 4.5.5 above. 
106 Par 3.5.4 above. 
107 Par 3.5.5 above. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE NATURE OF TRADE SECRETS; 
BASES OF LEGAL PROTECTION; 
AND THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET 
7 .1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a number of conclusions are drawn concerning the nature of trade 
secrets, and the foundations of their protection by the law. The first step is to 
establish what the vital elements of protectable trade secrets are or should be. The 
next step is to obtain clarity on the various juridical bases on which the legal 
protection of trade secrets may be founded. In drawing these conclusions, recourse 
is had to insights gained by the comparative study of trade secret protection in the 
legal systems of three industrialized nations and under the GA TT TR/Ps agreement. 1 
However, since the objective is to facilitate an understanding of and the development 
of trade secret protection in South African law, these conclusions are stated so as to 
be compatible with the principles of South African law. In culmination, a case in 
favour of the recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret is argued. 
7.2 ELEMENTS OF TRADE SECRETS 
It is submitted that trade secrets protectable at law must exhibit the following 
characteristics. 
7 .2.1 INFORMATION 
Trade secrets consist of information.2 3 It is true that a process, formula, recipe, or 
1 Ch 2-6. 
2 Cf par 2.2.1.2.1; 3.2.1.2.1; 4.2.1.2.1; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2 above. 
3 Since the concept information is a cornerstone of the concept trade secret, it is perhaps 
necessary to obtain some clarity on the meaning of information. For the purpose of his doctoral thesis 
on Die regsbeskerming van inligting, Geldenhuys defines (59) information as follows: "lnligting is enige 
voorstelling van feite betreffende enige onderwerp of voorwerp, welke voorstelling-
(1) sintuiglik waarneembaar is of in 'n sintuiglik waarneembare vorm omskep kan word; 
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a machine is sometimes described as a trade secret,4 but on closer analysis it will 
be found that, in essence, a trade secret is always information. The information may 
be contained in a formula or recipe written on a piece of paper, or may be learnt by 
analysis of a tangible machine or product, but the trade secret protectable at law is 
an intangible thing. The intervention of the law to protect trade secrets should 
therefore not be dependent on interferences with tangible objects, for instance the 
stealing or destruction of a secret document or a piece of machinery. The law should 
already intervene if the intangible secret information is misappropriated, for instance 
if a document is read and the information therein memorized and carried off in the 
wrongdoer's head, or if photographs are taken of the machine that will enable the 
(2) 'n onstoflike en afsonderlike bestaan voer, verwyderd van dit waarop die feite wat 
dit voorstel, betrekking het; 
(3) oor die potensiaal beskik om 'n persoon, wat dit sintuiglik waarneem, op die hoogte 
te stel van die feite wat daardeur voorgestel word, selfs al sou dit waarop die feite 
betrekking het, glad nie, of nie op daardie oomblik, vir sodanige persoon sintuiglik 
waarneembaar wees nie; 
(4) oor die potensiaal beskik om 'n onbeperkte aantal kere gedupliseer te word, hetsy 
deur dieselfde voorstelling te kopieer of deur ander voorstellings van dieselfde feite 
saam te stel, en deur middel van die verskaffing van sodanige voorstellings aan een 
of meer persona, dit vir sodanige persona moontlik maak om op hoogte te kom van 
die feite wat daardeur voorgestel word, sonder dat die persoon wat dit verskaf, deur 
die verskaffing daarvan van enige kennis aangaande die feite wat deur sodanige 
voorstelling voorgestel word, afstand doen; en 
(4) in die geval van 'n geestesvoorstelling, nie van 'n persoon weggeneem kan word 
sonder 'n ernstige inbreukmaking op die liggaamlike integriteit van die persoon wat 
sodanige voorstelling gevorm het nie." 
Information is thus basically defined as a presentation of facts, and as to what facts are, Geldenhuys 
accepts (59) the following definition by the Woordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal: "enigiets wat 'n 
individuele, konkrete bestaan het, ditsy subjektief of objektief beskou; iets wat deur regstreekse 
waarneming geken word; gebeurtenis, geestelik of fisies, wat werklik plaasgevind of ondervind is; 
voorval, hoedanigheid of verband waarvan die werklikheid uit die ondervinding blyk of met sekerheid 
afgelei kan word; gegewe wat metodies uit die ondervinding blyk of met sekerheid afgelei kan word; 
gegewe wat metodies i/d ervaring gekonstateer is en onafhanklik van die tyd, plek of die waarnemer 
bestaan". 
The important point is - information is something with the potential to inform the receiver thereof 
(enlighten the receiver thereof /'tell' the receiver thereof something) about something else. Thus, it 
is submitted, a piece of furniture is not information, nor is it a fact (although according to the definition 
of facts accepted by Geldenhuys it probably is a fact). However, by observing the piece of furniture, 
a person can inform him- or herself about the characteristics thereof - its colour(s), its physical 
dimensions (by taking measurements), the materials used in its construction (by taking it apart), etc. 
The said person then has information about the piece of furniture. If he or she shares that information 
with a second person, receipt of the information informs the latter of the characteristics of the piece 
of furniture, even though he may not have had the opportunity to observe the piece of furniture first-
hand. This explains why a competitor would go to great lengths to obtain the trade secret of a rival -
the secret - as information - is something that can, on the acquisition thereof, inform the receiver about 
the process used by his rival to manufacture his unique product, or inform the receiver about the 
immensely successful marketing strategy of his rival, etc. 
4 Cf eg the definition of trade secrets employed by the American Restatement (par 3.2.1.2.1 
above). 
182 
owner or recipient of the photograph to build a similar machine. 
7.2.2 COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY 
Information must be capable of commercial or industrial application to qualify as trade 
secrets.5 This requirement is rarely given much prominence in case law, but is 
implicit in the very concept 'trade secret', and perhaps even more so in the German 
terms Geschaftsgeheimnis and Betriebsgeheimnis.6 This requirement must be 
formulated in terms of a potential to be applied in commerce and industry, rather than 
an actual application. Formulation in terms of an actual application in commerce or 
industry would mean that confidential trade information could only qualify as a trade 
secret once it was put to use by the owner - and this would be an undesirable state 
of affairs. A trade secret should be recognized - and protected - by the law also 
before it is put to use. 
7.2.3 SECRECY 
Information must be secret to qualify as a trade secret.7 The negatively formulated 
criterion used to determine secrecy in the English, American and German legal 
systems, namely that information is secret if it is not public knowledge or if it is not 
in the public domain,8 appears to be an acceptable point of departure. It is admittedly 
a vague criterion, but key concepts in the law are often vague and are nevertheless 
applied by the courts to good effect.9 Also acceptable is the slightly narrower 
formulation of the GA TT TRIPs agreement, namely that secrecy means not "generally 
known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal 
with the kind of information in question".10 
5 Cf par 2.2.1.2.2; 3.2.1.2.2; 4.2.1.2.2; 6.2 above. 
6 Cf par 2.2.1.2.2 fn 36; 3.2.1.2.2; 4.2.1.2.2 above. 
7 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2; 6.2.1 above. 
8 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1 above. 
9 To cite just one example from the South African law of delict, few concepts can be more vague 
than the boni mores - the so-called legal convictions of the community - yet it has been employed by 
the courts to make delict a dynamic, adaptable branch of the law (cf eg Burchell 24-25). 
1° Cf par 5.1; 5.2; 6.2.1 above. 
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It is clear that secrecy must be a relative concept. 11 It is usually necessary for the 
trade secret owner to disclose the secret to others (employees, manufacturers, 
potential partners or clients, etcetera) in order to exploit it economically. Such 
disclosures will normally be made subject to obligations of confidence, but they 
nevertheless indicate that secrecy cannot be an absolute requirement. Furthermore, 
secrecy will not necessarily be destroyed if the secret is known to outsiders not 
bound by obligations of secrecy, and these outsiders may include some of the 
competitors of the trade secret owner. Examples would include instances where trade 
secrets have been acquired by double invention or reverse engineering. 12 
Mention has been made, in the results of the comparative research presented in the 
previous chapters, 13 of the phenomenon that non-secret trade information may in 
certain circumstances be protected. In principle, however, non-secret information 
should not constitute a trade secret, 14 and if such information is protectable at law, 
such protection should not be based on the same legal grounds as the protection of 
true trade secrets. 15 
Since absolute secrecy cannot be required, the problem arises of establishing the 
dividing-line between relative secrecy and non-secrecy. The problem is a conceptual 
one with crucial practical implications, since protectability of information as a trade 
secret hinges on the secrecy or otherwise of that information. When is trade 
information still relatively secret and therefore protectable, and when does it become 
non-secret and thus unprotectable (or protectable on other legal grounds 16)? If the 
relevant information is unknown and inaccessible to all the competitors of the owner 
of the information and all others who might make use thereof, it is not in the public 
domain and is therefore secret. If, on the other hand, it is known or accessible to all 
his major competitors and others who might make use thereof, it is public knowledge 
and not secret. Between these two extremes, the distinction between secrecy and 
non-secrecy is one of degree. Say the owner of an alleged trade secret has five 
competitors in the market. Four of the five know the alleged secret. Can the relevant 
information qualify as a trade secret vis-a-vis the fifth competitor? It is submitted that 
11 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2.1 above. 
12 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1 above. 
13 Cf eg par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.2.2.1.1.1; 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.1; 4.2.2.2; 4.4.4; 6.2.1. 
14 It is a terminological contradiction as well. 
15 Non-secret information could inter alia be protected by contract (cf eg par 2.2.2.1.1 .1 ; 3.5.1; 
6.2.1 ); in terms of duties of good faith or fiduciary duties (cf eg par 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 6.2.1 ); as (other) forms 
of unlawful competition (cf eg par 3.5.2; 4.4.4; 6.2.1 ); or by statute (cf eg par 4.2.2.2; 6.2.1 ). 
16 Fn 15 above. 
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in principle it can, but that a definitive answer cannot be given in abstracto. All factual 
circumstances must be considered, and secrecy must be objectively established on 
the facts. Thus, if the four competitors who know the alleged secret take steps to 
prevent others from gaining access to it, it may still not be readily accessible to the 
fifth competitor. It can then not be said to be in the public domain, and is therefore 
still secret. If, however, one of the four has published the allegedly secret information 
in a technical journal, it is readily accessible to the fifth competitor, and is - on the 
facts - not secret any more. 
It is submitted that, in practical terms, secrecy boils down to difficulty of access.17 
Thus if the alleged secret has been published, it is readily accessible. It is then also 
in the public domain and not secret. If access to the allegedly secret information can 
be gained by examining a product on the market, the difficulty of access must be 
assessed with reference to the amount of time and labour18 that an average 
competitor in the field will need to unravel the secret. If substantial, the information 
is not readily accessible and not (yet) in the public domain.19 If negligible, the 
information is in the public domain. Again, the dividing-line is not a clear-cut one, and 
it is probably impossible to be more specific. The decision must be based on a 
careful analysis of all the facts of the case, and will ultimately be in th~ discretion of 
the court. It must be emphasized, however, that if the relevant information is found 
to be secret, it does not follow as a matter of course that it is a trade secret - it must 
also comply with the other requirements discussed here. 
7.2.4 THE OWNER'S WILL TO MAINTAIN SECRECY 
This requirement appears in various guises in different legal systems and in the 
GATT TR/Ps agreement. 20 As noted,21 German law requires a subjective 
Geheimhaltungswil/e on the part of the trade secret owner. American law tends to 
focus more on the behaviour of the owner, in so far as it requires reasonable efforts 
17 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2.1 above. 
18 Cf eg the 'time and labour' test used in English law (par 2.2.1.2.3) above. 
19 In such a case, the (secret) information may be (lawfully) obtained by reverse engineering - cf 
par 8.2.2.2.3 below. The length of time needed to reverse engineer such a secret will be of importance 
when the court must decide on the duration of legal protection - cf par 8.6.4 below. 
2
° Cf par 2.2.1.2.4; 3.2.1.2.4; 4.2.1.2.4; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2 above. 
21 Par 4.2.1.2.4; 6.2 above. 
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on his part to maintain secrecy.22 It is submitted that American law really looks at 
the same issue from a different angle - it looks for objective manifestations of the 
owner's will to maintain secrecy. From a dogmatic point of view, the German angle 
appears to be the purer of the two, identifying as it does the root of the issue - the 
reason why the owner would take steps to guard the secrecy of his information. From 
a practical point of view, the American angle highlights the need to examine the 
behaviour of the trade secret owner to decide whether his secret merits protection or 
not. Even if a subjective formulation is adopted requiring a will to maintain secrecy, 
it will normally be necessary in court to prove that the owner has taken steps to 
preserve secrecy, from which his subjective will may be deduced.23 
It is submitted that this is a necessary requirement. It is unthinkable that a court of 
law will protect trade information if the owner thereof displayed no will to keep it 
secret. 
Some clarification is needed on the relationship between the objective requirement 
of secrecy and the subjective requirement of the owner's will to maintain secrecy. The 
owner's will to 'maintain secrecy' can never transform information that is not 
objectively secret into a trade secret. In so far as authority may be found - in English 
law for instance - that the subjective will or belief of a person is a decisive factor in 
establishing secrecy,24 it is open to criticism. Secrecy must be objectively 
established on the facts. The subjective will of the owner to keep the information 
secret, as manifested in steps taken by him to preserve the secrecy, is best regarded 
as a independent element of a trade secret that must be established separately. 
Trade information that is on the facts (still) secret because it is not in the public 
domain, may be judged unworthy of legal protection if the owner does not display a 
will to keep it secret. 
7.2.5 ECONOMIC VALUE 
Trade secrets are usually required to have economic value.25 This requirement 
ensures that a potential plaintiff does not call upon the courts to protect trivial secrets, 
the "infringement" of which does not really affect the complainant's patrimony nor has 
22 Par 3.2.1.2.4; 6.2 above; cf, however, Callmann 14.50 who requires an intention to maintain 
secrecy (par 3.2.1.2.4 fn 72; 6.2 fn 12). 
23 Cf Joubert 1985 De Jure 42. 
24 See par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.2.1.2.4; 6.2 above. 
25 Cf par 2.2.1.2.5; 3.2.1.2.5; 4.2.1.2.5; 5.1; 5.2; 6.2 above. 
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the potential to do so. In this sense, this requirement is in harmony with an 
established maxim of the law - de minimis non curat Jex. This requirement is closely 
related to the requirement of commercial or industrial applicability. The secret will 
have economical value if it is capable of commercial or industrial application. Again, 
it should not be required that the economical value be already realized - it may be a 
potential value only to be fully realized when the secret is put to use. 
7.2.6 CONCRETENESS OR POTENTIAL CONCRETENESS 
A secret can only constitute a trade secret protectable at law, if it can lead an 
existence separate of its owner. To this end, it must be capable of being embodied 
in a concrete form, 26 for instance in writing, a sketch, a diagram, a plan, a computer 
program, a model and so forth. It need not be reduced to a concrete form, but it must 
be capable of reduction to a concrete form. 27 This characteristic of a trade secret 
is closely linked to the requirements of commercial or industrial applicability and 
economic value. If an idea is still so undeveloped and vague that it cannot lead an 
existence separate from its owner, it cannot be exploited for commercial or industrial 
use, and can therefore also have no economic value. 
7.2. 7 CONCLUSION: A DEFINITION OF A TRADE SECRET 
As a synthesis of the requirements considered above, a trade secret may broadly be 
defined as secret information which is capable of commercial or industrial application, 
in respect of which the owner has the will to keep it secret, which has economic 
value, and which can lead an existence separately from that of its owner. 
7.2.8 RELATED TERMINOLOGY 
The definition of a trade secret adopted above incorporates what are submitted to be 
the minimum requirements of a trade secret protectable at law. Its relationship with 
terminology regularly encountered in case reports and literature on the legal 
protection of trade secrets needs some clarification. 
26 Cf par 3.2.1.2.6; 4.2.1.2.6; 6.2. 
27 Thus a simple trade secret may be exploited without, eg, being written down. If such a trade 
secret is orally confided to another, the latter can infringe it by eg unauthorized disclosure. Legal 
protection of such a secret will not be precluded simply because it has never been rendered in a 
concrete form. Cf the views of Pfister 30 (par 4.2.1.2.6 fn 44 above). 
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7.2.8.1 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
Especially in English law, the terms trade secret and confidential information are 
frequently used together, often as apparent equivalents.28 However, in its widest 
sense confidential information is a much wider concept than trade secret. In the first 
place it includes not only information capable of commercial or industrial application, 
but also information relating to the private life of the individual or legal person.29 The 
latter category of confidential information belongs to the province of the law of privacy 
in South African law and must be distinguished from trade secrets. 30 This does not 
mean, however, that confidential information which does indeed pertain to trade or 
industry is synonymous with the definition of trade secrets adopted above. Especially 
in English law, and particularly in cases concerning the alleged misappropriation of 
information in a relationship of (ex-)employer and (ex-)employee, different classes of 
confidential trade information are recognized, with trade secrets forming one of those 
classes. The different classes may receive different degrees of legal protection, and 
protection may be based on different legal grounds. 31 Thus even confidential 
information relating to trade or industry may be a wider concept than the definition of 
trade secrets above. 
7.2.8.2 KNOW-HOW 
The term 'know-how' is frequently encountered in case law and commentaries,32 in 
Anglo-American law as well as in Continental legal systems, and some clarification 
of its position in trade secret terminology is needed. It is a rather imprecise term 
given various meanings by various users.33 For present purposes, three broad 
categories of usage may, it is submitted, be distinguished. First, know-how may refer 
to trade secrets; second, it may refer to knowledge or skills which are not trade 
secrets; and third, it may be used as a broader generic term including trade secrets 
as well as knowledge and skills which are not trade secrets. 
28 Par 2.2.1.1.1; 2.2.1.2.3; 2.4.1 above. 
29 The importance of confidential information as a term of legal significance stems from the English 
action for breach of confidence, which protects confidential trade information as well as confidential 
information of a personal nature - cf par 2.1 above. 
30 Par 7.4.4.3 below. 
31 Par 2.4.1 above; 8.6.1 below. 
32 Cf par 2.2.1.1.3; 3.2.1.1.2; 4.2.1.1 above. 
33 So much so that English commentators have referred to its "chameleonic nature" (cf par 
2.2.1.1.3 above). 
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7 .3 BASES OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
Various possible foundations of trade secret protection in three foreign legal systems 
have been surveyed above.34 In the following paragraphs, a number of possible 
choices concerning the juridical base of trade secret protection in South African law 
will be considered. The insights gained from the comparative survey will be applied, 
with due recognition of the fundamental differences that may exist between the South 
African legal system and the three foreign systems. 
7.3.1 CONTRACT AND DELICT 
It can safely be assumed that there will in principle always be room for contractual 
protection of trade secrets.35 In practice, contractual regulation of trade secrets may 
frequently be the preferable course of action. The scope and importance of contract 
as a basis of trade secret protection vary between different legal systems on account 
of mainly two factors. First, and this concerns primarily protection by express contract, 
the boundaries will be drawn by legal rules limiting freedom of economic activity for 
reasons of public policy, particularly the rules regulating covenants in restraint of 
trade. Second, the degree to which protection may be said to be based on contract 
implied in law, will be limited by the extent to which ex Jege protection of trade 
secrets may in a given legal system be more satisfactorily explained with reference 
to another base, for instance delict. Thus an obligation to preserve secrecy said to 
originate in implied contract in one system, may be explained as arising in delict in 
another system. 36 
Delictual protection of trade secrets may co-exist alongside contractual protection. 
Where the parties have not by agreement regulated their rights and obligations in 
respect of trade secrets, this should be done by the norms of the law, 37 and more 
34 Par 2.5; 3.5; 4.5; 6.6 above. 
35 Cf par 2.5.1; 3.5.1; 4.5.3; 6.6.1 above. 
36 Especially in English law, some applications of implied contract to protect trade secrets - notably 
in the absence of a factual contractual relationship or where the implied contract actually overrides an 
express contract - may appear artificial to a lawyer from another legal system, and he or she might 
prefer to explain such protection as tortious or delictual in nature (cf par 2.2.2.1.1.2; 6.6.1 above). 
37 That is, by norms of the law other than the law of contract. In the contractual context the rights 
and duties of the parties are also regulated by the law, that is, by the law of contract. However, the 
parties may by an exercise of their will choose whether they wish to acquire rights and duties towards 
each other - whether to enter into a contractual relationship or not, and if yes, into what kind of 
contractual relationship, is after all their decision - and in this sense they may be said to regulate their 
rights and duties by agreement. The law of delict, on the other hand, confers rights and duties to the 
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particularly by the law of delict.38 This is the position, at least as far as private law 
is concerned, in the United States of America39 and in Germany.40 The position in 
English law is different - delictual protection does not play a major role, because of 
the very wide application of implied contract on the one hand, and the application of 
equity on the other.41 From a South African perspective, it appears more logical and 
satisfactory to confine the role of contract more or less42 to protection based to a 
certain degree on consensus between the relevant parties, and to base ex lege 
protection primarily on delict.43 On a practical level, too, delict is the better choice, 
promoting a wider-ranging and more flexible protection of trade secrets, independent 
of any real or fictitious contractual relationship between trade secret owner and 
infringer. This proposition is demonstrated by a comparison of the scope of practical 
trade secret protection in the English and American legal systems.44 
Where contractual and delictual protection of trade secrets co-exist in one legal 
parties ex lege, quite independent of their wishes. Cf, however, Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 6 fn 
21. 
38 Cf Lubbe and Murray 1: "Contractual obligations are created by the agreement (or apparent 
agreement) of parties. Unlike many other obligations, they are supposed to arise voluntarily. An 
obligation based on delict, on the other hand, arises ex lege when a legal subject wrongfully and 
without adequate justification, intentionally or negligently, infringes a recognized interest of another to 
the detriment of that person" and 2: "In a capitalist, free-market economy, contractual obligations are 
perceived to provide the mechanism by which the process of production and exchange is undertaken 
voluntarily by individuals. The law of delict then governs situations where the individual freedom which 
is asserted to be central to such systems is violated." 
39 Par 3.5.2; 6.6.3 above. 
40 Par 4.5.2; 6.6.3 above. 
41 Par 2.2.2.1.1.2; 2.2.2.1.2; 2.5.2; 2.5.4; 6.6.1; 6.6.2; 6.6.3 above. 
42 Not all contractual protection can be explained with reference to consensus of the parties - in 
particular, the majority of implied terms are legal consequences of the conclusion of contracts, and are 
not the result of agreement. Cf in general Vorster esp 112-113 203. However, consensus remains an 
important reason why parties to a contract are legally bound to the terms of that contract - cf De Wet 
and Van Wyk 9ff; Christie 21ff; Joubert Contract 33 36ff; Kerr 3ff; Lubbe and Murray 1-2 28ff; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 11ff. 
43 Ex /ege protection may also be of contractual origin in the case of implied in law terms. See fn 
42. In South African law, this type of protection should, it is submitted, be confined to situations where 
trade secret owner and infringer are in fact in a contractual relationship. It should not - as has been 
done in English law - be extended to apply to situations where no contractual relationships exist, 
because such relationships will then have to be feigned. These latter situations should be the domain 
of delict. 
44 Cf eg par 2.4.2; 3.4.2; 6.5.2; 2.5.4 above. Furthermore, more generally formulated, open-ended 
delictual norms appear to promote a more comprehensive protection than more rigidly codified delictual 
norms, as suggested by a juxtaposition of the American and German legal systems (cf eg par 6.5.1 ; 
6.5.2; 6.6.3 above. 
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system, they compliment each other, but also overlap to a degree. Where one 
infringing act gives rise to both contractual and delictual actions, the situation must 
be regulated by the general principles concerning a concurrence of claims.45 
7.3.2 DELICT AND PROPERTY 
The relationship between delict and property46 as foundations of trade secret 
protection is an interesting one. Potentially they appear to be capable of harmonious 
co-existence, with a property perspective providing a clearer insight into the nature 
of the subject matter which is protected primarily by the norms of the law of delict. 
However, American law - the one system where ample authority may be found for 
both property and delict as bases of trade secret protection - shows that different 
results may be reached depending on which ground liability is based. Thus in 
decisions of jurisdictions leaning towards a property view of trade secrets, the focus 
tends to fall on the nature of the subject-matter; while in jurisdictions emphasizing the 
tort law aspects of trade secret protection, the focus is more on the conduct of the 
alleged wrongdoer. The importance of this division is not merely dogmatic in nature, 
but has very real practical consequences. Thus emphasis of the unreasonableness 
of the infringer's conduct may in the absence of a careful consideration of the 
protected subject-matter lead to the protection of information that is not secret. In 
particular, this may lead to perpetual injunctions being given against an infringer after 
the information has fallen into the public domain.47 A careful consideration of the 
subject-matter will in principle48 limit the duration of injunctive protection to the 
period during which the information is in fact secret.49 
It is submitted that the focus must fall on both the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, 
and the nature of the subject matter for which protection is sought. The focus must 
fall on the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, because only unreasonable50 
45 On the topic of concurrence of claims in general, see Van Aswegen 230ff (on German law) 259ff 
(on English law) 285ff (on American law); cf further par 8.4 below. 
46 
"Property" can be understood to signify various things. Three potentially relevant meanings of 
property are explored in par 7.3.3 below. In the current paragraph, property is used in a wide sense, 
so as to include all three meanings discussed in par 7.3.3. 
47 Cf par 3.5.2; 3.5.3 fn 318 above. 
48 Subject to the idea that a limited 'lead-time injunction' may be granted to cancel out the unfair 
head-start obtained by the infringer - cf par 3.4.4; 6.5.4 above. 
49 Cf par 3.5.3 (especially fn 318) above. 
50 On the role of reasonableness in respect of delictual wrongfulness, see par 7.4.1.1 below. 
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acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets should lead to liability. Equally, 
however, the focus must fall on the nature of the subject matter, on two accounts. In 
the first place, if trade secrets law is to be regarded as an identifiable branch of the 
law, its subject-matter must be capable of identification. Secondly, and for practical 
purposes more importantly, the nature of the subject matter may be of assistance in 
determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the allegedly infringing 
conduct. Thus it may be said that appropriation of secret trade information without the 
owner's consent should in principle51 be unreasonable, but exploitation of trade 
information in the public domain should in principle52 be reasonable. 
One could therefore be tempted to conclude that the best way to achieve a balanced 
approach to trade secret protection, in which the focus falls sharply on the conduct 
of the wrongdoer as well as the nature of the trade secret, is to combine the delict 
and property approaches. However, circumspection is needed here. It should be 
borne in mind that property is a concept given different meanings in different 
branches of the law, in different legal systems, and by various legal scientists.53 It 
is therefore essential to obtain more clarity on property (in its various guises) as a 
potential basis of trade secret protection. 
7.3.3 TRADE SECRETS AS PROPERTY 
As noted,54 the question whether trade secrets constitute property is debated in all 
three the legal systems examined in the comparative study, and answers are given 
both in the affirmative and the negative. This divergence of opinion can partly be 
attributed to the fact that the term "property" is given different meanings by different 
jurists. 
51 le, in the absence of a special ground rendering such appropriation reasonable - see eg par 
8.2.2.2 below. ' 
52 le, in the absence of special circumstances rendering such appropriation unreasonable on other 
legal grounds - see eg fn 15 above. 
53 For a striking juxtaposition of the meanings of property in respectively the American and German 
Constitutions, plus an assessment of implications for the South African situation after adoption of the 
Constitution of 1993, see Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 191-194. Note, too, how in German law a 
strict distinction is maintained between the constitutional law and private law concepts of property (or, 
more precisely ownership); whereas this is not the case in American law. Cf further Lewis 1992 SAJHR 
389 392ff. 
54 Par 2.5.3; 3.5.3; 4.5.4; 6.6.4 above. 
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First, property may be understood as basically55 corporeal (physical) things, 
immovable or movable. Exponents of this view may be found among the ranks of 
eminent South African authors.56 In common law systems the Blackstonian concept 
of property is a similar one, 57 while the concept of property in German private (as 
opposed to public) law has a similar content.58 It should be immediately apparent 
that this concept of property is not wide enough to accommodate trade secrets, since 
a trade secret is in essence (intangible) information not to be equated with the 
document, product or other physical thing in which it may be embodied. 
Second, however, property is understood by many to include much more than only 
physical things. Property has been given a particularly liberal meaning in America, 
where authors like Reich59 and Vandevelde60 have shown that property has been 
"de-physicalized" to include potentially any valuable interest. In South African law a 
55 Some exceptions - ie, forms of incorporeal property - may be recognized, but these are 
frequently rationalized as anomalies that do not distract from the validity of the premise that property 
is in principle corporeal things - see fn 56 below. 
56 Thus the majority of modern authors writing on property law (cf Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 
13-15; Van der Merwe 21-22) or the doctrine of subjective rights (par 7.4.1 below) in other contexts 
(Du Plessis and Du Plessis 129; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 45; Van der Merwe and Olivier 55; 
Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 408; Van der Vyver and Joubert 13) state that things are in principle 
corporeal objects. Accordingly they maintain a strict distinction between things and intellectual property 
(see par 7.4.1 below), and hence between real rights and intellectual property rights. South African 
positive law recognizes real rights on certain incorporeal things. Examples are usufructs on mineral 
rights, and rights of real security over mineral rights, leases or personal servitudes (cf Kleyn and 
Boraine 11; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 14). Some authors object to the recognition of these 
'things' on dogmatic grounds: such recognition blurs the distinction between the different subjective 
rights - especially real and personal rights, since it implies that a subjective right can be the object of 
a real right - which is branded dogmatically unsound, and it is in conflict with the traditional conception 
of a real right as conferring direct physical powers over a thing in favour of a person. They prefer to 
treat these incorporeal things as exceptions that do not distract from the basic validity of the rule that 
things are corporeal (cf Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 14; Van der Merwe 21-22). Others are of 
the opinion that no worthy purpose is served by denying - in the interest of pure dogma - the need 
experienced in modern South African legal practice for the recognition of such incorporeals (cf Kleyn 
and Boraine 13-14; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 233-236 246). In Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
corporeal as well as incorporeal things were recognized. The latter can largely be equated with what 
is today known as rights. Intellectual property in its modern sense was unknown to those systems. Cf 
Kleyn and Boraine 9-10; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 13-14. 
57 Blackstone (Vol 2) 1. 
58 Sec 90 BGB; cf eg Muller 6-7; Scwab and Prutting 1. 
59 1964 Yale LJ 733-786; cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 191-192; 1996 THRHR 413; 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 404-406. 
60 1980 Buffalo LR 325ff; cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 191-192; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 
404-406. 
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wide concept of property is propagated by, for instance, Kleyn and Boraine.61 They 
define a thing - object of a property right62 - as "anything whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, that is of use and/or value to man, and that is regarded as in 
commercio". These more liberal concepts of property appear sufficiently wide to 
accommodate trade secrets. 
Third, the influence of constitutional law must be borne in mind. The (interim) South 
African Constitution63 guarantees64 the protection of rights in property. The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill of 1996 provides65 that no-one may 
be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. These concepts could undoubtedly be 
construed sufficiently widely to include trade secrets.66 Such an interpretation could 
be supported on utility grounds, since it would imply that trade secrets are to be 
protected against unreasonable interference by organs of the state.67 Another 
question altogether is whether such a wide constitutional law definition of property 
61 19. It may be added that although these authors give a definition of a thing wide enough to 
include intellectual property (par 7.4.1; 7.4.3 below), they restrict their text on the law of property to 
the subjects traditionally classified under the law of property. They do argue (30) that intellectual 
property rights may be things and as such objects of real rights (keep in mind that according to Roman 
and Roman-Dutch law rights were incorporeal things - fn 56 above). However, as far as could be 
ascertained, they never argue in so many words that a form of intellectual property itself - and not the 
right thereto - may be the object of a real right (cf the different categories of subjective rights par 7.4.1 
below). 
62 Cf par 7.4.1 below. 
63 Act 200 of 1993. 
64 Sec 28. Cf in general Van der Walt in Van Wyk et al 455ff; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 ff. 
65 Cl 25. 
66 Cf Van der Walt in Van Wyk et al 490 (cf 493ff): "In constitutional theory the guarantee of 
property is usually interpreted widely to include... rights to incorporeal property such as intellectual 
property, [and] commercial interests such as goodwill." A case will be made below (par 7.4.3) that 
trade secrets are intellectual (immaterial) property, and it will also be noted (par 7.4.4.4) that in South 
African positive law trade secrets protection is usually a corollary of the legal protection of goodwill. 
Classification of intellectual property rights and the goodwill (which is itself categorized by eminent 
authors as the object of an intellectual property right - see 7.4.4.4 below) as property for the purposes 
of constitutional law should therefore imply that trade secrets are also property in that sense. Also Van 
der Walt 1993 SAPR!PL 315; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 15 fn 88 16; Lewis 1992 SAJHR 399. 
67 In terms of sec 7(1) the third chapter of the Constitution - entrenching the fundamental rights 
which the 'rights in property' belong to - binds the legislative and executive organs of state. Cf Van der 
Walt in Van Wyk et al 494. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 
1996 applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state 
(cl 8(1 )). Furthermore, the provisions of the Bill of Rights also bind natural and juristic persons in so 
far as - taking into account the nature of the rights and the duties imposed by them - they can be 
applied to such persons (cl 8(2)). 
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would (or should) influence the private law concept meaning of property.68 In two 
developed countries with a long tradition of entrenched fundamental rights, 
developments in this regard followed divergent routes. Thus in the Federal Republic 
of Germany a strict distinction is maintained between a narrower private law meaning 
of ownership - confined to corporeal things - and a wider public law meaning.69 In 
American law, on the other hand, no such distinction is maintained, and a concept of 
property even wider than the German constitutional law meaning of ownership has 
developed.70 The greater accessibility of American sources of law to the average 
South African jurist - on account of language considerations - might mean that the 
South African courts would be more open to influence of the American example than 
the German one. 71 
For obvious reasons a definitive exploration of the boundaries of the property concept 
cannot be attempted in this study. However, the question whether trade secrets are 
property cannot be avoided, and some tentative conclusions and suggestions in this 
regard will now be offered. 
On the one hand, the recognition of trade secrets as property seems to be potentially 
beneficial for the development of legal protection of trade secrets. Thus American 
trade secrets law has probably benefited from widespread recognition of trade secrets 
as property in that system.72 On the other hand, the adoption of a wide, all-inclusive 
property concept is not necessarily always advantageous. In American law the 
property concept has been interpreted so liberally as to include not only trade secrets, 
but potentially any valuable interest.73 Commentators have suggested that this 
process has to a large extent rendered the very concept of property meaningless, 
forcing the courts to base property protection purely on public policy, rather than on 
68 On the possibility of so-called horizontal application (ie application to private law relationships) 
of the Constitution in general, cf eg Van der Walt in Van Wyk et al 494-495; Van Heerden and 
Neethling 14; Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 450ff; Van der Vyver 1994 THRHR 378ff; Sasson 1994 
THRHR 501-502; Neethling and Potgieter 1994 THRHR 516ff; Visser in Van Aswegen (ed) 26ff. 
69 Cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 192; Van der Walt 1993 SAPR!PL 303. 
7
° Cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 191-192. 
71 Cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 203; Van der Walt 1993 SAPR!PL 315. 
72 As noted, trade secret protection is generally more comprehensive in American law than in the 
other systems surveyed (par 6.5.1; 6.5.2; 6.6.3 above). The recognition of trade secrets as property 
has probably contributed to this situation (cf par 3.5.3 above, especially fn 305). On the other hand, 
the recognition of trade secrets as property also has the (opposite, yet equally beneficial) effect of 
keeping legal protection within reasonable bounds, resisting its indiscriminate extension to the 
protection of non-secret information (par 7.3.2 above). 
73 See in general Vandevelde 1980 Buffalo LR 325ff; cf Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 191-192; 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 404-406. 
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the nature of the subject-matter for which protection is sought.74 Such a situation 
must, it is submitted, be avoided.75 It is not desirable that every decision taken by 
a court of law should be based purely on policy, with no reference to more or less 
fixed rules and principles. The existence of at least a measure76 of legal certainty -
a measure of predictability - is surely in itself a worthy consideration of legal 
policy.77 To this end, it may be argued, legal policy itself dictates that certain 
distinctions be made, certain 'labels' be applied, and legal consequences to a certain 
degree be made dependent on these distinctions and labels.78 
74 Vandevelde 1980 Buffalo LR 325ff; cf Callmann Vol 2 14.9. 
75 Some may welcome such a result - cf in respect of specifically trade secrets Callmann Vol 2 
14.9: "[l]t is circular to reason that because something is called property it should be protected; when 
in fact it is the policy judgment that something ought to be protected that leads us to call it property 
in the first place. Thus we are required to reason from a policy basis, and not allowed to fall into habits 
of mechanical jurisprudence whereby a mere label (property) automatically implies a legal result 
(protectable)." However, for the reasons advanced in the main text, this attitude cannot be supported 
without qualification. 
76 Absolute certainty and predictability is unattainable and undesirable since a legal system must 
remain flexible and adaptable enough to cope with novel situations and to dispense justice in individual 
cases - cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 194 and authorities cited. 
77 Cf Van der Merwe 1992 SALJ 619ff. 
78 This may be stating the obvious, but the simple truth is: the law must make distinctions, it must 
attach labels, it must classify. And specific norms and principles must be developed on the basis of 
these distinctions. The specific rules must be in conformity with legal policy, and may be regarded as 
concrete expressions of legal policy, but they must exist, they must be there for the courts to apply. 
This does not mean, however, that legal policy is just a theoretical justification for rigid rules that are 
mechanically applied by the courts on the strength of their classification of the parties, conduct and 
objects in front of them. Although some cases in a developed legal system may be decided without 
explicit reference to legal policy, others may not. Some legal norms are formulated in an 'open-ended' 
manner to incorporate considerations of legal policy in their application - eg the bani mores criterion 
for delictual wrongfulness, and the criterion for legal causation in the law of delict and criminal law -
cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 180-182. When applying such norms, it will frequently be necessary to 
weigh considerations of policy. Furthermore, when courts are confronted by novel issues not yet 
catered for by existing legal rules, the courts will rely directly on the policy considerations underpinning 
the legal system - cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 182-186. The courts may even decide to change a 
legal rule that does not reflect compelling considerations of legal policy - cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 
186. Policy considerations may also facilitate choices between conflicting rules applicable to the same 
set of facts - eg where more than one person has delictual claims for the same loss, or in cases of 
concurrence of delictual and contractual claims - cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 186-188. A balance 
must be achieved between the conflicting ideals of legal certainty on the one hand, and flexibility and 
justice in the individual case on the other. To this end both concrete norms and fluid policy 
considerations are indispensable. Cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 194: "[A] balance between the two 
competing ideals of legal certainty on the one hand and flexibility and justice in the individual case on 
the other, can best be achieved in the following way. Policy considerations should be seen as an 
inherent part of legal materials, often reflecting fundamental principles immanent in the legal system. 
Judicial law-making via the utilisation of policy considerations in the decisions is necessary and 
desirable, but is basically interstitial. It occurs where a plain and clear valid legal rule cannot, by means 
of the conscious, rational use of ordinary logical and deductive reasoning, furnish an answer. Policy 
considerations are then used, implying inductive and intuitive reasoning. The judge is then performing 
his or her most openly acknowledged law-making function. However, because the judge is not the 
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The objective should therefore be to apply the "property" label to trade secrets in a 
manner that would contribute to the development of the legal protection of trade 
secrets, without stretching the property concept so wide as to become meaningless. 
It is submitted that this objective is admirably served by the doctrine of subjective 
rights as recognized in South African law.79 In accordance with this doctrine, it will 
be argued below,80 trade secrets are intellectual property. As such, they are objects 
of intellectual property rights, and are distinguished from real rights - the rights to 
things, which basically correspond with the stricter, physical concept of property 
examined above. 81 This classification recognizes, on the one hand, that trade 
secrets - like other forms of intellectual property - display some of the characteristics 
of property in its narrow, physical meaning. Thus trade secrets - like physical property 
- may be sold, may devolve by testate or intestate succession, may be subject to a 
trust, and may form part of the assets of a business for insolvency purposes.82 By 
way of analogy, it is furthermore possible to refer to both the possessor and owner 
of a trade secret.83 On the other hand, this classification does not obscure the 
fundamental differences between trade secrets and those forms of property that are 
the objects of real rights. Two such differences may be highlighted as examples. 
First, the same trade secret may be owned by more than one owner - with equal but 
competing rights - as a result of double invention84 or reverse engineering,85 
whereas it is not possible for two or more persons to simultaneously acquire 
individual ownership of the same property in its narrow sense.86 Second, legal 
remedies available to protect property in its traditional narrow sense - like the 
mandament van spolie and the rei vindicatio - may not be suitable for the protection 
supreme legislator, and to minimize the most important objections to judicial law-making, he or she 
must perform this function with constraint and in a principled way." 
79 Par 7.4.1 below. 
80 Par 7.4.3. 
81 Some exceptions are recognized - cf fns 55 56 above. 
82 Cf Gurry 48; Milgrim Vol 1 2.22ff. 
83 Par 1.2 above. 
84 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.5.3 fn 286; 3.2.1.2.3; 3.5.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 4.5.5.1; 6.2.1 above; 8.2.2.2.2 below. 
85 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.5.3 fn 286; 3.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1 above; 8.2.2.2.3 below. 
86 Cf Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 35. Joint ownership or co-ownership of property (in the 
narrow sense) is possible, but such owners only own undivided shares in the property, and their 
powers of use and disposal are limited by the rights of the other co-owner(s) - cf Kleyn and Boraine 
31 Off; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 35; Van der Merwe 378. 
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of trade secrets, at least not directly.87 
87 The mandament van spolie and the rei vindicatio may in certain instances be suitable for indirect 
protection of trade secrets. The mandament van spolie is a remedy aimed at restoring unlawfully 
deprived possession to a possessor, in order to prevent people from taking the law into their own 
hands. It offers speedy, interim relief. The court does not evaluate the merits of the dispute between 
the parties - in this respect the mandament differs from the interdict where the applicant must prove 
that he has a clear right which is infringed or threatened with infringement. The applicant must prove 
that he was in possession and that an act of spoliation was committed by the respondent. Possession 
is physical control with the animus to control the thing for own benefit. Spoliation is the unlawful 
deprivation of possession. Unlawfulness here does not denote the infringement of a right or the breach 
of a legal duty, as the determination thereof by the court would involve an evaluation on the merits. 
Unlawfulness for the purposes of the mandament simply means that possession has been deprived 
against the possessor's will and without recourse to the legal process (cf Kleyn 331; Kleyn 1986 De 
Jure 1 Off; Kleyn and Boraine 130; De Waal 1984 THRHR 115; Sonnekus 1985 TSAR 33311; Van der 
Merwe 125; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 197-198. Cf Van der Walt 1983 THRHR 238-239, 1984 
THRHR 435, 1988 THRHR 288-292 who maintains that the purpose of the mandament is not to protect 
possession but to protect the public order against breaches of the peace; this view is adopted by 
Pienaar 150 152 to promote his view that the mandament may be used to protect confidential 
information. Van der Walt's view does not appear to have met with general approval (cf Kleyn and 
Boraine 130 fn 34), and in 1989 THRHR 44411 Van der Walt himself promotes the notion that the 
mandament is aimed at the restoration of physical control over (corporeal) things. Cf further Harker 
1988 SALJ 198 who argues that in some cases the mandament is used not as a possessory remedy 
in private law, but is adapted for use in public law as a means to control the conduct of public 
authority). 
Can the mandament be used - as suggested by Pienaar 150-153 - to restore the possession of a trade 
secret where the trade secret possessor has been deprived thereof? Although the mandament is 
normally used in cases where the possession of tangible things has been deprived, there is authority 
in South African law that it may also be used to restore the possession of intangible things. The 
physical control element of the possession of intangible things is satisfied when rights in connection 
with such intangibles are exercised (cf Kleyn 390ff; Kleyn and Boraine 137-138; Olivier, Pienaar and 
Van der Walt 186; Van der Merwe 122-123). However, Van der Walt 1989 THRHR 444ff argues 
persuasively that even in cases of deprivation of so-called quasi possession of incorporeals - which 
are in this context usually equated with rights - cf Kleyn 390ff; Kleyn and Boraine 137-138; Olivier, 
Pienaar and Van der Walt 186; Van der Merwe 122 - the mandament does not primarily restore the 
undisturbed exercise of a right, but rather the undisturbed control - albeit of a limited nature - over a 
physical thing. 
If, for instance, an industrial spy has stolen a computer program or piece of machinery in which a trade 
secret is embodied, but has not yet managed to unravel the secret by reverse engineering, the secret 
can effectively be protected by having possession of the stolen item restored to the original possessor 
by the mandament. The position may be the same where possession of a stolen document containing 
a trade secret is restored before the thief or other party can commit the secret to memory - perhaps 
because of its complicated nature - or copy the contents onto another substrate. The trade secret is 
indirectly protected in such cases. The possessor is deprived of possession of the physical thing - the 
disk containing the computer program, or the physical machinery itself, or the document - and it is 
possession of that physical thing that is restored by the mandament. In such a case, the secret itself -
the intangible information - has really not yet been acquired by the outsider, and timely institution of 
the mandament prevents such acquisition. 
However, if the infringer has already committed the trade secret to memory, or copied it onto his own 
materials, the trade secret owner's right to his secret cannot be protected by restoration of possession 
of the spoliated physical thing in which the secret was embodied. The misappropriated information 
cannot be "taken from" the infringer's mind and "returned" to owner. What is needed is a court order 
prohibiting the infringer from using or disclosing that information - that is, an interdict. This is not the 
province of the mandament. Similar arguments militate against the direct protection of trade secrets 
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7.3.4 ENRICHMENT 
Situations could conceivably arise where someone is enriched by the use of a trade 
secret at the expense of the trade secret owner - who is in turn impoverished by that 
use - for no legally justifiable reason. An example could be where a trade secret 
owner discloses a trade secret to a minor (or other person with restricted contractual 
capacity) for certain limited purposes. If the minor then uses the secret in breach of 
the agreement, the trade secret owner would have no contractual remedy against him 
or her, and an action for undue enrichment appears apposite in principle. Another 
possibility may be gleaned from the American Matarese case:88 An inventor 
discloses his secret invention to someone else for the expressly stated purpose to 
interest the latter in buying the secret. If the negotiations fail and no contract is 
concluded, the inventor may have no contractual remedy against the other person if 
he proceeds to exploit the secret anyway. Again an action for undue enrichment 
springs to mind as a possible solution, as indeed employed in the Matarese decision. 
However, a couple of factors must be borne in mind here. Enrichment is a wide-
ranging foundation of liability in American law,89 whereas the trend in South African 
positive law is to limit enrichment to specific historical condictiones and a limited 
number of modern enrichment actions with rather narrow fields of application.90 
South African case law does not recognize a general enrichment action, 91 as is the 
case in for instance German law.92 Furthermore, it appears uncertain whether the 
South African courts will regard the use of information as sufficient ground for 
enrichment liability in the light of the trend-setting decision in Nortje v Pool N0.93 In 
by the rei vindicatio, which is the remedy with which an owner recovers his property if it is in the 
possession of another (Kleyn and Boraine 273ff; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 126ff; Van der 
Merwe 347ff). Again, indirect protection of trade secrets by the rei vindicatio is possible, if for instance 
a stolen machine or product is vindicated before the secret is unravelled by reverse engineering or a 
stolen document is vindicated before the secret contained therein is memorized or copied. 
88 Par 3.5.4 above. 
89 Cf De Vos 152. 
9
° Cf De Vos 153ff. 
91 Cf De Vos 311ff. 
92 De Vos 121ff; cf in general on enrichment in common law and civil law systems Zweigert and 
Kotz 575tt. 
93 1966 3 SA 96 (A). In that decision a prospector who had discovered valuable mineral deposits 
on another's land, was denied an enrichment action for his expenses in bringing this knowledge to 
light. What was required was a tangible/physical improvement of the land. The mineral deposits had 
always been there, and although their discovery might have increased the market or production value 
of the land, it could not be regarded as an improvement of the land for enrichment purposes. Cf, 
however, the minority judgments - especially that of Ogilvie Thompson AJ 103-105, and criticism by 
De Vos 322ff. 
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sharp contrast with the law of undue enrichment, the South African law of delict is a 
dynamic, adaptable branch of private law, based on wide general principles of 
liability.94 It is submitted that South African courts will far more readily attach 
delictual liability to the two scenarios sketched above,95 than to look at enrichment 
to come to the aid of the trade secret owner. Furthermore, the generic requirements 
of enrichment law that the one party must be enriched and the other impoverished96 
implies that if enrichment can found relief in trade secret cases, it can only do so 
where there has been substantial use of the secret. An interdict to prevent use -
generally the most valuable instrument of trade secret protection - will not be 
available on the ground of undue enrichment. On the whole, it appears rather unlikely 
that South African courts will base trade secret protection on undue enrichment rather 
than on deli ct. 97 
7.3.5 CONCLUSION 
The most logical and advantageous synthesis of trade secret protection bases from 
a South African perspective may be stated as follows: 
a) Contract and delict are equally valid, complimentary bases of trade 
secret protection. Contractual protection should not be stretched too 
far by employing legal fictions. In the absence of protective measures 
based on consensus, protection should primarily be based on delict. 
In so far as contractual and delictual protection may overlap, the 
situation must be regulated by the general principles concerning 
concurrence of claims - this could mean that the plaintiff may in 
certain circumstances have a choice of basing his action either on 
contract or on delict. 
b) An analogy between trade secrets and property provides useful 
insights into the nature of trade secrets. However, since the property 
concept can be understood in different ways, trade secrets are best 
classified as intellectual property. 
c) Undue enrichment is of doubtful value as a base of trade secret 
protection. 
94 Cf eg Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 4 11-13. 
95 The minor in the first scenario must be cu/pae capax if a delictual action is to be instituted 
against him - cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 114ff. 
96 Cf De Vos 329ff. 
97 Cf Joubert 1985 De Jure 40. 
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7.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET 
In the following paragraphs the case in favour of the recognition of a subjective right -
and more specifically an intellectual property right - to the trade secret will be argued. 
7.4.1 THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
The doctrine of subjective rights98 99 enjoys significant support among South 
African academics, 100 and has been given a nod of approval by the Transvaal 
Division of the Supreme Court. 101 The doctrine has been expounded in detail by 
98 The rights referred to in this doctrine are called subjective rights because they are the rights of 
legal subjects - as will be explained in the main text presently. This slightly cumbersome term 
originated in the need in Dutch and Afrikaans to distinguish between Jaw and right, both of which are 
known as recht or reg respectively in those languages. Thus law is known as reg in objektiewe sin in 
Afrikaans, and right as reg in subjektiewe sin; or, more concisely, objektiewe reg and subjektiewe reg 
respectively. Cf Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 212. The problem does not arise in English, and Boberg 
38 favours a simple term 'right' instead of 'subjective right' (cf Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 201ff who 
uses the term 'private-law rights'). For the purpose of this study it was decided to use 'subjective right' 
to distinguish the rights referred to here from eg constitutional rights, procedural rights, etc (Van der 
Vyver's 'private-law rights' would have served this purpose equally well, but in this regard it was felt 
that 'subjective rights' would fit more naturally into the tradition of the subjektiewe reg as it already 
exists in South African case law - eg Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 
4 SA 376 <n; cf Hawker v Life Offices Association of South Africa 1987 3 SA 777 (C) 781 - and 
especially South African legal literature). Thus subjective rights as used in the context of this study 
signify rights (a) in a private law context, and (b) with certain specific characteristics, as enumerated 
in the main text below. Furthermore, the term 'subjective right' was preferred because it was felt that 
a 'doctrine of rights' would be a rather blunt and meaningless appellation. Neethling, Potgieter and 
Visser, who give more prominence to the doctrine than most other authors on the law of delict, also 
use (43ff) the term 'subjective right'; and so, too, does Van der Walt 22. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 
79 fn 5. 
99 The doctrine of subjective rights has its origins in the legal world of continental Western Europe -
cf Du Plessis and Du Plessis 142. In the Anglo-American legal world, the concepts of rights and duties 
have been developed by especially the American jurist Hohfeld 1913 Yale LJ 16ff, 1917 Yale LJ 71 Off. 
His system has been said to be perhaps not quite as consistent nor as comprehensively systematic 
as the doctrine of subjective rights - Du Plessis and Du Plessis 145; cf Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 
206-208. Since the doctrine of subjective rights has received recognition of South African courts, and 
since the Hohfeldian system does not appear to open up important insights other than those opened 
up by the subjective rights doctrine (cf Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 208), it was deemed unnecessary 
to consider the Hohfeldian system in depth (cf, however, Van der Walt 1996 THRHR 407-408). 
100 Cf Joubert 1958 THRHR 12ff 98ff; Neethling Privaatheid 287ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
43ff; Van der Merwe Beskerming van vorderingsregte 138ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54ff; Van der 
Vyver in Strauss (ed) 201ff; Van der Walt 22; Van Heerden 154ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 79ff; 
Du Plessis and Du Plessis 123ff; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 412ff; Van der Vyver and Joubert 8ff; 
Hosten et al 277-288; Geldenhuys 84ff; Venter 99ff 154ff. 
101 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T); cf Scott 1985 
De Jure 139. 
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writers, 102 and it is not intended to repeat everything that has been written on the 
topic here, nor to break any new ground in this respect. However, for the sake of 
clarity a brief exposition of the basics of the doctrine - in its current, adapted form 103 
- will be given. It will then be shown how the doctrine of subjective rights can 
contribute to a better understanding of trade secrets and a more comprehensive and 
systematic protection thereof. 
The doctrine of subjective rights postulates that people, as legal subjects, are holders 
of subjective rights. 104 The holder of a subjective right has a right to something, 
which right is enforceable against other people.105 Thus a subjective right is typified 
as a dual relationship.106 On the one hand, the right is a relationship between the 
person who is holder of the right - a legal subject - and the entity that is the object 
of the right - a legal object.107 At the same time, the right is also a relationship 
between the holder of the right and other people - that is, other legal subjects. 108 
The first-mentioned relationship confers powers of enjoyment, use and disposal on 
the legal subject in respect of the legal object. 109 The content and limits of these 
102 Cf the authors mentioned in fn 100 above. 
103 The brief exposition of the doctrine of subjective rights offered here, focuses on the doctrine as 
developed and adapted by South African writers since Joubert. No attempt has been made to trace 
its history all the way back to its origins in the writings of continental legal philosophers like Dabin and 
Dooyeweerd. Cf in this regard Joubert 1958THRHR100ff; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 201ff; Witte 
1993 SALJ 543ff. The principles summarized here differ from the original expositions of the doctrine. 
Especially important for the concept of delictual wrongfulness has been the synthesis of the doctrine 
of subjective rights and the boni mores criterion - see Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 48; par 7.4.1.1 
below. Cf Van der Walt 1995 THRHR 413-415 who regards the boni mores and the doctrine of 
subjective rights as "not entirely mutually compatible". Viewed more positively, it is submitted that a 
sensible and useful synthesis between the two has been attained in the South African law of delict, 
admirably suited to achieve a balance between legal certainty on the one hand, and flexibility and 
justice in the individual case on the other (cf the views of Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 194 on the role 
of policy considerations, quoted in fn 78 above). 
104 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. 
105 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van Heerden and Neethling 
80. 
106 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 
211; Van der Walt 22; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. 
107 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 
211; Van der Walt 22; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 415ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. 
108 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 
211; Van der Walt 22; Van Heerden and Neethling 80; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 418ff. 
109 Joubert 1958 THRHR 110-111; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 43-44; Van der Vyver in Strauss 
(ed) 211; Van der Walt 22; Van Heerden and Neethling 80; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 415ff. 
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powers are determined by the norms of the law.110 The second relationship implies 
that the holder of a right may enforce his or her powers over the legal object against 
other legal subjects. 111 A correlative duty rests on other legal subjects not to 
interfere with the relationship between the holder of the right and the object of his or 
her right. 112 Again, the content and limits of the holder's powers of enforcement, as 
well as the content and limits of the correlative duty of other legal subjects, are 
determined by the norms of the law. 
Subjective rights are classified according to the legal objects to which they pertain. 
On this basis, subjective rights were traditionally divided into four categories: (a) real 
rights, pertaining to (tangible) things; (b) personality rights, pertaining to aspects of 
personality such as good name, physical integrity, honour, and privacy; (c) personal 
rights, pertaining to performances which may be juridically claimed from another on 
the strength of a legal obligation ex contractu, ex delicto, or from other sources; and 
(d) intellectual (immaterial) 113 property rights, pertaining to intangible products of the 
human mind and endeavour which are situated outside the personality of the creator 
thereof, for instance an invention or a work of art.114 More recently a fifth category 
has been proposed, 115 namely personal immaterial property rights, pertaining to 
intangible products of the human mind and endeavour which are connected with the 
personality, such as earning capacity and creditworthiness. 
A subjective right comes into existence when the law recognizes and sanctions an 
individual interest as worthy of legal protection.116 Some interests, for instance the 
interests of legal subjects in the tangible things they own, have been thus 
110 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 44; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 420. 
111 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 44; cf Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 418. 
112 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 44; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 
211; Van der Walt 22; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. 
113 A substantial number of South African authors use the term immaterial property, probably under 
the influence of the Afrikaans immaterieelgoedere, and terminology employed in legal systems of 
continental Europe. Since the term intellectual property is generally used in the legal systems of 
English-speaking countries, it is preferred here. A distinction is sometimes made between intellectual 
property and industrial property. No such distinction is adopted for the purposes of this study -
intellectual property is used here as a wider generic term inclusive of industrial property. 
114 Joubert 113; Van der Merwe and Olivier 55; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 231-232; Van Zyl 
and Van der Vyver 421 ff. 
115 Neethling 1987 THRHR 316; Neethling and Le Roux 1987 Industrial LJ 719; Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser 45; cf Du Plessis and Du Plessis 130-131 136; Van der Vyver in Strauss (ed) 232-233; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 80. 
116 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 46; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. 
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transformed into rights almost since time immemorial. Other interests have only more 
recently been recognized, and in principle new ones may be identified as changing 
sociological and economical realities may dictate. To name an example, the right to 
privacy has only been recognized as an independent subjective right in relatively 
recent times. 117 The transformation of privacy from an individual interest to the 
object of a subjective right has undoubtedly been precipitated by new and far-
reaching threats to privacy posed by rapid technological developments, 118 thus 
necessitating the intervention of the law. Thus new threats to an old interest may 
prove to be a catalyst for the recognition and protection of that interest and the 
concomitant transformation thereof into a subjective right. However, to qualify for such 
legal protection an interest must exhibit two qualities. Firstly, it must be of value. 119 
In the second place it must have a sufficient measure of independence to be capable 
of use, enjoyment and disposal (if possible).120 It must, therefore, be susceptible of 
human control.121 
A fundamental premise of the doctrine of subjective rights is that the infringement of 
such a right constitutes delictual wrongfulness.122 This is also the primary practical 
value of the doctrine - to determine whether an act harming another may be branded 
as wrongful or not. It has been shown 123 that a dual investigation is necessary to 
determine whether a subjective right has been infringed or not. First, it must be 
determined whether the conduct complained of factually disturbed the relationship 
117 Neethling Privaatheid 19 22 117 152ff 241 373ff. 
118 Neethling Privaatheid 3ff 275. 
119 Some writers - eg Joubert 1958 THRHR 112 - require economic value, but this view is criticized 
(cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 46 fn 75) mainly because some legal objects - notably personality 
objects - are said not to have economic value. However, no-one can contest that they are very highly 
valued by legal subjects - frequently much more so than other legal objects with undisputed economic 
value. The primary value of personality interests may perhaps best be described as sentimental in 
nature - cf Du Plessis and Du Plessis 130. The value requirement should therefore not be formulated 
exclusively in terms of economic value. Cf Geldenhuys 90; Van Heerden and Neethling 80 fn 11. 
120 Du Plessis and Du Plessis 130; Neethling Personality 14; Van Heerden and Neethling 80. (The 
objects of personality rights cannot be disposed of in so far as they cannot be transferred, or pass by 
way of succession - Neethling Personality 15. Van Niekerk 1990 TRW 28 has argued that there is no 
subject-object relationship between a legal subject and his interests of personality, and personality 
rights are therefore not subjective rights.) 
121 Cf Geldenhuys 90-93. 
122 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 387; Joubert 
112; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 47; Van der Walt 22; Van der Merwe and Olivier 50; Van Heerden 
and Neethling 81; cf Burchell 28 who postulates that "unlawfulness (or wrongfulness) involves the 
infringement of a legally-protected right or interest". 
123 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 47ff. 
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between the legal subject and the legal object, that is, whether the holder of a 
subjective right was disturbed in the use, enjoyment and disposal of the object of his 
or her right. 124 If so, this may be an indication that the conduct was wrongful. 
However, this indication is not necessarily conclusive, since the law condones certain 
factual interferences in the relationship between the legal subject and his or her legal 
object. It must therefore also be enquired125 whether the mentioned factual 
disturbance took place in a legally reprehensible way, that is, in violation of a legal 
norm.126 The relationship between the doctrine of subjective rights and legal norms 
is examined in the following paragraph. 
7.4.1.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
AND LEGAL NORMS 
The concept of wrongfulness essentially refers to a juridical value judgment127 over 
certain conduct in the light of the harmful results or potential harmful results thereof. 
In the law of delict, wrongfulness is usually determined with reference to a harmful 
result. In the case of the actio legis Aquiliae (and the other two principal delictual 
actions - the action for pain and suffering and the actio iniuriarum) the focus falls on 
a harmful result already caused. In the case of the interdict, the harmful result may 
not have materialized - it might only be imminently threatening. Because of this 
intimate link between a harmful consequence (actual or potential) and delictual 
wrongfulness, the perception that the infringement of an interest is the essence of 
wrongfulness can easily arise. However, it is submitted that this is incorrect. It is true 
that wrongfulness is inconceivable without at least a potential infringement of an 
interest, but interests may be infringed without wrongfulness being present, for 
instance where someone harms another in private defence or with the latter's 
consent. 128 Therefore, the essence of wrongfulness is not the infringement of an 
124 It is submitted that this first step does not deal directly with the delictual element of wrongfulness 
yet - rather, it concerns the elements established on the facts of the case, viz an act, damage, and 
factual causation (see par 8.2 on delictual elements). Thus, the relationship between a legal subject 
and the object of his right is factually disturbed if there is (a) an act which (b) factually causes (c) 
damage. However, establishing this on the facts, is an essential preliminary step in the enquiry into 
wrongfulness. See par 7.4.1.1 below. 
125 And this second step, it is submitted, is the essence of the enquiry into wrongfulness - see par 
7.4.1.1 below. 
126 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 48; Van Heerden and Neethling 81. 
127 Van der Merwe and Olivier 56-57; Van Aswegan 139; Visser 1991 THRHR 782. 
128 Cf eg Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 39. 
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interest, 129 but rather the condemnation by the law of conduct infringing an interest 
in the light of all the circumstances. 130 
If the law is seen as a system of norms, 131 wrongfulness is fundamentally a 
violation of a norm; in a delictual context, specifically a violation of a norm of the law 
of delict.132 133 The approval and condemnation of the law finds expression in 
legal rules, that is, norms. The basic criterion used to determine the legal 
permissibility or otherwise of conduct, is the boni mores, the so-called legal 
convictions of the community. 134 135 The boni mores is a criterion of objective 
129 That an interest has been infringed, is the essence of another delictual element, namely 
damage. Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 198: "Damage is the diminution, as a result of a damage-
causing event, in the utility or quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the legally 
recognized needs of the person involved." Two other elements are also relevant here, namely the act 
(cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 21 ff; par 8.2.1 below) and factual causation (cf Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser 160ff; par 8.2.4 below). Legal causation (cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 169ff; par 8.2.4 
below) is not yet relevant here, since it, like wrongfulness, is not established purely on the facts, but 
involves a juridical value judgment. Cf fn 124 above, fn 130 below. Cf further Visser and Potgieter 33: 
"In determining wrongfulness the real question is whether the infringement of interests is in violation 
of a legal norm. When damage is assessed, the law is concerned with the diminution in utility or quality 
of interests. It must be obvious that the violation of a legal norm (illegality) cannot be a prerequisite 
for any diminution, because the former is based on a legal evaluation whereas the latter is a 
quantitative phenomenon"; Visser 1991 THRHR 782-783 (emphasis added): "In die privaatreg word 
onregmatigheid (regskrenking) gesien as die feitelike aantasting van 'n individuele belang [cf, however, 
fn 124 above], op 'n regtens ongeoorloofde wyse... Onregmatigheid word ge"identifiseer deur 'n 
ondersoek na die versteuring van die betrokke belang as gevolg van 'n menslike handeling in die fig 
van die relevante regsnorm wat enige onredelike versteuring verbied. Onregmatigheid is 'n abstrakte 
waardeoordee/ wat niks kan veroorsaak nie maar wel 'n vereiste vir skuld is ... Skade is die atname 
in die nuttigheid van 'n getroffe vermoens- of persoon/ikheidsbelang by die bevrediging van die 
betrokke persoon se regserkende behoeftes ... Ska de word vasgestel deur die nuttigheid van iemand 
se vermoens- of persoonlikheidsbelange (na gelang die geval) voor en na 'n beweerde skadestigtende 
feit met mekaar te vergelyk." 
130 The conduct complained of and its harmful result (if it has already materialized) or the probability 
of the occurrence of the harmful result (if a prohibitory interdict is applied for) are established on the 
facts. Wrongfulness, on the other hand, is not established purely on the facts, but involves a juridical 
value judgment over the (factually established) conduct in the light of the (factually established) harm 
caused thereby or potentially caused thereby. See Van der Merwe and Olivier 56-57. 
131 Cf Hosten et al 3ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 2. 
132 Cf Scott 1985 De Jure 134. 
133 Incidentally, the view that wrongfulness - or unlawfulness - is constituted by the violation of legal 
norms, also holds good for criminal law - cf Snyman 91. 
134 Cf in general Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 31ff 48; Boberg 33ff; Burchell 24ff; Van der Merwe 
and Olivier 58ff; Van der Walt 22-23. 
135 What the content of the boni mores is in a given instance, is not determined by the public at 
large, but rather by the legal policy makers of the community, like the courts and the legislature. Cf 
Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; Burchell 28; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 36-37; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 58 f n 99. 
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reasonableness. 136 Conduct conforming with the bani mores is reasonable in the 
eyes of the law, and thus lawful. Conduct conflicting with the bani mores is 
unreasonable in the eyes of the law, and thus wrongful. This is a very vague criterion, 
which is advantageous in the sense that it is flexible and adaptable to novel 
situations. Under the banner of the bani mores, the courts have the opportunity to 
invoke considerations of legal policy to find solutions to new legal problems or to 
improve existing legal rules that have proved unsatisfactory in the past. Thus the law 
can adapt to changing social and economic conditions. The bani mores has 
undoubtedly contributed to making the South African law of delict the dynamic and 
adaptable branch of the law that it is.137 
On the other hand, the vagueness of the bani mores can be a disadvantage in so far 
as it may cause uncertainty. Thus in many instances, more specific norms have 
crystallized as more concrete applications of the bani mores, making direct reference 
to the bani mores unnecessary, except in very involved or border-line cases. 138 
This, it is submitted, is the true niche of the application of the doctrine of subjective 
rights to establish wrongfulness today - it is a practical application of the bani mores 
criterion of wrongfulness. 139 
The relationship between the bani mores and the doctrine of subjective rights, may 
be typified as one of Grundnorm and derivative norm. The Grundnorm of delictual 
wrongfulness is that conduct causing harm may not conflict with the bani mores - if 
it does, it is wrongful. From this basic norm flows the derivative norm that conduct 
infringing a subjective right is (in conflict with the bani mores and therefore) 
wrongful. 140 Again it must be emphasized that the interference with the object of a 
subjective right is only an indication that conduct violates a legal norm and is 
therefore wrongful, since grounds of justification may be present. The grounds of 
justification are simply other norms - also concrete expressions of the bani mores141 
136 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 31- 32; Boberg 33; Burchell 24; Van der Merwe and Olivier 
57-58. 
137 Cf eg Burchell 24; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40ff; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171ff; 
Neethling in Van Aswegen (ed) 5; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1976 
4 SA 376 (D 387. 
138 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 39ff 66-67; Van der Merwe and Olivier 58. 
139 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40. Cf Van der Walt 1995 THRHR 413-415 for a view that 
the doctrine of subjective rights and the boni mores are not entirely compatible, and the reaction in fn 
103 above. 
140 Another derivative norm flowing from the boni mores is that conduct in breach of a legal duty 
is wrongful - par 7.4.1.2 below. 
141 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 66; Van der Walt 41. 
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- indicating that conduct harming another is reasonable in certain circumstances. 
Conduct interfering with the object of a subjective right, but complying with the 
requirements of a ground of justification, is therefore not in violation of a legal norm 
and thus lawful. 
7.4.1.2 CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS AND A 
JUSTIFICATION OF ITS USE IN THIS STUDY 
The doctrine of subjective rights has received its share of criticism. Such criticism has 
been based on moral as well as utility grounds. To cite an example of an objection 
against the doctrine on moral grounds, it has been said142 that the doctrine is 
founded on a social philosophy of "arrogant subjectivism and individualism", which 
is the "origin of the selfishness, the social corruption and the moral bankruptcy that 
characterize twentieth century western society in general and contemporary South 
African society in particular". Thus a "fundamental paradigm shift" is advocated143 
towards a "contextually sensitive, socially responsible and morally defensible 
system" .144 
Not everyone will be convinced by this type of argument. The doctrine of subjective 
rights has after all been used by academics and the courts to develop legal rules 
regarded by many as instruments to serve justice.145 If a legal system contains 
unjust legal rules they should be identified and rooted out, and with the institution 146 
of a constitutional court in South Africa an instrument to facilitate such a process has 
been created. It is, however, unnecessary - and probably unrealistic - to blame the 
existence of unjust rules in the South African legal system on the doctrine of 
subjective rights, when such rules have in all probability been made by a 
legislature 147 that gave no thought whatsoever to that doctrine, or if such rules 
perhaps emanate from a common law source older than the doctrine itself. 
142 Van der Walt 1993 SAPR!PL 313. 
143 Van der Walt 1993 SAPR!PL 313. 
144 Cf Van der Walt 1993 SAPR/PL 316. 
145 Eg the work on the theoretical foundations of the legal protection of personality interests by 
Joubert Grondslae; of the legal principles applicable to unlawful competition by Van Heerden; and of 
the protection of privacy by Neethling (cf fn 100 above) - to mention just three examples based 
squarely on the doctrine of subjective rights. 
146 Secs 98-100 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
147 Many of the South African legal rules criticized as unjust are statutory in origin - cf eg Dugard 
1971 SALJ 181 ff; Kahn 1989 SALJ 602ff especially 606-611; Forsyth 1988 SALJ 679ff; Mahomed 1985 
Lesotho LJ 360; Neethling in Van Aswegan (ed) 3. 
208 
More convincing are arguments attacking the utility of the doctrine of subjective rights. 
The most important148 of these - for the present purpose - relates to the inability of 
the doctrine to explain all instances of delictual wrongfulness. In South African 
positive law wrongfulness is determined in some cases with reference to the breach 
of a legal duty, rather than the infringement of a subjective right. 149 This fact could 
justify two possible conclusions - either the doctrine of subjective rights cannot 
explain all instances of delictual wrongfulness; 150 or it can, but the relevant 
subjective rights at stake have not yet been identified in all cases. 151 Some 
148 Another point of criticism relates to possession and the mandament van spolie. Van der Walt 
1990 THRHR 316ff has argued that the doctrine cannot explain the legal protection of possession by 
the mandament van spolie (on the mandament in general, see fn 87 above). Even a thief can recover 
possession of a thing with the mandament. If the doctrine of subjective rights postulates a subjective 
right for every legal remedy, as contended by Van der Walt 1990 THRHR 325, one must conclude that 
since a remedy - the mandament - is available to protect possession, possession must be a subjective 
right. The absurd result will be that the thief has a subjective right to the stolen thing in his or her 
possession. The alternative is to accept that although the mandament is available to the possessor, 
he or she does not have a subjective right. This will mean that the doctrine of subjective rights fails 
to explain the legal protection of possession by the mandament. In the light of the importance of 
possession in the law of property, this failure of the doctrine of subjective rights - so runs the argument 
- exposes a fundamental shortcoming of the doctrine, and indicates a need for (at least) its serious 
revision. 
However, it must be borne in mind that the mandament is an interim remedy, and the court does not 
evaluate the merits of the dispute between the parties when considering an application for a spoliation 
order (cf fn 87 above). The granting or refusal of the mandament cannot be based on an investigation 
of the subjective rights of the parties, because that would require of the court a decision on the merits. 
By issuing a spoliation order, the court restores what is arguably the most primitive - and most basic -
relationship of which the law takes cognizance - physical control. It does so without making any judicial 
value judgment over that physical control. The only value judgment made at this stage pertains to the 
act by which the physical control was terminated - if it took place against the will of the possessor and 
without recourse to the legal process, it qualifies as spoliation and the mandament may be granted. 
The subsequent suit on the merits is the setting for a judicial value judgment over the physical 
possession of the thing. This is the stage where the doctrine of subjective rights is of help. Thus if the 
owner proves his or her (subjective) right of ownership to the thing, and it transpires that the successful 
applicant for the spoliation order has no subjective right to the thing, it will be restored to the owner 
(cf again fn 87 above; Kleyn and Boraine 130-132; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 183). It is 
accordingly submitted that if the interim character of the mandament is kept in mind, one cannot 
realistically expect the doctrine of subjective rights to explain it. A conclusion that the doctrine is 
fundamentally flawed is therefore not justified by its inability to explain the protection of possession by 
the mandament. What the argument does demonstrate, is that a facet of private law cannot be 
explained satisfactorily by reference solely to the doctrine of subjective rights. The doctrine does have 
its limitations, but it is not necessarily fatally flawed. 
149 Cf Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1976 4 SA 376 (T) 387; Van 
der Walt 21; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40; Boberg 30-34. 
15
° Cf Van Aswegen 144-147. 
151 The question is therefore whether there is a corresponding right - even if as of yet still 
unidentified - for every legal duty recognized by the law. An affirmative answer is an attractive 
proposition - cf Joubert 1958 THRHR 112 - but it remains to be seen whether all the missing rights 
which must then be found to match the legal duties already recognized in our positive law, will still be 
identified. One of the instances where wrongfulness is based on breach of a legal duty, and where the 
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commentators 152 - and the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme court153 -
appear to be comfortable with a dualistic system whereby the infringement of a right 
and breach of a legal duty are equally valid, independent criteria for the establishment 
of wrongfulness. Others are uneasy with the notion of wrongfulness in the absence 
of an infringed right, or reject such a proposition outright. 154 Yet others question the 
validity of the subjective rights doctrine, and would elevate breach of a legal duty to 
the only criterion for wrongfulness. 155 
If - as argued above156 - the principle that infringement of a subjective right is a 
practical application of the bani mores, the principle that conduct breaching a legal 
duty is wrongful is simply another concrete application of the bani mores.157 
Therefore both the infringement of a subjective right and breach of a legal duty are 
violations of the delictual Grundnorm - the bani mores - and constitute wrongfulness. 
The fact that all instances of delictual wrongfulness cannot at present satisfactorily 
be explained in sole reliance on the doctrine of subjective rights, does not, it is 
submitted, invalidate legal research based on the premise that the doctrine is 
essentially sound and useful. The doctrine - like any other creation of the human 
mind - is not without its limitations. It is after all only a model of thought used to 
explain certain legal phenomena. It cannot be expected to explain all legal 
phenomena. However, it has proved useful to South African legal science in the past. 
And as a yardstick for the determination of delictual wrongfulness it has been 
subjective right at stake could in the past not be identified, is the case of negligent misrepresentation -
cf Pauw 1978 THRHR 56-58; Scott 1985 De Jure 134. Neethling 1990 THRHR 104-105 has proposed 
the right to receive the correct information, which has as its object a performance of another - viz to 
furnish the correct information - and which may therefore be classed as a personal right (par 7.4.1 
above), as the subjective right infringed by a wrongful act of misrepresentation. 
152 Cf Pretorius 229ff who contends (235) that it would be unrealistic to expect only one criterion 
of wrongfulness to accommodate all arising cases; cf Van der Walt 21; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
40; Boberg 30-34; Van Aswegen 140ff; De Jager 1978 THRHR 354-558; Pauw 1980 De Jure 265ff. 
153 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1976 4 SA 376 CD 387. 
154 Cf eg Joubert 1958 THRHR 112. 
155 Cf Du Plessis 1985 TRW 96ff. In some older works on the law of delict the element of 
wrongfulness was approached from the angle of the 'duty of care' of English law, with no consideration 
of the infringement of rights as basis thereof - cf eg the definition of a delict given by McKerron 5: "The 
breach of a duty imposed by law, independently of the will of the party bound, which will ground an 
action for damages at the suit of any person to whom the duty was owed and who has suffered harm 
in consequence of the breach." However, in the light of all the recent literature on subjective rights and 
the recognition thereof in the Tommie Meyer case (fn 153 above), an author writing on delictual 
wrongfulness today cannot simply ignore the doctrine of subjective rights. 
156 Par 7.4.1.1 above. 
157 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40. 
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accepted by the South African courts. It can therefore not be dismissed as simply a 
theory of a few idle academics. Incidentally, the very fact that the positive law and 
commentators recognize shortcomings of the doctrine, can be taken as a sign that 
it has come of age. It may once have been meant as a closed system explaining the 
entire private law reality on an infallible, rational basis, 158 but this is certainly not the 
case any more. Today, the doctrine may be seen as one of the tools - albeit an 
invaluable one - at the disposal of the legal scientist and practitioner. This is perhaps 
even more graphically illustrated by the synthesis of the logic-based doctrine of 
subjective rights and the policy-based boni mores concept in the modern law of delict, 
to produce a criterion for wrongfulness that promotes legal certainty without sacrificing 
flexibility and adaptability.159 
It is submitted that if a study is undertaken of an emergent branch of the law of delict, 
the identification - where possible - of the legal objects and concomitant subjective 
rights protected by such a branch of the law, will instill in the study a clarity of thought 
and an orderliness of development that can hardly be attained in any other way. To 
ignore the legal object and its peculiar characteristics, and the right thereto and its 
characteristics, could conceivably result in aimless ad hoc development of the law, 
resulting in an incoherent body of loose norms.160 
7.4.2 THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET 
In the light of the foregoing, a case can be made out for the recognition of a 
subjective right to the trade secret. 161 It is clear that in the factual reality many 
entrepreneurs and business concerns have very real individual interests in their trade 
secrets. This situation is probably as old as trade and commercial endeavours 
themselves. However, the technological advances of modern times pose new and 
more far-reaching threats to trade secrets, and highlight the need for legal recognition 
and protection. 162 This raises the question whether a trade secret possesses the 
qualities necessary to qualify as the object of a subjective right. The question can be 
158 Cf Van der Walt 1995 THRHR 403ff. 
159 Cf fn 103; par 7.4.1.1 above. 
16° Cf Joubert Grondslae 117; Neethling Privaatheid 280; Personality 28; Van Heerden and 
Neethling 81-82. 
161 A subjective right to the trade secret has already been propagated by others - cf Van Heerden 
and Neethling 1st ed (1983) 132-133; Du Plessis 1985 MB 68-69; Du Plessis in Neethling (ed) 91-92. 
The present contribution is aimed at the development of this theme in more depth. 
162 Cf par 1.1 above. 
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answered in the affirmative. First, as has transpired clearly from the comparative legal 
research expounded above, a trade secret has economic value. 163 It may be said 
to possess the requisite quality of scarceness. Indeed, the very significance of a trade 
secret for both its owner and his or her competitors stems from the fact that it is not 
accessible to many.164 In the second place, a trade secret exhibits the requisite 
qualities of independence, distinctness and definiteness to be capable of enjoyment, 
use and disposal. It has been shown that a trade secret consists of information that 
may lead an existence separate from both the mind of the person where it originated 
and the tangible object in which it may have been objectified. 165 There can also be 
no doubt that a trade secret is capable of use, enjoyment and disposal by its owner. 
One may conclude that a trade secret is eminently suitable to serve as the object of 
a subjective right. 
Mention must be made again of the objection of notably German writers that trade 
secrets cannot qualify as objects of subjective rights or property-like rights because 
the first owner of a trade secret has no legal recourse against a so-called double 
inventor who gains access to the same secret in a legally permissible manner by way 
of independent discovery or research. 166 This argument should not carry much 
weight in South African law. The powers sprouting from any subjective right are 
always limited by the norms of the law, and the peculiar limitations to the powers of 
a trade secret owner should simply be regarded as inherent in the unique nature of 
trade secrets as legal objects, without posing a fundamental hurdle in the way of their 
recognition as objects of subjective rights. Furthermore, it may be noted that a similar 
situation is known in copyright law, where it is possible for two persons - working 
independently from each other - to come to the same result, and for each of them to 
acquire copyright in his or her own work - even though it is the same as the work of 
the other.167 
7.4.3 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET AS AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHT 
More specifically, if a subjective right to the trade secret is recognized, it can be 
163 Par 7.2.5 above. 
164 Par 7.2.3 above. 
165 Par 7.2.1; 7.2.6 above. 
166 Par 4.5.5.1 above. 
167 Copeling 24 and authorities cited. 
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classified as an intellectual property right. 168 It has been noted169 that a trade 
secret is an intangible product of the human mind and endeavour which can be 
expressed in an outwardly perceptible form. It complies with the accepted concept of 
intellectual property, which may be defined as the intangible products of human skills, 
or inventions of the human mind, situated outside the personality of the author and 
which are protected by the legal order. 17° Classical examples of intellectual property 
are patents, copyrighted artworks or literary works, and trademarks. 171 The legal 
protection of most of these legal objects is a relatively recent phenomenon. 172 Most 
of the recognized intellectual property rights are protected by statute.173 This does 
not mean that new intellectual property rights may not be identified, nor that they 
need to be creatures of statute.174 There seems to be no reason militating against 
the recognition of the right to the trade secret as a (non-statutory) intellectual property 
right. 175 Trade secrets law is, in fact, frequently discussed in treatises on intellectual 
168 On intellectual property rights in general, see Van Heerden and Neethling 93ff. 
169 Par 7.2 above. 
17° Cf Domanski 1993 SA Mere LJ 128: "The legal object of an immaterial-property right... is an 
intangible, incorporeal product of the human mind. This product exists outside and independently of 
its creator, and has an economic value"; Du Plessis and Du Plessis 130: "lmmateriele goedere is nie-
tasbare geestesprodukte van die mens, dit wil se 'produkte' van menslike vindingrykheid" 134; Du 
Plessis in Neethling (ed) 89-90: "Die immaterieelgoedereregte verskil van die ander subjektiewe regte 
op grond daarvan dat die regsobjek by 'n immaterieelgoederereg 'n ontasbare onliggaamlike produk 
van die mens se geestesarbeid is wat buite die mens en onafhanklik van horn bestaan, en wat 
vermoenswaarde het"; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 45: "intangible products of the human mind, 
intellect and activity which are expressed in one or other outwardly perceptible form"; Van der Merwe 
and Olivier 55: "onstoflike goedere buite die mens gelee"; Van der Vyver 231: "the intangible 
expressions of human skills, or inventions of the human mind, embodied in a tangible agent and which 
are by law allotted to their author"; Van Zyl and Van der Vyver 408: "'n lmmateriele goed is 'n 
onstoflike menslike geestesproduk wat 'n regsubjek regtens teenoor ander subjekte toekom"; cf 424. 
171 Cf Chisum and Jacobs 1.3ff; Dratler 1.6ff; Kintner and Lahr v. 
172 Van der Vyver 236; Dratler 1. 7ff. 
173 South African examples are the Patents Act 57 of 1978; the Copyright Act 98 of 1978; the Trade 
Marks Act 194 of 1993; the Designs Act 195 of 1993; and the Plant Breeders' Rights Act 15 of 1976. 
174 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 99; Du Plessis in Neethling (ed) 91-92; Mostert 343-346. 
175 Cf, however, Joubert 1985 De Jure 34 and the reaction in par 7.4.4.6 below. Note, too, that 
some authors require intellectual property to be "embodied in a tangible agent" (cf Van Heerden and 
Neethling 95: ''[Tihe idea only becomes a real creation when it is in some way or the other expressed 
in a tangible agent so that it becomes externally perceptible"; further the definitions by Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser 45 and Van der Vyver 231 quoted in fn 170 above); whereas it was argued above 
(par 7.2.6) that a trade secret need not be embodied in a tangible agent, it must only be capable of 
such embodiment. Certainly embodiment in a tangible form is a prerequisite for the protection of the 
majority of the recognized forms of intellectual property. However, it is submitted that it need not 
invariably be a prerequisite for the existence and protectability of intellectual property. Thus it may be 
argued that the goodwill of an undertaking - which is the object of a recognized intellectual property 
right (cf par 7.4.4.4.1 below) - is not necessarily always embodied in a tangible agent (cf Van Heerden 
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property law.176 
7.4.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET DISTINGUISHED FROM SIMILAR 
RIGHTS 
7.4.4.1 PATENT RIGHTS 
Patent rights 177 are intellectual property rights similar in many respects to trade 
secret rights. Both types of rights pertain to intangible products of the human mind 
and endeavour situated outside the human personality. Furthermore, patent rights 
always relate and trade secret rights frequently relate to inventions with industrial, 
commercial or agricultural applicability. 178 Inventions which are secret and 
furthermore meet all the requirements of patentability179 may therefore qualify for 
protection either as trade secrets or as patents. Nevertheless, trade secret and patent 
rights can in general not simultaneously exist in the same subject matter for any 
significant period of time. A patent can only be obtained by filing an application 180 
accompanied by, or later supplemented by, a complete specification - describing the 
invention in detail and also disclosing the best method of performing the invention 
known to the applicant.181 This full disclosure will become open to public inspection 
after a prescribed period, usually upon publication of acceptance of the application 
in the patent journal. 182 Thus as a rule the existence of a patent goes hand-in-hand 
and Neethling 98). Programme-carrying signals, which may be the object of copyright (sec 2(g) Act 98 
of 1978) are arguably also not embodied in a tangible agent. The true general requirement is not, it 
is submitted, that intellectual property must invariably be embodied in a tangible agent, but simply that 
it must be capable of leading an existence independent of the personality of the creator thereof - cf 
Joubert Grondslae 21; Bainbridge 19-20; Dratler 1.3. Trade secrets meet this requirement - they can 
be shared with others, can be sold, can devolve by succession, etc. They need not, however, be 
embodied in a tangible agent - they may be transferred to other persons by the spoken word. 
176 Eg Bainbridge 219ff; Chisum and Jacobs 3.1 ff; Cornish 215ff; Dratler 4.1ff; Kintner and Lahr 
129ff. 
177 On South African patent law, see the Patents Act 57 of 1978; Burrell; cf Geldenhuys 100-102. 
178 Cf Burrell 12ff. 
179 Cf sec 25 Act 57 of 1978; Burrell 12ff. 
18
° Cf Burrell 35ff. 
181 Cf sec 32 Act 57 of 1978; Burrell 47ff; Du Plessis 1985 MB 62. 
182 Sec 43 Act 57 of 1978; Burrell 94ff; Du Plessis 1985 MB 62 fn 13. 
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with its publication to the world, 183 whereas the existence of a trade secret is 
dependent on the continued secrecy of the relevant information.184 
A further difference between patent and trade secret rights concerns the duration of 
legal protection. Patent protection lasts for a fixed period of time determined by 
statute, 185 after which it falls into the public domain. 186 Trade secret protection, 
on the other hand, lasts as long as the owner can successfully keep the information 
secret. The inventor whose invention meets the statutory requirements of patentability 
and is still secret, must therefore elect whether he or she desires patent or trade 
secret protection. He or she cannot have both.187 During its existence, patent 
protection is more absolute than trade secret protection in the sense that the patent 
owner can in principle enforce his or her rights against all infringers, and in principle 
no other legal subject can obtain rights to the same patent without his or her 
consent.188 In the case of a trade secret, on the other hand, a second inventor may, 
as noted, 189 through independent research or discovery gain access to the same 
trade secret, and the first trade secret owner has no power to exclude the second 
inventor from so doing or from subsequent use or disposal of the secret. 
It may be noted that two conflicting policy considerations appear to underlie the 
protection of both patents and trade secrets.190 On the one hand, it is considered 
beneficial to the economic and scientific advancement of the community that new 
technological and commercial developments fall into the public domain, enabling 
others to build thereupon. A monopoly on technology (like most monopolies) is in 
general regarded as detrimental to the general economic and scientific advancement 
of a community. On the other hand, it is seen as desirable that someone who has 
invested energy, time and money to produce a new invention, be rewarded for his or 
183 Cf Du Plessis 1985 MB 62. Provision is made for patents to be kept secret in certain exceptional 
cases; cf Burrell 123-125. 
184 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 489. 
185 20 years - sec 46 of Act 57 of 1978; cf Burrell 2-3; Neethling 1992 (1) Codicil/us 11. 
186 The idea is that, in return for absolute statutory protection for a specified time period, the 
inventor must then relinquish his invention into the public domain in order that others may also build 
thereupon. Cf Burrell 1. 
187 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 489. 
188 Cf Burrell 233ff 309ff. 
189 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1; 7.2.3 above. 
19° Cf Burrell 1; Chisum and Jacobs 1.2 1.6-1.8; Dratler 1.4-1.6 1. 76-1.80; in respect of copyright 
law Dean 1.1. 
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her efforts by enjoying the exclusive use and disposal thereof for at least a certain 
period of time. Such an award provides an incentive to inventors to go to all the 
trouble, with ultimate benefit, hopefully, to the general economic and scientific 
advancement of the community.191 The positions concerning the scope and duration 
of legal protection of patents and trade secrets respectively may be seen as an effort 
of the law to balance these conflicting interests. In the case of patents, this balance 
favours 'strong' protection for a limited period; in the case of trade secrets, the law 
affords 'weaker' protection for a potentially unlimited time. 192 In both cases, the 
inventor is rewarded for his or her efforts, without a situation being created where the 
invention can never lawfully fall into other hands.193 
7.4.4.2 COPYRIGHT 
Copyright is another intellectual property right created and protected by statute.194 
Unlike the position with patent rights, copyright and trade secret protection may in 
given situations overlap, that is, the same material may be the object of both 
copyright and trade secret rights. Certain "artistic works"195 like drawings and 
photographs, and certain "literary works"196 like letters, reports, memoranda, written 
tables and compilations may all, for instance, be the object of copyright, 197 and 
trade secrets may of course also be embodied in them. However, there are important 
differences between copyright and trade secret rights even where they pertain to the 
191 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 241. 
192 Cf Burrell 1; Chisum and Jacobs 3.6; Dratler 1.24 1.26 1.28 1. 76-1.80 4.3. 
193 Cf Mostert 1987 SALJ 48011 in respect of the following theories explaining the protection of 
intellectual property: (a) the natural law theory (480), which is "based on the fundamental principle that 
what an individual created by his own effort and labour, belongs to him. This principle rests on the 
conviction that a person is entitled to the fruits of his own intellectual effort and that equity demands 
that he is entitled to reap where he has sown"; (b) the reward theory (500) which "like the natural-law 
theory ... is premised on the idea that the individual should be rewarded for his labour and effort, but 
the reward theory specifically takes into account the benefit to society in general which flows from the 
individual's effort. The theory is predicated on the premise that an individual should be rewarded for 
his creative efforts from which society generally benefits. The reward takes the form of the granting 
of an exclusive intellectual property right to the creator in his intellectual creation"; and (c) the incentive 
theory (500), which "takes the emphasis on the interest of society one step further. The incentive 
theory rests on the conviction that if an individual's intellectual creation is protected by law, this will 
serve as an incentive for other creative individuals to produce intellectual works from which society will 
benefit." 
194 Cf Copeling 1. The current Act in South Africa is the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Cf further 
Geldenhuys 98-100. 
195 As defined in sec 1 Act 98 of 1978. 
196 As defined in sec 1 Act 98 of 1978. 
197 Sec 2 read with definitions of 'artistic works' and 'literary works' in sec 1. 
216 
same material. The most obvious difference relates to the ways in which these rights 
may be infringed. What constitutes copyright infringement depends to a degree on the 
relevant category of copyrightable work, but typically includes conduct such as the 
unauthorized reproduction or publication of the copyrighted work.198 Trade secret 
rights are infringed by unauthorized acquaintance, use or disclosure of the trade 
secrets. 199 Areas of overlap are apparent. Thus acquaintance with a trade secret 
can be made by copyright-infringing conduct such as the reproduction of a 
copyrighted document, or a trade secret can be disclosed by copyright-infringing 
conduct such as publication of a copyrighted work. But acquaintance can also be 
made with a trade secret by the mere reading and memorizing of the contents of a 
copyrighted document200 - actions which do not constitute infringements of 
copyright. A trade secret embodied in copyrightable matter can also be used in ways 
that constitute trade secret infringement, but do not constitute copyright infringement. 
Examples could be the use of a secret recipe, gleaned from a copyrighted document, 
to make a soft drink; or the implementation of secret marketing techniques, gleaned 
from a copyrighted document, in a business enterprise. 
Apart from the more obvious differences mentioned above, and other differences that 
may exist,201 fundamental differences pertain to the objects of copyright and trade 
secret rights respectively. The traditional view has been that copyright law protects 
form rather than ideas. According to this view, copyright law does not protect original 
ideas but rather the original expression of ideas. 202 More recently there has been 
recognition - also from the South African Appellate Division203 - that copyright 
protection does to a certain degree also extend to the protection of ideas.204 
However, a mere idea cannot constitute the object of copyright. An idea must first be 
expressed in some statutorily prescribed outwardly perceptible form205 - and the 
198 Sec 23 read with secs 6-11 B; cf Copeling 24ff who states (24) that it is a general principle of 
copyright law that there can be no (direct) infringement of copyright without actual copying. 
199 Par 6.3 above. 
200 And trade secret protection in American law, and according to the GA TT TR/Ps agreement, is 
wide enough to render such acquisition actionable - cf par 3.2.2; 5.1; 5.2; 6.3 above. 
201 Eg differences relating to defences available in the two respective fields. See Copeling 40ff for 
a discussion of defences peculiar to copyright law. 
202 Cf Copeling 25 and authorities cited; Joubert 1985 De Jure 35-36. 
203 Ga/ago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Erasmus 1989 1 SA 276 (A) 283-285. 
204 See Copeling 25; Dean 1.12; cf further Pistorius 1992 De Jure 166 169-175. 
205 With the possible exception of broadcasts and programme-carrying signals - which must, 
however, meet other statutory requirements to be eligible for copyright; cf sec 2(2A) Act 98 of 1978. 
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majority of "works" are required by the Copyright Act206 to be "reduced to material 
form" - before they may be eligible for copyright protection. The object of copyright 
may therefore be said to consist of two components, the idea and the form of 
expression.207 Trade secrets law, on the other hand, definitely protects ideas,208 
irrespective of the form in which they are expressed. As noted,209 trade secrets 
must be capable of embodiment in some concrete form, but it is not necessary that 
the secret be in fact so embodied. Even if a trade secret has never been reduced to 
some concrete form and has hitherto only existed in the mind of the inventor, it can 
be infringed by someone to whom he or she has orally confided it. It may be 
concluded that the object of copyright is in essence an idea expressed in one of a 
number of statutorily prescribed forms, 210 whereas the object of the right to the 
trade secret is in essence certain types of information irrespective of its form of 
expression. Seen in this light, it is perhaps more accurate to say that different 
aspects of the same material may be objects of copyright and trade secret rights 
respectively, rather than to say that the same material may be the object of both 
copyright and trade secret rights. 
The differences mentioned above distinguish copyright and trade secret rights in 
those cases where they pertain to the same material and where copyright and trade 
secret protection may overlap. Other differences between the objects of copyright and 
trade secret rights exclude such overlap in many cases. Thus trade secret protection 
does not, for instance, apply to copyrightable material that is not secret or not 
capable of industrial or commercial application.211 Similarly, copyright protection 
does not extend to trade secrets which are not embodied in materials that qualify as 
206 Sec 2(2). 
207 Cf Study guide for patent law and copyright law Unisa 1993 80; Cope ling 1965 THRHR 3ff. 
208 There is a close link between idea and information (par 7.2.1 above) in this regard. A trade 
secret originates as an idea. By the time an idea is concrete enough to be applied in trade or industry, 
it constitutes protectable information. Seen from the perspective of an outsider, a trade secret is 
something the acquisition of which will inform him of eg the method by which the trade secret owner 
manufactures a unique product or renders a unique service, the marketing strategy employed by him, 
etc. A trade secret may be said to consist of information based on an idea or ideas. Trade secrets law 
may therefore be said to protect ideas meeting certain requirements. 
209 Par 7.2.6 above. 
21° Contra Copeling 1965 THRHR 3ff who argues that copyright may exist in mere ideas as long 
as they have been expressed in an outwardly perceptible form. He proposes that the idea for a literary 
work can be the subject of copyright if it has only orally been communicated to another - and has 
therefore never been reduced to material form. The current position in South African positive law does 
not support Copeling's proposition - sec 2(2) Act 98 of 1978. 
211 Par 7.2.2; 7.2.3 above. 
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"works" eligible for copyright in terms of the Copyright Act.212 
Like patent rights, but unlike trade secret rights, the duration of copyright protection 
is coupled to a statutorily determined time limit.213 
7.4.4.3 RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Privacy is defined by Neethling214 as an individual condition of life in terms of which 
a certain measure of seclusion from others is maintained. This condition includes all 
the personal facts which an individual shields from acquaintance by outsiders, and 
in respect of which the individual has a will to prevent such acquaintance. This 
definition has been quoted with implicit approval by the South African Appellate 
Division.215 Privacy may be infringed by the unauthorized acquaintance with private 
facts or by the unauthorized disclosure thereof.216 There are interesting parallels 
between trade secrets and privacy as thus defined. First, both legal objects consist 
essentially of facts or information that are not generally known and which the relevant 
212 Sec 2, which reads as follows: 
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the following works, if they are original, shall be eligible for 
copyright -
(a) literary works; 
(b) musical works; 
(c) artistic works; 
(d) cinematograph films; 
(e) sound recordings; 
(f) broadcasts; 
(g) programme-carrying signals; 
(h) published editions; 
(i) computer programs. 
(2) A work, except a broadcast or programme-carrying signal, shall not be eligible for copyright unless 
the work has been written down, recorded or otherwise reduced to material form. 
(2A) A broadcast or a programme-carrying signal shall not be eligible for copyright until, in the case 
of a broadcast, it has been broadcast and, in the case of a programme-carrying signal, it has been 
transmitted by a satellite." 
Some of the terms used in sec 2 are defined in sec 1 . 
213 Sec 3(2) Act 98 of 1978. 
214 Privaatheid 287: "Privaatheid is 'n individuele lewenstoestand van afsondering van 
openbaarheid. Hierdie lewenstoestand omsluit al daardie persoonlike feite wat die belanghebbende 
self bestem om van kennismaking deur buitestaanders uitgesluit te wees en ten opsigte waarvan hy 
'n privaathoudingswil het." Cf Neethling Personality 34; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 333. 
215 National Media Ltd v Jooste (not yet reported - case no 335/94 (A)) 13-14. 
216 Neethling Personality 36 243ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 333-334; Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd 
v Sage Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 462. 
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legal subject does not desire to be generally known.217 Second, these legal objects 
face similar threats, in so far as they are prone to unauthorized access and/or 
disclosure.218 In the third place, the threats to both trade secrets and privacy 
assume greater proportions, and the need for legal protection is felt far more acutely, 
with the rapid technological developments of modern times.219 Indeed, in English 
law, as noted,220 trade secrets and aspects of privacy are protected by one action, 
the action for breach of confidence. 
From the perspective of the South African private law, there is - at least at first blush 
- a fundamental distinction between the two legal objects. A trade secret is 
information capable of application in commerce and industry, and is of real or 
potential economic value to its owner.221 The right to the trade secret, it follows, is 
a patrimonial right.222 Privacy, on the other hand, is an interest of personality, and 
the right to privacy is a personality right.223 In the structure of the South African law 
of delict, with its Romanistic foundations, trade secrets are therefore protected by the 
actio legis Aqui/iae224 - the delictual action with which patrimonial loss is recovered; 
and privacy by the actio iniuriarum225 - the delictual action applicable when a 
217 Cf in respect of privacy Neethling Personality 243ff; Neethling Privaatheid 287; Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser 333. In respect of trade secrets, see par 7.2 above. Cf further Geldenhuys 110-
111. 
218 Cf in respect of privacy Neethling Personality 243ff; Neethling Privaatheid 315ff; Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser 333ff. In respect of trade secrets, see 6.3 above. 
219 Cf par 1.1 above, and in respect of privacy McQuoid-Mason 5ff; Neethling Privaatheid 2ff. 
220 Par 2.1; 2.2.1.1.1 above. 
221 Par 7.2 above. 
222 Intellectual property rights, like real and personal rights, are classed as patrimonial rights. 
Personality rights are classed as non-patrimonial rights. Cf Du Plessis and Du Plessis 137; Van Zyl 
and Van der Vyver 429-430; Visser and Potgieter 47 85-86. 
223 Cf eg Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A) 849; Neethling Personality 33ff 240; 
Neethling Privaatheid 287ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 45; Van Heerden and Neethling 224 fn 5. 
224 See par 9.3.1 below. 
225 Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 4 SA 842 (A) 849. McQuoid-Mason 253ff (cf 134) suggests 
that the actio /egis Aqui/iae can also lie for (negligent) infringements of privacy, provided the plaintiff 
can prove patrimonial loss - for instance (the cost of medical treatment after the suffering of) emotional 
shock as a result of an invasion of privacy. However, this does not mean that the right to privacy is 
not a personality right. The type of situation envisaged by McQuoid-Mason is simply one where an 
infringement of a personality right also gives rise to patrimonial loss. A concurrence of the actio 
iniuriarum and the actio legis Aquiliae is a possibility in such a situation - cf Neethling, Potgieter and 
Visser 250-251; Van der Merwe and Olivier 464. 
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personality right has been intentionally infringed.226 
However, the distinction between trade secrets and privacy has been complicated by 
the recognition by the South African courts of the privacy of a business organisation 
(whereas it was previously thought that only natural persons could have a right to 
privacy).227 Some writers have also suggested that the true ratio for the protection 
of trade secrets in certain cases could be found in the protection of the privacy of a 
business.228 Does a criterion exist by which the privacy of business organisations 
may be distinguished from trade secrets? A tentative distinction put forward by 
Neethling and Potgieter229 is that a trade secret consists of information with 
economic value, whereas the privacy of a business concern is said not to have 
economic value.230 Another difference concerns the requirement231 that a trade 
226 Although the actions need not be mentioned by name in court, they are subject to differing 
principles (eg in respect of the form of fault required) and the distinction between the actions is 
therefore still of very real significance today. Cf Boberg 18; Burchell 19; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
5-6; Van der Merwe and Olivier 15; Van der Walt 2. 
227 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A); Janit v Motor Industry Fund 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 293 (A). Cf Neethling and Potgieter 1993 THRHR 704; Neethling 
and Potgieter 1994 THRHR 703; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 311-313; Van Heerden and Neethling 
299-300. 
228 In respect of American law, this opinion has been canvassed by Callmann Vol 2 14.11-14.12 -
see par 3.5.5 above. In South African law, similar thoughts have been expressed by Dendy 1990 (19) 
BML 150. 
229 1994 THRHR 707; see also Van Heerden and Neethling 300 fn 153. 
230 On the other hand, it may be argued that the facts constituting the privacy of a business concern 
(and probably most other personality interests) may have economic value. Thus, to cite two examples, 
the fact that a business concern is in financial straits (cf the facts of Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage 
Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A)) or that it was involved in malpractices (cf the facts of Janit v Motor 
Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 293 (A)) can - if known to consumers - impact 
severely on the financial position of the business. Neethling and Potgieter's suggested distinction can 
be refined by stating that facts which constitute the privacy of a business concern do not have direct 
commercial value, whereas trade secrets do - see Neethling Personality 81. This does not necessarily 
take the matter any further. In the case of natural persons, it may be true that conduct infringing a 
personality right may cause non-patrimonial harm directly, and patrimonial loss indirectly (eg where 
a medical doctor is defamed, as a result of which he or she firstly suffers harm of a non-pecuniary 
nature in the form of a lowering of his or her good name, and secondly - indirectly - loss of an 
economic nature because of lost patient confidence). In the case of a business organisation, on the 
other hand, there can be such a direct link between its interests of personality and its performance in 
the market that it might arguably be unrealistic to say that infringement of its personality rights causes 
economic loss only indirectly. However, since the notion that privacy (or other interests of personality) 
may have economic value is in conflict with the traditional view of personality rights as non-patrimonial 
rights, it will not be further pursued here. The traditionally more prudent explanation is probably that 
the infringement of the privacy of a business organisation directly causes some non-patrimonial harm 
for which the actio iniuriarum may lie, and may indirectly cause patrimonial loss (eg in the form of a 
negative impact on the goodwill), for which the actio legis Aquiliae may be available. 
231 Par 7.2.6 above. 
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secret must be concrete enough to exist independently of its owner. Thus a trade 
secret may continue to exist if the owner thereof dies (in the case of a natural person) 
or otherwise ceases to exist (in the case of a juristic person). It may, for instance, 
devolve by testate succession to the heir of the deceased owner, and may be 
exploited by the heir in another business enterprise. The privacy of the business 
concern, on the other hand, should be so intimately connected with that business that 
it cannot be meaningful independent of the existence of the business itself.232 233 
Be that as it may, the protection of trade secrets may in certain situations be a 
practical result of the protection of the privacy of a business concern. Thus legal 
action (for instance by the granting of an interdict234) against the tapping of the 
telephones of a business, or the unauthorized invasion of its premises, and so forth, 
may be based on an infringement of privacy.235 In this way the right to the privacy 
of a business concern may be used as a shield against industrial espionage - with the 
practical effect of thus also protecting its trade secrets. 
232 Privacy is, after all, the object of a personality right, and personality rights are understood to 
pertain to legal objects that are so intimately connected with the person that they cannot lead a 
separate existence from him or her - Joubert Grondslae 121; Neethling Personality 14-15. It is 
submitted that this principle should apply equally to the personality rights of juristic persons, and not 
only to those of natural persons. Thus, to refer again to the examples mentioned in fn 230 above, the 
privacy of the fact that a certain business enterprise is in financial straits, or is involved in malpractices, 
ceases to be a legally protectable interest once that business ceases to exist. In so far as a natural 
person who was involved in such a terminated business concern is still alive, such an individual may 
have a continued interest of personality in the privacy of the fact that he or she was in his or her 
personal capacity in financial straits or involved in malpractices. 
233 The interim Constitution of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993) provides (sec 13): "Every person shall 
have the right to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to searches 
of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private 
communications." The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996 provides (cl 14): 
"Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have - (a) their person or home 
searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their 
communications infringed." Cf on constitutional rights to privacy in general Du Plessis and De Ville in 
Van Wyk et al 242ff. Du Plessis and De Ville contend (252) that the qualification of personal privacy 
in the interim Constitution is indicative of an intention not to grant constitutional protection to the 
privacy of juristic persons. However, this qualification has been omitted from the text of the Bill of 1996. 
See Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) on the constitutional right to personal privacy. 
234 Cf par 8.5.4 below. 
235 Cf Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings 1993 2 SA 451 (A); Janit v Motor Industry Fund 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 293 (A). Thus further intrusions and/or disclosure of already 
acquired private facts - which may well include trade secrets - may be restrained. However, it is 
doubtful whether the use of a trade secret acquired by privacy-infringing conduct can be restrained in 
sole reliance on the right to privacy, if such use does not involve disclosure of the secret to third 
parties. 
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7.4.4.4 THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET AND THE LAW OF UNLAWFUL 
COMPETITION 
7.4.4.4.1 The right to the trade secret and the right to goodwill 
It will be seen236 that trade secret infringement is usually regarded as unlawful 
competition by the South African courts. The legal protection of trade secrets in South 
Africa has therefore largely developed in the cadre of unlawful competition law, which 
forms part of the law of delict.237 The most important subjective right generally 
protected by unlawful competition law is the entrepreneur's right to the goodwill of his 
enterprise (die reg op die werfkrag). 238 Goodwill in this sense239 has been 
described as "the attractive force which brings in custom".240 The right to goodwill, 
pertaining as it does to an intangible creation of the human intellect and endeavour, 
has been classed as an intellectual property right. 241 
The majority of trade secret infringements (actual or imminent) that come before the 
courts also constitute infringements (actual or imminent) of the goodwill of a business 
enterprise. Even a very superficial analysis of case law will show this. 242 An 
entrepreneur whose trade secret is misappropriated, may seek relief on the basis of 
an infringement of either the right to the trade secret or the right to goodwill. 
However, although the majority of trade secret infringements also infringe the 
goodwill, this is by no means always the case. A pertinent example of trade secret 
infringement that does not affect goodwill, would be where an inventor has developed 
a trade secret which he does not intend exploiting himself, but which he intends 
selling to an entrepreneur who would be interested to employ the secret in the latter's 
business. Such an inventor may have no business enterprise and thus no goodwill 
236 Par 9.3.1 below; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 229ff. 
237 Van Heerden and Neethling 62ff; Boberg 149ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 297ff; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 382ff. 
238 Van Heerden 197ff 203ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 93ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 298; 
Van der Merwe and Olivier 383; Dreyer 90; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano 
(Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 182; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 
4 SA 376 (T) 386; Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A) 416. 
239 The word is also used in other contexts; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 103ff; Van Heerden 
207ff. 
240 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd 1901 AC 217 224; cf Van 
Heerden and Neethling v 95 103. 
241 Van Heerden 203ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 94ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 298 fn 
223; Van der Merwe and Olivier 383. 
242 Cf par 9.3.1 below. 
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that may be infringed. 243 The trade secret is nevertheless a valuable asset in his 
patrimony, and if it is misappropriated before he can sell it to an entrepreneur, he 
should be able to obtain an interdict or damages (depending on whether the secrecy 
has been destroyed by the thief or not). Since the inventor does not have a goodwill, 
the wrongfulness of the misappropriator's conduct cannot be based on the 
infringement of the right to goodwill. To deny such an inventor legal relief, would be 
patently unjust. Wrongfulness in such a case must be based on the infringement of 
a subjective right to the trade secret itself.244 245 It can therefore be concluded 
that a trade secret infringement may result in an infringement of goodwill in many 
instances, but that an infringement of goodwill is not a prerequisite for liability for the 
misappropriation of a trade secret. 
7.4.4.4.2 The right to the trade secret and the right to the business enterprise or 
undertaking 
The right to goodwill is not the only subjective right that must be considered regarding 
the protection of trade secrets in the context of unlawful competition. Influential 
German authors regard an infringement of a trade secret as an infringement of the 
right to the business enterprise.246 Recently, the view that the right to the 
undertaking is the subjective right infringed in unlawful competition cases has been 
argued in South Africa by Domanski.247 The right to the undertaking is seen as an 
243 See in general Van Heerden and Neethling 112-116142-145. An example could be a housewife 
who discovers that adding certain ingredients to washing powder increases its efficiency dramatically. 
She has no right to goodwill, for the simple reason that she has no business enterprise. Her secret is, 
however, an asset with which she can reap considerable financial benefits if she can sell it to a 
manufacturer of washing powder. See Knobel in Neethling (ed) 77 fn 44; Knobel 1990 THRHR 493 fn 
45; Van Heerden and Neethling 225 fn 11. 
244 The wrongfulness of such conduct could conceivably also be based on an infringement of the 
right to earning capacity, depending on how this right is construed - see par 7.4.4.6 below. 
245 Also where a trade secret owner does have a business enterprise and a right to goodwill, his 
or her trade secret can be infringed by a wrongdoer who is not a competitor in the same trade. An 
example could be the case of an industrial spy - who is not a competitor of the trade secret owner -
misappropriating the secret; cf the American Christopher case (par 3.2.2 above). Instances of trade 
secret infringement out of a competition context have also featured in South African case law; see par 
9.3.1.2.2 below; Van Heerden and Neethling 224. In such a case an application for an interdict could 
probably be based on the threat that the right to goodwill of the trade secret owner might eventually 
be infringed (cf Van Heerden and Neethling 145) - however, legal relief can be based more 
satisfactorily on the direct infringement of the right to the trade secret itself. 
246 Par 4.5.5.2 above; cf Van Heerden 44ff on the right to the undertaking in German law, and 183ff 
189ff for a theoretical analysis of the right to the undertaking. 
247 1993 SA Mere LJ 127ff; cf Pienaar 86-88. 
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intellectual property right,248 but authors differ as to the various components of the 
legal object of this right. Some249 include corporeal property such as buildings, 
stock, and equipment; rights from, for instance, contracts with suppliers and 
employees; and immaterial interests like goodwill.250 According to others251 the 
undertaking as legal object consists of a collection of only immaterial things, like 
rights, legal relationships and factual relationships. Domanski, associating himself with 
the latter group, goes further by postulating252 that the undertaking consists of an 
"assemblage of disparate components, all of which are rights of one kind or another". 
The advantage of recognizing the right to the undertaking as the right infringed by 
unlawful competition, argues Domanski,253 is that it allows wider legal protection 
than the right to goodwill. Thus where a new business has not yet acquired a 
goodwill, relief can still be obtained against competitive acts infringing the right to the 
undertaking. However, Domanski states254 that liability for unlawful competition can 
only arise if the plaintiff's right to the undertaking was infringed by a competitor in 
trade,255 and if the performance of the undertaking in the market was adversely 
affected. 
The same arguments advanced above256 in support of the view that trade secrets 
cannot adequately be protected under the right to goodwill, are also applicable to the 
right to the undertaking. Again, the inventor of a trade secret who has no business 
enterprise will go unprotected if protection is based solely on a subjective right to the 
undertaking. Protection of trade secrets outside the competitive context can only be 
based on a right to the trade secret itself. Similarly, protection of trade secrets in a 
competitive context can still be explained most satisfactorily by the recognition of the 
248 Cf Van Heerden 189ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 88ff; Domanski 1993 SA Mere LJ 140-141. 
The right to the undertaking was once regarded as a personality right, surprisingly also by Kohler 22, 
father of the concept of intellectual property rights - cf Van Heerden 183ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 
86-87. This proposition is convincingly refuted by Van Heerden 187 and Van Heerden and Neethling 
87, pointing out that the undertaking has economic value and is not inseparably bound to the 
personality of the entrepreneur. 
249 See the authors cited by Van Heerden and Neethling 88 fn 70. 
25° Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 88 fns 73 and 74 for criticism of this concept. 
251 Oppikofer 136; Domanski 1993 SA Mere LJ 137-138. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 89-91. 
252 137. 
253 141-142. 
254 140-141 . 
255 Cf, however, Van Heerden 66 who states that in German law the right to the undertaking has 
not only been considered in cases arising in a competitive context. 
256 Par 7.4.4.4.1. 
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right to the trade secret,257 the infringement of which would usually also result in an 
infringement of the subjective right protected by the law of unlawful competition, 
whether it be the right to the goodwill or the right to the undertaking.258 
7.4.4.5 RIGHTS TO TRADE MARKS AND SIMILAR LEGAL OBJECTS 
The trade names used by the entrepreneur to individualize his or her undertaking, 
and the trade marks, "get-up" and service marks used to individualize his or her 
products or services, are also the objects of intellectual property rights.259 The 
primary function of these legal objects is to distinguish an entrepreneur's business, 
products or services from similar businesses, products or services of competitors.260 
They may furthermore fulfil quality-indicating and advertising functions. 261 Van 
Heerden and Neethling accordingly recognize two types of subjective rights to trade 
marks and the like - the right to the distinctive mark and the right to the advertising 
mark.262 From this follows a basic distinction between respectively trade marks and 
257 Interestingly, Domanski himself - perhaps unwittingly - lends support to a right (admittedly not 
necessarily a subjective right - although it is difficult to conceive of a different type of right in this 
context) to the trade secret. He mentions (133 fn 38) "the misappropriation by a trade rival of secret 
formulations or know-how belonging to a newly-formed pharmaceutical company as yet unknown to 
the public" as an example of a situation where protection against unreasonable competitive conduct 
may be based on an infringement of the right to the undertaking, but not on an infringement of the right 
to goodwill. If, as Domanski contends, all the components of the undertaking (as legal object) are 
rights, the implication is inescapable that the secret formulations or know-how in the example are also 
the objects of rights. 
258 It is not necessary to decide here which of the two postulated rights is the better foundation of 
the law of unlawful competition. For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to show that neither of 
them is the primary foundation of trade secret protection, and that trade secret protection cannot be 
confined to the competition context. See Van Heerden and Neethling 88ff for a critical evaluation of 
the right to the undertaking; and Domanski 133ff for a critical evaluation of the right to the goodwill. 
It should be noted, however - as Domanski 143 concedes - that the right-to-goodwill "formulation of 
Van Heerden and Neethling has gained a strong foothold in our law, and it would be difficult at this 
stage to persuade our courts to forsake it". 
259 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 106ff. 
260 Van Heerden and Neethling 107; cf Webster and Page 19ff. 
261 Cf in respect of especially trade marks, Mostert 312ff; Rutherford in Neethling (ed) 55ff. The 
advertising function of a trade mark is regarded by modern commerce as its most important economic 
function; see Rutherford in Neethling (ed) 56 and authorities quoted. The advertising and quality-
indicating values of eg a trade mark are dependent on its distinguishing function; cf Mostert 316-317. 
262 The object of the right to the distinctive mark is identified by Van Heerden and Neethling 108 
as the distinguishing value of the mark in connection with the entrepreneur's business, product or 
service. The 'right to the advertising image' (die reg op die rek/amebeeld) was originally championed 
by Mostert and is a concept wider than the right to the advertising mark. Mostert 1982 SALJ 424 
defines the advertising image as "every name, mark, symbol or character that is identified with a 
particular product, business, or person, and that harbours potential advertising value and possible 
goodwill for products or businesses of other entities in various other unrelated fields of commerce"; 
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the like, and trade secrets. In order to distinguish or advertise businesses, products 
or services, distinctive and advertising marks must come to the attention of potential 
customers and clients. They cannot fulfil their functions in secrecy. A trade secret, on 
the other hand, is only of value if it remains secret.263 
Information about a (potentially) distinctive or advertising mark can in certain 
circumstances be a trade secret. If, for instance, a label is designed for use on a new 
product to be launched, information concerning the appearance of the label, and the 
product in connection with which it is to be used, may well constitute trade secrets. 
As soon as the product is released on the market with the label, the trade secret 
comes to an end. It may be argued that before the label is used to distinguish the 
relevant product from similar ones - which can only happen once the product is 
launched and the mentioned trade secret has therefore been terminated - no right to 
the distinctive or advertising mark has come into existence.264 Certainly there can 
be no statutory protection in South African law before registration as, for instance, a 
trade mark. 265 However, an as yet unregistered and unused distinctive or 
advertising mark could possibly be protected from misappropriation by the common 
law (Aquilian) action for unlawful competition. Passing off and leaning on are two 
forms of unlawful competition which may be relevant here. Passing off occurs when 
an entrepreneur misleads the public that his or her business, product or service is 
that of a competitor by copying the latter's distinctive marks,266 thus frustrating the 
distinguishing function of the marks. Leaning on occurs when an entrepreneur 
misappropriates the advertising value of another's trade marks, trade names and 
service marks to promote his or her own products or services.267 In so far as the 
application of the Aquilian action to remedy these delicts may be regarded as 
common law protection of the rights to the distinctive and advertising marks,268 
cf Mostert 281: "Die reklamebeeld bestaan uit die lokkrag of reklamewaarde beliggaam in die identiteit 
van 'n persoonlikheidskenmerk van 'n individu, fiktiewe karakter of simbool." In so far as Mostert's right 
to the advertising image pertains to trade names, trade marks and service marks, it has been adopted 
by Van Heerden and Neethling 216ff (see especially fns 121 125) as the right to the advertising mark. 
See further Neethling 1995 THRHR 313ff. For the present purposes the right to the distinctive mark 
and the right to the advertising mark may conveniently be dealt with together. 
263 Par 7.2.3 above. 
264 Cf eg Van Heerden and Neethling 172. 
265 Cf sec 33 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. 
266 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 149 163ff. 
267 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 201 ff; Mostert 1986 THRHR 173ff; Mostert 383ff. 
268 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 106ff 166 216. It is of importance in this regard that neither the 
present Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (sec 33), nor its predecessor, Act 62 of 1963 (sec 43), affects 
the right of any person to bring common law actions (the Act of 1963 specifically mentioned the action 
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partial overlap with trade secret protection is possible. However, such overlap will be 
limited to situations where the relevant distinctive and advertising marks are still kept 
secret and have not yet been used.269 
7.4.4.6 THE RIGHT TO EARNING CAPACITY 
The precise content and status of the right to earning capacity in private law is 
uncertain.270 In respect of the nature of earning capacity, divergent views have been 
for passing off) against any other person; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 196-197; Webster and Page 
255. Cf, however, Webster and Page 413-414 who maintain - relying on English and South African 
case law - that the passing-off action does not protect rights to trade marks and similar symbols, but 
rather the right to goodwill. 
269 Van Heerden and Neethling 172 state that one cannot acquire a right to a distinctive mark 
before it is actually used in connection with a product on the market, since it cannot have any 
distinguishing value before it is thus used. On the other hand, one could argue that a distinctive mark 
can indeed have a (potential) distinguishing value before it is used, and that it is just as wrongful to 
misappropriate the distinguishing value of such a mark before the owner has had the opportunity of 
using it to distinguish his goods or services, than if it is misappropriated after he has already begun 
to do so. This is not passing off in its traditional sense, since the misappropriator is not misleading the 
public that his product or service is that of another (see Van Heerden and Neethling 172), but it is 
arguably a wrongful misappropriation of the distinctive mark since the misappropriator makes it 
impossible for the real owner of the mark to use it to distinguish his own products or services. Cf 
Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd, Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch 
Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C). 
270 In Hawker v Life Offices Association of South Africa 1987 3 SA 777 (C) 780 a "subjective right 
to exercise a chosen calling without unlawful interference from others" was recognized. According to 
Neethling 1987 THRHR 321 this formulation is inaccurate in so far as such a liberty (to exercise a 
chosen calling) is said not to qualify as the object of a subjective right - a right to earning capacity is 
therefore preferred. (Whatever the true nature of this right in the context of private law, a right freely 
to engage in economic activity has since been entrenched as a fundamental human right in South 
African constitutional law - see par 8.6.1 below.) In the Hawker case it was stated (780) that the right 
to exercise a chosen calling without unlawful interference from others does not solely relate to factors 
of personality, but also has a monetary component; while in Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 
2 SA 904 (A) 917 it was said that "the capacity to earn money is considered to be part of a person's 
estate". However, it is submitted that the capacity to earn - as opposed to the earnings which may 
result from the exercise of such capacity - cannot be part of a person's estate. Thus it cannot for 
instance devolve by testate or intestate succession. It can also not be sold to another. (Some authors 
have suggested that a person can 'trade' with his or her earning capacity, citing for instance a person 
securing employment with a new employer by offering his earning capacity in return for remuneration, 
and even a prostitute 'trading', not with her body, but rather with her earning capacity (eg Neethling 
1987 THRHR 319; 1990 THRHR 103; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 46 fn 70; cf however Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 183 fn 11; Wiehahn 192). It is submitted that these constructions are artificial. In 
both examples the relevant person is simply offering services for remuneration. It is true that the 
services offered may be more attractive than the services offered by other individuals on account of 
eg the relevant person's academic and professional qualifications, experience, intelligence, health, 
appearance, etc, which are all factors that may co-determine the person's earning capacity. 
Nevertheless, neither these characteristics, nor the earning capacity influenced thereby, are 'sold' to 
the other party.) Certainly an infringement of a person's earning capacity can result in a diminution of 
his or her estate, but so can eg infringements of the bodily integrity or the good name - which are not 
generally considered to be assets in a person's estate. It is submitted that the above-mentioned dicta 
in the Hawker and Dippenaar cases must simply be understood to mean that an exercise of earning 
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put forward. 271 According to one view, earning capacity is a facet of personality.272 
According to another view, it is so-called personal immaterial property - an intangible 
patrimonial asset which is bound up with the human personality.273 Both personality 
interests274 and personal immaterial property cannot exist separately from the 
person of the legal subject - they cannot be transferred to other legal subjects, and 
lapse (at the latest) at the death of the legal subject.275 A trade secret, on the other 
hand, can exist separately from its owner - it can therefore be transferred to other 
legal subjects, and may continue to exist after the death of the (original) owner.276 
It follows that although a trade secret owner can generate an income by exploiting his 
or her trade secret, the trade secret does not form part of his or her earning capacity. 
If the view that earning capacity is not a facet of personality (or perhaps a personality 
interest) is correct, an infringement of a trade secret may also result in an 
infringement of the earning capacity of the trade secret owner,277 just as an 
capacity can cause patrimonial gain, and an infringement of earning capacity can cause patrimonial 
loss. Trade secrets, on the other hand, definitely fall into the owner's estate - they may devolve by 
testate and intestate succession, and may be sold, etc. 
271 Apart from the two views dealt with in the main text, see further Van der Merwe and Olivier 186 
fn 28 who ask the question whether a diminution of earning capacity is not a type of loss resulting from 
the infringement of one of the four more generally accepted subjective rights (par 7.4.1 above), rather 
than the infringement of an independent subjective right itself - a skadepos rather than a regskrenking. 
Thus they show that a loss of earning capacity can result from the infringement of personality rights, 
real rights, intellectual property rights and personal rights. 
272 Van der Walt Sommeskadeleer 289, "Book review" 1990 THRHR 141-142; cf Wiehahn 191-193 
on the capacity to work. 
273 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 45-46; Neethling Personality 19ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 
112ff. 
274 Cf par 7.4.1; 7.4.4.3 above. 
275 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 45 fn 70; Neethling Personality 20-21; Van Heerden and 
Neethling 113. 
276 Cf par 7.2.6; 7.4.4.3 above. 
277 Thus protagonists of the view that earning capacity is personal immaterial property, argue that 
the destruction of an advocate's library may infringe his earning capacity - cf Neethling, Potgieter and 
Visser 45 fn 70; Neethling Personality 20 fn 173; Van Heerden and Neethling 113 fn 129. If this is 
correct, one may argue by way of analogy that the destruction (eg by publication) of a trade secret 
infringes the earning capacity of the trade secret owner. If, on the other hand, the capacity to earn is 
a facet (or perhaps interest) of personality, the destruction of the advocate's library does not interfere 
with his earning capacity, unless he suffers a personality infringement which does interfere with his 
capacity to earn - eg a nervous breakdown - as a result of the destruction. The patrimonial loss 
suffered as a result of the loss of the use of his books, can - since it is the result of an unreasonable 
interference with the advocate's powers of use, enjoyment and disposal over the library in terms of his 
property right thereto (par 7.4.1 above) - still be recovered. By way of analogy, the patrimonial loss 
suffered by the trade secret owner as a result of the deprivation of the full use of his trade secret, can 
be recovered since it results from an infringement of his intellectual property right to the trade secret 
itself. Just as the protection of property rights to tangible things does not depend on the exact nature -
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infringement of a trade secret may also result in an infringement of the goodwill278 
of an undertaking. However, just as proof of an infringement of goodwill is not 
necessary to establish trade secret infringement, proof of an infringement of earning 
capacity is similarly not necessary to prove trade secret infringement. 
7.4.4.7 THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
A subjective right to information has been championed in South Africa by Du 
Plessis. 279 Since trade secrets consist essentially of information, recognition of a 
subjective right to information could conceivably provide a basis for the legal 
protection of trade secrets. It is therefore necessary to consider the notion of a right 
to information and its relevance for trade secret protection. 
According to Du Plessis280 information can be divided into two categories - public 
and personal. Public information consists of facts concerning phenomena such as 
acts of government, growing inflation, maladministration, and the planning of a 
road.281 These facts make it possible for the individual to evaluate the actions of the 
state positively or negatively.282 Personal information comprises all the facts 
concerning an individual's personal life, which he or she may not wish to disclose to 
everybody.283 284 Public information is protected by public law subjective rights 
(publieke subjektiewe regte), 285 286 whereas personal information is protected by 
or indeed the judicial recognition - of a right to earning capacity, so the protection of the intellectual 
property right to the trade secret is also independent of the right to earning capacity. 
278 Par 7.4.4.4.1 above, cf par 7.4.4.4.2. 
279 Neethling 1990 THRHR 104-105 has proposed a subjective right to the correct information. 
However, the proposed right has as its object a performance of another - viz to furnish the correct 
information - and not information per se. It is advocated as the subjective right infringed by an 
actionable misrepresentation, and need not be considered here. 
280 13ff. 
281 Du Plessis 13. 
282 Du Plessis 33 423. 
283 Du Plessis 14, cf 423. 
284 It should be noted that, according to these definitions, 'public information' does not necessarily 
mean information that is in the public domain, ie not secret. Du Plessis's 'public information' may be 
secret or public knowledge - the same is true of her 'personal information'. 
285 Du Plessis 33-36 424. 
286 Du Plessis's concept of public subjective rights is built on the work of Venter - cf Du Plessis 30ff. 
Venter 155 defines a subjective right in general as the legally protected claim of a legal subject to a 
legal object - die regsbeskermde aanspraak wat 'n regsubjek op 'n bepaalde regsobjek het. For Venter 
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(private law) subjective rights - mainly the right to privacy.287 However, Du 
Plessis288 contends that it is not always possible to distinguish between personal 
and public information, and therefore she proposes an 'alternative' subjective right to 
information, comprising both personal and public information. This right may be 
enforced against both private individuals and organs of the state,289 and comprises 
a twofold claim (aanspraak) -to the disclosure of public information, 290 and the 
protection of personal information.291 Du Plessis's postulated right to information 
does not open up new insights regarding the protection of trade secrets, because her 
concept of personal information appears to correspond with the legal object of the 
right to privacy, and the comments made above292 concerning trade secrets and 
privacy also apply here. Since her public subjective right to public information 
comprises a claim to the disclosure of such information by the state, it does not 
furnish a basis for the protection of trade secrets. Her "alternative subjective right" to 
information appears to be no more than a combination of the (private law) subjective 
right to personal information and the public subjective right to public information, and 
does not seem to take the matter any further as far as the protection of trade secrets 
158 the important characteristic of a legal object is that it must have the function of regulating the 
community ('n gemeenskapsordenende funksie). From these premises he identifies (159ff) a number 
of legal objects worthy of protection in public law and promotes (162-163) a system of public subjective 
rights in respect of those legal objects. These are categorized into material public subjective rights 
(materiele publieke subjektiewe regte) and immaterial public subjective rights (immateriele publieke 
subjektiewe regte). The first category comprises public real rights (pub/ieke saaklike regte). The latter 
are subdivided into rights to public acts (publieke handelingsregte), public rights to the maintenance 
of certain conditions or situations (publieke handhawingsregte), and public intellectual property rights 
(publieke immateriee/goedereregte) - the latter pertaining to inter alia state symbols like the national 
flag and the national anthem. Du Plessis contradicts herself when identifying the legal object of the 
public subjective right protecting public information. At 32-33 she states that the legal object is public 
information. However, at 36 she classes this right as one of Venter's publieke handelingsregte, where 
the legal object of the right is an act of the state - in this case the disclosing of public information. It 
may be noted that Venter's publieke handelingsregte are akin to the personal rights in the (traditional, 
private law) system of subjective rights, in so far as they also have performances as legal objects. Cf 
Du Plessis and Du Plessis 164-167; Wiechers in Strauss (ed) 270ff. 
287 Du Plessis 16-22 424. 
288 36-37 408. 
289 Du Plessis 36. 
290 This matter has been addressed by sec 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(Act 200 of 1993), which guarantees every person a right of access to all information held by organs 
of the state in so far as such information is required for the exercise or protection of any of his or her 
rights. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996 provides (cl 32) that everyone has 
the right of access to any information held by the state, or any information held by another person that 
is required for the exercise or protection of any rights. 
291 Du Plessis 37 408. 
292 Par 7.4.4.3. 
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is concerned. By redefining Du Plessis's concept of personal information to include 
information applicable to trade and industry, trade secrets may also be protected 
under a wide all-embracing right to information. However, such a step will run counter 
to the conviction expressed above293 that meaningful development of the law 
requires dissimilar things to be kept distinct. 
The opinions of two South African authors, both denying the feasibility of a subjective 
right to information, also merit consideration here. Joubert294 shows that intellectual 
property law protects ideas complying with certain requirements. Thus ideas are 
protected by, for instance, patent law, model law, trade marks law and so on.295 
Joubert emphasizes296 that not all ideas are protected - only ideas complying with 
certain criteria. Without clarifying the relationship between ideas and information, he 
states that only confidential information may be protected by the law, 297 mainly by 
the law of contract298 and the law of delict in so far as it protects goodwill 
(werfkrag). 299 However, information - also confidential information - does not 
constitute the object of an intellectual property right ('n immateriele regsgoed) in 
South African law.300 According to Joubert301 it is primarily the confidentiality, 
rather than the information, that is protected. The objection against an intellectual 
property right to information is that such a right will confer a monopoly over 
information - whereas it is apparent, says Joubert,302 that the law does not confer 
such a monopoly over information. The law protects the confidentiality of confidential 
293 Par 7.3.3. 
294 1985 De Jure 35-36. 
295 Joubert 35 supports the traditional view that copyright law does not protect ideas per se, but 
rather the product (of the ideas) against copying. Cf par 7.4.4.2 above. 
296 1985 De Jure 36. 
297 1985 De Jure 42, cf 36. 
298 1985 De Jure 38ff. 
299 1985 De Jure 40ff. 
300 1985 De Jure 37-38, citing Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit 
Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C) - cf, however, the discussion in par 9.3.1.2.2 below. 
However, Joubert states (36) that nobody can acquire an exclusive right (alleenreg) to an idea, 
information or knowledge, except in terms of intellectual property law (which he presumably sees as 
the traditional fields of patent law, copyright law, trade marks law, etc). Is the implication that in terms 
of intellectual property law subjective rights may be acquired to certain narrowly defined classes of 
information? 
301 1985 De Jure 36-37. 
302 1985 De Jure 37. 
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information, and will prohibit someone who has obtained information in confidence 
from the plaintiff to disclose or use it. But third parties who have acquired the 
information independently from the plaintiff - so the argument goes - will not be 
prohibited to disclose or use it. Furthermore, legal policy does not justify the 
protection of information if it does not qualify for protection under patent law. If a 
patent application is denied because an invention does not meet the requirements for 
patentability, the invention should then not be protected qua information. 303 
Joubert's objections against the recognition of intellectual property rights to 
confidential information are unconvincing. It is true that the law does not confer a 
monopoly over trade secrets. But nor does it confer an absolute monopoly over, for 
instance, the object of copyright.304 Thus, the Copyright Act305 limits the monopoly 
of the copyright owner by making provision for a number of statutory defences against 
his claims.306 Furthermore,307 two persons, working independently from each 
other, may come to the same result and nevertheless acquire copyright in their own 
work. It is furthermore not true that the law will not prohibit all third persons who 
acquire confidential information independently from the plaintiff, from using or 
disclosing it. Thus the law may visit the industrial spy with legal sanction. 308 The 
fact that, for instance, the double inventor may use a trade secret with impunity does 
not prove that there is no intellectual property right to confidential information - it 
merely shows that a reasonable interference with a legal object does not constitute 
wrongfulness309 - or, phrased differently, the "monopoly" over confidential 
information is limited by defences recognized by the law against the claims of the 
holder of the right. Furthermore, as noted,310 legal policy does not object to the 
existence of trade secret protection next to patent protection. The recognition of an 
intellectual property right to confidential trade information can therefore not be 
opposed for reasons of legal policy. 
303 1985 De Jure 37. 
304 Du Plessis et al Patent law and copyright law (Study guide Unisa 1993) 103. 
305 Act 98 of 1978. 
306 Secs 12-198. 
307 As noted in par 7.4.2 above. 
308 Par 6.5.2 above. 
309 Par 8.2.2.2.2 below. 
310 Par 7.4.4.1 above. 
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Geldenhuys311 postulates three requirements that must be met before an entity may 
serve as a legal object:312 (a) it must be of value and capable of fulfilling a need of 
a legal subject; (b) it must be susceptible of allocation to a particular legal subject to 
the exclusion of others - which implies that it must not be generally available to all, 
it must be susceptible of human control, and it must be sufficiently independent that 
enjoyment and disposal thereof is possible; and (c) allocation of the object to a legal 
subject must fulfil the function of regulating the community. Testing information 
against these requirements, he finds that not all information is of value to legal 
subjects, but certain classes of information - like trade secrets - are. 313 Furthermore, 
some information is freely available to everybody, but certain information - like a trade 
secret - is not. Not all information is susceptible of human control, but some 
information - for instance a trade secret - is.314 In this regard Geldenhuys 
emphasizes that control over information can also be accomplished in ways other 
than by controlling access to the relevant information. Thus information may also be 
controlled by exercising control over the use thereof. The implication is that non-
secret information may also serve as a legal object, as long as the use thereof can 
be controlled by a legal subject. Referring to the requirement that an entity must be 
sufficiently independent that enjoyment and disposal thereof is possible, Geldenhuys 
states that only information delineated so clearly that no doubt can exist as to what 
information is included and what excluded, can qualify as a legal object. Finally, 
Geldenhuys315 is of the opinion that information complying with all the mentioned 
requirements, may nevertheless not qualify as legal objects if allocation thereof to a 
legal subject would not fulfil the function of regulating the community. As example he 
mentions316 a trade secret that is used to supply illegal drugs for the black market. 
Geldenhuys concludes317 that information in general cannot be a legal object, and 
therefore there can be no subjective right to information as such. However, certain 
categories of information - which do not form a numerus clausus - qualify as objects 
of subjective rights. He then identifies318 a number of subjective rights which, in his 
opinion, pertain to such categories of information. These are: copyright, patent rights, 
311 85-93. 
312 Cf the requirements for a legal object - par 7.4.1 above. 
313 Geldenhuys 93-94. 
314 94-96. 
315 96-97. 
316 97. 
317 79. 
318 98-114. 
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trademark rights, design rights, plant breeders' rights, heraldic rights, the right to the 
trade secret, the right to goodwill, the right to privacy, the right to identity, and the 
right to the good name or reputation. 
The main thrust of Geldenhuys's argument is, it is submitted, most convincing. One 
can conclude that although information is without a doubt one of the most valuable 
commodities in contemporary societies, the adoption of a subjective right to 
information per se is not justified. The legal protection of information should be built 
on the identification and delineation of specific categories of information that merit 
such protection, and the development of rules and principles suited to deal with their 
unique characteristics. This study is meant to contribute to this process in respect of 
one such category, namely trade secrets. 
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CHAPTER 8 
A MODEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
TRADE SECRETS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical model for the legal protection 
of trade secrets in South African law. It is endeavoured to make this model comply 
with three requirements: 
(a) It must be fully compatible with the general principles of South African law, 
as embodied in particularly the Constitution, the law of delict and the law 
of contract; 
(b) it must profit from insights gained from the comparative legal results 
presented in previous chapters, emulating the strengths and avoiding the 
weaknesses of the legal protection of trade secrets in other legal systems 
where possible; and 
(c) it must not promote results at variance with the provisions of the GATT 
TR/Ps agreement. 
The objectives intended to be served by the development of this model are twofold. 
First, it is intended to serve as a basis for a critical evaluation of the existing 
recognition and protection of trade secrets in the South African positive law. Second, 
it suggests answers to some questions concerning trade secret protection which have 
not yet enjoyed the attention of South African courts or the legislature, but may well 
do so in future. 
First, the focus falls on trade secret protection by the law of delict and the law of 
contract. Second, some thoughts concerning a concurrence of delictual and 
contractual claims are set forth. Third, applicable remedies are considered. Finally, 
ways are suggested to deal with a number of specific problems with trade secret 
protection. Whenever appropriate, implications of the recognition of a subjective right 
to the trade secret will be highlighted. 
8.2 DELICTUAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
The generalising approach of the South African law of delict allows it to deal with any 
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novel wrongful act which may be committed in regard to trade secrets. 1 Since a trade 
secret is an asset with economic value,2 and forms part of the patrimony of the 
owner thereof, the appropriate delictual action to recover damages for trade secret 
infringement is the actio /egis Aquiliae.3 Aquilian liability is in principle recognized for 
the causing of any type of patrimonial loss, provided the plaintiff can establish4 five 
elements, namely an act, wrongfulness, fault, causation, and damage.5 If an interdict 
is applied for to prevent or put an end to wrongful conduct, two of these elements 
must be proved, namely an act and wrongfulness.6 
8.2.1 ACT 
For the purposes of the law of delict, an act is defined as voluntary, human conduct.7 
Conduct is voluntary if it is susceptible to control of the will of the person involved; 
it need, however, not be willed or desired.8 An act may take the form of either a 
commission or an omission.9 As noted,10 a subjective right is infringed by a factual 
disturbance of the relationship between the legal subject and the object of his right, 
in a way that violates a legal norm and is thus legally impermissible. Any voluntary 
human commission or omission that can disturb the relationship between the trade 
secret owner (or other right-holder, such as a licensee) and the trade secret is 
therefore relevant. It is apparent from the comparative research presented above, 11 
1 Neethling 1992 (1) Codicil/us 12. 
2 Par 7.2.5 above. 
3 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 8ff. 
' 
4 Elements not in dispute in a particular lawsuit need not be proved by the plaintiff. South African 
law knows instances of strict liability, ie liability without fault (cf eg Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
341ff), which need not be considered here. 
5 Cf Boberg 24-25; Burchell 23; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 4; Van der Merwe and Olivier 15-16 
24; Van der Walt 20. 
6 See par 8.5.4 below. 
7 Cf Burchell 36-37; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 21; Van der Merwe and Olivier 25; Van der 
Walt 57. 
8 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 22; Van der Merwe and Olivier 25. 
9 Cf Boberg 21 Off; Burchell 37; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 21-22 26-28; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 29ff; Van der Walt 58-59. 
10 Par 7.4.1 above. 
11 Cf par 2.2.2.2; 3.2.2; 4.2.2; 5.1; 5.2 above. 
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that three categories of conduct can comply with these requirements: (a) the gaining 
of access to or acquisition of the secret; (b) the use thereof; and (c) the disclosure12 
thereof. Due to the generalizing approach of the South African law of delict, 13 these 
three categories of conduct should all be scrutinized by the law, 14 and if 
accompanied by the other delictual elements, liability must ensue. 
8.2.2 WRONGFULNESS 
Wrongfulness 15 is essentially a juridical value judgment over an act in the light of the 
harmful result16 caused 17 (or potentially caused) 18 thereby. 19 An act which is -
judged according to the norms of the law of delict - objectively unreasonable, is 
wrongful for the purposes of the law of delict.20 
8.2.2.1 THE CRITERION OF WRONGFULNESS 
As noted, 21 the basic norm of delictual wrongfulness is the bani mores - the legal 
12 Disclosure of a trade secret can conceivably take place not only by way of a commission, but 
also by way of an omission. Someone to whom a trade secret has been entrusted under an obligation 
of confidence, eg an employee entrusted with his or her employer's secret, may fail to take proper 
precautionary steps to prevent a third person from gaining access to the secret. If the trade secret 
owner cannot obtain relief from the latter - eg because his or her identity is unknown or he or she is 
impecunious - relief may be obtained from the confidant on the strength of his or her disclosure of the 
secret by way of an omission, provided the other delictual elements can also be proved. Cf Knobel 
1990 THRHR 499. 
13 Cf par 8.2 above. 
14 Whereas English law is prevented by the restrictions of the action of breach of confidence, and 
German law (possibly) by the wording of its codes, to attach liability - if other requirements of liability 
are met - to any human act with the potential to infringe a trade secret (cf par 6.3 above), South 
African law is not restricted by such considerations. Note, too, that the suggested South African 
position is in conformity with the GA TT TR/Ps agreement, which also mentions disclosure, acquisition 
and use (par 5.1; 5.2 above). 
15 On wrongfulness as delictual element, see in general Boberg 30ff; Burchell 24ff 38f; Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser 29ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 49ff; Van der Walt 20ff. 
16 Par 8.2.5 below. 
17 Par 8.2.4 below. 
18 In the case of the interdict - par 8.5.4 below. 
19 Par 7.4.1.1 above. 
2° Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 29ff. 
21 Par 7.4.1.1 above. 
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convictions of the community. Conduct in conflict with the bani mores is wrongful. In 
the application of the bani mores criterion, legal policy considerations play an 
important role. In particular, the bani mores must be permeated by the values upheld 
by the South African Constitution.22 The open-endedness of this basic norm - its 
suppleness and lack of rigidity - enables the South African law of delict to adapt to 
novel situations, to keep pace with changing sociological and economical 
conditions. 23 
The very same qualities that make the bani mores such an extraordinarily useful 
general criterion for delictual wrongfulness, may limit its usefulness in specific 
instances. Its vagueness makes it difficult to apply with predictability and consistency 
22 Act 200 of 1993. In the interpretation of any law, and in applying and developing the common 
law and customary law, the courts must have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of chapter 
3 of the Constitution, in which certain fundamental human rights are entrenched (sec 35(3)). In 
interpreting chapter 3, the courts must promote the values which underlie an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality (sec 35(1 )). Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 13-16; Visser in 
Van Aswegen (ed) 26ff. The interim Constitution does not expressly make the fundamental rights 
binding on natural and juristic persons, thus giving rise to conflicting court decisions, and opinions in 
the literature, on the horizontal application (ie between citizens, as opposed to so-called vertical 
application between the state and citizens) of the fundamental rights - cf eg Potgieter v Kilian 1996 
2 SA 276 {N) 297ff; Du Plessis v De Klerk case no CCT 8/95; authors mentioned in par 7.3.3 fn 68 
above. 
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 1996 applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state (cl 8(1 )). Furthermore, the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights also bind natural and juristic persons in so far as - taking into account 
the nature of the rights and the duties imposed by them - they can be applied to such persons (cl 8(2)). 
In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and juristic persons, a court must - to give 
effect to a right entrenched in the Bill - apply, or where necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right (cl 8(3)(a)). A court may - in applying the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and juristic persons - develop rules of the common law to limit 
the relevant right, provided the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1) (cl 8(3)(b)). Clause 36(1) 
provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application, 
and only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including - the 
nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the 
limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. Juristic persons are entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the 
nature of the rights and of the juristic persons (cl 8(4)). When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; must consider international law; and may consider foreign law 
(cl 39(1)). When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights (cl 
39(2)). The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are 
consistent with the Bill (cl 39(3)). 
23 Par 7.4.1.1 above. 
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to specific factual situations.24 Thus more concrete norms tend to develop from the 
ground-norm of the bani mores, by which the delimitation of wrongfulness and 
lawfulness may be performed. According to current dogma, these norms are either 
formulated with reference to subjective rights, the infringement of which constitutes 
wrongfulness; or they are expressed directly in the form of legal duties, the breach 
of which constitutes wrongfulness.25 
Wrongfulness in the case of trade secret misappropriation is constituted by an 
infringement of the subjective right to the trade secret. 26 A more concrete norm of 
delictual wrongfulness applicable to trade secret misappropriation, may therefore be 
formulated as follows: Any act that interferes with the powers of use, enjoyment and 
disposal exercised in respect of a trade secret by someone with a subjective right 
to that trade secret, is, in the absence of legal grounds justifying such interference, 
wrongful. 27 
Trade secret misappropriation usually takes place in a context of trade competition, 
but can also occur outside such a context. If it does take place in a competitive 
context, it may constitute a form of unlawful competition, and the plaintiff's right to 
goodwill28 may be infringed in such a case. However, it is not necessary to prove 
the infringement of the right to goodwill to establish the wrongfulness of such 
misappropriation - proof of infringement of the right to the trade secret is sufficient.29 
24 In the context specifically of unlawful competition law, this situation is formulated by Van Heerden 
and Neethling 127 as follows: "One cannot find fault with the bani mores as a general criterion for 
wrongfulness in our law. On the contrary, the pliability or open-endedness of this yardstick definitely 
has the practical function and value in that it provides the judge with a mandate to ascertain - by 
making a value judgment - which interests are worthy of legal protection and what the extent of such 
protection should be (inter alia therefore the extent and limits of a particular subjective right), in this 
process adapting such protection to changes in social and economic relations as well as developments 
in culture and technology. On the other hand, this criterion is so vague and wide that it does not in 
itself provide a rational yardstick for the delimitation of the right to goodwill in the area of conflicting 
interests of competitors. A particular concretisation of the bani mores test in the competitive struggle -
if at all possible - thus seems to be called for." 
25 Par 7.4.1.1; 7.4.1.2 above. 
26 Par 7.4 above. 
27 Cf par 7.4 above. 
28 Par 7.4.4.4.1 above. 
29 Par 7.4.4.4 above; Van Heerden and Neethling 146 fn 181: "[l]t is often unnecessary to apply 
the competition principle (or bani mores test) in regard to indirect infringements of goodwill. This will 
be the case where the infringement of goodwill flowed from the infringement of another, independent 
right of the prejudiced competitor, such as the right to the trade secret..., ie from the infringement of 
rights which are also of significance outside the context of the law of unlawful competition. Under these 
circumstances the unlawfulness of the infringement of the other subjective right is of a continuous 
nature, so that the ensuing infringement of goodwill must also be considered unlawful"; cf 228 fn 40. 
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It bears repetition that the delictual norm that infringement of the right to the trade 
secret is wrongful, is a concretization of the ground-norm of delictual wrongfulness, 
namely that conduct in conflict with the legal convictions of the community - the bani 
mores - is wrongful. In novel or borderline situations the courts can therefore always 
fall back on the bani mores to solve particularly difficult questions of wrongfulness. 30 
In applying the bani mores criterion, a careful balancing of the conflicting interests of 
the parties involved must be performed. As noted, considerations of legal policy play 
an important role in this process, and in particular, the decision of the court must 
reflect the values upheld by the South African Constitution. 
8.2.2.2 GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION 
As noted, an act that interferes with the powers of use, enjoyment and disposal 
exercised in respect of a trade secret by someone with a subjective right to that trade 
secret, is only wrongful in the absence of legal grounds justifying such interference. 
Such grounds, usually called grounds of justification, are delictual norms indicating 
that damage-causing conduct is condoned by the bani mores in certain situations, 
and is therefore lawful. 31 Grounds indicating that interference with another's trade 
secret is lawful, are the following: 
8.2.2.2.1 Consent 
If a person with a right to a trade secret consents32 to interference with the secret -
whether by acquisition, use, or disclosure thereof - such interference will be legally 
permissible and thus lawful. Phrased differently, legal policy dictates that a person 
who has obtained a subjective right to a trade secret - whether by use of his or her 
own talents to develop such a trade secret, by buying it, or whatever lawful reason -
is in principle entitled to use, enjoy and dispose of the secret as he or she wishes. 
If someone else interferes with this capacity of the latter, such conduct is in principle 
contra bonos mores and thus wrongful. If, however, he or she has consented to such 
3° Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40-43. 
31 In the parlance of the doctrine of subjective rights, grounds of justification are grounds indicating 
that a factual disturbance of the relationship between the subject of a subjective right and the object 
of his right does not violate a legal norm in a particular situation, and is therefore not wrongful (cf par 
7.4.1.1 above). In the context of the right to the trade secret, such grounds indicate that conduct 
factually interfering with the powers of use, enjoyment and disposal exercised in respect of a trade 
secret by someone with a subjective right to that trade secret, does not violate a delictual norm - is 
therefore not in conflict with the boni mores - and is therefore lawful. On grounds of justification in 
general, cf Burchell 67; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 66ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 70ff; Van der 
Walt 40ff. 
32 Cf in general Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 90ff; Boberg 724ff; Burchell 68ff; Van der Merwe 
and Olivier 89ff; Van der Walt 50ff. 
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conduct, his or her capacity to dispose of the secret according to his or her will is not 
violated, and the conduct is then not condemned by the bani mores and is therefore 
lawful. 
Consent is the most important ground of justification in respect of trade secrets, since 
it is frequently necessary for someone who has a subjective right to a trade secret 
to authorize another to acquire and/or use the secret. An employer might, for 
instance, need to disclose his or her trade secret to employees and authorize them 
to use the secret in the performance of their duties. Similarly, an entrepreneur might 
have to disclose his or her trade secret in the course of pre-contractual business 
negotiations. In such situations the consent will as a rule be confined in its ambit to 
certain specified acts. Thus the employees will probably be authorized to use the 
secret in the business of the employer, but not in their own private interest, nor will 
they be authorized to disclose the secret to third parties. The natural or juristic person 
to whom a trade secret is disclosed in the course of pre-contractual business 
negotiations, will probably only be authorized to consider the secret for the purpose 
of the relevant business decision. Only conduct covered by the ambit of the consent 
will be lawful. 
The requirements and some of the characteristics of consent as a ground of 
justification are the following: Consent must be freely or voluntarily given.33 The 
person giving the consent must be capable of volition.34 He or she must have full 
knowledge of the extent of the prejudice he or she is consenting to.35 He or she 
must also fully appreciate, that is, understand, the nature and extent of the 
prejudice.36 He or she must in fact subjectively consent to the prejudice,37 and such 
consent must be permitted by the legal order.38 The giving of consent is a unilateral 
act and may take place expressly or tacitly. 39 
33 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 93; Boberg 724; Burchell 68; Van der Merwe and Olivier 92; Van 
der Walt 52-53. 
34 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 94; cf Boberg 731; Burchell 68; Van der Merwe and Olivier 91; 
Van der Walt 54. 
35 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 94; Van der Merwe and Olivier 92; Van der Walt 51-52; Burchell 
69. 
36 Neethling , Potgieter and Visser 95; Burchell 68; Van der Walt 52. 
37 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 95; Boberg 725; Van der Merwe and Olivier 90; Van der Walt 
52. 
38 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 96; Burchell 69; Van der Merwe and Olivier 92ff; Van der Walt 
54; cf Boberg 7 40ff. 
39 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 91; Van der Merwe and Olivier 89-90; Van der Walt 51 54. 
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8.2.2.2.2 Double invention 
If somebody through independent research, development, or discovery obtains the 
same trade secret that is already held by another (the first owner), he or she is in 
principle free to enjoy and dispose of the secret as he or she wishes.40 If he or she 
uses or discloses the secret without the consent of the first owner, he or she commits 
no wrongful act. Because he or she used his or her own talents and energy in a 
reasonable manner to obtain the secret, his or her conduct is not condemned by the 
bani mores. Legal policy41 is equally in favour of the double inventor enjoying the 
fruits of his or her own labour, as it is in favour of the first owner doing so. The 
position of the first owner may be contrasted with the inventor who has chosen to 
register a patent on his or her invention. Legal policy dictates that he or she be 
awarded exclusive rights to his or her patent for a prescribed period of time, in return 
for describing the patent so that it may become part of the public domain when the 
protection period has expired. In contrast, the first trade secret owner tries to keep 
his or her invention out of the public domain, and if he or she succeeds, no one else 
will ever be able to build thereupon. In this case, it is submitted, legal policy dictates 
that the holder of the right be protected against unfair infringements, but by not 
describing his invention in a patent application, he or she runs the risk that someone 
may by fair means obtain the same secret. According to current policy dictates the 
law will not protect him or her against that risk. And the most obvious way in which 
a second person can obtain a trade secret in a manner that will not be condemned 
by the bani mores, is by doing exactly what the first owner did - using his or her own 
talents, and investing his or her own energy, time and money to discover or invent 
the secret. This is thus an unusual situation where the law awards two (or more) legal 
subjects equally strong subjective rights to the same legal object.42 They can 
enforce these rights against others, but not against each other.43 It follows that in 
an action for trade secret infringement, it would be a complete defence for the 
defendant to show that he or she has by independent research, development or 
discovery obtained the secret. The defence renders his or her subsequent use or 
disclosure of the secret lawful. The defendant is exercising his or her own subjective 
4° Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.5.3 fn 286; 3.2.1.2.3; 3.5.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 4.5.5.1; 6.2.1 above; cf Joubert 1985 
De Jure 43. 
41 Cf par 7.4.4.1 above. 
42 As has been noted in par 7.4.2 above, a similar situation is possible in the case of copyright. 
43 Cf, in particular, the exposition in the (first) American Restatement of the law of torts, sec 757 
comment (b) where it is recognized that independent invention by a second person does not 
necessarily destroy the secrecy of the trade secret in the hands of the first inventor. This view is 
eminently reasonable, since the second inventor may - like the first one - protect the secrecy of the 
invention in order to exploit it. 
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right, and the extent of the plaintiff's subjective right as against the defendant is 
accordingly limited thereby. Both plaintiff and defendant can enforce their rights 
against unreasonable interference by others. This position accommodates policy 
considerations favouring the general economic and scientific advancement of the 
community.44 Both inventors are rewarded for their efforts, without a situation being 
created where the invention can never lawfully fall into the hands of others who may 
· build thereupon. One situation where a double inventor will act wrongfully, however, 
is where he or she uses or discloses the secret with the sole motive of harming the 
other trade secret owner.45 
8.2.2.2.3 Reverse engineering 
Reverse engineering is the term coined to the process whereby someone obtains a 
trade secret by analysis of the product in which the secret is embodied. In English 
and American law reverse engineering is generally accepted as a complete defence 
against an action for trade secret infringement.46 It is submitted that this is another 
instance where subsequent use or disclosure of the trade secret is not condemned 
by the boni mores. If the trade secret owner can only exploit his or her trade secret 
by placing a product in which that secret is embodied on the market, he or she must 
run the risk of having the secret discovered by reverse engineering. The law will not 
shield him or her from that risk - unless he or she has obtained a patent right to the 
invention. Some trade secrets are inherently short-lived, and the value of such 
secrets to the owner is usually situated in the head-start in production and/or 
marketing he or she gains over his or her competitors, who must first obtain the 
secret by reverse engineering, and implement it, before they can compete on an 
equal footing. The competitor who reverse engineers a trade secret does not go to 
the same amount of trouble as the double inventor, but he or she must nevertheless 
use his or her own talents and invest his or her own energy, time and money. He or 
she will therefore not be penalized for subsequent use of the secret by the boni 
mores. Thus the trade secret owner is rewarded for his or her efforts by protection 
of the law for (at least)47 the length of time it takes his or her most astute competitor 
to reverse engineer the secret, while the latter is rewarded for his or her efforts by 
44 Par 7.4.4.1 above. 
45 See par 8.2.2.3 below on the role of motive in the determination of wrongfulness. 
46 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.5.3 fn 286; 3.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1 above; Coleman Trade secrets 25. In German law, 
reverse engineering will probably fall foul of the provisions of sec 17(2)(1) UWG - cf par 4.2.2.1; 6.2.1 
fn 28 above. 
47 If the person who obtained the secret by reverse engineering elects to preserve the secrecy 
thereof, the legal protectability of the trade secret is not necessarily terminated - see the main text 
below. 
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subsequent use of the secret with impunity. The legal position is further in 
accordance with policy considerations of economic expediency48 in the sense that 
a lawful manner is recognized whereby a trade secret can fall into the hands of others 
who may further build thereupon. 
A defendant in a trade secret misappropriation case should not be able to rely on 
reverse engineering executed by somebody else. 49 It cannot be a valid defence, for 
instance, for a defendant who has obtained a trade secret by industrial espionage, 
to show that another competitor of the trade secret owner has reverse engineered the 
secret and is already using it in competition with the original owner. If the competitor 
who reverse engineered the secret uses it without disclosing it, it may still be a trade 
secret. In such a case the original owner will still be able to enforce his or her rights 
against the industrial spy in the example. He or she still has a subjective right to the 
secret, and only the competitor who has reverse engineered the secret is now holding 
the same right (in a position analogous to that of double inventors) and may now use 
the secret with impunity. 
A prerequisite for successful reliance on the defence of reverse engineering should 
be that the reverse engineered product must have been obtained in a manner that 
does not infringe the trade secret owner's rights. If an industrial spy steals a prototype 
from the trade secret owner's production plant, and then reverse engineers the 
prototype, his or her conduct remains legally reprehensible and thus wrongful. 
Reverse engineering a product that is bought on the open market, on the other hand, 
is lawful. 
8.2.2.2.3.1 Reverse engineering and the identical copying of a competitor's product 
It is important to note that if someone reverse engineers a trade secret and then 
proceeds to market a product identical to the trade secret owner's product in which 
that secret is embodied, such conduct may in certain circumstances be wrongful. This 
would not be because the acquisition of the secret was conducted in a wrongful 
manner - as shown, discovery of a trade secret by reverse engineering is lawful. The 
legal reprehensibleness of such conduct would relate to the parasitic copying of the 
trade secret owner's product,50 instead of incorporating the discovered secret in a 
48 Par 7.4.4.1 above. 
49 If, however, the person who acquired the trade secret by reverse engineering caused it to fall 
into the public domain, this fact may be relied upon by another sued for alleged infringement of that 
same (former - since secrecy has been destroyed) trade secret. 
50 This form of unlawful competition is also known as prestasie-aanklamping. Ct Van Heerden and 
Neethling 242ff; Du Plessis in Neethling (ed) 1990. 
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product differing sufficiently from that of the trade secret owner to have an own 
identity in the market. Van Heerden and Neethling51 have argued that the identical 
or substantially identical copying52 of the product of a trade rival constitutes unlawful 
competition. The subjective right infringed in such a case would be the right to 
goodwill,53 not the right to the trade secret. However, the South African courts 
appear to require some additional factors indicating the legal reprehensibleness of the 
defendant's conduct, before the identical copying of a rival's product will be branded 
wrongful. For instance in the leading case, Schultz v Butt, 54 the defendant went 
further than the mere copying of the hull of the boat marketed by the plaintiff. He 
actually made a mould of the hull of one of the defendant's boats to facilitate exact 
reproduction of the hull, and then 'added impudence to dishonesty'55 by applying for 
a design registration on the hull. In the light of these factors the court was prepared 
51 They maintain (240ff) that while ideas in the public domain may - in the absence of specific 
statutory or common law prohibition - freely be used by competitors, the identical copying of a 
competitor's performance (ie product or service) is in principle wrongful. Such conduct is in conflict with 
the competition principle, which has been adopted by these authors as a concretization of the boni 
mores (cf par 7.4.1.1 above) in unlawful competition cases, and which has also received recognition 
of the courts - cf Van der Westhuizen v Scholtz 1992 4 SA 866 (0) 873-874; Payen Components SA 
Ltd v Bovie Gaskets CC 1994 2 SA 464 (W) 47 4. The competition principle requires that the competitor 
who delivers the best or most reasonable performance must achieve victory, while the one rendering 
the weakest performance must suffer defeat. The merits of a competitor's performance must therefore 
be decisive in the competitive struggle. Competitive conduct that infringes another's goodwill but which 
is not based on the merits of the competitor's own performance, will therefore in principle be wrongful. 
In the case of identical copying, the copier is said not to rely on the merits of his own performance, 
but rather on the merits of the performance of another. His conduct is therefore in conflict with the 
competition principle and thus wrongful. Exceptions to this principle are recognized. Thus in a situation 
of so-called 'functional necessity', ie where the entrepreneur cannot in any other way produce a 
competitive performance than by identically copying his rival's performance, such copying will be lawful. 
Also, if the plaintiff's performance is not sufficiently unusual to have a 'competitive own identity', 
identical copying will be lawful. Cf Neethling 1991 THRHR 565-566; 1992 THRHR 136-138; 1993 SALJ 
711 ff; cf Dean 1990 BML 190. On the competition principle in general, see Van Heerden 168-172; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 128-134; Van Heerden in Neethling (ed) 6ff. 
52 In emulation of German law, Van Heerden and Neethling 242ff distinguish between the direct 
or immediate adoption of a competitor's performance (unmittelbare Leistungsubername) and the 
identical or substantially identical duplication thereof (identisches Nachmachen). The Schultz case (fn 
54 below) is seen as an example of the former category, and the Bress designs (fn 57 below) case 
as an example of the latter. However, they concede (247) that the two classes may be very difficult 
to distinguish in practice, and should in any rate not be treated differently as a matter of principle, both 
being in conflict with the competition principle (fn 51 above). 
53 Par 7.4.4.4.1 above. Statutory intellectual property rights - like copyright - may also possibly be 
infringed - cf eg Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A); Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 2 SA 455 (W); Dean 1990 BML 159ff 187ff. 
54 1986 3 SA 667 (A). 
55 683. 
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to find the identical copying wrongful.56 And in Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge 
Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd57 the court did not regard the disassembling of a piece 
of furniture to reveal the structure of its frame and the subsequent copying thereof as 
wrongful per se. However, in the light of the defendant's improper motive,58 the 
court determined59 that his conduct amounted to unlawful competition. In the 
absence of such factors as those in the Schultz and Bress Design cases, even 
identical copying of a competitor's products will probably be lawful according to the 
current South African positive law.60 
8.2.2.2.4 Statutory authority and official capacity 
A natural or juristic person may be authorized by statute to acquire, use or disclose 
a trade secret without the consent of the person with a subjective right to that 
secret,.61 and certain officials may be authorized by the legal order (whether by 
statute or the common law) to do so when acting in their official capacity.62 
8.2.2.2.5 Public interest 
Some factual interferences with trade secrets may be objectively reasonable and 
therefore lawful because they are justified in the public interest.63 Examples could 
be the acquaintance with or disclosure of trade secrets which are used (or are 
capable of use) in ways that endanger the safety of the state or promote crime.64 
In such a case the interest served is more valuable than the one violated, and the 
conduct is not condemned by the boni mores. 
56 Cf further Boberg 1986 BML 64 and the interpretation of the Schultz case in Bress Designs (Pty) 
Ltd v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 2 SA 455 {W) 474A-D. 
57 1991 2 SA 455 (W) 474. 
58 The defendant's sole or dominant purpose was to harm the plaintiff, rather than to promote his 
own interests. Cf par 8.2.2.3 below. 
59 475. 
6
° Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 251ff; Dean 1990 BML 159ff 187ff. 
61 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 97-99 on statutory authority as ground of justification. 
62 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 99-100 on official capacity as ground of justification. 
63 Cf Gurry 325ff. 
64 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 495. 
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8.2.2.2.6 Other grounds on which wrongfulness may be disproved 
Apart from the above-mentioned grounds of justification, a defendant in trade secret 
litigation may prove the lawfulness of his or her conduct by showing that the alleged 
trade secret in question does not meet the requirements for a trade secret protectable 
at law. He or she may show that the relevant information is not really secret, for 
instance, by proving that it has been published;65 or that the secret does not really 
have any economic value66 - such a defence could arguably be an application of the 
rule de minimis non curat lex; or that the secret is not capable of commercial or 
industrial application;67 or that the plaintiff's conduct in the past is irreconcilable with 
a will on the part of the latter to keep the alleged trade secret confidential;68 or that 
the secret is not sufficiently concrete to exist separately from the personality of the 
plaintiff. 69 A successful reliance of any of these defences will also exclude 
wrongfulness, but they operate on a different level than the grounds of justification 
enumerated above.70 The defences mentioned in this paragraph are aimed at 
disproving the existence of a trade secret. If successful, they eliminate wrongfulness 
on the ground that there was in fact no subjective right to be infringed. The grounds 
of justification mentioned above acknowledge the existence of a trade secret, but -
as noted - render the factual interference with the powers of use, enjoyment and 
disposal exercised in respect of a trade secret by a person with a subjective right to 
that secret, legally permissible - and therefore lawful - because of the presence of 
special circumstances. The distinction is of importance in so far as it may determine 
who bears the onus of proof. When raising one of the defences mentioned in this 
paragraph, the defendant is trying to cast doubt on the allegations made by the 
plaintiff, and the defendant then carries a mere evidentiary burden. When raising one 
of the grounds of justification mentioned above, he or she is making fresh allegations, 
and may then be saddled with a full onus of proof in respect of those allegations.71 
65 Cf par 7.2.3 above. 
66 Cf par 7.2.5 above. 
67 Cf par 7.2.2 above. 
68 Cf par 7.2.4 above. 
69 Cf par 7.2.6 above. 
10 Par 8.2.2.2.1-8.2.2.2.5. 
71 Cf Schmidt 34ff; Schmidt and Zeffert LAWSA Vol 9 (1979) 336. The form in which the pleadings 
are drafted, influences this matter. If the defendant's plea is one of confession and avoidance, eg he 
admits that he has used the trade secret, but avers that he had obtained the owner's consent, he is 
saddled with a full onus, cf Minister of Law and Order v Monti 1995 1 SA 35 (A). 
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8.2.2.3 THE ROLE OF MOTIVE 
The enquiry into wrongfulness is an objective one and subjective factors, that is, 
factors relating to for instance the defendant's thoughts and emotions, are normally 
not taken into account.72 However, it is a well-established principle in the law of 
delict that in certain cases73 the defendant's motive74 may be taken into account -
with other relevant factors, especially the relative weights of the interests promoted 
by the defendant's conduct and the interests harmed thereby75 - to determine 
whether his or her conduct was wrongful. Motive can conceivably play an important 
role in connection with especially the defences of double invention and reverse 
engineering. A simple scenario may be used for illustrative purposes. If X reverse 
engineers Y's trade secret and then discloses it to all Y's major competitors with the 
sole or dominant motive76 of harming Y, X's conduct is wrongful. At first blush X is 
simply exercising his right obtained by reverse engineering, but in the light of his 
motive - and the matter will be more clear-cut if it can be shown that X has not 
advanced any lawful interest of his own or only relatively insignificant interests of his 
own - this is not the case.77 His conduct is contra bonos mores and thus wrongful. 
The same conclusion will be reached if a double inventor should disclose the secret 
with the sole or dominant motive of harming the original trade secret owner, 
especially if he or she is not advancing significant lawful interests of his or her own. 
However, it should be noted that a motive to destroy the competition by recognized 
competition tactics, need not necessarily colour an act wrongful.78 The law does not 
necessarily frown on severe competition, depending on the manner in which it is 
72 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 36-38; Van der Walt 21. 
73 Notably in the so-called field of neighbour law, but also in other fields - cf Burchell 63ff; 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 104ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 64ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 
135ff; Van der Walt 41ff. 
74 Motive must not be confused with intent. Intent is a technical legal term for a form of fault, and 
is present when an accountable wrongdoer directs his or her will at a result which he or she is causing 
in a wrongful manner, while he or she knows that his or her conduct is wrongful. Motive simply refers 
to the subjective reason why someone acts in a certain way; cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 38 fn 
36; Van der Walt 61-62; Boberg 269. 
75 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 109; Van der Merwe and Olivier 68-69; Van der Walt 42; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 136-137. 
76 Cf Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 2 SA 455 (W). 
77 Some will call this type of situation an abuse of right, but it is probably more accurate to say that 
X's conduct has exceeded the limits the law places on his right. Cf Burchell 64ff; Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser 105 fn 437; Van der Merwe and Olivier 67-68; Van der Walt 42; Van Heerden and Neethling 
135. 
78 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 139-140. 
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conducted. Thus if Q reverse engineers R's trade secret and then exploits it in his 
own products with the declared motive of dealing R a fatal blow on the market-place, 
his conduct will not necessarily be wrongful. If Q's primary motive is to gain the upper 
hand in the market, to which end he has the secondary motive to eliminate, if 
possible, his competition, his conduct will not be unreasonable. If his sole or dominant 
motive, on the other hand, is to harm R - that is, sheer malice - his conduct may be 
wrongful. 79 Again, it is important not to consider the defendant's motive in isolation, 
but rather in conjunction with all other relevant factors - especially the relative weights 
of respectively the interests promoted and the interests harmed by the defendant's 
conduct.80 
8.2.3 FAULT 
Whereas the enquiry into wrongfulness concerns the question whether conduct is 
objectively reasonable or unreasonable in the light of the harmful consequences 
caused or potentially caused thereby, the enquiry into the element of fault81 
concerns the question whether a person whose conduct has thus been found to be 
wrongful, can be blamed for that conduct by the law in the light of the person's mental 
disposition and standard of care observed at the time of the wrongdoing.82 Two 
forms of fault are recognized, namely intention and negligence. A wrongdoer acts 
intentionally if his or her will is directed at the result which he or she causes whilst 
conscious of the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.83 A wrongdoer acts negligently 
if the reasonable person84 in his or her position would have foreseen the possibility 
of his or her conduct harming another and would have taken steps to prevent or 
minimize such harm, but the wrongdoer failed to take such steps.85 Fault - in either 
of its two forms - can only be imputed to a wrongdoer who is accountable, that is, 
79 Cf Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 2 SA 455 (W). 
8° Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 139-140, who also point out that it may be very difficult to 
establish whether the primary motive of a competitor is to harm a rival or to promote his own interests. 
81 Cf in general Boberg 268ff; Burchell 30ff 85ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 113ff; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 11 Off; Van der Walt 60ff. 
82 Cf Boberg 268; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 113; Van der Merwe and Olivier 110 115 126; 
Van der Walt 60. 
83 Cf Boberg 268; Burchell 30-31; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 116; Van der Merwe and Olivier 
115; Van der Walt 62. 
84 Or, according to the traditional formulation, the reasonable man - the diligens paterfamilias. 
85 Cf Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430; Boberg 27 4; Burchell 31 86; Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser 122; Van der Merwe and Olivier 128; Van der Walt 68. 
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who has the mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong and act in 
accordance with such appreciation.86 
Both forms of fault can found Aquilian liability,87 but negligence is the applicable 
form of fault in the majority of cases in which the actio legis Aquiliae is instituted.88 
Logically, since liability in the case of trade secret misappropriation is Aquilian, proof 
of either intention or negligence should be sufficient in trade secret infringement 
cases. Such a position would also be in conformity with the provisions of the GA TT 
TR/Ps agreement in this regard.89 
However, some authors - writing on unlawful competition in general or trade secret 
misappropriation in particular90 - have suggested that intention is always a 
prerequisite for liability. Others91 might concede the correctness in principle of the 
view that negligence should also be sufficient, whilst doubting the practical relevance 
thereof in this part of the law. A third group92 is clearly of the opinion that both 
intention and negligence should found liability. It will be seen93 that the reported 
case law seems to have dealt mainly - if not exclusively - with intentional trade secret 
misappropriation thus far. This raises the question whether the negligent infringement 
of trade secrets is a realistic possibility in practice, or whether it is simply of academic 
interest. 
It is submitted that negligence as a form of fault may be of great practical importance 
in the field of trade secret misappropriation. The most important substantiation for this 
statement must be sought in the nature of intent as form of fault. Intention comprises 
two elements, namely direction of the will at a certain result and, secondly, 
consciousness of wrongfulness.94 The second element, consciousness of 
86 Cf Boberg 268; Burchell 29 83; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 114; Van der Merwe and Olivier 
112; Van der Walt 60. 
87 Boberg 268; Burchell 30; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 11; Van der Merwe and Olivier 227. 
88 Boberg 269; Burchell 30. 
89 Cf par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
90 Boberg in Neethling (ed) 20ff; Boberg 149; Pienaar 7 113ff; cf Burchell 1978 BML 122. 
91 Domanski 1993 THRHR 433. 
92 Van Heerden and Neethling 232; Neethling and Potgieter 1991 SALJ 35; Knobel 1990 THRHR 
498-499; cf Copeling 1968 THRHR 192. 
93 Par 9.3.1.3 below. 
94 Minister of Justice v Hotmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 154; Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Brenner 1989 1 SA 390 (A) 396; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 116-120. 
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wrongfulness, may readily be absent when trade secrets are infringed. An ex-
employee may, for instance, not realize that certain information imparted to him by 
his former employer during subsistence of the service contract was a trade secret of 
the latter. If the ex-employee then discloses the information to his new employer, not 
realizing that such conduct is wrongful, he has no intent in its legal sense. Should this 
mean that the former employer cannot institute an action for damages against him 
(or against the new employer if he now makes use of the information not knowing that 
his conduct is wrongful)? It is submitted that it should not. If the reasonable person 
in the position of the ex-employee (or/and new employer) would have realized that 
the information was a trade secret, and would have taken steps not to harm the 
former employer damage by disclosing the secret without authorization, the ex-
employee (or/and new employer) was/were negligent. According to general delictual 
principles the Aquilian action should then be available to the former employer to 
obtain damages95 for the negligent infringement of his trade secret. Recognition of 
delictual liability for negligent trade secret infringements will therefore have the 
important practical consequence that a trade secret infringer who for some reason is 
not conscious of the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, will not escape delictual 
liability if it can be shown that the reasonable person in his or her position would have 
had consciousness of wrongfulness.96 
A second situation where negligence may conceivably play an important role in trade 
secret litigation, could be where the trade secret owner has disclosed his or her 
secret to another in confidence, and the latter fails to take the steps which the 
reasonable person in that position would have taken to prevent others to acquaint 
themselves with the secret, with the result that a third person indeed acquires the 
secret against the will of the owner thereof. The trade secret owner should have a 
delictual action against such a negligent discloser.97 
95 This example presupposes a situation where the secrecy of the trade secret cannot be preserved 
by interdicting the ex-employee and his or her new employer any more (cf par 8.5.4; 8.6.4 below). If 
it is not to late to save the secret by an interdict, the latter would be a more advantageous remedy 
than an action for damages, and the question of fault need not arise in such a case (par 8.5.4 below). 
96 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 498-499; Copeling 1968 THRHR 192; in respect of unlawful competition 
generally Van Heerden and Neethling 70. 
97 Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 499. However, in such cases the trade secret owner and the negligent 
discloser will normally be in a contractual relationship, and the trade secret owner may frequently 
prefer to use a contractual remedy against the negligent discloser. If secrecy can still be preserved by 
court orders restraining the discloser and the third person from further disclosure, an interdict will be 
the more advantageous remedy - in which case fault need not be proved (par 8.5.4 below). 
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8.2.4 CAUSATION 
To succeed with an action for damages ex lege Aquilia, a causal link between the 
wrongful act or conduct and the damage must be established.98 In the first place, 
factual causation must be established, that is, the plaintiff must show on the facts that 
the act caused the damage. Being a factual issue, factual causation is established 
in a court of law by way of evidence. 99 In a trade secret misappropriation case, the 
plaintiff must show that the misappropriation of the trade secret was the factual cause 
of the patrimonial loss 100 suffered by him or her. 
If a factual causal link between the trade secret misappropriation and the patrimonial 
loss has been established, there must according to general principles also be a legal 
causal link between the said misappropriation and the said loss.101 Legal causation 
concerns the question whether the nexus between the conduct of the wrongdoer and 
the damage factually caused thereby, is sufficiently close that the wrongdoer can on 
legal policy grounds be held liable for the causing of that damage. If the damage is 
"too remote", the wrongdoer will not be held liable, although his or her conduct 
factually caused that damage. Various theories have been advanced as criteria or 
tests to determine whether damage is too remote for legal causation to be 
present.102 The most widely accepted of these in cases of patrimonial loss appears 
to be reasonable foreseeability. 103 A legal causal connection can according to this 
test only exist between conduct and (factually caused) consequences that were 
98 Cf in general Boberg 380ff; Burchell 32-34 114ff; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 159ff; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 196ff; Van der Walt 94ff; Pienaar 127ff. 
99 The courts profess to use the conditio sine qua non test to establish factual causation - cf eg 
Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 33 35 44; S v Daniels 1983 3 SA 275 (A) 331; S v 
Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 39; International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700. 
Thus an act is the (factual) cause of a particular harmful result if the act cannot be mentally eliminated 
without the result also disappearing - the act is then a conditio sine qua non for the realization of that 
result. However, commentators have argued that the conditio sine qua non is not really a scientific 
test, but rather a way of formulating an already pre-determined causal relationship between a cause 
and a consequence - cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 162ff and authorities cited. Viewed in this way, 
a test is not needed to establish a factual issue like factual causation - what is needed, is simply 
evidence showing that the conduct complained of caused the damage complained of. 
100 Par 8.2.5 below. 
101 Boberg 439ff; Burchell 32-34 119-122; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 169ff; Van der Walt 98-
104. 
102 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 172ff; Boberg 439ff; Burchell 119ff; Van der Walt 98ff. 
103 Cf eg Boberg 445; Van der Walt 103. 
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reasonably (objectively) foreseeable. However, the current approach of the courts 104 
is a flexible one, in terms of which none of the theories of legal causation is regarded 
as suitable to establish legal causation in all cases. Whether a sufficiently close 
nexus between act and consequence exists, is determined with reference to policy 
considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and justice. Existing criteria 
(theories) of legal causation may play a subsidiary role in determining legal causation 
by means of the flexible criterion. 
In trade secret misappropriation cases, the plaintiff must therefore show that there 
was a sufficiently close nexus between the patrimonial loss factually caused by the 
defendant's misappropriation of the farmer's secret and the latter's conduct that 
liability for that loss may - with reference to policy considerations based on 
reasonableness, fairness and justice - be imputed to the defendant. 
8.2.5 DAMAGE 
To succeed with an action for damages ex /ege Aqui/ia, the plaintiff must prove that 
he suffered damage in the form of patrimonial loss.105 The existence and 
quantum 106 of patrimonial loss are established by a comparative method.107 In the 
104 S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A); International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 
(A); cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 191-195; Van Heerden and Neethling 71; Burchell 121-122; Van 
der Walt 102-104. 
105 Cf Pienaar 73. Patrimonial loss is defined by Visser and Potgieter 42 as: "[nhe diminution in 
the utility of a patrimonial interest in satisfying the recognized needs of the person entitled to such 
interest. It may also be defined as the loss or reduction in value of a positive asset in someone's 
patrimony or the creation or increase of a negative element of his patrimony (a patrimonial debt)"; cf 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 206. Cf further Boberg 476: "[Patrimonial] loss is the diminution in the 
plaintiff's patrimony (his interesse or id quad interest), and it is represented by 'die verskil tussen die 
vermoensposisie van die benadeelde v66r die onregmatige daad en daarna ... Skade is die ongunstige 
verskil wat deur die onregmatige daad ontstaan het' (Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 
1973 2 SA 146 (A) at 150 ... ). Because a delict may diminish an estate not only by reducing its value 
but also by preventing its value from increasing, damage is not confined to actual losses or expenses 
(damnum emergens), but includes also the deprivation of a financial benefit that would otherwise have 
accrued (lucrum cessans)"; Van Aswegan 160: "Vermoenskade, finansiele verlies of 
vermoensvermindering word ... omskryf as, of liewer gelykgestel aan, die verskil tussen die eiser se 
huidige vermoensposisie en die posisie waarin hy sou gewees het indien die skadestigtende 
gebeurtenis (in huidige verband die delik) nie plaasgevind het nie. Hierdie omskrywing, wat skade 
gelykstel aan 'n geldsom wat by wyse van 'n vergelykingsmetode vasgestel word, staan bekend as die 
sommeskadeleer ... of die 'method of difference'. Dit dien nie alleen as definisie of omskrywing van 
skade nie, maar oak as maatstaf vir die bepaling van die omvang daarvan, wat natuurlik tegelyk die 
kwantifisering of berekening van die skadevergoedingsbedrag behels ... [D]it druk meteen ook die doel 
van deliktuele skadevergoeding uit, naamlik om dle benadeelde in die vermoensposisie te plaas waarin 
hy sou gewees het indien die delik nie gepleeg is nie." 
106 Cf Van Aswegen 160, quoted in fn 105 above. 
254 
case of patrimonial loss already suffered, the (actual) patrimonial position of the 
plaintiff after perpetration of the delict is compared with the hypothetical patrimonial 
position the plaintiff would have been in, had the delict not taken place. The 
difference between the two positions constitutes the plaintiff's patrimonial loss.108 
Prospective loss, on the other hand, can only be assessed with reference to two 
hypothetical patrimonial positions. The hypothetical patrimonial position the plaintiff 
would have been in, had the delict not been committed, is compared with his or her 
hypothetical future patrimonial position that will probably ensue in the light of the 
commission of the delict.109 
In cases of trade secret misappropriation, patrimonial loss will usually take the form 
of a loss of profit - already suffered and/or prospective - resulting from the deprivation 
of the plaintiff (the owner or licensee) of the power to exploit the secret. 110 Such 
loss may arise in a competitive context, but it may also be caused by non-
competitors.111 In a context of unlawful competition, the plaintiff's loss of profit will 
usually flow from his or her loss of trade or custom, in that clients or potential clients 
deal with the defendant instead of with him or her.112 His or her patrimonial position 
is thus adversely affected because - as a result of the defendant's misappropriation 
of his or her trade secret and the latter's use or disclosure thereof - he or she is 
unable to exploit the secret in enhancing his or her goodwill as effectively as before. 
If the secret was misappropriated by a non-competitor, the plaintiff's loss of profit may 
consist of the loss of royalties which he or she could have earned by way of licensing 
agreements, or the 'purchase price' he or she could have obtained by selling all the 
107 Potgieter and Visser 59; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 209. 
108 This method is generally known as the sum-formula approach (sommeskadeleer) - cf Visser 
and Potgieter 59-67; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 209-210. It has been suggested that many forms 
of patrimonial loss already suffered are probably best assessed by comparing the plaintiff's actual 
patrimonial position before the delict with his actual patrimonial position after the delict, thus employing 
a so-called concrete approach - cf Visser and Potgieter 66-67; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 210. 
A loss of profit can, however, not be assessed in such a manner - cf Visser and Potgieter 63; 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 210. Where a loss of profit has already been suffered, the (actual) 
patrimonial position of the plaintiff after perpetration of the delict must be compared with the 
hypothetical patrimonial position the plaintiff would have been in, in the light of the profit that he would 
probably have made, had the delict not taken place. A future loss of profit is prospective loss, and 
must therefore be assessed by comparing two hypothetical positions as explained in the main text 
above. Since patrimonial loss caused by trade secret misappropriation will usually take the form of loss 
of profit, it is submitted that a concrete comparative method will rarely be apposite in trade secret 
cases. 
109 Cf Visser and Potgieter 63. 
11° Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 499. 
111 Cf par 7.4.4.4.1 above; 9.3.1.2.2 below. 
112 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 72; Visser and Potgieter 345 fn 112; Knobel 1990 THRHR 499. 
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rights to the secret to another. The loss of profit may also flow from the deprivation 
of the power to exploit the trade secret in a business enterprise yet to be launched. 
Commentators113 have alluded to the difficulty - if not impossibility - to establish with 
mathematical accuracy the exact quantum of damage in unlawful competition cases 
in general. The same can be said about trade secret misappropriation cases, whether 
the misappropriation occurred in a context of unlawful competition or not. The reason 
for this situation lies in the extremely speculative nature of profits that might have 
been made, but were not made because of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Van 
Heerden and Neethling 114 submit that the courts should not require precise proof 
of the exact extent of damage in unlawful competition cases. On the probabilities 
revealed by the evidence, the courts should assess the loss and make an award ex 
aequo et bona. Their submission is fully supported in so far as trade secret litigation 
is concerned, and the position should be no different if trade secret misappropriation 
occurs outside a competitive context, since the difficulties militating against the 
determination of the exact quantum of damages are similar in such instances. 
In the light of the elusiveness of the exact quantum of patrimonial loss caused by 
trade secret infringement, it is submitted that South African courts will do well to 
emulate other legal systems115 where the quantum is determined with reference to 
a reasonable royalty for use of the secret. Significantly, provision has been made in 
related branches of intellectual property law for the quantum of damages to be based 
on the amount of a reasonable royalty for use.116 
The quantum of the damage may be influenced by various factors. What the 
misappropriator does with the trade secret may play a role. If the infringing conduct 
consists of the unauthorized acquisition of the trade secret and the subsequent use 
thereof in a competing business, while keeping the misappropriated information secret 
from other competitors in the same field, the quantum of the loss will tend to be 
smaller than in a situation where the infringer disclosed the secret to all the major 
competitors of the plaintiff, thereby effectively destroying the secret. Some trade 
secrets obviously have the potential to generate greater profits for the persons 
exploiting them than others, and this fact should be reflected in the quantum of 
113 Van Heerden and Neethling 72; Visser and Potgieter 345-346. 
114 72; cf Potgieter and Visser 346. 
115 Cf par 2.3.1; 3.3.1; 4.3.1 above. 
116 Cf sec 65(6) of the Patent Act 57 of 1978 (as amended by Act 76 of 1988) and sec 24(1 A)-(1 C) 
of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (as amended by Act 125 of 1992). Cf sec 43(3)(d) of the Trade Marks 
Act 194 of 1993 and sec 35(3)(d) of the Designs Act 195 of 1993 which provide that the court may 
grant the proprietor a reasonable royalty in lieu of damages. 
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damages awarded. In this regard the fact that many trade secrets can at the most 
give their owners a temporary head-start over competitors, should also be borne in 
mind when a monetary value must be placed on the deprivation of the power to fully 
exploit such a secret. 117 
8.3 CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
8.3.1 EXPRESS CONTRACT 
Trade secrets may be protected by express contractual provisions. 118 Such 
provisions will frequently be expressed in restraint of trade agreements in 
employment contracts.119 Express contractual agreements protecting trade secrets 
may also be entered into by actual or potential customers 120 or parties to trade 
secret licensing agreements. The common denominator in all these instances is the 
entrusting of the trade secret by the trade secret owner to another person for limited 
purposes, for instance to enable his or her employee to execute his or her duties; to 
persuade a potential customer to do business with him or her; or to receive royalties 
from a licensee. The purpose of express contractual protection of trade secrets in 
such instances is always to impose a duty on the receiver of the secret not to use the 
secret for other purposes than those envisaged by the owner, nor to disclose the 
secret to other parties. 
Before the decision of the Appellate Division in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis, 121 agreements in restraint of trade were regarded as prima facie 
void and hence unenforceable. If, however, the covenantee - that is, the party seeking 
to restrain the other - could prove that the restraint agreement was reasonable 
between the parties and not contrary to the public interest, the courts would enforce 
117 This suggestion is inspired by the springboard doctrine of English law and the so-called /ead-
time interdicts of American law (cf par 2.4.4; 3.4.4 above). It is submitted that just as the time limitation 
on the value of many trade secrets is of cardinal importance when the duration of an interdict is 
determined, it cannot be disregarded when the quantum of loss must be determined in an action for 
damages. Cf the American Uniform Trade Secrets Act sec 3 Commissioners' comment (par 3.3.1 
above); Milgrim Vol 3 15.214 (par 3.3.1 fn 132 above); Van Heerden and Neethling 233; Visser and 
Potgieter 345 fn 112; Knobel 1990 THRHR 492 fn 43 500. 
118 Frequently a wise option for the trade secret owner - cf Delport 1982 BML 188-189; Knobel 
1990 THRHR 490 fn 22. 
119 Domanski 1993 THRHR 240; cf in general Christie 432ff; Christie LAWSA Vol 5 (1994) 216-217; 
Joubert Contract 144ff; Kerr 503ff; Lubbe and Murray 238ff; Van der Merwe et al Contract 155ff. 
12
° Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 240. 
121 1984 4 SA 874 (A). 
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such an agreement. The covenantee could prove the reasonableness of the restraint 
by showing that it protected a proprietary interest, 122 of which two classes were 
recognized as worthy of protection, namely trade secrets and trade connections. 123 
In the Magna Alloys case 124 the basic premise concerning agreements in restraint 
of trade was reversed. Restraint agreements were held to be in principle enforceable, 
and such an agreement would only be unenforceable if the person sought to be 
restrained - the covenantor - could show the restraint to be contrary to the public 
interest or public policy. The applicable principles were further elucidated by the 
Appellate Division in Basson v Chilwan. 125 It was stated 126 that a restraint is 
against public policy if its effect would be unreasonable. The reasonableness of the 
restraint must be determined with reference to the broad interests of the community 
and the interests of the contracting parties. As far as the broad community interests 
are concerned, two considerations are relevant - agreements should be honoured; 
and unproductivity must be discouraged. As far as the parties themselves are 
concerned, a restraint is unreasonable if it restricts a party's freedom of economic 
activity without serving a protectable interest of the other party. In this regard the 
courts have continued to determine the reasonableness of restraint agreements by 
asking whether they protect proprietary interests in trade secrets or trade 
connections. 127 Whether a restraint of trade agreement purporting to protect a trade 
secret will be enforced by the courts or not, will therefore depend on whether the 
person seeking to enforce it does indeed have a trade secret, and that the restraint 
is not wider than is necessary to protect the secret - if it is, the court may order partial 
enforcement.128 The reasonableness of the restraint must be determined with 
reference to the circumstances pertaining at the time enforcement is sought - not with 
122 This rule applied particularly where the contracting parties were regarded as dealing on an 
unequal footing, eg in the case of employer and employee - cf Van Heerden and Neethling 25. The 
rule has, however, also been applied to an agreement between parties dealing on an equal footing -
Ackermann-Goggingen Aktiengesellshaft v Marshing 1973 4 SA 62 (C); Van Heerden and Neethling 
26 fn 72. 
123 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 25-26 and authorities cited. 
124 878-879; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 26ff. 
125 1993 3 SA 742 (A). 
126 767; cf Christie LAWSA Vol 5 (1994) 216. 
127 Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (D 486-488 502-506; Basson 
v Chi/wan 1993 3 SA 7 42 (A) 769-773; Rawlins v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 1 SA 537 (A) 541-542; 
The Concept Factory v Heyl 1994 2 SA 105 (T) 112; Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real Estate (Edms) Bpk v 
So// 1986 1 SA 673 (O) 886 887; cf further Van Heerden and Neethling 28 fn 87; Domanski 1993 
THRHR 240-242. 
128 Cf eg Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (T). 
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reference to the circumstances pertaining at the time the agreement was entered 
into.129 
The main practical difference brought about by the Magna Alloys case is that the 
onus of proof is now on the party opposing the restraint agreement to prove that it is 
unreasonable - whereas previously the onus was on the party seeking to enforce the 
agreement to prove that it was reasonable. This means that the alleged trade secret 
infringer must prove that the alleged trade secret owner had no secret to protect or 
that he or she (the alleged infringer) had no access to the secret - whereas previously 
the alleged trade secret owner had to prove the existence of his secret. It could be 
argued, in the light of the entrenchment of the right to free economic activity as a 
fundamental right in the Constitution, 130 that the onus of justifying a limiting of this 
fundamental right by a restraint of trade should rest on the covenantee - thus 
reverting to the position before Magna Alloys. 131 However, in Waltons Stationery 
Co (Edms) Bpk v Fourie132 it was held that the relevant section133 of the 
Constitution does not exclude agreements in restraint of trade and that Magna Alloys 
still states the law correctly .134 
The shift in onus brought about by the Magna Alloys case means that it should now 
be easier to protect trade secrets by way of express contractual provisions than it was 
before. It also means that it should be easier to succeed with a claim based on 
express contract than it would be to succeed with a delictual claim, since in order to 
establish wrongfulness, the plaintiff/trade secret owner in a delictual claim must prove 
the existence and the infringement of his or her trade secret. 
129 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 87 4 (A) 898; Sibex Engineering 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (T) 503. 
130 Sec 26 Act 200 of 1993: "Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity 
and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in the national territory." The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Bill, 1996 protects the right of all citizens to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely 
(cl 22). The Bill also provides in this regard that the practice of a trade, occupation or profession may 
be regulated by law. The right freely to choose trade, occupation or profession appears to be narrower 
in scope than the right to freedom of economic activity protected in the interim Constitution. 
131 Cf Grove 1994 De Jure 396; Van Heerden and Neethling 15 fn 90. 
132 1994 4 SA 507 (0) 511. 
133 26. 
134 Cf Waker 1994 SA Mere LJ 329ff; Rautenbach and Reinecke 1995 TSAR 551ff; Van Heerden 
and Neethling 27 fn 84. 
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8.3.2 IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Where parties stand in a contactual relationship, trade secrets may in the absence 
of express contractual terms protecting trade secrets, be protected by implied 
contractual terms. 135 During the subsistence of a contract of service, there is an 
implied contractual obligation on the employee to preserve the secrecy of the 
employer's trade secrets. This obligation is a corollary of the employee's duty of good 
faith, also called the duty of fidelity or the duty to further the employer's business 
interests.136 This duty is one of the so-called naturalia of the service contract. This 
means that the term is implied by the law as a matter of course and without reference 
to the actual intention or conduct of the contracting parties. Such a term may, subject 
to some qualification, be excluded by the parties, and in that sense their intention is 
not completely irrelevant. However, such a term does not originate in contractual 
consensus - it is imposed by the law from without. 137 
Implied terms may also be of another type, sometimes referred to as tacit terms.138 
Such a term derives - or is said to derive - from the common intention of the parties 
but is not expressed by them. It is inferred or deduced from the express terms and 
surrounding circumstances of the contract. The test as to whether a tacit term can be 
implied is the so-called 'innocent bystander' test expressed as follows in the English 
decision Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom): 139 "You must only imply 
a term if it is necessary in the business sense to give efficacy to the contract; that is, 
if it is such a term that you can be confident that if at the time the contract was being 
negotiated someone had said to the parties: 'What will happen in such a case?' they 
would have both replied: 'Of course, so-and-so. We did not trouble to say that; it is 
too clear'." Such a term protecting a trade secret may be implied into an existing 
contract. Furthermore, the possibility exists of a contract protecting a trade secret 
being implied where parties stand in certain relationships, for instance during pre-
contractual negotiations.140 
135 Cf in general Domanski 1993 THRHR 233ff; Delport 1982 BML 187-188; Joubert 1985 De Jure 
39ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 234. 
136 Cf Gibson 218-220; Grogan 41; Rycroft and Jordaan 61; Van Jaarsveld and Vivier 652-653. 
137 Cf Christie 183ff; Joubert Contract 65-66; Kerr 283ff ('residual provisions'); Lubbe and Murray 
422-425; Van der Merwe et al Contract 196-197; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal 
Provincial Administration 197 4 3 SA 506 (A). 
138 Cf Christie 194ff; Kerr 269ff; Joubert Contract 66ff; Lubbe and Murray 417-419; Van der Merwe 
Contract 197ff. 
139 118 LT 479 483. 
14° Cf Joubert 1985 De Jure 39-40. 
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8.4 CONCURRENCE OF CLAIMS 
It is recognized in South African law that contractual remedies and the actio legis 
Aqui/iae may concur in situations where breach of contract at the same time 
constitutes a delictual act causing patrimonial loss. However, the actio /egis Aquiliae 
is only available alongside the contractual action if the conduct complained of 
constitutes an infringement of both the plaintiff's contractual rights and a right which 
he or she has independently of the contract.141 The right to the trade secret is 
precisely such a right. It is an intellectual property right and exists independently of 
contract. 142 Conduct breaching a contractual term protecting a trade secret against 
unauthorized use or disclosure, will also - quite independently of any contractual 
relationship between the parties - constitute an infringement of the right to the trade 
secret, and will therefore also be wrongful143 for delictual purposes. 
8.5 REMEDIES 
8.5.1 DAMAGES 
An action for damages may be founded in delict or contract. The requirements for a 
delictual action for damages have been discussed above. 144 The trade secret owner 
who wishes to claim damages for breach of contract145 must prove:146 
(a) a breach of contract - in this context breach of an express or implied 
141 Van der Walt 7; Lil!icrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 
1 SA 475 (A) 499; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 253; cf Van Aswegen 1992 THRHR 273: "In effek 
word dus vir die erkenning van sameloop tussen kontrakbreuk en delik vereis dat, naas inbreuk op die 
vorderingsreg oftewel verbreking van 'n kontraktuele verpligting, die optrede van die dader boonop 6f 
'n ander subjektiewe reg moet skend, 6f 'n regsplig wat onafhanklik van die kontrak bestaan, moet 
verbreek"; Van Aswegen 293. Both Van Aswegen 298, 1992 THRHR 277 and Midgley 1993 SALJ 76-
78 are of the opinion that the true test is to mentally substitute an invalid agreement for the valid 
contract and then to enquire whether delictual liability may still ensue. According to this view it is 
unnecessary to eliminate the factual circumstances surrounding the contract or the relationship formed 
by the contract; only the validity of the contract need be eliminated in the enquiry into the concurrence 
question. 
142 See par 7.4.2; 7.4.3 above; Van Heerden and Neethling 235 fn 79. 
143 Unless a ground of justification was present. 
144 Par 8.2.1-8.2.5. 
145 Cf in general Van der Merwe et al Contract 296-315; Christie 639-656; De Wet and Van Wyk 
222-234; Joubert Contract 246-264; Kerr 573-645; Lubbe and Murray 594-644. 
146 This exposition is based on Van der Merwe et al Contract 296. Cf Joubert Contract 246-247; 
Kerr 573. 
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contractual term protecting the plaintiff's trade secret - by the other 
party to the contract; 
(b) damage; 
(c) a causal connection between the breach of contract and the damage; 
and 
(d) that for the purpose of the law, the damage is close enough to the 
breach of contract, in that it was reasonably foreseeable or agreed to 
by the parties to the contract. 
8.5.2 ACCOUNT OF PROFITS 
As noted, 147 in other legal systems the quantum of a trade secret owner's loss may 
be determined with reference to the infringer's profits. This can obviously only be 
done if the amount of such profits is known. In this regard the remedy of English law, 
whereby the defendant is ordered to render an account of profits, appears to offer a 
solution.148 However, South African courts are unwilling to issue such an order, 149 
and it has been abolished or is of suspect status in the case of statutory intellectual 
property rights. 150 Van Heerden and Neethling 151 argue that this remedy is 
147 Par 6.4 above. 
148 Note, however, that in English law the account of profits is an independent remedy alternative 
to an action for damages - see par 2.3.2 above; cf Copeling 61; and not an aid for the determination 
of damages as suggested here. 
149 In Rectifier and Communication Systems (Pty) Ltd v Harrison 1981 2 SA 283 (C) - a case that 
dealt with confidential information - Watermeyer JP said (286): "If a claim for an account of profits and 
payment thereof is permissible in the field of South African patent, trade-mark and copyright law, a 
matter upon which I express no opinion, [see in this regard fn 150] it has not to my knowledge been 
extended ... to claims under the lex Aquilia like the present. It would seem to be wrong in principle and 
no authority for such an extension has been quoted." Cf Montres Ro/ex SA v Kleynhans 1985 1 SA 
55 (C); Victor Products (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Lateulere Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd 1975 1 SA 961 (W) 963; 
John Waddington Ltd v Arthur E Harris (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 38 (T) 48; William Lasar v Sabon 
Precision Machine Co (Pty) Ltd 1954 2 PH A37 (W); Peter Jackson (Overseas) Ltd v Rand Tobacco 
Co (1936) Ltd 1938 TPD 450 457; Crossfield & Son Ltd v Crystallizers Ltd 1925 WLD 216 224; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 72-7 4; Visser and Potgieter 346 fn 124. 
150 In respect of copyright, sec 24(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 originally provided: "Subject 
to the provisions of this Act, infringements of copyright shall be actionable at the suit of the owner of 
the copyright, and in any action for such infringement all such relief by way of damages, interdict, 
accounts, delivery of infringing copies or plates used or intended to be used for infringing copies or 
otherwise shall be available to the plaintiff as is available in any corresponding proceedings in respect 
of infringements of other proprietary rights" (emphasis added), and sec 24(2) provided: "Where in an 
action for infringement of copyright it is proved or admitted that an infringement was committed but that 
at the time of the infringement the defendant was not aware and had no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates, the plaintiff shall not be 
entitled under this section to any damages against the defendant in respect of the infringement but 
shall be entitled to an account of profits in respect of the infringement whether any other relief is 
granted under this section or not." Some authorities were of the opinion that the "accounts" referred 
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necessary in South Africa because of the enormous practical difficulties confronting 
a plaintiff in establishing the quantum of damage in an unlawful competition case, and 
that it should be incorporated into our law by way of legislation. However, in the light 
of the practical difficulties experienced in English law with the remedy, 152 and the 
general trend in South African intellectual property law of abolishing it, it is doubtful 
whether this proposal deserves support.153 
to in sec 24 were not the independent remedy of English law (par 2.3.2 above), but a "procedural 
remedy, designed merely to assist a plaintiff in proving his damages in cases where the extent of these 
damages is something peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant" - Copeling 62; Rutherford 
1980 MB 100; for a different opinion, cf Dean 1986 SALJ 103. However, sec 24(2) provided that an 
account of profits would be available if at the time of the infringement the defendant was not aware 
and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work to which the action 
related - thus where the defendant had no fault. Since a claim for damages must be based on fault, 
it appears that sec 24(2) envisaged a remedy independent from damages. Be that as it may, an 
account of profits as remedy for copyright infringement was removed from sec 24(1) of the Copyright 
Act by the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992. Sec 24(2) was also amended and now reads: 
"Where in an action for infringement of copyright it is proved or admitted that an infringement was 
committed but that at the time of the infringement the defendant was not aware and had no reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates, the plaintiff 
shall not be entitled under this section to any damages against the defendant in respect of the 
infringement." An account of profits is therefore not available for copyright infringement any more. 
In respect of patents law, sec 65 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978 does not provide for an account of 
profits. In Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v Rodi & Wienenberger Aktiengesellschaft 1960 3 SA 747 (A) an 
account was ordered in the court a quo and the point was not considered but the order was confirmed 
on appeal. Subsequently, the Patents Amendment Act 76 of 1988 introduced a new sec 65(6) providing 
that damages may be calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty. Burrel 380 concludes that an 
account of profits does not seem to be available in modern South African law for patent infringement 
unless there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties or where one party is under a duty, imposed 
by contract or statute, towards the other. 
In respect of trade marks law, it was held in Montres Ro/ex SA v Kleynhans 1985 1 SA 55 (C) that 
an account of profits is not available in trade mark infringement proceedings in South Africa - cf 
Webster and Page 467. Sec 34 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, while allowing inter alia a 
reasonable royalty in lieu of damages and an enquiry into damages, does not make provision for an 
account of profits. 
In respect of designs law, an account of profits was an available remedy in terms of sec 24(1) and (2) 
of the Designs Act 57 of 1967 - cf Rutherford 1980 MB 104-105. However, sec 35 of the new Designs 
Act 195 of 1993 makes no provision for this remedy. 
151 73-74. 
152 See par 2.3.2 above. 
153 Note that the GA TT TR!Ps agreement makes provision (art 45(2)) for a recovery of profits to 
be authorized "in appropriate cases" (which are not defined) even in the case of innocent 
infringements. However, the provision is not phrased in mandatory terms. Cf par 5.1 fn 26 above. 
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8.5.3 ENQUIRY INTO DAMAGES 
Another remedy that can be helpful in the determination of the quantum of damages, 
is the enquiry into damages - that is, where the court itself does not determine the 
loss but directs an official to do so.154 In a trade secret case, Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd, 155 Nicholas J felt that an order for an enquiry into 
damages was not apt under South African procedure, where the trial judge alone 
decides all the issues in the action. However, in a more recent case dealing with 
trade mark infringement, Montres Ro/ex SA v Kleynhans, 156 Seligson AJ had no 
difficulty in accepting the remedy, since it "is directed to a determination of the 
damages actually sustained by the plaintiff, can serve a useful purpose and is not 
inconsistent with any fundamental tenet of our legal system" .157 The Trade Marks 
Act158 and the Designs Act159 now make express provision for an enquiry into 
damages to be ordered in trade mark and designs litigation respectively. In the light 
of this recognition in other branches of intellectual property law, and the difficulty to 
establish the quantum of damages in trade secret cases, it is submitted that an order 
for an enquiry into damages can be useful in trade secret cases. Ideally, an order for 
an enquiry into damages can be made in conjunction with a decision that the 
quantum should be established with reference to a reasonable royalty160 for use of 
the secret. 161 
154 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 73; par 2.3.1 above (English law). 
155 1977 1 SA 316 (T) 328; Van Heerden and Neethling 73; Burrell 379. 
156 1985 1 SA 55 (C) 68-69. 
157 The court was, however, not prepared to order an enquiry into damages in motion proceedings -
69-70. 
158 Sec 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 provides: "For the purposes of determining the 
amount of any damages or reasonable royalty to be awarded under this section, the court may direct 
an enquiry to be held and may prescribe such procedures for conducting such enquiry as it may deem 
fit." 
159 Sec 35(4) of the Designs Act 195 of 1993 provides: "For the purposes of determining the 
amount of any damages or reasonable royalty to be awarded under this section, the court may direct 
an enquiry to be held and may prescribe such procedures for conducting such enquiry as to it may 
seem fit." 
160 Par 8.2.5 above. 
161 This is indeed the position according to the current trade marks and designs law - see fns 158 
159 above. According to the new Trade Marks Act and Designs Act a reasonable royalty is awarded 
in lieu of damages, but it is submitted that there is no reason in principle why an enquiry into damages 
cannot be combined with an order directing that damages in the case of trade secret infringement 
should be determined on the basis of a reasonable royalty. 
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8.5.4 INTERDICT 
The interdict is a remedy aimed at the prevention of wrongful conduct. 162 It can take 
the form of a prohibitory or a mandatory court order. The former prohibits the 
committing or continuing of a wrongful act; the latter requires positive conduct of the 
wrongdoer to terminate the continuing wrongfulness of an act that has already been 
committed. 163 The interdict may also be obtained to enforce an order for specific 
performance of a contractual obligation.164 
An interdict may be final or temporary. 165 The requirements for the granting of a 
final interdict are the following: 166 
(a) a clear(ly established) 167 right on the part of the applicant; 
(b) an act of interference with such right actually committed or 
reasonably apprehended; and 
(c) the unavailability of any other remedy by which the applicant may be 
protected with the same result. 
The requirements for the temporary (interim or interlocutory)168 interdict have been 
162 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 248-249; Van Heerden and Neethling 74; Van Aswegen 106; 
Van der Merwe and Olivier 250; Van der Walt 105; Prest 2-3. 
163 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 248; Van Heerden and Neethling 74; Van Aswegen 106; Van 
der Merwe and Olivier 250; Van der Walt 105. 
164 Cf Van der Merwe et al Contract 278; Christie 628-630; Joubert Contract 223; Kerr 546; Lubbe 
and Murray 544-545; Van Aswegen 119-120. 
165 Van Heerden and Neethling 75; Van der Walt 105; Prest 46. 
166 Prest 27 47-51. The locus classicus in South African case law is Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 
221 227 - cf Prest 37ff; and the exposition by South African courts of the three requirements follows 
Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 3 1 4 7 - cf Prest 25ff 38-42; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
249 fn 23; Van der Merwe and Olivier 251ff; Van Heerden and Neethling 75 fn 174. Where an interdict 
is granted to effect specific performance of a contractual obligation, an adaptation of these 
requirements may be necessary - cf Van der Merwe et al Contract 275; Christie 514-518; Lubbe and 
Murray 544-545; Van Aswegen 120. 
167 The requirement is usually cited as "a clear right". The correct interpretation is probably that the 
word "clear" does not qualify "right", but rather indicates that the right must be clearly established, that 
is, it must be proved on a balance of probabilities - see Prest 47 and authorities cited. 
168 Prest 2 fn 2: "In South Africa, as in England, the words interlocutory and interim are used 
interchangeably. Strictly speaking an interlocutory injunction is a provisional order granted at an early 
stage in the proceedings before the matters in issue are finally disposed of in subsequent proceedings. 
An interim (or temporary) interdict remains in force only for a fixed time, ie until a named day or hour." 
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formulated169 as follows: 
"[T]he applicant for such temporary relief must show -
(a) that the right which is the subject matter of the main action and which 
he seeks to protect by means of interim relief is clear or, if not clear, 
is prima facie established, though open to some doubt; 
(b) that, if the right is only prima facie established, there is a well-
grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicant if the 
interim relief is not granted and he ultimately succeeds in establishing 
his right; 
(c) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of interim relief; 
and 
(d) that the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy." 
From the positive law requirements for the interdict - in both its final and interim forms 
- it is clear that in a delictual context, two elements 170 must be present before this 
remedy can be granted, namely an act already committed or imminent, and 
wrongfulness - expressed in terms of the infringement or threatening infringement of 
a right. 171 Fault is not a requirement for the interdict, neither in the form of intention, 
nor negligence.172 This position is in keeping with the nature of the interdict - it is 
169 By Corbett J in LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality; Cape Town 
Municipality v LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 2 SA 256 (C). This statement of the 
requirements is "representative of what has become the almost standard formulation of the 
requirements" - Prest 54; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 76. 
110 Indeed, the authors of textbooks on the law of delict usually phrase the requirements for the 
interdict in terms of delictual elementology rather than quoting the formulation adopted by the courts 
as set forth above - cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 249; Van der Merwe and Olivier 251ff; Van der 
Walt 105-106. Cf also Van Heerden and Neethling 75; Van Aswegen 106. 
171 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 249; Van Heerden and Neethling 75; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 253; Van der Walt 106; Van Aswegen 106 fn 7. Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 249 (cf Van 
Heerden and Neethling 75 fn 180) are of the opinion that wrongfulness may for the purposes of the 
interdict also be constituted by the breach of a legal duty. This view deserves support. In accordance 
with the premise adopted in par 7.4.1.1 and 8.2.2 above, wrongfulness is essentially the violation of 
a legal norm, which norm may in the law of delict be expressed with reference to either infringement 
of a subjective right or breach of a legal duty. 
172 As is clear from the exposition of requirements set forth above - see further Neethling, Potgieter 
and Visser 249; Van Heerden and Neethling 7 4-75; Van der Merwe and Olivier 259; Van der Walt 105; 
Neethling and Potgieter 1991 SALJ 35 and case law cited. Boberg in Neethling (ed) 21-22 (cf Boberg 
152) suggests that in unlawful competition cases intention is a prerequisite for wrongfulness. An 
implication of Boberg's argument - as spelled out by himself 21-22 - is that intention must be proved 
before an interdict will be granted in unlawful competition cases "because, although fault is not 
required, wrongfulness certainly is, and the defendant's conduct will not be wrongful unless he acted 
with do/us". This argument has been refuted - see Neethling and Potgieter 1991 SALJ 36-38; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 140-142 - inter alia on the ground that since consciousness of wrongfulness 
is an element of intent, the enquiry into the presence of intent can in a given case only begin after 
wrongfulness has already been established. Intent can therefore not be a co-determinant of 
wrongfulness. 
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a preventive, rather than compensatory, remedy.173 
The interdict is the most useful remedy in trade secret litigation.174 An action for 
damages can only be instituted once damage has materialized.175 The implication 
is that such an action will usually only be applicable after the trade secret has fallen 
into the public domain - and has thus been destroyed. The interdict is the remedy 
with which a trade secret, which has fallen into the wrong hands but has not yet been 
published, can be saved from destruction. In such a case it may be necessary for an 
interdict to be granted in both its prohibitory and mandatory forms. Thus the 
respondent will on the one hand be ordered to abstain from further use or disclosure 
of the trade secret, and will on the other hand be compelled to deliver up 176 or to 
destroy any materials in his or her possession that might enable him or her to commit 
further infringements of the secret. 
Furthermore, since fault is not a requirement for the interdict, an innocent recipient 
of a trade secret may be interdicted from using or disclosing it. This may only happen 
if the recipient's possession of the secret is, although innocent, nevertheless wrongful. 
An example would be where someone receives an employer's trade secret through 
an unauthorized disclosure by an employee without notice that it is a secret and in 
circumstances where the reasonable person would also not have realized that his or 
her acquaintance with the secret was unauthorized. Although fault is absent, the 
recipient's possession of the secret is nevertheless wrongful - since it already 
infringes the owner's subjective right to his or her trade secret - and moreover creates 
the risk of further infringements of the trade secret owner's right. The recipient can 
therefore be interdicted from using or disclosing the secret. 177 
8.5.5 DELIVERY UP 
The remedy known as delivery up was developed in English law to deal with the 
situation where a defendant who has committed an infringement of intellectual 
property, remains in possession of items enabling him or her to commit further 
173 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 249; Van Heerden and Neethling 74; Neethling and Potgieter 
1991 SALJ 35-36; Neethling 1991 THRHR 210. 
174 Cf in respect of unlawful competition Van Heerden and Neethling 74. 
175 Cf eg Boberg 475; Kerr 573. 
176 Since such an order for "delivery up" is sometimes regarded as an independent remedy, it will 
be considered under a separate title in par 8.5.5 below. 
177 See further par 8.6.3 below. 
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infringements. The remedy orders the handing over or destruction of such items. 178 
Orders for delivery up have been granted by South African courts in intellectual 
property cases, 179 and South African intellectual property rights legislation 180 have 
also made provision for the granting of the remedy. 181 Kelbrick argues 182 
persuasively that an order for delivery up in South African law is a form of mandatory 
interdict, and as such has a firm basis in the common law.183 Where a trade secret 
infringer is still in possession of articles enabling further infringements of the trade 
secret owner's rights, an order for delivery up should therefore be competent relief 
in combination with a prohibitory interdict restraining the infringer from further use or 
178 Cf Kelbrick 1987 MB 12; par 2.3.4 above. 
179 See Kelbrick 1987 MB 14-18 for a historical overview of orders for delivery up - primarily in trade 
mark but also in unlawful competition litigation - in South African law. An order for delivery up was, 
inter alia, confirmed in Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) (cf the decision in the court a quo - Butt v 
Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 570-571 583). Kelbrick 1987 MB 16 shows that the order in Schultz v Butt 
could not have been based on sec 24(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, since that section does not 
make provision for delivery up to any person other than the plaintiff, whereas the court ordered delivery 
up to the deputy sheriff. The conclusion is that the order for delivery up was viewed as competent relief 
in the case of unlawful competition. 
180 Sec 24 (1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (as amended by Act 125 of 1992) provides: "Subject 
to the provisions of this Act, infringements of copyright shall be actionable at the suit of the owner of 
the copyright, and in any action for such an infringement all such relief by way of damages, interdict, 
delivery of infringing copies or plates used or intended to be used for infringing copies or otherwise 
shall be available to the plaintiff as is available in any corresponding proceedings in respect of 
infringements of other proprietary rights" (emphasis added); cf Kelbrick 1987 MB 21. Sec 65(3) of the 
Patents Act 57 of 1978 provides: "A plaintiff in proceedings for infringement shall be entitled to relief 
by way of - ... (b) delivery up of any infringing product or any article or product of which the infringing 
product forms an inseparable part"; cf Burrell 378; Kelbrick 1987 MB 21. Sec 34(3) of the Trade Marks 
Act 194 of 1993 provides: "Where a trade mark registered in terms of this Act has been infringed, the 
court may grant the proprietor the following relief, namely - ... (b) an order for removal of the infringing 
mark from all material and, where the infringing mark is inseparable or incapable of being removed 
from the material, an order that all such material be delivered up to the proprietor." Sec 35(3) of the 
Designs Act 195 of 1993 provides: "A plaintiff in proceedings for infringement shall be entitled to relief 
by way of - ... (b) surrender of any infringing product or any article or product of which the infringing 
product forms an inseparable part." 
181 Writers also assume that an order for delivery up is competent relief in South African courts -
cf Van Heerden and Neethling 195; Webster and Page 323-326 469; Neethling (1993) LAWSA 27 4; 
see further Kelbrick 1987 MB 16-17. 
182 1987 MB 18-20. 
183 See further Kelbrick's convincing criticism (1987 MB 17-18) of the use of the term "delivery up" 
as component of Anton Piller type orders (par 8.5.6 below). She shows that a true order for delivery 
up cannot be granted on an interim basis - as Anton Piller orders invariably are - since an order for 
delivery up finally disposes of the infringing articles. An order for "delivery up" as component of an 
Anton Piller order can therefore only be an order for interim attachment. Any doubt that might have 
been expressed about the competence of an order for "delivery up" as component of an Anton Piller 
order, does therefore not affect the validity of an order for delivery up in its true sense, ie as a form 
of (final) mandatory interdict. 
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disclosure of the secret. 184 An order for delivery up should always be formulated in 
such a manner so as to minimize the defendant's financial loss.185 
8.5.6 ANTON PILLER-TYPE ORDERS 
The so-called Anton Piller order 186 is an extraordinary remedy aimed at the 
preservation of evidence. Typically it is obtained ex parte without notice to the 
defendant, and authorizes entry of the premises of the latter for the purpose of 
inspecting and removing documents and other articles of evidential value to prevent 
their destruction or concealment before the case comes to trial or the stage of 
discovery.187 Conceived in English law, Anton Piller-type orders were soon granted 
by South African courts. 188 However, the desirability of these orders were 
questioned especially on account of their potential for misuse.189 Conflicting 
decisions rendered the scope and even the availability of Anton Piller orders in South 
184 Cf Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 183; Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH 
(Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W) 688-689 692; Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined 
Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 211, in which orders for delivery up were asked but 
not considered by the court. In Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 688 - not a trade secret case - an 
order for delivery up was granted; cf Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 570 583. Cf Knobel 1990 
THRHR 500. 
185 Kelbrick 1987 MB 22 suggests that "the British form of order, in which the defendant is always 
given the option of himself erasing the mark or otherwise destroying the goods rather than delivering 
the items concerned to the plaintiff, should be followed in South Africa. This will offer the defendant 
the opportunity to minimize any financial loss he may suffer. Safeguards to protect the plaintiff must 
then be included in the order and he should be afforded the opportunity of either supervising the 
erasure or destruction by the defendant or having these actions confirmed on oath, should the 
defendant elect to deal with the relevant items himself". Cf the English breach of confidence case Peter 
Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] 3 ALL ER 402, where the defendants 
were given the option of destroying - unstitching - the objectionable garments themselves, since the 
garments had been made of expensive materials which could possibly have been salvaged - see 
Kelbrick 13. 
186 So named after the pioneering English decision in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes 
Ltd [1976] 1 All ER 779 (CA). Cf Pienaar 153ff; par 2.3.5 above. 
187 See Prest 183-184. 
188 The first reported South African case was Roamer Watch Co SA v African Textile Distributors 
also t/a MK Patel Wholesale Merchants and Direct Importers 1980 2 SA 254 (W). Cf Prest 183; 
Erasmus 1984 SALJ 324. However, Anton Piller orders had already been issued prior to the Roamer 
Watch case - see Erasmus 1984 SALJ 332. 
189 Cf eg Economic Data Processing (Pty) Ltd v Penreath 1984 2 SA 605 (W) 606-607: "The Anton 
Piller, that is the local variety, has developed into a secretly obtained search warrant by means of 
which a person's premises can be invaded and turned inside out to look for papers and documents and 
other material which the applicant believes to be relevant to some action (its nature depending on what 
he discovers) which he will still institute"; 608 where the Anton Piller type order is described as a 
"combination of a search warrant, a wide discovery in anticipando and an interrogatio injure"; cf Prest 
184-185; Erasmus 1984 SALJ 342ff; Pienaar 159ff. 
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African law uncertain. 190 
In Shoba v Officer Commanding, Temporary Police Camp, Wagendrift dam; 
Maphanga v Officer Commanding, South African Police Murder and Robbery Unit, 
Pietermaritzburg191 the Appellate Division has now settled the matter.192 Corbett 
CJ held193 that Anton Piller orders directed at the preservation of evidence should 
be accepted as part of South African legal practice, and continued: 194 
"[A]n applicant for such an order, obtained in camera and without notice 
to the respondent, must prima facie establish ... the following: (1) That he, 
the applicant, has a cause of action against the respondent which he 
intends to pursue; (2) That the respondent has in his possession specific 
(and specified) documents or things which constitute vital evidence in 
substantiation of applicant's cause of action (but in respect of which 
applicant cannot claim a real or personal right); and (3) That there is a 
real and well-founded apprehension that this evidence may be hidden or 
destroyed or in some manner be spirited away by the time the case 
comes to trial or to the stage of discovery. 
I have used the words 'vital evidence' in the sense of being evidence of 
great importance to the applicant's case. In the case of Ex parte Matshini 
1986 (3) SA 605 (E) it was held that in order to obtain an Anton Piller 
order the applicant would have to show that the evidence was 'essential' 
or 'absolutely necessary' in order for him to prove his claim and that its 
non-availability at the trial would result in the administration of justice 
being defeated (at 613A-C). [T]his poses too stringent a test. The Court 
to which application is made for such an Anton Piller order has a 
discretion whether to grant the remedy or not and, if it does, upon what 
19° Cf eg Economic Data Processing (Pty) Ltd v Penreath 1984 2 SA 605 (W); Cerebos Food 
Corporation Ltd v Diverse Foods SA (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 149 (T); Trade Fairs and Promotions (Pty) 
Ltd v Thomson 1984 4 SA 177 (W): Network Video (Pty) Ltd v Universal City Studios Inc 1984 4 SA 
379 (C); Jafta v Minister of Law and Order 1991 2 SA 286 (A); see further Beck 1985 THRHR 203; 
Beck 1986 SALJ 184; Coetzee 1985 SALJ 634; Erasmus 1991 SALJ 379ff; Van Heerden and 
Neethling 76; Domanski 1993 THRHR 438-439; Knobel 1990 THRHR 501. 
191 1995 4 SA 1 (A); cf Erasmus 1996 SALJ 1. 
192 At least in so far as Anton Piller orders for the preservation of evidence are concerned - Shoba 
case 15. Anton Piller-type orders have on occasion been formulated to go further than mere 
preservation of evidence, but the court refrained from expressing a view on such orders. In Dabe/stein 
v Hildebrandt 1996 3 SA 42 (C) it was held that properly granted Anton Piller orders are not 
unconstitutional. 
193 15. 
194 15-16. 
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terms. In exercising this discretion the Court will pay regard, inter afia, to 
the cogency of the prima facie case established with reference to the 
matters listed (1), (2) and (3) above; the potential harm that will be 
suffered by the respondent if the remedy is granted as compared with, or 
balanced against, the potential harm to the applicant if the remedy is 
withheld; and whether the terms of the order sought are no more onerous 
than is necessary to protect the interests of the applicant."195 
It is submitted that Anton Piller orders may serve a useful purpose in trade secret 
misappropriation litigation, 196 and that this latest authoritative statement of the law 
by the Appellate Division signifies a healthy development. The granting of Anton 
Piller-type orders in intellectual property cases will furthermore give effect to the 
provision of the GA TT TR/Ps agreement that the judicial authorities of signatory 
countries must have the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures, 
inaudita altera parte where appropriate, to preserve evidence in regard to alleged 
intellectual property infringements.197 However, because of its enormous potential 
of harm, such an order must always be carefully confined within certain limits to 
prevent abuse thereof. 198 Particularly relevant in the context of trade secret litigation 
is the possibility that execution of an Anton Piller order may enable a plaintiff - in the 
process of attempting to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence of the 
defendant's infringement of his or her trade secret - to discover the trade secrets of 
the latter.199 
195 Corbett CJ further held (16) that in so far as the decisions in the Economic Data, Cerebos Food 
and Trade Fairs cases (fn 190 above) are in conflict with the principles set forth in the Shoba case, 
those judgments must be taken to be overruled. 
196 Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 438-439: 'Tnhe drastic relief which that remedy provides has a vital 
role to play in the protection of trade secrets. When the owner of confidential documents or materials 
becomes aware that they have come into possession of another (for example, a trade rival) without 
his authorization, an urgent ex parte application to court for an order directing the deputy sheriff to 
seize and hold the confidential matter is the only summary procedure currently available in our law for 
ensuring the recovery and preservation of that matter"; Pienaar 164-165; in general Erasmus 1984 
SALJ 344-345; Prest 186-187 196-197 207-208. 
197 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
198 Cf eg Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd t!a T-Chem v Sanderson-Kasner 1984 3 SA 850 (W) 855-857; 
Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstap/an Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 930-933; Prest 196. 
199 Cf Prest 183; Knobel 1990 THRHR 501 fn 105. 
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8.6 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS 
In the three foreign legal systems researched, certain situations posing specific 
problems with the legal protection of trade secrets have been identified.200 In the 
following chapters, it will be endeavoured to show how some of these problems may 
be solved - or, at the least, how the search for solutions may be guided - by an 
application of general principles of South African law, in the light of insights gained 
from comparative legal research and the recognition of a subjective right to the trade 
secret. 
8.6.1 TRADE SECRET INFRINGEMENT BY FORMER EMPLOYEES AFTER 
TERMINATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
It has become clear from the comparative study201 that the situation where a former 
employee uses or discloses the trade secret of his or her former employer after 
termination of the employment contract - without authorization to do so, but where he 
or she is not breaching a valid covenant in restraint of trade202 - poses special 
problems to the courts. It is submitted that this thorny problem must be approached 
in three steps. 
The first step is to establish whether the allegedly misappropriated information really 
is a trade secret. This must be established by applying the normal requirements of 
a trade secret. 203 During the subsistence of the employment relationship it may not 
be so crucial - from a practical point of view - to establish whether information 
allegedly misappropriated by the employee really is a trade secret. This is because 
the duty of good faith implied into the employment contract provides a much wider 
base for legal action against misconduct of the employee during the subsistence of 
the employment relationship. 204 However, once the employment relationship is 
200 Par 2.4; 3.4; 4.4; 6.5 above. 
201 Cf 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 4.4.1 ; 6.5.1 above. 
202 Par 8.3.1 above. 
203 As set out in par 9.2 above. 
204 Thus the employee must also further the business interests of the employer, avoid a clash 
between his or her personal interests and the business interests of the employer, may not use his or 
her employment to make a secret commission or profit, and may not misappropriate the employer's 
property. During the subsistence of the employment relationship, unauthorized use or disclosure of 
information regarded by the employer as confidential, may therefore result in liability even if such 
information does not quite comply with all the requirements of a trade secret. The unreasonableness 
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terminated, it becomes crucial to know whether the allegedly misappropriated 
information is in fact a trade secret, since the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
employee's conduct must now be determined by enquiring whether he or she has 
infringed the employer's right to the trade secret.205 In this phase, a distinction must 
be made between the employer's trade secrets - which the ex-employee may not use 
after termination of the employment contract; and the general knowledge and skills 
acquired by the latter during his or her employment - which he or she is free to 
use.2oa 
If the information is a trade secret, the second step is to enquire whether the 
employee gained access thereto in a reasonable or unreasonable manner. 207 An 
example of reasonable acquisition would be where the employer disclosed it to the 
employee in the course of the employment relationship. On the other hand, any 
acquisition of the secret contrary to the will of the employer, would in principle be 
of the employee's conduct in such a situation may be judged with reference to the infringement of a 
personal right arising from the employment contract (the breach of a duty implied into the contract), 
rather than an infringement of an intellectual property right to the trade secret itself. Liability in such 
a case is dependent more on the precise nature of the relationship between the parties than the 
precise nature of the misappropriated information. Cf par 2.4.1; 3.4.1; Grogan 40-42; Rycroft and 
Jordaan 59-62; Van Jaarsveld and Vivier 651-653. 
205 Liability is now - in the absence of a valid covenant in restraint of trade - dependent on the 
intrinsic nature of the information, rather than the relationship between the parties. Even if an 
agreement in restraint of trade has been reached, the nature of the information remains important -
the restraint of trade will more readily be deemed valid if the ex-employer can show that it does indeed 
protect a trade secret (par 8.3.1 above). 
206 Par 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 6.5.1 above. This distinction, serving as it does as a touchstone for liability, has 
been criticized by some commentators as unworkable - cf Baumbach-Hefermehl 1310 (par 4.4.1 fn 233 
above); Van Heerden and Neethling 237. However, it is submitted that the general idea behind the 
application of this distinction is sound. Nobody can quarrel with the notion that an ex-employee should 
in principle not be restrained from using his or her acquired skills and knowledge - in so far as these 
are not trade secrets of his or her ex-employer - in his or her new profession. It is therefore clearly 
necessary, in a case of alleged trade secret infringement by an ex-employee, to determine whether 
the information used by the latter was indeed a trade secret, or merely general knowledge and/or skills 
acquired in the course of employment. The problems encountered by the courts, it is submitted, do not 
relate to the validity of the distinction itself, but to the way in which it is applied. Commentators on 
English law have expressed an opinion that in the context of terminated employment relationships 
trade secrets seem to be defined differently than in other cases (par 2.4.1 above). Such an approach 
would be an unnecessary complication of the issue. A better approach, it is submitted, would be to 
adopt a uniform definition of protectable trade secrets valid for post-employment as well as other 
situations, but then to recognize openly that in the post-employment context specific policy 
considerations are operative that may nevertheless - in the light of a careful balancing of conflicting 
interests and policy considerations - exclude the protection of the employer's trade secret in certain 
circumstances: see the main text below. 
207 The importance of this intermediary step in the post-employment context is particularly evident 
from German law - see par 4.4.1 above. 
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unreasonable.208 
The third step is to determine whether the unauthorized use or disclosure of the 
trade secret after the termination of the employment contract was reasonable or not. 
The outcome of this enquiry will partially depend on the outcome of the enquiry 
conducted during the second step. If the employee's acquisition of the secret during 
the subsistence of the employment relationship was already unreasonable, there is 
in principle also no justification for his or her unauthorized use or disclosure thereof 
after termination of the employment relationship. Such use or disclosure infringes the 
former employer's right to the trade secret and is wrongful. 
If, on the other hand, the employee obtained the secret in a reasonable way in the 
course of employment, and then uses or discloses it without authorization after 
termination of the employment relationship, the matter is not disposed of as simply. 
It is in this type of situation where the conflicting interests are more equal in 
importance, and the balancing process to be performed by the court accordingly more 
difficult. Here the ex-employee's knowledge of the employer's trade secret - which 
was, after all, acquired in accordance with the will of the employer - may well be his 
or her most valuable asset in the pursuance of a vocation. The employee may 
therefore be severely handicapped in seeking new employment, or starting out on his 
or her own, if he or she may not use this knowledge. The higher the position of 
confidence the employee served in during the subsistence of the employment 
relationship, the more difficult may his position be after termination of the relationship. 
Conflicting policy considerations also play a prominent part here. On the one hand, 
it is deemed beneficial to the general economic advancement of the community that 
an inventor should - at least for a certain time period or under certain circumstances -
be allowed to enjoy the exclusive use of the fruits of his or her labour. In this way, 
there is an incentive to invent new things, which is beneficial to the general economic 
advancement of society. 209 This would imply that the owner of a trade secret should 
be protected against the misappropriation of his or her secret.210 On the other hand, 
legal policy strongly favours the liberty of the individual to the unfettered pursuit of the 
208 Cf par 4.4.1 above. 
209 Cf par 7.4.4.1 above where the different ways in which this policy consideration find application 
in respectively patent law and trade secrets law, are discussed. See further par 8.3.1 above on the 
policy considerations underlying the reasonableness or otherwise of covenants in restraint of trade. 
210 This proposition would be strengthened if trade secrets (or intellectual property in general) were 
to be recognized as property for the purposes of Constitutional law (see again par 7.3.3 above). 
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vocation of his or her choice. 211 This would imply that in seeking a new vocation, 
the ex-employee should be subjected to as few limitations as possible. 
Ideally every decision should strive to satisfy both these opposing policy 
considerations. However, to see the situation as a choice between two individuals, 
each backed by strong but conflicting considerations of legal policy, may actually be 
an oversimplification. Sight must not be lost of the other employees212 of the trade 
secret owner, whose job security might be threatened if the ex-employee is allowed 
to use the secret.213 Any negative impact on the business of their employer could 
adversely affect their position. If the employers's business depends so heavily on the 
secret that it will be crippled by disclosure of the secret, the freedom of all the other 
employees to pursue their chosen callings may be threatened. In such a case, the 
legal policy consideration that everybody should be free to pursue the calling of his 
or her choice, operates in two directions, both in favour of the ex-employee and 
against him or her (in favour of the other employees remaining in the employ of the 
trade secret owner). 
Again, it is submitted, no hard and fast rules can in advance be laid down, and the 
court should have a discretion to dispense justice on the facts before it. Bearing this 
in mind, a number of guidelines are proposed that will, it is submitted, accommodate 
the conflicting individual interests and policy considerations as far as possible. As a 
point of departure, any decision must strive to respect and protect the employer's 
right to his or her trade secret. Such an approach will be in conformity with both the 
doctrine of subjective rights as a recognized yardstick for the determination of 
wrongfulness, and policy considerations in favour of the inventor reaping the benefits 
of his labour. It would also be, it is submitted, in accordance with the basic tenor of 
the provisions regarding trade secret protection in the GATT TR/Ps agreement. 214 
Only in cases where the ex-employee will be significantly handicapped in his or her 
freedom to choose a new vocation, should the possibility arise that use of the secret 
may be lawful. However, it should be emphasized that all factors must be taken into 
211 Thus the (interim) Constitution Act 200 of 1993 provides (sec 26(1 )): "Every person shall have 
the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in the national 
territory"; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 13-16. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill, 
1996 protects (cl 22) the right of all citizens to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. A 
"subjective right to exercise a chosen calling without unlawful interference from others" has also been 
recognized in private law (Hawker v Life Offices Association of South Africa 1987 3 SA 777 (C) 780; 
see par ,7.4.4.6 fn 270 above). 
212 Assuming that the trade secret owner has other people in his employ. To some businesses 
these considerations will obviously not apply. 
213 Cf the arguments of Nastelski 1957 GRUR 7 (par 4.4.1 above). 
214 Cf par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
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account, and all conflicting interests and policy considerations carefully weighed. 215 
Factors taken into account in other legal systems216 include: the duration of 
employment - the longer the period of service, the more worthy of protection the 
employee's interest to use the knowledge acquired; the employee's personal 
contribution to the development of the secret - the greater the contribution the more 
worthy of protection his or her interest in using it; the employee's position in the 
employer's business - if he or she acquired knowledge of the secret because he or 
she served in an unusually high position of confidence, use of the secret after 
termination of the employment relationship will rarely be justified; the competitive 
importance of the secret to the enterprise of the employer - the greater its 
importance, the slimmer the employee's chances of using it with impunity; whether 
the employer impressed on the employee the confidentiality of the information - if he 
or she did, the employee's case is weakened. 217 
If the ex-employee's use of the secret will not cause the owner significant financial 
loss, such use may be reasonable according to the bani mores, depending on the 
type of factors mentioned above. If use by the ex-employee will cause the owner 
serious financial loss, such use should only be lawful - if at all - in highly unusual 
circumstances. In such cases, it might be a good idea for the court to have a 
discretion to order the ex-employee to pay the owner a reasonable royalty for use of 
the secret. 218 If use of the secret by the ex-employee has the potential of crippling 
the owner's business, such use should be wrongful. If, as envisaged above, the 
careers of other employees are at stake, use by the ex-employee can hardly be 
reasonable according to the bani mores. Use by the ex-employee may only be 
reasonable, it is submitted, if he or she does not endanger the existence of the secret 
by disclosure. Thus, if the balance swings in favour of the employee using the secret 
according to the principles set out above, he or she may, for instance, disclose the 
secret - or parts thereof - to his or her own employees in so far as it is necessary to 
exploit the secret. His or her employees must, in such a situation, be bound by an 
obligation of confidence not to divulge the secret to others. The ex-employee may not 
publish the secret in a scientific journal, or for that matter, in patent specifications in 
an application for a patent. Such misappropriation would not further his or her interest 
to follow his chosen calling in a reasonable manner - taking into account the interests 
of the former employer - and would be wrongful. 
215 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 236. 
216 Cf par 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 4.4.1; 6.5.1 above; see also Van Heerden and Neethling 238. 
217 Viewed from another angle, the employee's knowledge that the information is a trade secret 
may be a factor pointing towards the wrongfulness of his appropriation thereof. Cf in general on 
knowledge as a factor indicating wrongfulness Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 38 283ff. 
218 In analogy to the proposed position with innocent recipients - par 8.6.3 below. 
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Protection of trade secrets in a post-employment context can be effected by 
contract.219 The law of contract balances the conflicting policy considerations 
mentioned above by allowing restraint of trade agreements reasonably protecting 
proprietary interests in trade secrets, whilst disallowing agreements aimed purely at 
the elimination of competition. 220 
8.6.2 ACQUISITION OF TRADE SECRETS BY INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND 
OTHER REPREHENSIBLE MEANS 
Viewed from the perspective of the subjective rights doctrine and general delictual 
principles, the acquisition of trade secrets by reprehensible means221 - and 
specifically by industrial espionage - need not present special problems. In the 
absence of the owner's consent or another ground of justification, the acquisition of 
a trade secret infringes the right to the trade secret and is therefore wrongful. Such 
acquisition impairs the secret in the sense that it is now known to somebody else, 
and poses the threat of further infringements by unauthorized use and even 
destruction by unauthorized disclosure. An interdict restraining use or disclosure, 
combined with an order for delivery up or destruction of infringing materials in the 
respondent's possession, can therefore be sought. If unauthorized use or disclosure 
has already followed the unauthorized acquisition, damages may be claimed with the 
actio legis Aquiliae - provided the additional elements of fault, damage and causation 
can be proved. 
From this perspective, it is not necessary to prove a relationship of confidence 
between the alleged infringer and the trade secret owner. Therefore the difficulties 
experienced by English law222 to deal with industrial espionage are sidestepped. 
Furthermore, because liability rests on general principles, the positive law limitations 
to liability applicable in German law223 are irrelevant here. The practical result 
reached by the above analysis is similar to the generally satisfactory position in 
American positive law,224 with the added advantage that it is based on principles 
219 Par 8.3 above. 
22° Cf the discussion in par 8.3 above. Note particularly the consideration of the influence of sec 
26 of the Constitution, Act 200 of 1993. 
221 Cf par 2.4.2; 3.4.2; 4.4.2; 6.5.2 above. 
222 Cf par 2.4.2 above. 
223 Cf par 4.4.2; 6.5.2 above. 
224 Par 3.4.2 above. 
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compatible with the South African law of delict. It is also in accordance with the GA TT 
TR/Ps agreement, according to which natural and legal persons lawfully in control of 
undisclosed information shall have the possibility of preventing others from acquiring 
such information without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices. 225 
8.6.3 INNOCENT RECIPIENTS 
The legal position of innocent recipients of trade secrets may also be resolved by the 
recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret and an application of general 
delictual principles. If somebody receives a trade secret without the consent of the 
trade secret owner, such receipt will, in the absence of other defences excluding 
wrongfulness, be wrongful. It infringes the owner's subjective right to the trade secret, 
and poses the threat of further infringements by unauthorized use or disclosure. Such 
acquisition is therefore, judged objectively,226 unreasonable. An interdict may thus 
be granted against the innocent recipient, restraining unauthorized use or disclosure, 
and ordering delivery up or destruction of infringing materials. The recipient's absence 
of fault227 does not affect this position, because fault is not a requirement for the 
granting of an interdict.228 An action for damages, on the other hand, will not lie 
against an innocent recipient because fault - in the form of either intention or 
negligence - is a requirement for Aquilian liability.229 As soon as the recipient 
acquires knowledge that the information is a trade secret received against the owner's 
will, he or she may also be liable for damages for subsequent use or disclosure of the 
secret. This is because he or she will then have fault, either in the form of intention -
directing his or her will at the wrongful use or disclosure of the secret, now knowing 
that it is wrongful; or negligence - the reasonable person in his or her position would 
have foreseen that such use or disclosure could be wrongful and cause harm to the 
225 Par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
226 We are here concerned with the objective reasonableness or otherwise of conduct because the 
inquiry into wrongfulness is essentially an objective one - cf par 8.2.2 above. (Judged more 
subjectively, the recipient's conduct is reasonable in the sense that he acts without fault - cf par 8.2.3 
above. An action for damages will therefore not lie against the innocent recipient.) 
227 In the sense that he did not know that the relevant information was a trade secret received 
against the owner's will (thus no consciousness of wrongfulness and therefore no intention - cf par 
8.2.3 above), nor would the reasonable person in the same position have foreseen such a possibility 
and taken appropriate steps to prevent harm (thus no negligence - cf par 8.2.3 above). 
228 Par 8.5.4 above. 
229 Par 8.2 above. 
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owner, and would accordingly have acted differently to prevent such harm.230 
It will be noted that the solution suggested here differs from the positions in both 
English231 and American law,232 where the innocent recipient enjoys immunity until 
the moment he or she acquires knowledge that the information is another's trade 
secret and that he or she has received it against the owner's will. In South African 
law, fault is not a requirement for the interdict, and since the innocent receipt of the 
secret already infringes the subjective right of the owner and poses the threat of more 
serious infringements - including the possibility of complete destruction of the secret 
by unauthorized disclosure - an interdict is, it is submitted, appropriate relief.233 
One issue remains for consideration, namely the position of an innocent recipient who 
has in good faith paid value for the secret, or materially altered his or her position. 
Is an interdict appropriate in such a case? The problem, it is submitted, is again 
centred on the element of wrongfulness. The innocent receipt of the secret clearly 
disturbs the relationship between the trade secret owner and the object of his or her 
right, but in this case unreasonableness or norm violation is not so easy to establish. 
The problem here is again one of conflicting interests. The trade secret owner stands 
to lose his or her secret or a measure of its economical value. The innocent recipient 
stands to lose his or her financial investments made in good faith on the strength of 
his or her innocent receipt of the secret. The objective reasonableness or not of the 
innocent recipient's conduct, and hence the availability or not of an interdict against 
him or her, must hinge on the outcome of the balancing of these interests. It is 
submitted that no hard and fast rules can be made according to which this balancing 
may be done. The court must have a discretion in this regard, and the outcome must 
depend on the particular facts before the court. An important factor to be considered 
by the court, it is submitted, is the relative weight of the respective economic values 
of the interests of the two parties. Thus, the estimated financial loss that the trade 
secret owner would suffer if he or she were denied an interdict, must be compared 
to the estimated financial loss that the innocent recipient would suffer if the interdict 
were granted. If there is a significant discrepancy between the two, the decision 
should favour the party who stands to lose most. If the two parties stand to suffer 
similar financial losses, the court must exercise its discretion with regard to all other 
factors that may in the given situation be of importance. Whatever the outcome in a 
given case, considerations of reasonableness and fairness may dictate that some 
23° Cf par 8.2.3 above. 
231 Par 2.4.3 above. 
232 Par 3.4.3 above. 
233 See Van Heerden and Neethling 232. 
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relief be granted to the unsuccessful party. Here, it is submitted, South African law 
can borrow from both American law234 and the proposals of the English Law 
Commission.235 Thus if the trade secret owner has successfully applied for an 
interdict, it appears reasonable that the court should have a discretion to order such 
a trade secret owner to make a reasonable contribution to the innocent recipient's 
expenses. Whether such a contribution will be appropriate, should inter alia depend 
on whether the innocent recipient has any remedies against intermediate parties. 
Where, for instance, an intermediate party holds the secret under an obligation of 
confidence owed to the owner of the secret, and then discloses the secret without 
informing the recipient that it is another's secret disclosed in breach of confidence, 
the innocent recipient, may - depending on the facts - have delictual and/or 
contractual remedies against that intermediate party. In such a case, the innocent 
recipient should claim his or her losses from the intermediate party, and a contribution 
by the trade secret owner would in such a case usually be inappropriate. 
If the court deems it inappropriate to restrain the innocent recipient from using the 
secret, it appears reasonable that the court should have the discretion to order such 
a recipient to pay the owner a reasonable royalty for that use, as is provided for in 
the American Uniform Trade Secrets Act.236 Whether such an order would be 
appropriate, would inter alia depend on whether or not the trade secret owner can 
adequately recover his or her loss by an action for damages against an intermediate 
party who was at fault. 
Since a trade secret is more likely to fall in the public domain - and thus be destroyed 
- in the case of disclosure than in the case where the recipient chooses to use the 
secret without disclosing it to others, an interdict to restrain unauthorized disclosure 
by an innocent recipient should rarely be denied. In the case of disclosure, the trade 
secret owner generally stands to lose much more by denial of the interdict than what 
the innocent recipient stands to lose if the interdict is granted. 
If the innocent recipient materially alters his or her position only after he or she has 
learnt that the relevant information is another's secret disclosed against the latter's 
will, he or she must bear the blame for his or her own losses if he or she is then 
interdicted from using the secret. In such a case, no considerations of policy exist in 
favour of the granting of financial relief of the type just discussed to such a recipient. 
234 Par 3.4.3 above. 
235 Par 2.4.3 above. 
236 Cf par 3.4.3 above. 
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8.6.4 DURATION OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
It has transpired from the comparative research,237 and especially from a study of 
American law,238 that differences of opinion exist on how long the duration of an 
interdict restraining use of a trade secret should be. The acceptance of a subjective 
right to the trade secret239 facilitates the making of a principled choice in this 
regard. From this perspective the main objective of trade secrets law is to protect the 
right to the trade secret. And since the right to the trade secret is extinguished when 
the 'secret' is no longer secret, it follows that in principle an interdict cannot restrain 
use of a trade secret after it has fallen into the public domain. Stated quite simply, no 
subjective right exists to be protected in such a situation. The possibility of a 
permanent interdict restraining use of a trade secret after it is in fact not a trade 
secret any more,240 can thus be rejected outright. After all, the function of the 
interdict is not to punish, but to prevent wrongful conduct. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that an interdict may never outlast the 
secrecy, and thus the very existence of a trade secret. In this regard the English 
"springboard doctrine"241 and the American "lead-time" injunctions242 are 
instructive. The economic value of a trade secret to its owner is often of a temporary 
nature, frequently existing purely in a temporary head-start over competitors in 
production and marketing. This will always be the situation in a case where marketing 
a product in which the secret is embodied will enable competitors to unravel the 
secret by reverse engineering. If one competitor acquires the secret in a wrongful 
manner, the trade secret owner's head-start over him or her is erased. In the parlance 
of English law, such a competitor uses his or her unfair tactics as a "springboard" to 
obtain an unfair advantage in the market. In such a case, an interdict restraining use 
indefinitely would be inappropriate, and the interdict should be of such a duration that 
it prevents the infringer from gaining the unfair head-start. The duration of the 
interdict must therefore be computed with reference to the estimated time that it will 
take other competitors to lawfully gain access to the secret by reverse engineering -
the "lead time" which the trade secret owner should enjoy in the market by virtue of 
237 Cf par 2.4.4; 3.4.4; 4.4.4; 6.5.4 above. 
238 Par 3.4.4 above. 
239 Par 7.4 above. 
240 As is the case in American cases of the Shel/mar persuasion - cf par 3.4.4 above. 
241 Par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.4.4 above. 
242 Par 3.4.4 above. 
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his or her trade secret. 243 If the secret then falls into the public domain before the 
estimated "lead time" has expired, the interdict will outlast the secret for a limited 
period of time. If the infringer himself caused the trade secret to fall into the public 
domain, the trade secret owner will be able to institute the Aquilian action against him 
to recover his or her damage. In such a case, the wrongful act is complete, and the 
interdict, with its preventive function, is not available. 
It must be emphasized that the above-stated principles do not imply that interdicts in 
trade secret cases must always be of limited duration. If, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, the probability of protecting the relevant trade secret 
indefinitely by an interdict unlimited in duration is good, such an interdict should be 
granted.244 If, on the other hand, in the circumstances of the case the probability 
of protecting the relevant trade secret indefinitely by an interdict unlimited in duration 
is remote - because the probability is good that the trade secret will in any case fall 
into the public domain relatively soon after the infringement by the defendant, the 
interdict must be limited in time to the period that may reasonably be expected to be 
sufficient for the secret to fall into the public domain. To determine which one of the 
two situations is present, must be decided on the facts, and particularly by 
considering the nature of the secret and the nature of the field of competition in which 
it is applied. Thus, to juxtapose extremes, the probability of indefinitely protecting a 
trade secret concerning a recipe or manufacturing process which cannot be 
unravelled by reverse engineering of a product on the market, is good - whereas the 
probability of so protecting a trade secret which can be unravelled by reverse 
engineering of a marketed product is low. Similarly, the probability of protecting a 
trade secret indefinitely by a perpetual interdict is far better in a field where 
competitors are few and far between, than in a fiercely competitive field where rivals 
keep a close watch on each other and immediately attempt reverse engineering of 
new competing products in order to keep up with the competition. It is submitted that 
only in those cases where it is clear from all the circumstances that the defendant's 
misappropriation of the trade secret will only give him or her a temporary head-start 
over the rest of the competition (or at least a significant proportion thereof), that 
interdicts must be limited in time to neutralize that wrongfully gained advantage. 
243 It should be emphasized that the unfair advantage gained by the infringer over the other 
competitors is not the ratio for the trade secret owner's taking legal action. The basis of the owner's 
interdict against the infringer is the latter's imminently wrongful conduct against the owner him- of 
herself, in the sense that the (fair) advantage in the market gained by the owner by invention of the 
trade secret, is now erased by the unfair tactics of the infringer. It is the owner's subjective right that 
is infringed, not the rights of the other competitors. The reference to the unfair head-start over the 
other competitors is made purely to determine the duration of the legal protection. 
244 Cf par 3.4.4 fn 229 above. 
282 
CHAPTER 9 
THE RECOGNITION AND PROTECTION OF 
TRADE SECRETS IN SOUTH AFRICAN POSITIVE LAW 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the recognition and protection of trade secrets in the South African 
positive law, and specifically case law, 1 are examined. Where deemed necessary, 
the position is evaluated in the light of the theoretical model of trade secret protection 
presented in the previous chapter, and the subjective right to the trade secret.2 In so 
far as specific issues concerning trade secret recognition and protection, which have 
featured in other legal systems, have not yet been addressed by our courts, the 
previous chapter may be consulted for suggested ways of dealing with them. General 
principles concerning the various remedies which might be applicable in trade secret 
cases have also been dealt with in the previous chapter.3 
9.2 ELEMENTS OF A PROTECTABLE TRADE SECRET4 
It is difficult to find a comprehensive definition of a trade secret in South African case 
law.5 However, it is possible to piece together from the various cases the 
characteristics of a protectable trade secret. These are the following: 
1 Trade secrets have not enjoyed much attention of the legislature - cf however sec 67 of Act 28 
of 1956; sec 12 of Act 5 of 1957; sec 49 of Act 56 of 1981; sec 24 of Act 3 of 1983; sec 36 of Act 85 
of 1993. Cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 489-490 fn 20. 
2 Par 7.4 above. 
3 However, some specific problems concerning the application of the interdict in South African trade 
secret cases will be dealt with in this chapter (par 9.4.2 below). 
4 Cf in general par 7 .2 above. 
5 Cf Leon 1982 De Rebus 381: "It is interesting to note that in no South African case is there 
actually an attempt at definition, no doubt owing to the judicial desire to keep this branch of the law 
as fluid as possible"; Domanski 1993 THRHR 230. 
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9.2.1 INFORMATION6 
In the first place, one is left in no doubt that trade secrets consist of information. Well 
nigh every decision dealing with trade secrets typifies them as information. The term 
confidential information is frequently used - more frequently than the concept trade 
secret itself - usually as a wider concept of which trade secrets are a species. 7 
9.2.2 COMMERCIAL OR INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY8 
Although it may be difficult to find a dictum in the reported case law expressly stating 
that only information that is capable of commercial or industrial application may be 
protectable as trade secrets, it is nevertheless clear by implication that this is indeed 
the case - so much so that it is described by Van Heerden and Neethling9 as self-
evident.10 
9.2.3 SECRECY11 
The requirement of secrecy, or confidentiality as it is often referred to, frequently 
receives scrutiny in case law. The South African courts have been deeply influenced 
by English law in this regard, and English precedents are usually cited as authority 
for discussions of secrecy or confidentiality. The basic formulation of secrecy adopted 
is the well-known one of English law12 that confidential information is information 
that is not in the public domain, 13 or as it is frequently stated,14 "it must not be 
6 Cf in general par 7.2.1 above. 
7 Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 232; see par 7.2.8 above on terminology. 
8 Cf in general par 7.2.2 above. 
9 225. 
1° Cf par 7.2.2 above. 
11 Cf in general par 7.2.3 above. 
12 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3 above; cf further par 7.2.3 above. 
13 Cf Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 680 and other authorities in fn 14; and further Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 194. 
14 Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 680; Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 (D 730 731; 
Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnjectaseal CC 1988 2 SA 54 (D 64; Cambridge Plan AG v Moore 
1987 4 SA 821 (D) 845; Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 814 (D) 
822; Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 927; Harchris Heat 
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something which is public property or public knowledge".15 A relative concept of 
secrecy16 is employed. Thus information has been found to be secret or confidential 
if only available to a limited number of persons.17 Following English law, 18 our 
courts have also held that information may be secret "as a whole" even though the 
"constituent parts" from which it has been assembled may be individually in the public 
domain.19 Especially in this context, it is clear that information will be secret if it can 
only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process of expenditure 
of time, labour and effort as that gone through by the owner of the information. 20 It 
is also recognized that secrecy is not necessarily destroyed if the information is also 
known to some competitors of the trade secret owner. 21 Secrecy must be objectively 
determined.22 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 <D 551; HaNey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 
1977 1 SA 316 (D 321 322 323; Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit 
Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 214. See further Van Heerden and Neethling 225; 
Neethling 2 (1993) LAWSA 281. 
15 This phrase is a quotation from the English locus classicus Saltman Engineering Co Ltd 
Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1948] 65 RPC 203 (CA), 1963 3 All ER 415; cf par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
16 Cf par 7.2.3 above. 
17 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 
1 SA 209 (C) 221: "[nhe fact that the information is distributed upon a confidential basis to a limited 
class of persons prevents it... from becoming public property capable of being used or imitated by rival 
traders." Cf Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 194 
where a production process was found not to be confidential because there was "no evidence that the 
production sequence was kept secret or limited to certain employees only; all employees and visitors 
had access to the plant. The various units used in the process were more or less openly used in [the] 
factory". Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 225; Knobel 1990 THRHR 491; Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA 
Mere LJ 344. 
18 Par 2.2.1.2.3 above. 
19 Eg HaNey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 19771 SA 316 (D 323-326; Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (D 191-192; Harchris Heat 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 <D 550-551; cf Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 
1 SA 409 (W) 429. 
2° Cf eg the authority quoted in fn 19; Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 (D 731. Note 
that the origin is again English case law - cf par 2.2.1.2.3 above. In this regard, the "springboard 
doctrine" of English law has also received recognition in South African courts - see par 2.2.1.2.3 
above; par 9.4.2.2 below. 
21 Sibex Engineering SeNices (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (D 502; cf Van Heerden and 
Neethling 225 fn 14; Knobel 1990 THRHR 491 fn 30. Domanski 1993 THRHR 242 brands this a 
"questionable proposition" - it is, however, perfectly in consonance with the position in the foreign legal 
systems surveyed in this study - see par 2.2.1.2.3; 3.2.1.2.3; 4.2.1.2.3; 6.2.1 above. Cf further par 
7.2.3; 8.2.2.2.2; 8.2.2.2.3 above. 
22 This is apparent from the way in which the inquiry into the presence or absence of secrecy is 
performed in cases such as Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau 
(Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 221; HaNey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 
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9.2.4 THE OWNER'S WILL (OR STEPS TAKEN) TO MAINTAIN SECRECY23 
Dicta may be found in case law indicating that the owner of confidential trade 
information must have the will to maintain the secrecy thereof before it will qualify for 
legal protection. Most of these statements focus on the presence or absence of steps 
taken by the owner to preserve secrecy,24 but some refer to the subjective will or 
316 <n 321-325; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 <n 
194; Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 <n 550-551; Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 
667 (A) 680 - cf Knobel 1990 THRHR 491 fn 32; Van Heerden and Neethling 225. In Van Castricum 
v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 (T) 732 Roos J expressly stated that the test is objective. However, 
strangely enough, this statement was preceded by a quotation from the English decision in Thomas 
Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1978] 3 All ER 193 (Ch) 209-21 O which, as noted (par 2.2.1.2.3), is 
authority for a subjective test. The same passage was quoted in Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v 
Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 186. It is submitted that whereas a subjective element does enter the 
enquiry in so far as a trade secret will only be protected if the owner had the will to keep it secret (par 
9.2.4 below; cf par 7.2.4 above), the information must nevertheless objectively be secret as well. The 
correct position in this regard, it is submitted, was stated in SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 
2 SA 84 (C) 89: "One cannot protect what is ordinary general information by telling the employee that 
it is a trade secret: that cannot alter the quality of the material" and Petre & Madco (Pty) Ltd Va T-
Chem v Sanderson-Kasner 1984 3 SA 850 (W) 858: "It is trite law that one cannot make something 
secret by calling it secret. Facts must be proved from which it may be inferred that the matters alleged 
to be secret are indeed secret". The Thomas Marshall test of secrecy should therefore not be followed 
in our law - see again par 2.2.1.2.3 above for criticism by an English commentator; cf par 7.2.4 above. 
23 Cf in general par 7 .2.4 above. 
24 Eg Cerebos Food Corporation Ltd v Diverse Foods SA (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 149 <n 154: •All 
information and data collated and assimilated by the applicant through its investigations and research 
are contained in a comprehensive set of documents, the highly confidential nature of which the 
applicant has at all stages impressed on all its employees" (emphasis added); Stellenbosch Wine 
Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 
3 SA 152 (C) 153: "The decision was taken in secrecy and the confidential nature of their assignments 
was firmly impressed on the printers, and the marketing and advertising agents"; Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W) 690: "[W]hen Abbey devices are advertised, simple line drawings 
are used and there is no attempt to produce accurate details or drawings. In particular, no technical 
details are furnished as these are a matter of confidentiality between the applicants and their 
customers or their distributors or agents ... mhe applicants allege that the technical brochure contains 
confidential information ... and for that reason is not freely distributed by them. It is supplied in 
confidence to certain distributors, agents and customers"; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v 
Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 324: "I do not think that the process for which 
protection is sought in the instant case is confidential. There is no evidence that the production 
sequence was kept secret or limited to certain employees only; all employees and visitors had access 
to the plant. The various units used in the process were more or less openly used in Atlas' factory" -
note how the absence of steps taken to keep the relevant information secret was here taken to 
establish that the information was not protectable. Cf Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v 
Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) 126 where the respondent averred - unsuccessfully - that the conduct 
of the applicant showed that he did not regard the relevant computer program as a trade secret. Cf 
Delport 1982 BML 165; Joubert 1985 De Jure 42: "[D]ie inligting moet deur die aanspraakmaker as 
vertroulik behandel word. Dit kan hy uitdruklik, maar ook stilswyend doen deur byvoorbeeld die 
vertroulike inligting binne 'n kring belanghebbendes te probeer hou en die bekendmaking van die 
inligting buite daardie kring te beperk en te beskerm"; Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA Mere LJ 344. 
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wish of the owner to maintain secrecy.25 26 In practice, this requirement may be 
employed negatively, in the sense that the defendant or respondent may raise the 
absence of a will to keep the information secret as a ground on which the alleged 
secret does not merit protection,27 rather than the plaintiff or applicant citing his will 
(as evidenced by steps taken) to keep it secret as a reason why the information is 
deserving of protection. 28 
9.2.5 ECONOMIC VALUE29 
Explicit statements requiring trade information to be valuable to qualify for legal 
protection, may be found in the case law.30 It is clear that the required value must 
be of an economic nature.31 It must be objectively established.32 Sometimes the 
25 Cf Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 325; Northern Office Micro 
Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) 126 where the respondent averred -
unsuccessfully - that the applicants did not regard the relevant information as a trade secret; Knobel 
1990 THRHR 491-492; Van Heerden and Neethling 225 fn 13; Domanski 1993 THRHR 230. 
26 See par 7.2.4 above on the relationship between objectively discernable steps to preserve 
secrecy and a subjective will to preserve secrecy. 
27 Cf eg Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) 126. 
28 In such a situation, the absence of steps to protect secrecy may probably be construed as tacit 
consent by the owner to use or disclosure of the information, which consent will - as a ground of 
justification (par 8.2.2.2.1 above) - exclude the wrongfulness of such use or disclosure - cf Knobel 1990 
THRHR 491 fn 35. 
29 Cf in general par 7.2.5 above. 
30 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 <n 194: "That 
which is sought to be protected should ... not only differ from what was previously generally known, but 
be of value as well." In SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 90 authority was 
quoted stating that business information which is not necessarily new, novel or unique, but which is 
nevertheless not generally available, "qualifies for treatment as a trade secret if it has value to the 
business"; and in Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 325 the court 
found that the plaintiff's production process was not only confidential, it was also "a great commercial 
success". Cf Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 428; Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real 
Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 1 SA 673 (O) 692 where the court asked whether allegedly confidential 
information was "uit 'n mededingingsoogpunt van waarde" ; Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 577 and 
Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 680; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 187; 
Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 929; Crown Cork & Seal 
Co v Rheem SA (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 1093 (W) 1101-1102; Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 689 691. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 225; Knobel 1990 THRHR 
492; Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA Mere LJ 345. 
31 Cf Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 19771 SA 316 (T) 325 where the court found 
that the plaintiff's production process was "a great commercial success"; Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real 
Estate (Edms) Bpk v So/11986 1 SA 673 (0) 692 where the court asked whether allegedly confidential 
information was "uit 'n mededingingsoogpunt van waarde". The examples quoted thus highlight the 
value of a trade secret to the entrepreneur in a competitive context. However, it is submitted that a 
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focus falls on the value of the secret to the owner thereof;33 sometimes on the 
(potential) value thereof to the owner's competitors.34 It is submitted that this is 
merely a case of two sides to the same coin. The value or potential value of the trade 
secret to the owner's competitors is a correlate of the value of the secret to the 
owner. 
In a number of cases the value or usefulness of information was apparently used to 
determine whether the information was confidential or not. 35 It is submitted that 
economic value or usefulness cannot be a determinant of secrecy. Secrecy simply 
concerns the question whether information is known or accessible to a restricted 
number of persons. The value of the information cannot help determine this. Thus 
trade secret can also have economic value to someone who is not an entrepreneur and who is not 
involved in competition with trade rivals. This conclusion follows logically from the recognition in 
Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /scor 1983 1 SA 548 Cn that trade secrets also qualify for legal 
protection outside the context of competition - par 9.3.1.2.2 below. The economic value of a trade 
secret in such a situation may consist of its potential to generate an income for the owner, eg by way 
of licensing agreements. Cf par 7.4.4.4.1; 8.2.5 above. 
32 Cf Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 689; Van Castricum 
v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 Cn 732; Van Heerden and Neethling 225; Knobel 1990 THRHR 492. 
33 Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 187. 
34 Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 689 691; Butt v Schultz 
1984 3 SA 568 (E) 577. 
35 In Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 689 Marais J said: "The 
difficult question in each case would be to decide what information gleaned by an employee is to be 
regarded as disclosable as being harmless or general knowledge and what items are confidential or 
secret. The dividing line may move from case to case, according to what is the general practice or 
convention in the category of trade or manufacture in which the plaintiff falls, with particular reference 
to existing or potential competitors of his. If, however, it is objectively established that a particular item 
of information could reasonably be useful to a competitor as such, i.e. to gain an advantage over the 
plaintiff, it would seem that such knowledge is prima facie confidential as between an employee and 
third parties and that disclosure would be a breach of the service contract. If use has in fact been 
made of it in an effort to harm the business interests of the plaintiff the presumption would be even 
stronger that the employer and the employee, who would in the course of his employment obtain 
knowledge of it, intended it to be treated as confidential information not to be divulged to third parties"; 
and at 691 : "What would constitute information of a confidential nature would depend on the 
circumstances of each case, and in this regard the potential or actual usefulness of the information 
to a rival would be an important consideration in determining whether it was confidential or nor 
(emphasis added). Cf Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 187: "[T]he 
information ... was, at the lowest, prima facie confidential in that it was of great value to the applicant, 
its disclosure was detrimental to the applicant and first respondent must have appreciated that he was 
under a duty to his employer ... not to disclose this information to others because it would harm 
applicant" (emphasis added). In Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 577 the following words from the 
Coo/air Ventilator case were quoted with implicit approval: "What would constitute information of a 
confidential nature would depend on the circumstances of each case, and in this regard the potential 
or actual usefulness of the information to a rival would be an important consideration in determining 
whether it was confidential or not", and Mullins J added that • the same considerations apply to cases 
where trade information is obtained from sources other than through an employee". 
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economic value is an element of a protectable trade secret, but it is not an element 
or determinant of secrecy.36 
9.2.6 CONCRETENESS OR POTENTIAL CONCRETENESS37 
Again, although it may be difficult to find specific dicta requiring trade secrets to be 
concrete or potentially concrete, this proposition is nevertheless implicit in the decided 
cases. It stands to reason that a trade secret can only be protected if it has the 
potential to lead an existence separate from the personality of its owner.38 On the 
other hand, case law does not require - correctly, it is submitted - that a trade secret 
be reduced to some material form before it can qualify for legal protection. Thus the 
requirement is potential, not necessarily actual, concreteness. 39 
9.2. 7 SYNTHESIS AND EXAMPLES40 
A trade secret protectable in South African law may therefore be broadly defined as 
secret information which is capable of commercial or industrial application, in respect 
of which the owner has the will to keep it secret, which has economic value, and 
which can lead an existence separate from its owner.41 Examples of trade secrets 
36 See Van Heerden and Neethling 225-226 fn 15; Neethling 1985 THRHR 237; Knobel 1990 
THRHR 492 fn 40; Pienaar 26. Cf Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 680. 
37 Cf in general par 7.2.6 above. 
38 Cf par 7.2.6; 7.4.4.3 above. 
39 See par 7.2.6 above. 
4° Cf in general par 7.2.7 above. 
41 It will be noted that this definition is in conformity with the views adopted in par 7.2.7 above. Cf 
Van Heerden and Neethling 223-224: ·A trade secret may be described as trade, business or industrial 
information belonging to a person (usually an entrepreneur) which has a particular economic value and 
which is not generally available to and therefore known by others" - accordingly they postulate (225) 
three requirements for a protectable trade secret, viz secrecy (including a subjective element in so far 
as the proprietor must have the will to keep the information secret - fn 13), potential application in trade 
or industry, and economic value. Cf further Pistorius and Visser who state the requirements of a trade 
secret as follows: the information must be treated as confidential and be known to a closed circle; it 
must have been developed by the owner for his or her own benefit; and it must be valuable or useful 
to the owner. Van Heerden and Neethling 226 fn 18 express the opinion that the requirement 
postulated by Pistorius and Visser that the information must have been developed by the owner for 
his or her own benefit, should merely be taken into account when determining the economic value of 
the information. In the opinion of the present writer it should not be seen as an element of a trade 
secret. However, it may be necessary for a trade secret owner to aver this fact, not to show that the 
information is a trade secret, but to show that he or she is the owner thereof and therefore has locus 
standi. 
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recognized in South African case law include information relating to or contained in 
manufacturing processes,42 a furnace for the heat treatment of metals,43 computer 
software,44 an unpublished trade mark,45 credit records,46 and customer lists.47 
9.3 BASES OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
In South African case law, the protection of trade secrets has been based mainly on 
two grounds: delict and contract. 48 
9.3.1 DELICT 
It is clear from case law that the infringement of a trade secret is actionable in terms 
of the actio Jegis Aquiliae. The seminal decision was Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd 
v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd.49 The plaintiff, a credit 
bureau, compiled certain credit records which were then distributed to subscribers on 
a confidential basis. The defendant obtained copies of these credit records in an 
unauthorized way and distributed information contained therein to its own subscribers. 
The plaintiff claimed inter alia damages from the defendant. The claim was based on 
two grounds. In respect of the issue of written reports the claim was based on 
infringement of copyright; in respect of the issue of verbal reports it was based on 
42 Eg Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D); Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Rodomac 1977 1 SA 316 (T). 
43 Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /SCOR 1983 1 SA 548 (T); cf, however, South African Iron 
and Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd v Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd 1987 4 SA 421 (A). 
44 Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C). 
45 Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd, Oude Meester Group Ltd v 
Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C). 
46 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) Ltd 1968 1 SA 
209 (C). 
47 Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 (T). 
48 Another ground is the breach of the fiduciary duty of a company director - cf Sibex Construction 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnjectaseal CC 1988 2 SA 54 CD; Havenga 388-394; Domanski 1993 THRHR 447-448. 
The basis of this liability is generally accepted to be of a sui generis nature, rather than contractual 
or delictual. Du Plessis 1993 THRHR 11 submits that the basis of liability should be the actio legis 
Aquiliae - cf however Havenga 314-331. See further par 7 .3 above for a consideration of other 
potential grounds of protection. 
49 1968 1 SA 209 (C). Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 229-231; Copeling 1968 THRHR 180ff; 
Domanski 1993 THRHR 430-433; Du Plessis 1985 MB 66-67; Leon 1982 De Rebus 379-380. 
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another right which had not been specified in the pleadings. It was this alleged right 
that formed the subject-matter of the decision on exception. 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that where material was the subject of a contractually 
imposed "confidence", the owner had a remedy at common law for "breach of 
confidence" against any person who, knowing of the confidence, verbally reproduced 
the material. 50 Noting that the term "breach of confidence" was derived from English 
law, Corbett J briefly surveyed51 the ambit of the English action for breach of 
confidence. Stating that the application of the action for breach of confidence in 
English law was interesting and informative as showing the basis upon which another 
legal system might have provided a remedy for the plaintiff, Corbett J nevertheless 
said52 that it was not directly relevant to the problem confronting the court, namely 
whether the plaintiff's allegations disclosed a cause of action in South African law. 
Corbett J found53 that a remedy similar to the English action for breach of 
confidence was unknown to South African law. He furthermore commented54 on the 
difficulty to ascertain the juridical basis of the action for breach of confidence in 
English law, noting that although tort would seem to be the most appropriate niche, 
neither the English courts nor leading English authors appear to have classified the 
action in such a way. He took cognizance55 of the fact that in American law the 
action was apparently regarded as a tortious remedy, and proceeded to consider56 
the two possible bases advanced by plaintiff's counsel for a claim in the South African 
law of delict. The first of these was that the information contained in the credit records 
constituted incorporeal property in the plaintiff's hands, and that the unlawful use 
thereof constituted a delict. Corbett J rejected57 this proposition.58 
The second suggested basis for the plaintiff's claim was "the form of delictual liability, 
50 213. 
51 213-214. 
52 214. 
53 214-215. 
54 215. 
55 215. 
56 215ff. 
57 216. 
58 This aspect of the decision is discussed in par 9.3.1.2.2 below. 
.. 
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in our law often referred to as 'unlawful interference with trade or business"'.59 This 
proposition Corbett J accepted, and, citing Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove,60 he 
made the following important remarks61 concerning the basis of liability: 
"[T]he basis of a plaintiff's action for wrongful interference by a competitor 
with his rights as a trader is clearly stated to be Aquilian. The significance 
of this is that it means that, while such an action must satisfy all the 
requirements of Aquilian liability, the broad and ample basis of the Lex 
Aquilia is available in this field for the recognition of rights of action even 
where there is no direct precedent in our law". 
He furthermore made the following all-important statement62 on the liability for the 
unauthorized use of confidential information: 
"[W]ithout attempting to define generally the limits of lawful competition, 
it seems to me that where, as in this case, a trader has by the exercise 
of his skill and labour compiled information which he distributes to his 
clients upon a confidential basis (i.e. upon the basis that the information 
should not be disclosed to others), a rival trader who is nota client but in 
some manner obtains this information, and well knowing its nature and the 
basis upon which it was distributed, uses it in his competing business and 
thereby injures the first mentioned trader in his business, commits a 
wrongful act vis-a-vis the latter and will be liable to him in damages. In an 
appropriate case the plaintiff trader would also be entitled to claim an 
interdict against the continuation of such wrongful conduct ... [Tihe fact that 
information is distributed upon a confidential basis to a limited class of 
persons prevents it, in my view, from becoming public property capable 
of being used or imitated by rival traders. In such circumstances the 
conduct of a rival trader who obtains and, well knowing the position, uses 
the information to advance his own business interests and activities 
amounts to a deliberate misappropriation and filching of the products of 
another's skill and labour. Such conduct must, in my view, be regarded as 
dishonest and as constituting a fraud upon the compiler of the information. 
I consider that... our Courts should treat this as constituting unlawful 
competition and as being actionable at the suit of the trader damnified 
thereby ... [T]he conduct of the trader misappropriating the information 
would amount to an infringement of the rights of the compiler thereof to 
59 216. 
60 1964 1 SA 434 (A). 
61 218. 
62 221-222. 
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carry on his trade and attract custom without unlawful interference from 
competitors; and the damage suffered would normally consist of the loss 
of customers or potential customers who have been induced by such 
conduct to deal with his competitor rather than with the compiler himself. 
Bearing in mind the Aquilian character of a claim based upon such 
conduct, it seems to me that the suffering of damage in this form and its 
causal connection with the acts of unlawful competition are essential 
ingredients of the claimant's cause of action." 
The exception against the plaintiff's claim was upheld because the particulars of claim 
contained no allegation that the plaintiff and the defendant had carried on business 
in competition with each other or that the defendant had used the purloined 
information in a competing business. Corbett J regarded63 such an allegation as 
essential, because it would in his opinion furnish part of the causal connection 
between the conduct complained of and the damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
However, Corbett J's important judgment laid a firm foundation for the recognition of 
Aquilian liability for the misappropriation of trade secrets. 
In Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Dude Meester Group Ltd; Dude Meester Group Ltd 
v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Lta64 the Dun and Bradstreet case was cited with 
approval. Diemont J emphasized65 that the basis of the action was Aquilian and that 
the absence of a direct precedent was not in itself fatal provided the requirements of 
Aquilian liability were satisfied.66 
63 222. 
64 1972 3 SA 152 (C) 161. Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 433; Leon 1982 De Rebus 380. 
65 161. 
66 Domanski 433 remarks that certain passages in Diemont J's judgment (160-161) appear to 
confuse or even equate the English action for breach of confidence with the delictual action for 
unlawful competition in South African law. Domanski submits that these remedies derive from 
completely distinct juridical grounds of trade secret protection, and are not equivalent. The statement 
that the two remedies are not to be confused or equated, deserves support. However, it is submitted 
that Diemont J's judgment did not necessarily confuse or equate the two. It is true that Diemont J 
started with a consideration of the English action for breach of confidence, but in this regard he did 
not add anything to what Corbett J had already said in his judgment in Dun and Bradstreet - compare 
160-161 of Diemont J's judgment with 213-214 of Corbett J's judgment. That Diemont J quoted the 
applicant as averring that the equivalent remedy to the action for breach of confidence could be found 
in the form of delictual liability for "unlawful interference with business", need not carry too much weight 
in this regard. After all, Diemont J embraced (161) the same parameters of liability as those recognized 
by Corbett J: viz, that the requirements of Aquilian liability must be satisfied, and that criteria such as 
fairness and honesty in competition must be given due recognition - see par 9.3.1.2.1 below. 
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In Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Lta67 it was again confirmed that the remedy 
for the misappropriation of confidential information was Aquilian. Moreover, Goldstone 
AJ decided that the Aquilian action was not only available to the owner of confidential 
information, but also to someone who had the right to use such information in the 
capacity of exclusive licensee of the owner. 
In Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Lta68 Van Dijkhorst 
J declared69 categorically: 
"A delictual action on "breach of confidence" can only be a manifestation 
of the Aquilian action on unlawful competition." 
In Schultz v Butt70 the Appellate Division had the opportunity to consider the 
protection of trade secrets or confidential information by the Aquilian action. The 
plaintiff in that case was the manufacturer of a catamaran-type boat with a unique hull 
which he had developed over a long period of time and with considerable expenditure 
of time, labour and money. The defendant acquired one of the plaintiff's hulls, made 
a mould thereof, and used this mould to make boats with hulls substantially identical 
to those of the plaintiff. The boats thus made he sold in competition with the plaintiff, 
and he even went so far as to obtain a registration of the design of the hull with the 
Registrar of Designs. The decision in the court a quo was apparently based71 inter 
alia on the application of principles extracted from classical English cases on breach 
of confidence. 72 Nicholas AJA, who delivered the judgment of the Appellate Division, 
found73 that the design of the plaintiff's hulls was in the public domain - there was 
nothing confidential about it. The plaintiff could therefore not succeed with an action 
based on the misuse of confidential information. 74 Before coming to this conclusion, 
however, Nicholas AJA made some important remarks concerning the basis of the 
67 1980 3 SA 687 (W). Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 231-232; Delport 1982 BML 166; Domanski 
1993 THRHR 434; Leon 1982 De Rebus 380; Neethling 1980 THRHR 437ff. 
68 1981 2 SA 173 (D. Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 435; Leon 1982 De Rebus 381. 
69 191. 
70 1986 3 SA 667 (A). 
71 Cf the decision of the court a quo - Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 577-579; the decision of 
the Appellate Division at 679; Domanski 439. 
72 Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd [1948] 65 RPC 203 (CA), 1963 3 
All ER 415; Terrapin Ltd v Builders' Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd 1960 RPC 128. 
73 680. 
74 The plaintiff was successful with his claim in so far as it was based on the slavish copying of his 
product by the defendant. See par 8.2.2.2.3.1 above. 
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protection of confidential trade information in South African law. Pointing out75 that 
the action for breach of confidence known to English law had been held in the Dun 
and Bradstreet case not to form part of South African law, he added: 
"[T]hat does not mean that the misuse of confidential information in order 
to advance one's own business interests and activities at the expense of 
a competitor's may not constitute a wrongful act in the context of an 
action76 for unlawful competition." 
In the light of the case law surveyed above,77 there can be no doubt that the 
protection of trade secrets against delictual violations is firmly entrenched as a 
species of Aquilian liability. A very important implication is that the generalising 
approach of the South African law of delict78 allows any novel wrongful act which 
may be committed in respect of trade secrets to be dealt with.79 To succeed with a 
delictual action for damages in the case of a trade secret infringement, the owner 
must prove the following elements: an act; wrongfulness; fault; causation and 
harm.8° Frequently, the interdict is a more appropriate remedy,81 on account of its 
preventive function.82 To obtain an interdict to prevent or stop trade secret 
infringement, the owner must prove two of these elements: an act, actual or 
imminent; and wrongfulness.83 General principles applicable to the five delictual 
75 679. 
76 Earlier in the judgment - at 678 - Nicholas AJA made it clear that the action for unlawful 
competition was the Aquilian action. 
77 See further Rectifier and Communication Systems (Pty) Ltd v Harrison 1981 2 SA 283 (C) 286; 
288 289; Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 (D 555; Kemp, Sacs & Nell Real 
Estate (Edms) Bpk v Soll 1986 1 SA 673 (0) 691; Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnjectaseal CC 
1988 2 SA 54 (D 63; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 426; Van Castricum 
v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 CD 732 735; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 22911; Domanski 43011. 
78 Par 8.2 above; Van Heerden and Neethling 64. 
79 Cf again Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) 
Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 218: "The significance of this is that it means that, while such an action must 
satisfy all the requirements of Aquilian liability, the broad and ample basis of the Lex Aquilia is 
available in this field for the recognition of rights of action even where there is no direct precedent in 
our law"; Neethling 1992 (1) Codicil/us 12. 
80 Par 8.2 above. 
81 Cf eg Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 CD; 
Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W); Harchris Heat 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 (D; Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 
(W); Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch 
Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C). 
82 Par 8.5.4 above. 
83 Par 8.5.4 above. 
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elements, and theoretical applications in trade secret protection, have been stated in 
the previous chapter.84 In the following paragraphs, the way in which the delictual 
elements have been dealt with in South African trade secret cases, is examined. 
9.3.1.1 ACT85 
Dicta can be found in case law that three types of voluntary, human conduct86 in 
respect of trade secrets can potentially give rise to liability: acquisition, 87 use88 and 
disclosure. 89 90 
84 Par 8.2.1-8.2.5. 
85 Cf in general par 8.2.1 above. 
86 See the requirements of an act for the purpose of the law of delict, par 8.2.1 above. 
87 Eg Easyfind International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 927: "To my 
mind the simple practical guide in cases of appropriation of confidential documents or ideas is the 
commandment 'Thou shallt not steal'"; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 90-91: 
"There is not... a general duty burdening an employee ... not to compete with the company that formerly 
employed him. But in the process of competing he may not 'steal' what is the company's property -
its trade secrets or confidential internal business information"; Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude 
Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C) 162. 
Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 228 fn 36; Knobel 1990 THRHR 494 fn 53. In accordance with the 
views adopted above (par 8.2.1; 8.2.2.1) a mere acquisition of a trade secret - ie in the absence of 
subsequent use or disclosure thereof - can already infringe the right to the trade secret and thus be 
wrongful. However, where such wrongful acquisition has not been followed by wrongful use or 
disclosure, the plaintiff may find it difficult to prove patrimonial loss (cf par 8.2.5 above). In such a case 
an action for damages will not readily lie - however, the wrongful acquisition of the trade secret should 
found a successful application for an interdict (cf par 8.5.4 above). 
88 Cf eg Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn 
Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (D; Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit 
Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C); Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v lscor 1983 1 SA 548 
(D; Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W); Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude 
Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C). Cf 
Van Heerden and Neethling 228; Knobel 1990 THRHR 494 fn 51. 
89 Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 185 187; cf Coo/air Ventilator Co 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 689 691. See further Van Heerden and Neethling 228. 
90 The position is essentially in accordance with the provisions of the GA TT TR/Ps agreement (par 
5.1; 5.2 above) and the view adopted above (par 8.2.1) in the light of a comparative study of other 
legal systems. 
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9.3.1.2 WRONGFULNESS91 
9.3.1.2.1 The general criterion for wrongfulness92 
In the locus classicus on Aquilian liability for trade secret infringement, Dun and 
Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd,93 
the emphasis fell94 on the criteria of fairness and honesty in competition. In this 
regard Corbett J said:95 
"Fairness and honesty are themselves somewhat vague and elastic terms, 
but, while they may not provide a scientific or indeed infallible guide in all 
cases to the limits of lawful competition, they are relevant criteria which 
have been used in the past and which, in my view, may be used in the 
future in the development of the law relating to competition in trade." 
In Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd 
v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltcf6 the importance of the criteria of fairness and 
honesty in trade was again emphasized. 
The judgment in Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltcf7 
is of particular importance for the field of unlawful competition law. Van Dijkhorst J 
found98 "fairness and honesty" to be unsatisfactory standards for the determination 
of wrongfulness, and stated that the true criterion is the general one for delictual 
91 Cf in general par 8.2.2 above. 
92 Cf in general par 8.2.2.1 above. 
93 1968 1 SA 209 (C); see par 9.3.1 above. 
94 218, following Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 1 SA 434 (A) 440-441 and Combrinck v De 
Kock 5 SC 405 409. 
95 218-219. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 121-122; Delport 1982 BML 186; Domanski 1993 
THRHR 431; Pienaar 54ff. 
96 1972 3 SA 152 (C) 161. Diemont J added at 161: "It must be conceded that these phrases, 
fairness in competition and honesty in trade, have an old-fashioned ring about them which may cause 
the cynic in business to smile, but it is right that the Courts should have regard to and emphasize 
these virtues. Moreover the phrases are somewhat elastic, as difficult to apply in some cases as the 
concept of the reasonable man is difficult to apply. Nevertheless, if our law is to develop and is to offer 
the commercial man protection from unlawful interference in his business, the Courts will not disregard 
the words fairness and honesty". Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 120-121; Delport 1982 BML 186. 
97 1981 2 SA 173 (T). 
98 186-188. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 121-124; Burchell 1981 Annual SuNey 197-200; Delport 
1982 BML 186; Domanski 1993 THRHR 435; Hertzog 1981 De Jure 354-356; Leon 1982 De Rebus 
381. 
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wrongfulness - the bani mores or "general sense of justice of the community".99 In 
determining and applying this norm in a particular case, the interests of the competing 
parties must be weighed, while "the morals of the market place" and the "business 
ethics of that section of the community where the norm is to be applied" must also 
be considered. 100 
In Schultz v Butt101 Nicholas AJA reconciled102 the "fairness and honesty" and the 
bani mores criteria: 
"In judging of fairness and honesty, regard is had to bani mores and to 
the general sense of justice of the community ... Van der Merwe and 
Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 5th ed at 58 
note 95 rightly emphasize that 'die regsgevoel van die gemeenskap 
opgevat moet word as die regsgevoel van die gemeenskap se 
regsbeleidmakers, soos Wetgewer en Regter'. While fairness and honesty 
are relevant criteria in deciding whether competition is unfair, they are not 
the only criteria... [Q]uestions of public policy may be important in a 
particular case, eg the importance of a free market and of competition in 
our economic system. "103 
One may thus conclude that the general criterion for the determination of 
wrongfulness in cases of trade secret infringement is the same as the general 
criterion for wrongfulness in the law of delict in general - the so-called legal 
convictions of the community or boni mores.104 Van Heerden and Neethling point 
99 188. 
100 188-189: "[nhe norm to be applied is the objective one of public policy. This is the general 
sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion. In determining and 
applying this norm in a particular case, the interests of the competing parties have to be weighed, 
bearing in mind also the interests of society, the public weal. As this norm cannot exist in vacuo, the 
morals of the market place, the business ethics of that section of the community where the norm is 
to be applied, are of major importance in its determination." 
101 1986 3 SA 667 (A). 
102 679. Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 125-126; Van Heerden in Neethling (ed) 9; Domanski 1993 
THRHR440. 
103 See further Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 Cn 732; Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd v /njectasea/ CC 1988 2 SA 54 Cn 63; Easyfind International (SA) Pty Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings 
1983 3 SA 917 (W) 929-931 (dishonesty); Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /SCOR 19831 SA 548 
en 554 ("applying, as the criterion of unlawfulness, the norms of justice and fair play demanded by 
public policy"); Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W) 696-697; Wilrose Timbers 
(Pty) Ltd v CE Westergaard (Pty) Ltd 1980 2 SA 287 (W) 290 (dishonesty) 292 ("unfair and dishonest 
competition"). 
104 Cf par 7 .4.1.1; 8.2.2.1 above; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 31 ff; Boberg 33ff; Burchell 24; Van 
der Merwe and Olivier 58ff; Van der Walt 22-23. 
298 
out105 that when this yardstick is applied to the field of commercial competition 
generally, the following factors may be taken into account: the fairness and honesty 
of the conduct; the morals and business ethics of the economic trade sector involved; 
the protection that already extends to the area concerned in case law; the importance 
of a free market and strong competition in our economic system; the question 
whether the parties are trade rivals; conventions with other countries; and the motive 
of the perpetrator. 
The flexibility of the bani mores as basic norm of delictual wrongfulness enables the 
law of delict to cope with novel situations where no precedents exist in the positive 
law.106 More concrete delictual norms - expressed either in terms of infringement 
of subjective rights or breach of legal duties - develop from the bani mores to serve 
as more concrete measures of wrongfulness in specific factual situations.107 
Arguments in favour of the recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret - the 
infringement of which may serve as a more concrete measure of wrongfulness in 
trade secret misappropriation cases - were presented above.108 In the following 
paragraph it is established what authority for this proposition exists in South African 
case law. 
9.3.1.2.2 The infringement of a subjective right as touchstone of wrongfulness in 
cases of trade secret misappropriation 109 
In Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) 
(Pty) Ltd1 10 two possible bases were advanced by the plaintiff's counsel for his 
delictual claim. The first was that the information contained in the credit records 
constituted incorporeal property in the plaintiff's hands, and that the unlawful use 
thereof constituted a delict. Corbett J rejected111 this proposition, stating that, 
except in a somewhat loose sense, such information could not be regarded as 
property, nor could the plaintiff found a cause of action upon an alleged invasion of 
his rights of property in such information. The second suggested basis for the 
plaintiff's claim was "the form of delictual liability, in our law often referred to as 
105 126. 
106 Par 8.2.2.1 above. 
101 Par 7.4.1.1; 7.4.1.2; 8.2.2.1 above. 
108 Par 7.4. 
109 Cf in general par 7.4; 8.2.2.1 above. 
110 1968 1 SA 209 (C); see par 9.3.1 above for a summary of the facts. 
111 216. 
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'unlawful interference with trade or business"'.112 This proposition Corbett J 
accepted. He took113 it as well established that every person had the "'right' -
'liberty' would perhaps be a more correct term - to carry on his trade without wrongful 
interference from others, including competitors". The main difficulty was to determine 
the dividing line between lawful and unlawful interference with the trade of another. 
In this regard the "right to attract custom"114 deserved consideration. However, 
competition by a rival trader would necessarily to some degree result in a diversion 
of such custom to the rival trader, and such interference would not necessarily be 
wrongful. It could be rendered wrongful by the manner in which the rival conducted 
his trade. Observing that the conduct of the defendant in the present case did not fall 
in one of the recognized forms of unlawful competition, and that the question whether 
or not it constituted unlawful competition was to his knowledge res nova in our law, 
Corbett J proceeded to consider whether there was "any broad criterion of 
unlawfulness by which the competition in question [could] be tested".115 This led to 
the criterion of "fairness and honesty in competition" .116 Corbett J then formulated 
a new rule, namely that where a trader has by the exercise of his skill and labour 
compiled information which he distributes to his clients upon a confidential basis, a 
rival trader who is not a client but in some manner obtains this information, and well 
knowing its nature and the basis upon which it was distributed, uses it in his 
competing business and thereby injures the first mentioned trader in his business, 
commits a wrongful act vis-a-vis the latter and will be liable to him in damages or be 
subjected to an interdict. 
It will be noted that the recognition of the "right to carry on trade and attract custom 
without unlawful interference from competitors" did not really facilitate formulating the 
essence of wrongfulness in this case. Pienaar117 has pointed out that circular 
reasoning was involved. To find out whether the misappropriation of confidential 
information was unlawful, one had to determine whether it was a form of unlawful 
competition. But how was one to determine when competition was unlawful? Since 
interference with trade or goodwill is the life of all competition, the court was led away 
to the vague criterion of fairness and honesty. The end-result was that the court 
formulated a new norm of delictual liability, applicable to a narrowly defined type of 
112 216. 
113 216; cf 221. 
114 Cf par 7.4.4.4.1 above on the right to goodwill. 
115 217. 
116 218-219; cf par 9.3.1.2.1 above. 
117 41; cf 39. 
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conduct. 
It is submitted that the process analyzed above is typical of the extension of delictual 
liability to a new field. First the law is confronted by a novel factual situation not 
covered by existing concrete delictual norms. Thus there is no recognized subjective 
right at stake, the infringement of which would constitute wrongfulness; nor has a 
legal duty - the breach of which would constitute wrongfulness - been recognized by 
the law to apply to the new situation. This forces the court to fall back on the vague, 
adaptable, general norm of wrongfulness.118 At this stage of the development of our 
law of delict we know this norm to be the boni mores.119 When the Dun and 
Bradstreet case was decided, the criterion in vogue in the context of trade 
competition was fairness and honesty.120 The functions of the two criteria are the 
same: to serve as a touchstone for a policy-based decision on what is juridically right 
and wrong - lawful and wrongful - in the new situation. Thus a new delictual norm is 
born. Such a new norm may be very limited in its scope, since judges are usually 
understandably loathe to formulate new rules of any wider application than is 
absolutely necessary to decide the relevant case. Note how the norm formulated in 
Dun and Bradstreet is restricted to a situation where the rival trader knows the nature 
of the information and the basis on which it was distributed by the compiler 
thereof. 121 In a next case the norm may be expanded somewhat, made applicable 
to a somewhat different situation, 122 and if this process is repeated a few times, a 
new body of law develops gradually. However, the legal analyst can often make a 
valuable contribution to such development if an emergent subjective right that might 
lie at the root of the process can be identified.123 Once this has been done, it is 
possible to formulate the applicable norm of delictual wrongfulness in terms of the 
infringement of that right. Such a norm has the advantage of being of much wider 
118 Cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 40-43. 
119 Cf par 7.4.1.1; 7.4.1.2; 8.2.2.1; 9.3.1.2.1 above. 
120 See the development of the general criterion for wrongfulness in this field, and the ultimate 
reconciliation of the boni mores and the fairness and honesty criteria, outlined in par 9.3.1.2.1 above. 
121 Its application was furthermore limited by the court requiring (222) an allegation that the parties 
to the dispute are competitors in trade (cf the discussion of Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /SCOR 
1983 1 SA 548 Cn below). Note how the narrow scope of the decision in Dun and Bradstreet is 
criticized by Copeling 1968 THRHR 191. 
122 This has indeed happened in the field of the delictual protection of trade secrets: in Prok Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W), for instance, legal protection was extended to a plaintiff 
who was a licensee rather than the owner of the trade secret (par 9.3.1 above), and in Harchris Heat 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /SCOR 1983 1 SA 548 <n protection was extended to a situation where the 
defendant was not a rival trader of the plaintiff (main text in this paragraph below). 
123 Cf par 7.4.1.2 above. 
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application than the casuistic type norm like the one formulated in the Dun and 
Bradstreet case, yet it is more precise and capable of more predictable application 
than the Grundnorm of the boni mores. 
It is submitted that the subjective right at stake here is the right to the trade secret 
itself as a species of intellectual property.124 The delictual norm which then emerges 
to determine the wrongfulness of a trade secret misappropriation is simply that 
conduct infringing the right to the trade secret is wrongful.125 Is adoption of such a 
view precluded by Corbett J's rejection of the proposition that confidential trade 
information can constitute property? It is submitted that it is not. Apart from 
considerations of policy and logic in favour of the recognition of an intellectual 
property right to the trade secret, 126 the following reasons may be cited: the 
authority on which the rejection of the property notion was based is not convincing; 
aspects of Corbett J's own judgment point towards the recognition of confidential 
trade information as an asset which must logically be taken to be object of a right, 
and subsequent case law contains dicta indicating that trade secrets are property or 
something akin to property. These points will now be dealt with separately. 
In the first place, the authority on which the rejection of the proposition that trade 
secrets are incorporeal property was based, is unconvincing. Corbett J referred127 
firstly to the view that a personal right flowing from contract is incorporeal 
property, 128 and that such property enjoys protection in so far as a delictual action 
is available for the intentional interference by a third party in contractual relations.129 
However, in casu no interference with contractual relations was involved, and an 
invasion of (incorporeal) property in the sense of an interference with personal rights 
could therefore not be a basis for the current action. Noting that the contention on 
behalf of the plaintiff was that the confidential information itself was property, 130 
Corbett J said simply this claim was unfounded. He did not deem it possible, "except 
in a somewhat loose sense", to regard such information as property at common law; 
124 See again par 7.4 for arguments for the recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret, and 
specifically 7.4.4.4.1 on the relationship between the right to the trade secret and the right to goodwill. 
125 Cf par 8.2.2.1 above. See par 7.4.1; 7.4.1.1 above on the infringement of a subjective right in 
general. 
126 Cf par 7.4.4.1 above. 
127 215. 
128 As noted in par 7.3.3, rights are regarded as incorporeal property. 
129 Cf in general Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 293ff; Van der Merwe and Olivier 370ff. 
13° Cf par 7.3.3 above for a consideration of possible meanings of the concept "property" when 
used in conjunction with trade secrets. 
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nor did he believe that the plaintiff could found a cause of action on an alleged 
invasion of his rights of "property" in such information.131 The only authority cited 
for this denial was the old case of Nelson and Meurant v Quin & Co.132 In that case 
the court refused an application for a perpetual interdict restraining the publication of 
certain private letters by a third party who had in some way come into possession 
thereof. Counsel for the applicant based the application solely on the ground of the 
sender's alleged "right of property" in the contents of the letters. 133 Noting that to 
succeed with that contention, the plaintiff would have to show that "every person has 
a clear and undoubted right of property in his own compositions, to the extent of 
being entitled to prevent every one else from multiplying copies of such compositions, 
whether they be of a purely literary character or not, and whether they have been 
communicated to others or not",134 De Villiers CJ found135 that no such right had 
been established. It is submitted that the Nelson and Meurant case may be regarded 
as authority for nothing more than the view that no right of property exists in the 
contents of a private letter - which was not shown to have any commercial value or 
to contain any information that could be used in trade or industry. To cite the case 
as authority for a denial of any right of property in a trade secret - information that is 
confidential, is capable of industrial or commercial application and which consequently 
has economic value - is, it is submitted, not convincing.136 It may be noted, 
incidentally, that according to current copyright law a letter may be the subject of 
copyright and the author may then prevent the making of copies or publication 
thereof.137 If the Nelson and Meurant case were to be decided today, its outcome 
would probably have been completely different, and the court would probably have 
held that the contents of the letters were the object of an intellectual property right -
copyright. Be that as it may, it is submitted that the court in Dun and Bradstreet did 
not seriously consider the possibility that a trade secret could be the object of an 
intellectual property right similar to - although not statutory in origin - copyright or 
patent rights. Seen in this light, the denial of any property right in confidential trade 
information in the Dun and Bradstreet case should not be taken as the definitive word 
131 216. 
132 1874 Buch 46. 
133 50. 
134 51. 
135 56. 
136 Cf Pienaar 41-42. 
137 Cf the definition of "literary work" sec 1 Act 98 of 1978; cf Copeling 8. 
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on the topic.138 
In the second place, certain dicta in the Dun and Bradstreet case can - in spite of the 
express denial that any property rights exist in confidential information - hardly be 
interpreted to mean anything other than that trade secrets are some form of property. 
Consider the following extract from the decision: 139 
"[T]he fact that information is distributed upon a confidential basis to a 
limited class of persons prevents it, in my view, from becoming public 
property capable of being used or imitated by rival traders. In such 
circumstances the conduct of a rival trader who obtains and, well knowing 
the position, uses the information to advance his own business interests 
and activities amounts to a deliberate misappropriation and filching of the 
138 Copeling, in a case note in 1968 THRHR 188-189 argues convincingly that the confidential 
information in the Dun and Bradstreet case did in fact constitute intellectual property in the plaintiff's 
hands: "In the field of immaterial property law it is well accepted that the intellectual product of man's 
mind is, in the legal sense, just as much 'property' as is the tangible product of his physical skills ... 
[Dhe contention by counsel for the plaintiff that the information contained in 'credit records' constituted 
property in the plaintiff's hands, cannot be dismissed too lightly. The first question that ought to be 
asked, so it seems, is whether or not the compilation of such information was in any way attributable 
to the expenditure by plaintiff of its own skill and labour. For, if it were not, the information itself (ie the 
bare data comprising the information) though property, could scarcely be termed property 'in the 
plaintiff's hands', in other words, the plaintiff's personal and private property. Rather, it would be in the 
nature of property falling within the common domain, free to be used by all and sundry. However, there 
is little doubt that plaintiff, by its selection and arrangement of the information contained in 'Credit 
Records' must have contributed substantially in the way of skill and labour. This being so, it is 
concluded that the information contained in 'Credit Records' ... did, in fact, constitute property in the 
plaintiff's hands.• However, Copeling then proceeds (189-199) to argue that there was still no basis 
at common law upon which the plaintiff could found a cause of action for the unlawful appropriation 
of his intellectual property in the confidential information: "The reason for this lies in our copyright 
legislation... [L]ike the Copyright Act of 1916, the Act of 1965 specifically states that, apart from the 
operation of any rule of equity relating to breaches of trust or confidence, no copyright or right in the 
nature of copyright is to subsist otherwise than by virtue of the Act or some other enactment in that 
behalf. Thus, even if it be accepted that the information in 'Credit Records' constituted property in the 
plaintiff's hands, it would seem that any action for the unlawful appropriation of such property - being, 
it is submitted, essentially in the nature of an action for infringement of copyright or a similar right -
would perforce have to be instituted under the Copyright Act ... But... our copyright legislation affords 
no basis upon which plaintiff could have founded such an action - at least, not in respect of defendant's 
verbal reports of the information contained in 'Credit Records'". It is submitted that the view that the 
right to the trade secret is a "right in the nature of copyright" is wrong. There are certain areas of 
overlap between copyright and the right to the trade secret, and they are certainly both intellectual 
property rights, but there are also fundamental differences between them - see par 7.4.4.2 above. The 
provisions of the copyright law can therefore not be construed to prohibit recognition of the right to the 
trade secret. Note that the operation of any rule of equity relating to breaches of trust or confidence 
was at any rate recognized by the Copyright Act of 1965. The generally accepted view is that those 
rules of equity were not received into our law - see case law discussed in par 9.3.1 above. The 
"equivalent" remedy in our law is the application of the Aquilian action to protect the right to the trade 
secret (as well as, to a certain extent, the application of the actio iniuriarum to protect the right to 
privacy). Seen in this light, Copeling's view that non-recognition of an intellectual property right to the 
trade secret can be justified with reference to our copyright legislation, does not merit support. 
139 221; emphasis added. 
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products of another's skill and Jabour' .140 
As products of the skill and labour of the plaintiff, such confidential information is 
obviously some asset to which the positive law extends protection. From the 
perspective of the doctrine of subjective rights 141 the logical conclusion is that such 
information is the object of a subjective right. 
In the third place, case law decided after the Dun and Bradstreet case shed new light 
on the question whether a trade secret can be property or something akin to property. 
In Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd 
v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd142 Diemont J said143 that the conduct of a 
competitor who filches from a rival information which he knows is secret and 
confidential, and which has been developed by the rival's skill and industry 
"amounts to deliberate misappropriating of a business asset which was 
acquired by another's skill and industry. It is difficult to appreciate how this 
conduct differs in principle from the conduct of a man who steals goods 
from the shelves of a rival's shop. Both types of conduct constitute 
unlawful interference with trade of another; both types of conduct are in 
my view actionable, and fall within the principles of the Lex Aquilia. "144 
This analogy between the misappropriation of a trade secret and the theft of 
merchandise from a shop is most interesting. Together with Diemont J's clear words 
that the filching of a trade secret amounts to the appropriation of a business asset, 
this analogy clearly suggests that a trade secret is a type of property (or something 
14° Consider, furthermore, the following quotation (220) from the American case International News 
Service Associated Press v Associated Press 248 US 215 (1918) and Corbett J's subsequent 
comments: "'Regarding news matter as the mere material from which two competing parties are 
endeavouring to make money, and treating it therefore, as quasi property for the purposes of their 
business because they are both selling it as such, defendant's conduct differs from the ordinary case 
of unfair competition in trade principally in this that, instead of selling its own goods as those of 
complainant, it substitutes misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and sells complainant's 
goods as its own.' This decision is particularly apposite in the present case. Here the gravamen of the 
case is that information garnered by the plaintiff by means of its skill, labour and money and intended 
to be sold to its customers has been misappropriated by the defendant and used in its own business. 
The allegation, in effect, is that defendant is 'endeavouring to reap where it has not sown'. On the 
facts, however, this case is a stronger one than the International News Service case in that, unlike the 
news garnered in that case, the information collected by plaintiff and published in "Credit Records" 
constituted a literary work (so it is alleged) and was not made public property by general publication.• 
141 Par 7.4.1 above. 
142 1972 3 SA 152 (C) 161. 
143 162. 
144 These words were quoted with approval in the Atlas Organic Fertilizers case 1981 2 SA 173 
(T) 185. Cf Pienaar 85-86. 
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analogous to property) after all. 
In Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 145 Goldstone AJ accepted146 the view 
expressed in Dun and Bradstreet that the relevant wrong was not an invasion of 
rights of property, but rather the unlawful infringement of a competitor's right to be 
protected from unlawful competition. However, later in the judgment Goldstone AJ 
referred147 to a licensee of the owner of confidential information as being "in lawful 
possession" of the information. He also cited148 with apparent approval the passage 
from the Stellenbosch Wine Trust case where Diemont J drew an analogy between 
the misappropriation of a trade secret and stealing goods from a shop. Of the 
confidential information in the "possession" of the licensee he then said149 the 
following: 
"In the present case the business asset was not acquired by the skill and 
industry of the [exclusive licensee]. However, it was acquired at the 
expense of the [exclusive licensee who] has acquired the information from 
[the owner] in terms of the licence agreement. It has thus become a 
business asset of the [licensee] no less than if [the latter] had acquired 
it by [his] own skill and industry." 
Again, the references to "possession" and "business asset" leaves one with a very 
strong impression that despite express protestations to the contrary, a trade secret 
is indeed something akin to property. Similar dicta categorizing trade secrets as 
property can be found in several other cases.150 
145 1980 3 SA 687 (W). 
146 Citing the Dun and Bradstreet case 215-216. Cf the criticism by Pienaar 39-40. 
147 696. 
148 162. 
149 698; emphasis added. 
150 Crown Cork & Seal Co v Rheem SA (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 1093 (W) 1100: "No less in South 
Africa than in England does the conflict arise between the need to protect a man's property from 
misuse by others, in this case the property being confidential information, and the need to ensure that 
a litigant is entitled to present his case without unfair halters"; cf 1095: ·mwo principles are in conflict. 
The one relied upon by the second plaintiff is that it has property in confidential documents, 
confidential in the sense that they are not the subjects of public knowledge and such that a reasonable 
businessman might wish to keep to himself ... and that merely because there is an action in progress 
they should not be available to a competitor for possible misuse, but that its proprietary rights should 
be protected. The other principle, relied upon by the defendants, is that no limits should be placed 
upon their procedural rights in terms of the Rules to make full use of relevant documents in the second 
plaintiff's possession in order to present their defence without being hampered at all"; cf 1101; SA 
Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 90-91: "There is not and cannot be a general duty 
burdening an employee ... not to compete with the company that formerly employed him. But in the 
process of competing he may not 'steal' what is the company's property - its trade secrets or 
306 
An exceptionally important decision in this context was given in Harchris Heat 
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v ISCOR.151 O'Donovan J unequivocally characterized152 the 
trade secret misappropriated in that case as "intellectual property belonging to the 
plaintiff". What makes the Harchris case furthermore really significant, is the fact that 
the plaintiff and defendant in the case were not competitors in trade. The 
wrongfulness of the defendant's misappropriation of the relevant trade secret could 
therefore not be based on unlawful competition. O'Donovan J held: 
"The remedy under the lex Aquilia in cases of unlawful interference with 
the business of another is not confined to competitors in trade. Loss will, 
at least prima facie, be occasioned by the unlawful deprivation of the 
owner of a trade secret of the right to exploit it, whether by attracting 
custom, or in other ways." 
The importance of these insights in the Harchris case can hardly be over-
emphasized. The whole issue of the legal protection of trade secrets is thereby 
placed in proper perspective. The insistence in the Dun and Bradstreet case 153 on 
an allegation that the parties are competitors in trade was - it is submitted 
confidential internal business information"; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 eo> 
184: "[nhe question to be decided is whether the applicant is seeking to protect its own property, 
namely some sort of confidential trade secret, or whether it is simply seeking to inhibit lawful 
competition because the ... respondents are merely drawing upon their general knowledge, experience, 
memory and skill"; 187: "I am satisfied that a prima facie case has been established that the first 
respondent misappropriated or filched this information which was, to his knowledge, secret and 
confidential and was the property of the applicant"; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 
409 ew> 428: "Customer lists drawn up by a trader, and kept confidential for the purposes of his own 
business, contain confidential information, the property of the trader"; 429: "It was recognised in 1972 
[in the Stellenbosch Wine Trust case] that the injury to a trader which results when a trade rival 
acquires ... confidential information [relating to proposals for the name, design, get-up and marketing 
of a new product]. .. and wrongfully makes use of it to the detriment of the trader whose confidential 
property it is, is an injury to be remedied on Aquilian principles"; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1992 
3 SA 520 ew) 527. Also in cases dealing with the contractual protection of trade secrets are trade 
secrets described as the objects of proprietary interests: cf eg Ackermann-Goggingen 
Aktiengesellschafft v Marshing 1973 4 SA 62 ec> 76; Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 
1991 2 SA 482 en 502 503 508 509 - a proprietary interest in a trade secret may be contractually 
protected by a covenant in restraint of trade. See also Van Heerden and Neethling 244 fn 8. 
151 1983 1 SA 548 en. On appeal the decision was reversed on the facts - South African Iron and 
Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd v Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd 1987 4 SA 421 eA). The majority 
of the court found it unnecessary to consider the questions of law raised in the court a quo; while the 
two dissenting judges of appeal were of the opinion that the court a quo had not erred in its findings 
of fact or on the law. 
152 555, emphasis added. 
153 222; see fn 121 above; cf Delport 1982 BML 166-167 - a contribution published before the 
Harchris decision was reported. 
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correctly1 54- not followed. The Harchris decision highlights the fact that trade 
secrets may be misappropriated - and are therefore in need of legal protection - also 
outside a context of unlawful competition. Certainly the majority of cases of trade 
secret misappropriation will take place in a competitive context, and loss will therefore 
frequently manifest itself as an infringement of the goodwill of the plaintiff's 
undertaking.155 However, the Harchris case illustrates clearly that this is not 
invariably the case. The need to recognize and protect an independent subjective 
right to the trade secret becomes apparent, 156 and the nature of that right is 
identified as an intellectual property right. Equally important is the insight that having 
an intellectual property right to a trade secret entitles the trade secret owner to exploit 
it by attracting custom - and expanding the goodwill of an undertaking - or in other 
ways. As an example, consider the case of an inventor who wants to exploit his trade 
secret by selling a licence for its use to someone else. If such an inventor does not 
have a business enterprise of his own, it stands to reason that he cannot base a 
delictual action for misappropriation of that trade secret on unlawful competition. 
However, his trade secret is a valuable asset to him just as it may be to the proprietor 
of a business enterprise. Legal protection must therefore be based on an infringement 
of his intellectual property right to the trade secret. 157 And the way for such 
protection has now been opened by the Harchris decision. 
Finally, mention should be made of the poignant statement of Schutz AJ in Easyfind 
International (SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstaplan Holdings: 158 
"To my mind the simple practical guide in cases of appropriation of 
confidential documents or ideas is the commandment 'Thou shallt not 
154 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 224 225 fn 10; Du Plessis 1985 MB 66; Domanski 1993 THRHR 
432 437. 
155 Par 7.4.4.4 above. 
156 As advocated in par 7.4 above. See especially par 7.4.4.4.1. 
157 See par 7.4.4.4.1 above. Cf Du Plessis 1985 MB 66-67 who comments on the Dun and 
Bradstreet case as follows: "It is seen as an unnecessary limitation that the court should tie the 
granting of a remedy to a situation of competition. A situation is not inconceivable where information 
compiled by a person (not necessarily a trader) by expending skill, labour and money is appropriated 
by another (again not necessarily a trader) and used to the detriment and loss of the first person. 
However, the court does not appear to envisage a wider basis at all... The reason for this unnecessary 
limitation is apparent, namely because the right which has been infringed was seen by the court as 
the plaintiff's right to the goodwill. The right to goodwill will be impinged upon by deeds of unfair 
competition. The court would probably have been prepared to grant a wider remedy if it had seen the 
plaintiff's right as an immaterial property right, viz a right to incorporeal property in the form of 
confidential information. Such a right would incorporate the exclusive power to use and exploit, or 
authorise others to use and exploit, the incorporeal property, and conversely, to prevent the 
unauthorised use and exploitation thereof by others." 
158 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 927; quoted with apparent approval in Aercrete SA (Pty) Ltd v Skema 
Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 814 (D) 822. 
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steal'. I hope that by saying this I do not call down on me the wrath of the 
doctors. I can already see what they may say. The word 'unscientific' may 
figure. But I do not see that simple practical test as being in conflict with 
the more elaborate definitions which may be needed in cases of 
complication. What is clearly established in our law is that it is unlawful for 
a servant to take his master's confidential information or documents and 
use them to compete with the master." 
Again the analogy of theft is applied to trade secret misappropriation. Obviously a 
trade secret can normally159 not literally be stolen in the sense of removal from the 
possession of the owner. However, the misappropriation of a trade secret should - as 
pointed out by Schutz J - receive similar condemnation from the law than that given· 
to theft. Again, the logical way to accomplish this is to recognize that a trade secret 
is indeed intellectual property, and that its unauthorized acquaintance is already 
wrongful because a subjective right to the secret itself is infringed. There is then no 
need to establish first that the goodwill of the trade secret owner's enterprise (if any) 
has also been adversely affected before a conclusion of wrongfulness can be made. 
9.3.1.2.3 Synthesis 
Although some important cases deny that trade secrets are property, many others 
contain dicta indicating that secrets are property or something akin to property, and 
in the Harchris decision a trade secret is expressly classified as intellectual property. 
A trade secret is therefore the object of an intellectual property right.160 
Wrongfulness in the case of trade secret misappropriation is thus constituted by the 
infringement of the subjective right to the trade secret. Trade secret misappropriation 
is not confined to a context of trade competition. If trade secret misappropriation does 
take place in a competitive context, it constitutes a form of unlawful competition, and 
in such a case the plaintiff's right to goodwill may be infringed in addition to his right 
to the trade secret. The delictual norm that the infringement of the right to the trade 
secret is wrongful, is a concretization of the basic criterion of delictual wrongfulness, 
the boni mores. The boni mores can therefore be used directly to solve particularly 
difficult questions of wrongfulness in novel or borderline situations. In applying the 
boni mores criterion, a careful balancing of the conflicting interests of the parties 
159 In rare cases it may be possible - eg if the secret is written down on a piece of paper, the 
contents of which are so intricate that the owner cannot retain them in his memory. If the physical 
piece of paper is stolen in such a case, the secret - the information - will simultaneously be removed 
from the owner's 'possession'. 
16° Cf par 7.4.3 above. This view is shared by Van Heerden and Neethling 224; Du Plessis 1985 
MB 68-69; Du Plessis in Neethling (ed} 91-92; Knobel 1990 THRHR 492. For a contrary view see 
Joubert 1985 THRHR 37-38. Cf further Domanski 1993 THRHR 230-231 442-443; Geldenhuys 109; 
Pienaar 31 ff 168. 
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involved must be performed, and regard must be had to policy considerations like 
fairness and honesty in trade and the values upheld by the South African 
Constitution.161 
9.3.1.3 FAULT162 
Since the appropriate delictual action for trade secret infringement is the Aquilian 
action, proof of either intention and negligence should be sufficient to found 
liability.163 However, this is not borne out quite unambiguously by case law.164 
In formulating important guidelines on delictual liability for the misappropriation of a 
trade secret, the court in the Dun and Bradstreet case 165 employed language 
suggesting that it had only intentional infringements in mind.166 However, sight 
should not be lost of Corbett J's clear statement167 that he was not attempting to 
define generally the limits of unlawful competition. Was he attempting to define the 
limits of liability for trade secret misappropriation, or was he merely dealing with the 
legal problem presented by the case before him? In other words, must the decision 
be understood to say that only intentional trade secret infringement can give rise to 
delictual liability; or simply that intentional trade secret infringement can give rise to 
delictual liability, without voicing an opinion on negligent trade secret infringement? 
It should be noted that the plaintiff's particulars of claim averred that the defendant 
had, well knowing that the relevant information had been kept in confidence, obtained 
it, reproduced portions thereof and issued written and verbal reports based thereupon 
to his subscribers.168 Thus it appears that the plaintiff's particulars of claim fixed the 
issues on an intentional infringement, and that it was unnecessary for the court to 
161 Cf par 8.2.2.1 above. 
162 Cf in general par 8.2.3 above. 
163 See par 8.2.3 above. This would also be in conformity with the relevant provisions of the GA TT 
TRIPs agreement - see par 5.1; 5.2 above. 
164 Cf Domanski 433; Knobel 1990 THRHR 498; cf in respect of unlawful competition generally Van 
Heerden and Neethling 69; Boberg 149ff. 
165 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 221 - quoted in par 9.3.1 above. 
166 Eg: "[A] rival trader who is not a client but in some manner obtains this information, and well 
knowing its nature and the basis upon which it was distributed, uses it..."; "mhe conduct of a rival 
trader who obtains and, well knowing the position, uses the information to advance his own business 
interests and activities amounts to a deliberate misappropriation and filching of the products of 
another's skill and labour." Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 232 fn 64. 
167 221, quoted in par 9.3.1 above. 
168 See the Dun and Bradstreet case 210. 
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consider negligent infringement. Seen in this light, the Dun and Bradstreet case 
cannot be cited as unambiguous authority for the proposition that only intentional 
trade secret infringement is actionable. The same argument is applicable to the 
Stellenbosch Wine Trust case, 169 where the language of the court170 can again, 
at first blush, be interpreted as authority that only intentional trade secret infringement 
is actionable, but where the applicant had claimed in his founding affidavit171 that 
his "secret and confidential information ... was appropriated and used by respondent 
with the deliberate intention of injuring applicants in their business and trade". 
In Van Castricum v Theunissen, 172 on the other hand, Roos J stated clearly that 
since a claim for damages in the case of misappropriation of confidential information 
will be based on the lex Aquilia, culpa on the part of the wrongdoer will suffice to 
found liability. It is submitted that this statement is correct, being in line with accepted 
general principles of the law of delict.173 
It was argued above 174 that liability for trade secret misappropriation can in principle 
be based on negligence in cases where a finding of intention is ruled out due to the 
absence of consciousness of wrongfulness on the part of the wrongdoer. This 
proposition is not entirely without positive law support, since precisely such a situation 
was, it is submitted, envisaged in Van Castricum v Theunissen. 175 The first 
respondent was an ex-employee who took information regarded as confidential by her 
former employer with her on leaving the latter's employ. She subsequently used that 
information while working for her new employer, who was a competitor of her former 
employer. The first respondent denied that the relevant information was confidential, 
but the court held that it was. In such a situation, Roos J said, 176 the first 
respondent's denial that the information was in fact confidential did not create a bona 
169 1972 3 SA 152 (C) 162. 
170 162 (emphasis added): "[nhe trader who filches information from a competitor, information 
which he knows to be secret and confidential... is acting unfairly and dishonestly if he uses the 
information for his own profit and to the detriment of his rival. His conduct amounts to a deliberate 
misappropriating of a business asset." These words were quoted with approval in the Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers case 1981 2 SA 173 <n 185. 
171 154 of the report. 
112 1993 2 sA 126 en 735. 
173 See again par 8.2.3 above. 
174 Par 8.2.3. 
175 1993 2 sA 126 en 735. 
176 735. 
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fide dispute of fact, inter alia because a claim for damages would be based on the 
lex Aquilia - so that culpa on the part of the first respondent would suffice. 
The implication is obviously that, in an action ex lege Aquilia, the first respondent 
would not necessarily succeed with a defence of absence of consciousness of 
wrongfulness, since her liability could be based on negligence. It should be noted that 
the decision in the Van Castricum case concerned an application for an interdict, so 
that Roos J's dicta regarding fault were strictly obiter, but the decision does at least 
offer persuasive force to the argument that negligence is a sufficient form of fault for 
Aquilian liability in the case of trade secret misappropriation. 
9.3.1.4 CAUSATION177 
In the Dun and Bradstreet case178 Corbett J regarded an allegation that the plaintiff 
and the defendant carried on business in competition with one another as essential 
for the plaintiff's claim, "not only because of the basis advanced for plaintiff's claim, 
viz interference with its trade arising from unlawful competition, but also because it 
furnishes part of the causal connection between the conduct complained of and the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff". Presumably it was meant that only a trade 
competitor can cause "loss of custom" by unfair competition tactics. In the Dun and 
Bradstreet case the plaintiff carried on his trade in Johannesburg and "elsewhere in 
the Republic", while the defendant carried on his trade in Fish Hoek. It was not clear 
whether their spheres of business activity overlapped or not. In this light the court 
was unable to determine whether the loss of custom allegedly suffered by the plaintiff 
was caused by the defendant's unfair competition, or was perhaps caused in other 
ways. 
The Dun and Bradstreet case thus demonstrates how proof that the parties to trade 
secret litigation are trade competitors may help establish a factual causal nexus 179 
between the plaintiff's damage - which will in such a case have manifested itself as 
a loss of goodwill - and the trade secret misappropriation by the defendant. However, 
it has been shown 180 that trade secret infringement can also be perpetrated by non-
competitors, and that trade secret protection is not dependent on the law of unlawful 
competition. Where trade secret misappropriation has taken place outside a 
competitive context, patrimonial loss can also be suffered - although it need not take 
177 Cf in general par 8.2.4 above. 
178 1968 1 SA 209 (C) 222. 
179 Cf par 8.2.4 above on the distinction between factual and legal causation. 
180 Par 9.2.1.2.2; 7.4.4.4 above. 
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the form of loss to goodwill - and in such a case the insight gained from the Dun and 
Bradstreet case on the determination of causation will not apply. 
Legal causation does not appear to have enjoyed the attention of the courts in trade 
secret cases reported thus far. 181 This can probably be attributed to the fact that 
legal causation is in general only expressly considered in the type of case where a 
chain of successive harmful consequences manifests itself, and the court is then 
called upon to decide for which of the consequences the defendant may be held 
liable. Such cases do not appear to have cropped up in the field of trade secret 
litigation yet. It must also be borne in mind that the majority of trade secret cases 
involve applications for interdicts, for which causation need not be established.182 
9.3.1.5 PATRIMONIAL LOSS183 
Recognition exists in case law that patrimonial loss may result from the deprivation 
of the plaintiff (the owner or licensee) of the power to exploit the secret.184 In a 
context of unlawful competition, ,the plaintiff's loss of profit will usually flow from his 
or her loss of trade or custom, in that clients or potential clients deal with the 
defendant instead of with him or her.185 
9.3.2 CONTRACT186 
9.3.2.1 EXPRESS CONTRACT187 
A study of reported South African case law shows that express contractual provisions 
protecting trade secrets are frequently expressed in restraint of trade agreements in 
181 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 71 in respect of unlawful competition cases in general. 
182 Cf par 8.5.4 above; 9.4.2 below. 
183 Cf in general par 8.2.5 above. 
184 Cf Harchris Heat Treatment (Pty) Ltd v /SCOR 1983 1 SA 548 CD 555: "Loss will, at least prima 
facie be occasioned by the unlawful deprivation of the owner of the trade secret of the right to exploit 
it, whether by attracting custom, or in other ways"; Knobel 1990 THRHR 499 fn 91. 
185 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 
1 SA 209 (C} 221-223; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 72; Visser and Potgieter 345 fn 112; Knobel 
1990 THRHR 499. 
186 Cf in general par 8.3 above. 
187 Cf in general par 8.3.1 above. 
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employment contracts. 188 General principles applicable to such agreements have 
been stated in the previous chapter.189 190 Express contractual agreements 
protecting trade secrets concluded between actual or potential customers have also 
enjoyed the attention of the courts.191 192 
188 Cf eg Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (T); Domanski 1993 
THRHR 240. 
189 Par 8.3.1. 
190 These principles have been stated and applied in trade secret cases. Cf eg Sibex Engineering 
Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 2 SA 482 (T) where the majority and minority judgments were 
substantially unanimous on the principles to be applied - 486 (majority): "In general, ... as was said in 
Sunshine records (1990 4 SA 782 (A) 794], it would 'be contrary to the public interest to enforce an 
unreasonable restriction on a person's freedom to trade'. The fact that a party does not have any 
interest in the enforcement [in casu in the sense of seeking to protect trade secrets - see 487] would 
obviously establish that the restraint is unreasonable"; 502-503 (minority): "A contractual restraint 
curtailing the freedom of a former employee to do the work for which he is qualified will be held to be 
unreasonable, contrary to the public interest and therefore unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
if the ex-employee (the covenantor) proves that at the time enforcement is sought, the restraint is 
directed solely to the restriction of fair competition with the ex-employer (the covenantee); and that the 
restraint is not at that time reasonably necessary for the legitimate protection of the covenantee's 
protectable proprietary interests, being his goodwill in the form of trade connection, and his trade 
secrets. If it appears that such a protectable interest then exists and that the restraint is in terms wider 
than is reasonably necessary for the protection thereof, the Court may enforce any part of the restraint 
that nevertheless appears to remain reasonably necessary for that purpose"; 505-506 (minority -
Stegmann J): "(l]n order to prove that the enforcement of a contractual obligation by which he has 
curtailed his freedom to work would be unreasonable and contrary to public policy, a former employee 
has to do nothing more than to prove that his former employer, seeking to enforce the restraint, has 
no trade connection and no trade secrets to protect; or, if he has, that the restraint is such that its 
enforcement would not serve to protect him. Alternatively he may show, if he can, that the restraint is 
wider than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the former employer's trade connection and 
trade secrets." However, the majority found (487-488) on the facts that there were no trade secrets 
to protect and that the restraint agreement could not be enforced; while the minority judge found (509) 
that the covenantor had not discharged the onus of proving that the covenantee had no trade secret 
to protect or that the former had no access to such secrets, and that the restraint was therefore 
enforceable. Cf Lewis 1991 Annual Survey 49: "It should be noted that there is no apparent dissension 
in the judgments on the principles to be applied to determine whether a restraint on an erstwhile 
employee is unenforceable: Stegmann J differed only in his interpretation of the facts. In view of the 
uncertainty as to the principles to be invoked in determining whether a restraint of trade is contrary to 
the public interest, the discussion of these issues by Stegmann J is most useful"; Domanski 1993 
THRHR 241-242 who is apparently of the opinion (242) that the majority and minority judgments differ 
in principle as well. 
191 Cf Aercrete South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 814 (D); cf 
Domanski 1993 THRHR 240. 
192 Cf par 8.3.1 above for other possibilities. 
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9.3.2.2 IMPLIED CONTRACT193 
During the subsistence of a contract of service, 194 there is an implied contractual 
obligation on the employee to preserve the secrecy of the employer's trade secrets. 
This obligation is a part of the employee's wider duty of good faith, 195 also called 
the duty of fidelity or the duty to further the employer's business interests.196 After 
termination of the service contract, there is still a duty on the ex-employee not to use 
or disclose the former employer's trade secrets, 197 and there are clear dicta in the 
case law that the origin of this duty may be an implied contractual term. Thus in 
Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg, 198 which has been described199 
as "undoubtedly the leading case under this head", Marais J said the following: 200 
''[l]t must be presumed that every employer who has trade competitors 
would, if asked the question, say: 'But, of course, my employees are 
under a duty to me not to disclose information which can harm my 
business,' and the employees would confirm that such a term is implied 
in their contracts of service. If an employee or ex-employee breaches this 
193 Cf in general par 8.3.2 above. 
194 Since the protection of trade secrets in South African case law by implied contractual terms has 
thus far featured only in an employment or ex-employment context (cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 233), 
the discussion will centre around the service contract. It is, however, conceivable that terms protecting 
trade secrets may also be implied into other contracts, or that a contract protecting a trade secret may 
be implied where parties stand in certain relationships, for instance during pre-contractual negotiations 
- cf par 8.3.2 above. 
195 Cf eg Pelunsky & Co v Teron 1913 WLD 34 38; Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 690-691; Premier Medical and Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler 
19713SA866 (W) 867-868; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) (Ltd) vRodomac (Pty) Ltd 19771SA316 <n 322; 
Allied Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 4 SA 325 (W) 335; Freight Bureau (Pty) Ltd v Kruger 1979 4 
SA 337 (W) 339-340; Rectifier and Communication Systems (Pty) Ltd v Harrison 1981 2 SA 283 (C) 
286 287; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 94. 
196 Cf Gibson 218-220; Grogan 41; Rycroft and Jordaan 61; Van Jaarsveld and Vivier 652-653. See 
par 8.3.2 above on the nature of this duty. 
197 Cf eg Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 Cn 736: "The duty to preserve confidential 
information is not merely limited to the existence of the contractual relationship of employer and 
employee, but extends to the period after [termination] of such contractual relationship." 
198 1967 1 SA 686 (W). 
199 Domanski 1993 THRHR 234. See also Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano 
(Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 Cn 190 where the Coo/air Ventilator case was cited as authority for the 
following statement: "Insofar as the English action on breach of confidence is based on an implied 
contractual term relating to confidentiality of information acquired, it finds its counterpart in our law in 
the action on breach of contract." Cf Delport 1982 BML 187 188 fn 25; Leon 1982 De Rebus 379; 
Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA Mere LJ 331. 
200 689, emphasis added. 
315 
term he is liable to be interdicted from continuing to do so and to be made 
to compensate for damages caused ... [D]isclosure would be a breach of 
the service contract." 
In Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter, 201 it was explicitly stated that 
"[t]he information received in confidence by an employee whilst in 
employment with a particular employer remains protected by a legal duty, 
implied by the contract of employment, which continues to prohibit 
disclosure of such information after the termination of the relationship of 
employer and employee".202 
However, if one delves a bit deeper, inconsistencies are unearthed. While the courts 
delineate with a fair measure of precision the duties of the employee in connection 
with his employer's trade secrets, the legal basis of those duties are rarely articulated 
in an unambiguous manner. This situation makes it exceedingly difficult to decide 
whether some of the reported South African trade secret cases were based on 
contract or on delict. 203 It is submitted that if the reported case law is analyzed, the 
mere fact that the parties to trade secret litigation were formerly in a contractual 
relationship of employer and employee, does not necessarily justify a conclusion204 
that the decision was based on implied contract. On the contrary, closer perusal of 
the cases often suggests that liability was delictual. 
The decision in Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg,205 which has 
been described206 as the leading authority for trade secret protection based on 
implied contractual terms may serve as an example. On the one hand, as seen 
above, dicta in the judgment indicate clearly that protection may be based on an 
implied contractual term. However, later in the judgment the reader encounters words 
with a strong ring of delictual liability to them: 
"It seems to me that an employer is entitled to be protected from unfair 
competition, as it is called in American law, brought about by confidential 
information of his business having been conveyed to a trade rival by an 
201 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 428-429. 
202 Cf also Beeton v Peninsula Transport Co (Pty) Ltd 1934 CPD 57-58. 
203 Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 232 238; Burchell 1977 Annual Survey 178; Atlas Organic Fertilizers 
(Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 185. 
204 As apparently suggested by Domanski 1993 THRHR 237; Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA Mere 
LJ 331. 
205 1967 1 SA 686 (W). 
206 See fn 199 above. 
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employee or ex-employee";207 and 
"[A] prima facie case has been established that... Liebenberg (first 
respondent) unlawfully pretended to continue his employment relationship 
with the applicant company with the intention of gaining confidential 
knowledge of the applicant's business affairs; that he ma/a fide and 
unlawfully used trade and business information obtained as an employee 
of the applicant in order to promote the interests of a rival enterprise; that 
through the agency of Liebenberg, the second respondent identified itself 
with this unlawful conduct and must share responsibility for it; and that the 
applicant is entitled to protection from such an invasion of its rights and 
to compensation for any damage it has suffered."208 
The delict-like tenor of these words speaks for itself. Furthermore, it is difficult to see 
how the second respondent - who was in no way party to a contractual relationship 
with the applicant - could 'share responsibility' for the first respondent's 
misappropriation unless the liability was founded in delict. Thus even the case which 
has been regarded as the South African locus c/assicus for the protection of trade 
secrets by implied contractual obligation, does not, on closer analysis, seem to offer 
unambiguous authority for the proposition after all. Similar ambiguity is a feature of 
other cases. 209 
It is submitted that this situation can at least partially be explained by the pervasive 
influence of English law on this part of South African law. English precedents are 
freely cited in well nigh every South African case dealing with the legal protection of 
trade secrets. As seen, 210 the English action for breach of confidence encompasses 
liability both in and out of contractual contexts. Liability in terms of that action in 
situations where no contractual relationship exists, appears - at least from the 
perspective of a South African lawyer - to have the attributes of delictual liability. It 
is, however, not characterized as such by the English courts, and is either based on 
equity or sometimes even on a contractual obligation implied by the law into a 
situation where no contractual relationship existed on the facts.211 Direct reliance 
207 691. 
208 692. 
209 Eg Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) - cf Domanski 
1993 THRHR 236; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) - cf Domanski 1993 
THRHR 237; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) - cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 
238. 
210 Par 2.2.2.1.1; 2.2.2.1.2 above. 
211 Cf par 2.2.2.1.1; 2.2.2.1.2; 2.5 above. 
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on English precedents has therefore probably contributed to obscure the true 
foundations of some South African trade secret cases, notably cases where a 
contractual relationship - and particularly one of employer and employee - was 
present at least at some stage during the events giving rise to the litigation. 212 
The decision in Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltcf13 may serve as 
illustration here. In this case an employee left the employ of his employer and - using 
a secret manufacturing process, the development of which he contributed to in the 
course of his employment - he started to manufacture roof tiles in competition with 
the former employer. The latter successfully applied for an interdict to restrain the 
former from using the secret. Nicholas J opened his exposition of the law to be 
applied in the case by stating that the parties were agreed that the applicable legal 
principle was the one formulated as follows in the classical Saltman Engineering 
case214 of English law: 
"The ... claim is based on breach of confidence, in respect of which a right 
may be infringed without the necessity of there being any contractual 
relationship... If two parties make a contract, under which one of them 
obtains for the purpose of the contract or in connection with it some 
confidential matter, even though the contract is silent on the matter of 
confidence the law will imply an obligation to treat that confidential matter 
in a confidential way, as one of the implied terms of the contract; but the 
obligation to respect confidence is not limited to cases where the parties 
are in contractual relationship." 
He proceeded to quote215 dicta supporting both contractual216 and non-contractual 
protection of trade secrets,217 and then simply stated218 that it was not disputed 
that the defendant, "as a former employee of [the plaintiff] was under a general duty 
of good faith not to take or use for the benefit of himself or [the company he had 
formed] information confidential to [the plaintiff]". Thus, although authority for both 
contractual and non-contractual protection is cited in immediate juxtaposition, no 
212 In cases where the parties did not enter into contractual relationships, the true foundation is 
usually pointed out to be delict - cf the case law mentioned in par 9.3.1 above. 
213 19111 sA 316 en. 
214 See par 2.2.2.1.2 above. 
215 321-322. 
216 From the Coo/air Ventilator case 1967 1 SA 686 (W). 
217 From the English Saltman Engineering case; see par 2.2.2.1.2 above. 
218 322. 
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choice was made indicating on which base the decision was founded. This has led 
to uncertainty among commentators219 as to whether the Harvey Tiling case was 
based on breach of an implied term of the employment contract or on delict. The 
courts,220 on the other hand, have interpreted Harvey Tiling as applying delictual 
principles. 
Could it be that after termination of the contractual relationship between employer and 
employee, protection must be based either on express contract221 or on delict, and 
not implied contract?222 It does seem a bit artificial to base protection of a trade 
219 Thus the Harvey Tiling case is discussed by Joubert under the rubric "Law of Agency" 1977 
Annual Survey 112, and under "Delict" by Burchell 1977 Annual Survey 177-178 (at 178 he says that 
it is "not certain whether Nicholas J regarded the basis of the action as delict or breach of a fiduciary 
duty"). Cf further Domanski 1993 THRHR 445: "To attempt to identify the basis upon which the interdict 
was granted, is no easy task ... Th[e] language [employed in the particulars of claim] suggests a cause 
of action founded on delictual liability for unlawful competition. But the reported judgment mentions 
neither this cause of action, nor any of the cases (other than the Stellenbosch Wine Trust case) which 
are associated with it. More's the pity, for the same result could easily have been achieved by the 
application of Aquilian principles. Instead, counsel were agreed that the applicable legal principle was 
breach of confidence... mhe question of whether or not this concept exists in our law was not 
addressed; nor was there any reference to Corbett J's discussion of the topic in the Dun and 
Bradstreet case [see par 9.3.1 above]. Nicholas J went on to quote a passage from the Coo/air 
Ventilator case. That passage, together with a statement which occurs shortly afterwards [322 - that 
the former employee was under a "general duty of good faith"], suggests that the court considered the 
legal basis of liability to be the breach of an implied term in the contract of service... One may 
tentatively conclude that the basis of the court's decision was a hybrid of the equitable doctrine of 
breach of confidence and the breach of an implied term in the contract of service"; Du Plessis 1985 
MB 67. Note again that the English action for breach of confidence can be said to contain contractual 
and non-contractual elements (par 2.2.2.1 above), and the South African lawyer would be tempted to 
classify the latter as delictual - the Americans have indeed classified breach of confidence as a tort. 
From a perspective coloured by familiarity with South African legal principles, the English action for 
breach of confidence may therefore itself be regarded as a hybrid remedy. Cf further Van Heerden and 
Neethling 239 fn 111 who are of the opinion that the case was based on the English action for breach 
of confidence, while "the same result could have been reached by an appeal to an implied term of the 
contract of service and the general principles of the law of delict". 
220 In the Atlas Organic Fertilizers case 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 185, Van Dijkhorst J allowed that 
"[t]here is some uncertainty as to whether the judgment in the Harvey Tiling Co case is based on delict 
or on breach of fiduciary duty (on the basis of an implied term in the contract of employment)", but 
concluded that the particulars of claim indicate that the basis of the action was delictual. In Meter 
Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 429-430 Stegmann J understood the Harvey Tiling 
case to apply South African delictual principles. Finally, in Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679 
Nicholas AJA embraced the opportunity to shed light on his own decision in Harvey Tiling and stated 
that although there was no statement in the summons to that effect, it is clear that the cause of action 
was unfair competition. (Domanski 1993 THRHR 434 fn 78 is apparently not prepared to accept this 
ex post facto explanation.) 
221 Which presupposes the presence of a valid restraint of trade agreement (which, it is submitted, 
effectively creates a new contractual relationship between the parties - albeit on a far more limited 
basis than before - for the duration of the restraint). 
222 Cf Rycroft and Jordaan 61 fn 384: "The duty not to disclose confidential information may extend 
beyond the life of the contract of employment... Subsequent disclosure may be prevented either in 
terms of a restraint of trade provision in the contract, or on the basis of unlawful competition." 
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secret on an implied term where the contractual relationship has been terminated. It 
is submitted that the dogmatically purer view is probably that the duty imposed on the 
ex-employee is delictual in origin, and is simply the correlate of the ex-employer's 
subjective right to his trade secret.223 On the other hand, the pragmatically more 
prudent view - in the light of the clear dicta from the case law quoted above - is 
probably that trade secret protection may after termination of the employment 
relationship be based either on delict or implied contractual terms. 
9.3.3 CONCURRENCE OF DELICTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS 
Principles applicable tb a concurrence of delictual and contractual claims have been 
set forth above.224 No decided trade secret case was encountered in which an 
articulated choice between delictual and contractual remedies was made in a 
concurrence situation. 
9.4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
9.4.1 THE POSITION OF EMPLOYEES AND EX-EMPLOYEES USING THE 
EMPLOYER'S TRADE SECRETS225 
The South African case law clearly reflects the high incidence of trade secret 
misappropriation in the context of extant or discontinued employer-employee 
relationships. 226 If an employee still in the employ of the trade secret owner 
discloses or uses the trade secret in an unauthorized manner, the trade secret owner 
may base legal proceedings against the employee on express contract (if the service 
contract contains a term or terms providing for the protection of the employer's trade 
secrets),227 implied contractual terms,228 or delict.229 Where the employee has 
already left the employ of the trade secret owner and then uses or discloses the 
secret without authority, the latter's remedies are based on express contract (if the 
223 Cf par 7.3.1; 7.3.5 above. 
224 Par 8.4. 
225 Cf in general par 8.6.1 above. 
226 Cf in general Van Heerden and Neethling 234ff; Domanski 1993 THRHR 233. 
227 Par 9.3.2.1 above. 
228 Par 9.3.2.2 above. 
229 Cf par 9.3.1 above; Van Heerden and Neethling 234-235. 
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service contract contained a valid restraint of trade agreement),230 (possibly) implied 
contract, 231 and delict. 232 
Following English law,233 the courts have held that a distinction must be made 
between the employer's trade secrets and the employee's general knowledge and 
skills acquired in the course of his or her employment.234 The former may not be 
used or disclosed without the employer's consent; whereas the latter may be used 
or disclosed235 after termination of the contract of employment.236 According to 
230 Par 9.3.2.1 above. 
231 Par 9.3.2.2 above. 
232 Par 9.3.1 above. 
233 Cf par 2.4.1 above. 
234 Cf eg HaNey Tiling (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 326-327; Allied Electric 
(Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 4 SA 325 (W) 335; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) 
Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 <n 192-194; Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 
123 (C) 128 136; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 91; Easyfind International 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v lnstap/an Holdings 1983 3 SA 917 (W) 929; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 
1984 3 SA 182 (D) 184; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 428 430; Van 
Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 <n 731. Cf Delport 1982 BML 186-187. 
235 In Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 (W) 690-691 and Allied 
Electric (Pty) Ltd v Meyer 1979 4 SA 326 (W) 335 (cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 236) a distinction is 
made, following the English case United Indigo Chemical Co Ltd v Robinson (1932) 19 RPC 179, 
between use and disclosure of the information in this regard. Thus the ex-employee may not be 
restrained from using the information in his own business, but he may be restrained from disclosing 
it to others. In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] All ER 617 (CA) 627 the English Court of Appeal 
preferred "to leave open... for further examination on some other occasion the question whether 
additional protection should be afforded to an employer where the former employee is not seeking to 
earn a living by making use of the body of skill, knowledge and experience which he has acquired in 
the course of his career, but is merely selling to a third party information which he acquired in 
confidence in the course of his former employment". Cf Coleman 15: "But should the balance of 
probabilities be so very different when an employee no longer seeks to earn his living from his 
knowledge and skill, but merely capitalises on it? Is there really a difference between earning one's 
living from using information and living off the proceeds of a one-off sale? Is the latter more akin to 
industrial espionage than earning an honest day's pay for an honest day's toil?" In Meter Systems 
Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 428 no distinction is made between use and disclosure in 
this regard. It is submitted that since the type of information at stake here does not amount to real 
trade secrets, use or disclosure after termination of the employment relationship should in principle not 
be lawful. The only situation in which different treatment may be warranted is where the ex-employee 
discloses such information to a rival of the employer with the sole motive of harming the former, 
especially if the employee obtains no other advantage from the disclosure - in such a case disclosure 
may well according to general delictual principles be wrongful - cf Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 38; 
par 8.2.2.3 on the role of motive in the determination of wrongfulness. It is not inconceivable that use 
of such information may also be made with the sole motive of harming the employer - in which case 
such use may also be wrongful - but the likelihood of this happening is probably far smaller. 
236 Cf eg HaNey Tiling (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 326; Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 <n 192-194; SA Historical Mint (Pty) 
Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 (C) 91; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D) 184; 
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which criteria is this distinction to be made? Individual judgments may not be equally 
clear on this, but a composite view gained by an overview of the relevant case law 
reveals that the criteria used to distinguish trade secrets are the elements of 
protectable trade secrets discussed above,237 especially secrecy,238 a will on the 
part of holder of the right - or steps taken by him or her - to keep the relevant 
information secret,239 and economic value.240 
In Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson241 Stegmann J made242 a distinction between 
trade secrets in a strict sense, and information which does not qualify as trade 
secrets, but which must nevertheless be treated as confidential by the employee in 
the discharge of his general duty of good faith243 to his employer. Trade secrets 
may not be used by the employee except for the benefit of the employer, even after 
termination of the employment contract. The second category of information may 
Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 ew> 428 430. 
237 Par 9.2 above. The judgment in Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) 
Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) was a model of clarity in this respect. At 193 Van Dijkhorst J dealt with the 
principle that the employee could not be restrained from using his acquired general knowledge and skill 
after termination of the service contract; and quoted authority indicating how difficult it could be to 
distinguish between the employer's protectable confidential information and the employee's acquired 
general knowledge and skill. Then, at 194, Van Dijkhorst J turned to the facts of the case before him 
to decide whether the relevant information merited protection: "Bearing in mind the principles and dicta 
set out above I have to determine whether public policy requires that the actions of Pikkewyn in setting 
up a production process in competition with Atlas were unlawful. Firstly, I do not think that the process 
for which protection is sought in the instant case is confidential." The judge then pointed out that there 
was no evidence that the production sequence was kept secret or limited to certain employees only, 
all employees and visitors had access to the plant, and the various units used in the process were 
more or less openly used in the factory. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the process was 
valuable enough. Note how the elements of secrecy, will or steps taken to preserve secrecy, and 
economic value were employed to determine whether the information was protectable. 
238 Cf Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 en 730-732; Bonnet v Schofield 1989 2 SA 156 
eo) 159; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 eo) 184; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd 
v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 ec> 89-91; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 
1981 2 SA 173 en 194; Premier Medical and Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler 1971 3 SA 866 
ew> 869-870. 
239 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 en 194. Cf 
Northern O(fice Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 ec) 126 where the respondent 
averred - unsuccessfully - that the applicants did not regard the relevant information as a trade secret. 
24° Cf Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 en 732; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 
1984 3 SA 182 eo) 187; SA Historical Mint (Pty) Ltd v Sutcliffe 1983 2 SA 84 ec) 90; Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 en 194; Coo/air Ventilator Co (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg 1967 1 SA 686 ew) 689. 
241 1992 3 SA 520 ew). 
242 Following the English Faccenda Chicken case - par 2.4.1 above. 
243 On the duty of good faith, see par 8.3.2; 8.6.1; 9.3.2.2 above. 
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during subsistence of the service contract only be used for the benefit of the 
employer, but after termination of the contractual relationship the employee is free to 
use such information - in so far as it remains in his head and has become part of his 
own skill and knowledge - for his own purposes. In the Meter Systems case244 
Stegmann J again confirmed the validity of the distinction between trade secrets and 
other information which must be treated as confidential only during the subsistence 
of the employment contract. 
Criticism has been levelled at the distinction adopted in Knox D'Arcy and Meter 
Systems. Van Heerden and Neethling245 point out that no practical criteria were 
supplied according to which trade secrets and the employer's other confidential 
information may satisfactorily be distinguished. The susceptibility of the information 
to "remain in the employee's head" cannot be such a criterion, since true trade 
secrets may also conceivably remain in the employee's head. Pistorius and 
Visser246 maintain that the protectability of trade secrets depends on the nature of 
the secrets, rather than on the duration of the employment contract. They say that the 
employee's obligation not to disclose the employer's trade secrets terminates only 
when the information ceases to be of a confidential nature, and not with the 
termination of the contractual relationship. One cannot but agree with Van Heerden 
and Neethling that satisfactory criteria to distinguish the two categories were not 
given. (These criteria are - as noted - the elements of secrecy, the owner's will and 
steps taken to preserve secrecy, economic value, and so forth.247) That the 
susceptibility of the information to remain in the employee's head cannot be such a 
criterion, also stands to reason. And the submission by Pistorius and Visser that 
protection of trade secrets depends (inter alia) on the secrecy thereof, is one of the 
fundamental tenets of this study. 
244 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 430-432. 
245 237: "It is difficult to see on which grounds a distinction is or can be made between trade 
secrets (as confidential information) and other confidential information - Stegmann J gave no indication 
as to the criterion(a) to be employed. Indeed, it seems that even information which may correctly be 
classified as trade secrets ... , may as a result of many years of experience, involvement in the 
development of the secret and above average intelligence also 'be carried away in the employee's 
head after the employment has ended'. Does this information then cease to be a trade secret?" 
246 1993 SA Mere LJ 343-344: "The fact that an employee has left the employment of her employer 
cannot be the touchstone to determine the confidentiality of information. An employee's duty not to 
divulge her employer's trade secrets or use it for her own benefit depends upon the intrinsic nature 
of the information; this duty does not terminate with the contract of employment... The (former) 
employee's obligation not to divulge or use her employer's confidential information terminates only 
when the information ceases to be of a confidential nature"; cf Van Heerden and Neethling 237-239. 
247 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 237-238 who emphasize confidentiality (secrecy) and economic 
value; Pistorius and Visser 1993 SA Mere LJ 344-345. 
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that the distinction made in Knox D'Arcy is a valid 
one248 and may shed light on the basis of trade secret protection in the context of 
employment contracts. Unauthorized use or disclosure by the employee of the 
employer's trade secrets during the subsistence of the contractual relationship is, inter 
alia,249 a breach of his or her duty of good faith implied in the service contract.250 
However, the duty of good faith entails more than a duty to respect the employer's 
trade secrets. 251 Thus the employee must further the interests of the employer - and 
he or she is for instance not allowed to compete with the latter.252 Say the employer 
is a merchant in certain goods which he obtains from one single supplier. This 
information, and the information about the identity, address, telephone number, 
etcetera of the supplier may not be a secret. Nevertheless, if during the subsistence 
of the contract of employment, the employee uses this information to obtain 
merchandise from the same supplier to sell for a private profit in his spare time, such 
employee will be in breach of his duty of good faith and the employer will have 
contractual remedies against him. However, once the contractual relationship is 
terminated, the employee's implied duty of good faith is, it is submitted, probably also 
terminated.253 The ex-employee is now entitled to compete with his former employer 
and in so doing he may use his general knowledge and skill acquired in the course 
of his employment, but not the trade secrets of his former employer. Therefore no 
basis remains on which use of the non-secret information in the example cited above 
can give rise to liability,254 since that information is not - like a trade secret -
248 Cf Larkin 1992 Annual Survey 269. 
249 It is also a delict committed against the employer, on the basis of an infringement of the latter's 
subjective right to the trade secret. 
25° Cf par 8.3.2; 8.6.1; 9.3.2.2 above. 
251 Cf Grogan 40-42; Rycroft and Jordaan 59-62; Van Jaarsveld and Viviers 651-653; Van Jaarsveld 
and Van Eck 118ff. 
252 Cf Grogan 40; Rycroft and Jordaan 60-61 especially fn 381; Van Jaarsveld and Viviers 651-652; 
Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck 123 and case law cited. 
253 Cf Premier Medical and Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler 1971 3 SA 866 (W) 868. 
254 Two possible exceptions may be considered: (a) Such information may possibly be protected 
by an express contractual agreement in restraint of trade. However, the position is not entirely clear. 
In the Meter Systems case 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 426 Stegmann J stated that "the parties to a contract 
are free to define 'confidential information' in such a manner as they may seem fit for the purposes 
of their contract... [They] are free to make such agreements as they choose to determine the extent 
of the protection to be enjoyed by confidential information, as defined by them, against use or 
disclosure by a party to the contract, both during subsistence of the main terms of the contract and 
after termination of its main provisions... Of course these contractual freedoms are subject to the 
ordinary rules of the law of contract relating to voidness or unenforceability ... for reasons of vagueness, 
or illegality, or infringement of public policy and so on". The question is, will the courts enforce a 
restraint of trade defining information - which is not really a trade secret according to the objective 
criteria recognized by the positive law - as confidential? In Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1986] All 
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protectable on account of its intrinsic nature. This explains, it is submitted, why such 
information may freely be used by the ex-employee after termination of the service 
contract, while trade secrets may not. Liability for the misappropriation of non-secret 
information is dependent on the relationship between the parties, but largely 
independent of the nature of the information; whereas liability for the use of trade 
secrets is largely independent of the relationship between the parties, but dependent 
on the nature and characteristics of the information. 255 
Why should the courts require that information which is not a trade secret, but which 
the employee has acquired in the course of his employment, may only be used with 
impunity by the ex-employee in so far as he carries that information away in his head 
- but not if the ex-employee has carefully made notes or copies of the information, 
or deliberately memorized it in its entirety, whilst still in the service of the 
employer?256 If the information is not protectable on account of its intrinsic nature, 
and if the employee's duty of good faith has been terminated with the service 
contract, what difference can the making of notes or deliberate memorizing make? 
Two explanations may be considered. On the one hand, liability may probably be 
based on the breach of good faith which took place during the subsistence of the 
contract - that is, when the list-making, copying or memorizing took place. Thus, 
although relief may be obtained against the employee after termination of the 
contractual relationship, it is still founded on a breach of implied duty that took place 
during the subsistence of that relationship. 
A second explanation relates to the fact that secrecy of a trade secret may relate to 
the information "as a whole". Thus, as noted above,257 information may be a secret 
ER 617 (CA) 626 the English Court of Appeal disagreed with the decision in the court a quo, where 
it was suggested that such information could be protected by way of a restraint of trade agreement: 
"The restrictive covenant cases demonstrate that a covenant will not be upheld on the basis of the 
status of the information which might be disclosed by the former employee if he is not restrained 
unless it can be regarded as a trade secret or the equivalent of a trade secret" (f par 2.2.2.1.1.1; 2.4.1 
above). The position could well be the same in our law - even though the basic premise regarding the 
validity of covenants in restraint of trade differs from that in English law (Magna Alloys and Research 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A)) - see again par 8.3.1 above. However, if such non-secret 
trade information refers to a trade connection it may on that account be protected by a covenant in 
restraint of trade (cf par 8.3.1 above); 
(b) An ex-employee may not use such information if, whilst still employed by the employer, he broke 
his duty of good faith by eg making or copying or deliberately memorizing, say, a customer list - see 
the main text below. 
255 Cf par 8.6.1 above. 
256 Cf Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 428; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 
1992 3 SA 520 (W) 527; Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 327; Van 
Heerden and Neethling 238 fn 104; Knobel 1990 THRHR 497. 
257 Par 9.2.3; cf 7.2.3 above. 
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"as a whole" even though the "constituent parts" from which it has been assembled 
may be individually in the public domain. Thus a customer list may be secret though 
the individual entries in it are not, and a production line may be secret though the 
individual elements thereof are not. Because such "constituent parts" of the secret are 
themselves not secret, the employee may after termination of the service contract use 
such individual pieces of information as he or she may remember. However, since the 
assembled whole is a trade secret, he or she may never make unauthorized use 
thereof - even if the information as a whole can be carried away in his or her head 
after termination of the service contract. Viewed in this way, the making of lists, notes 
or copies or the deliberate memorization of information are pointers indicating that the 
employee is not merely using his or her general knowledge and skills, but is 
endeavouring to use the information as a whole - that is, the trade secret of the 
former employer. In the case of misappropriation of such a trade secret, a "lead-time 
interdict"258 is particularly apposite, since the duration of the ex-employee's 
"springboard" or unfair advantage corresponds with the time it would have taken him 
or her to go through the same process as that gone through by the trade secret 
owner to compile the trade secret from its individual parts. The purpose of an interdict 
in such a case should be to deprive the ex-employee from the savings in time and 
effort gained by the misappropriation of the secret, in order to restore to the trade 
secret owner the advantage he or she lawfully deserves. 
It has been submitted by South African authors259 that even if specific information 
qualifies as a trade secret, unauthorized use thereof by the ex-employee may in 
special circumstances be justified by the boni mores. The court must weigh up the 
conflicting interests of the employer and the ex-employee and decide in the light of 
the circumstances of the case and relevant policy considerations whether use of the 
trade secret by the ex-employee is nevertheless reasonable and thus lawful.260 It 
is submitted that this proposition deserves support, but that only in highly unusual 
cases should an ex-employee be allowed to use the true trade secrets of the former 
258 Cf par 8.6.4 above; 9.4.2.2 below. 
259 Cf Van Heerden and Neethling 237-238: "It is proposed that the protection of trade secrets in 
regard to an ex-employee should be approached in the following manner. First of all it must be 
determined, with reference to the requirements of confidentiality and economic value, whether the 
information concerned actually constitutes a trade secret... If the information does not constitute a 
trade secret, the ex-employee is free to utilise it in a competing undertaking irrespective of whether 
he carried it away in his head or by other means. On the other hand, if the information is found to be 
a trade secret, it is in principle protected against appropriation by the ex-employee, unless the latter 
can show that his use of the trade secret is nonetheless justified. Whether such justification is present, 
can only be answered by a careful weighing up of the conflicting interests of the employer and ex-
employee, employing the criterion of reasonableness or the boni mores in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances of the case"; Knobel 1990 THRHR 497-498; par 8.6.1 above. 
26° For an enumeration of factors which may be taken into account, and policy considerations at 
stake, see par 8.6.1 above. 
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employer with impunity, and then only in situations where the ex-employee acquired 
the secret in a reasonable manner in the course of his or her service before the 
employment relationship was terminated. Guidelines applicable to this type of 
situation were suggested above. 261 
9.4.2 APPLICATION OF THE INTERDICT IN TRADE SECRET CASES 
9.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS262 
According to Harms263 the allegations essential for an application for an interdict 
protecting confidential information are: 
(a) The plaintiff must have an interest in the confidential information. This 
normally, but not necessarily, requires that he must be the 'owner' of 
the information·264 
' (b) the information must be of a confidential nature; 
(c) there must be a relationship between the parties that imposed a duty 
on the defendant to preserve the confidence of information imparted 
to him - the most common example of which is the relationship 
between employer and employee;265 or the plaintiff may also rely on 
the fact that the defendant is his trade rival and has obtained 
information in an improper manner;266 
(d) the defendant must have had knowledge of the confidentiality of the 
information and its value;267 
(e) improper possession or use of that information, whether as a 
springboard or otherwise;268 and 
261 Par 8.6.1. 
262 Cf in general par 8.5.4 above. 
263 73-74. 
264 Citing the Prok Africa case 1980 3 SA 687 ew> 696. 
265 Citing the Multi Tube Systems case 1984 3 SA 182 eo) and the Aercrete case 1984 4 SA 814 
eo) 822. 
266 Citing Dun and Bradstreet 1968 1 SA 209 ec). 
267 Citing the Multi Tube Systems case 1984 3 SA 182 eo) and the Atlas Organic Fertilizers case 
1981 2 sA 113 en 191. 
268 Citing the Multi Tube Systems case 1984 3 SA 182 eo) and the Harvey Tiling case 1977 1 SA 
316 en. 
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(f) damages suffered, if any.269 
The first five of these 'essential elements' were quoted in Van Castricum v 
Theunissen. 270 In the Multi Tube Systems case271 - in which application was 
made for an interim interdict, Broome J stated that the applicant had to establish the 
following elements: 
(a) that confidential information exists; 
(b) a relationship between the applicant and the respondent in terms of 
which information was made known or became discoverable; 
(c) express or implied knowledge of its confidentiality and value; and 
(d) revelation or disclosure to the potential or actual detriment of the 
applicant. 
A number of comments can be made in connection with these expositions of so-
called essential allegations or elements. First, it is not always necessary to allege the 
existence of some relationship between trade secret owner and trade secret 
misappropriator.272 Harms' formulation is closer to the truth than the Multi Tube 
Systems case, in so far as it is stated that the plaintiff may also rely on the fact that 
the defendant is his trade rival and has obtained information in an improper manner. 
However, in the light of the Harchris Heat Treatment case,273 it is not necessary to 
show that the defendant is a trade rival. The necessary allegation in this regard is 
simply that the information is a trade secret and was obtained under a duty of 
confidentiality, or in an improper manner.274 
In the second place, knowledge - on the part of the misappropriator - of the 
confidentiality and value of the information should not be required. In so far as this 
'element' can be understood to refer to intent, it is out of place, since fault is not a 
requirement for an interdict.275 In so far as it may be understood to be a factor 
269 No authority cited. 
210 1993 2 sA 126 en 130. 
271 1984 3 SA 182 (D} 185-186. 
272 See par 9.4.4 below. 
273 1983 1 SA 548 Cn; cf par 9.3.1.2.2 above. 
274 Cf par 9.3.1.2; 8.2.2; 8.5.4 above. 
275 Cf par 8.5.4 above. Some trade secret cases may be interpreted as requiring fault for the 
interdict - cf eg Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v 
Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 152 (C} 164; Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 (T} 
730 736; Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (D} 185-186 187. However, in the 
light of the weight of authority that fault is not a requirement for the interdict (cf par 8.5.4) above}, 
328 
pointing towards the presence of wrongfulness,276 proof of such knowledge may 
strengthen the applicant's case, but it should not be regarded as an essential 
allegation. As argued above, 277 a trade secret owner's subjective right may be 
infringed also by a wrongdoer who does not know that the information he or she has 
received is a trade secret, and the owner must be able to obtain an interdict to 
prevent or stop infringement by such a wrongdoer. 
Lastly, since the purpose of the interdict is to prevent damage, the applicant need not 
allege that the respondent has already used or disclosed the secret, nor that damage 
has already been caused. He or she need only allege a reasonable possibility of 
unauthorized use or disclosure to his or her potential detriment. Proof that the 
respondent has already wrongfully used or disclosed the secret may conceivably 
strengthen the applicant's case. But if such use or disclosure was extensive enough 
to destroy the secrecy of the information, the interdict will not be available any more. 
Since the secret has been destroyed, the wrongful causing of harm cannot be 
prevented any more, and the appropriate remedy in such a situation is an action for 
damages. 
9.4.2.2 DURATION OF AN INTERDICT278 
The springboard doctrine of English law279 has received recognition by South 
African courts.280 It has been accepted that if misappropriation of confidential 
information gives the misappropriator only a temporary head-start over other 
competitors, the interdict must be granted for a period no longer than necessary to 
deprive the misappropriator of this advantage. This was made particularly clear in 
these cases should not be followed in this respect. Cf further par 9.3.1.3 above. 
276 Subjective factors, such as the wrongdoer's knowledge, may sometimes be taken into account 
to establish wrongfulness - see Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 38 (especially fn 41) 56 fn 119 283-
284; Knobel 1987 THRHR 484. 
m Par 8.6.3. 
278 Cf in general par 8.6.4 above. 
279 Cf par 2.2.1.2.3; 2.4.4 above. 
280 Cf eg Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd 1977 1 SA 316 <n 324; Atlas Organic 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 191-192; Multi Tube Systems 
(Pty) Ltd v Ponting 1984 3 SA 182 (0) 189-190; Aercrete South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Skema Engineering 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1984 4 SA 814 (0) 822; Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E) 578-579; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v 
Jamieson 1992 3 SA 520 (W) 528-529; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 430; 
Van Castricum v Theunissen 1993 2 SA 726 <n 731. See further Van Heerden and Neethling 233; 
Delport 1982 BML 186; Ferreira 1985 Obiter 145-146; Joubert 1985 THRHR 110-111 ; Knobel 1990 
THRHR 492 fn 43; Pienaar 27ff. 
329 
Multi Tube Systems (Pty) Ltd v Ponting:281 
"[W]hat has to be prevented is the recipient of the confidential information 
enjoying an advantage over the general public, and it is this initial impetus 
that constitutes the advantage and that he will be deprived of by way of 
interdict... [Tihe unfair advantage of the headstart or springboard is 
usually of limited duration and ... there must come a time when the matters 
in question are no longer secret and... an interdict would not then be 
warranted". 
In casu, the trade secret concerned the manufacturing process of novel fibreglass 
furniture, which process took approximately three months to perfect. Broome J 
accepted282 that "it was reasonable that it would also take an outsider about three 
months to perfect this technique, that is an outsider who had seen the applicant's 
furniture in a shop, bought it and set about copying it with a view to going into 
competition with applicant".283 However, since more than three months had already 
passed since the applicant had first discovered that the respondents were using its 
trade secret, the court felt284 that an interdict was probably not an appropriate 
remedy at that stage, and that the applicant's proper remedy was probably a claim 
for damages only.285 
In Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson286 Stegmann J said that the principle that an 
interdict must be "appropriately limited in time" to deprive the infringer of the 
temporary advantage of the springboard, is not applicable to true trade secrets. It is 
only applicable to confidential information287 which an ex-employee would be free 
to use after termination of his employment contract, provided he had not, by 
breaching his fiduciary duty to his employer, wrongfully used such information to 
prepare himself a springboard to save himself the trouble of going through the same 
process as the employer. In the case of a true trade secret, however, the advantage 
281 1984 3 SA 182 (D} 189; cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 238-239; Larkin 1984 Annual Survey 331. 
See further Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 <n 192: 
"[nhe springboard doctrine is of limited duration.· 
282 188. 
283 These words, incidentally, show clearly that Broome J regarded reverse engineering as a lawful 
way to acquire a trade secret. Cf par 8.2.2.2.3 above. 
284 190. 
285 Broome J also referred to the Shellmar-Conmar dispute of American law (par 3.4.4 above}, and 
seemed to prefer the Conmar rule - cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 239. 
286 1992 3 SA 520 (W} 528. 
287 See par 9.4.1 above on this category of information. 
330 
provided thereby "is not merely that of a springboard where effectiveness diminishes 
with the passage of time, and ultimately evaporates entirely", and there is thus no 
basis on which to limit the duration of an interdict to such a shorter period. It is 
submitted that this proposition is not in pace with reality. In the fiercely competitive 
commercial world of today, even information that is a true trade secret,288 may also 
confer only a temporary advantage to its owner - typically for the duration of time it 
will take competitors to unravel the secret by reverse engineering after the trade 
secret owner has placed a product in which the secret is incorporated on the market. 
In the case of misappropriation of such a trade secret, this temporary nature of the 
secret must be taken into consideration by the court when issuing an interdict.289 
On the other hand, this does not mean that in all trade secret cases the advantage 
gained by misappropriation is a temporary one, and that an interdict must therefore 
always be limited in time. In Harvey Tiling Co (Pty) Ltd v Rodomac (Pty) Ltd,290 for 
instance, confidential information concerning the manufacturing process of novel roof 
tiles was misappropriated by an ex-employee. The information concerning the 
process as a whole was found291 to be sufficiently confidential to merit legal 
protection, and the court specifically concluded292 that it was not part of the former 
employee's practical knowledge and skill.293 Nevertheless, Nicholas J applied the 
springboard doctrine to the case in so far as he found294 that the ex-employee used 
the misappropriated information as a springboard to dispense with the need to go 
through the same lengthy and expensive research and development process as that 
gone through by the plaintiff, and so obtaining a long start over any member of the 
public. However, an interdict without any time limit was granted. At first blush, the 
result appears harsh, and one wonders whether an interdict limited to a period of time 
necessary to develop the manufacturing process by fair means - thus neutralizing the 
advantage of the springboard without banishing the defendant from ever competing 
with the plaintiff - would not have been more appropriate. On the other hand, sight 
must not be lost of the fact that the research and development of the tiles in question 
lasted almost from July 1967, when a factory was erected to manufacture the 
288 In that it complies with all the requirements of protectable trade secrets set forth in par 9.2 
above. 
289 Cf par 8.6.4 above; Van Heerden and Neethling 233; Knobel 1990 THRHR 492 fn 43. 
290 1977 1 SA 316 (D. 
291 322-326. 
292 326-327. 
293 Cf par 8.6.1 above. 
294 325-326. 
331 
forerunner of the tiles - which proved to be a failure - to February 1970, when 
production of the tiles in question began. Extensive testing was necessary, inter alia 
by the National Building Research Institute and the South African Bureau of 
Standards. The entire manufacturing plant had to be re-designed. After a suitable 
acrylic coating for the tile was found after time-consuming and expensive tests, an 
undertaking was procured from the supplier that it would not supply the product to 
others. Under those circumstances, it might well have been possible to protect the 
plaintiff's trade secret for an indefinite time by interdicting the defendant for an 
indefinite period. This could conceivably be the case if, for instance, the probability 
of other competitors in the same field discovering the secret through independent 
research and development was remote. If that was indeed the position, the granting 
of an interdict for an indefinite period was, it is submitted, justified.295 
9.4.3 INTERFACE OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRADE SECRET WITH STATUTORY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Examples may be found in case law where relief was sought on both the bases of 
alleged trade secret infringement296 and the alleged infringement of a statutory 
intellectual property right, notably copyright, in the same lawsuit.297 It is clear that 
copyright may to a degree overlap with trade secret rights,298 but it is equally clear 
from the treatment of these claims by the courts299 that the requirements for the 
existence of the two types of intellectual property rights differ, and that such 
295 See again par 8.6.4 for a suggested criterion for determining whether an interdict should be 
limited in duration or not. 
296 Albeit as a form of unlawful competition. On the relationship between unlawful competition and 
the infringement of the right to the trade secret, see par 7.4.4.4 above. 
297 Cf Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 
1968 1 SA 209 (C); Butt v Schultz 1984 3 SA 568 (E); Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A). 
298 A substantial degree of overlap of trade secret rights and copyright to the same material - in this 
case a suite of computer programmes - is shown particularly clearly by the decision in Northern Office 
Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) - see the discussion in the main text. That 
the overlap between the two rights is only partial, is illustrated clearly in the Dun and Bradstreet case 
where protection against the written publication of the plaintiff's credit records was sought in terms of 
copyright, and against the oral publication thereof in terms of unlawful competition in the form of 
misuse of confidential information - par 9.3.1 above. On the right to the trade secret and copyright in 
general, see par 7.4.4.2 above. 
299 Note eg how the enquiries into copyright and unlawful competition are dealt with under separate 
headings in Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 678 684; cf Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd 
v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C) 135: "[Tihe mere fact that a particular computer programme may 
qualify for copyright protection, does not mean that the programme is also a trade secret. Whether it 
is a trade secret, depends upon different considerations and is another enquiry altogether.· Cf further 
par 7.4.4.2 above. 
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requirements must be proved independently. 
In Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein300 the court was 
confronted with a conflict between trade secret rights and copyright. The respondent 
was employed by a predecessor of the applicant to develop a suite of computer 
programmes as an accounting and administrative system for doctors and dentists. On 
completion, the respondent maintained that the copyright in the programmes vested 
in him, and that he was entitled to have the applicant sign a royalty agreement. This 
the applicant refused to do, and sought an order restraining the respondent from 
communicating information relating to the programmes to third parties. The applicant 
based its case solely upon the "right of an employer to require an employee or ex-
employee to respect and maintain the confidentiality of his employer's trade 
secrets".301 Marais AJ found that the respondent was indeed the copyright 
owner,302 and that the particular suite of computer programmes - to be distinguished 
from the mere concept of a computer programme providing an accounting and 
administrative system for doctors and dentists303 - was indeed the applicant's trade 
secret. 304 The court was thus faced with a situation where the same material was 
object of both copyright and trade secret rights, with the two types of rights vested 
in different persons. Marais AJ resolved305 the conflict as follows: 
"mhe mere fact that copyright is vested in an employee in certain 
circumstances does not mean that, even if the subject of the copyright is 
confidential and a trade secret, the employee may divulge it to whom he 
pleases. I do not think that the adoption of this view emasculates or 
nullifies the employee's copyright. He will still have locus standi to protect 
his copyright against infringement by third parties. Indeed, he will even be 
able to protect it against infringement by his employer, to the extent that 
the employer's use [there]of ... goes beyond what was expressly, or 
impliedly, authorised by the contract of employment. It is true that he will 
be hampered in his exploitation of the copyright if he has to respect his 
300 1981 4 SA 123 (C); cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 236-237; Du Plessis 1985 MB 67-68; Patel and 
Patel 1982 THRHR 439. 
301 127. 
302 134. 
303 136-137. 
304 137. 
305 135. 
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employer's trade secret, but I do not think the Legislature306 intended 
otherwise." 
Marais AJ accordingly made an order307 restraining the respondent from copying, 
or permitting anyone to copy, or making use of, or permitting anyone to make use of, 
the whole or any part of the suite of programmes. 
The Copyright Act308 has since been amended309 to provide that where a work 
eligible for copyright protection is made in the course of the author's employment by 
another person under a contract of service or apprenticeship, that other person shall 
be the owner of any copyright subsisting in that work. The factual situation giving rise 
to the litigation in the Northern Office Micro Computers case is therefore not too likely 
to be repeated.310 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the decision remains of 
importance for the qualified precedence given to the right to the trade secret over 
copyright in a situation of conflict between the two. 
As far as could be ascertained, conflicts between other statutory intellectual property 
rights and rights to trade secrets have not featured in the reported case law. Should 
the type of conflict between patent rights and trade secret rights known to American 
law ever occur here, it is submitted that the courts should take note of the very 
reasonable solution suggested in that regard by the American Bar Association.311 
306 Marais AJ based this view (135) on sec 41(3) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, which he 
interpreted to "save the express or implied rights of employers to have their employees respect their 
trade secrets", and further on the principle of interpretation of statutes that an Act must not be 
interpreted to abolish or derogate from common law rights (in casu relating to the protection of trade 
secrets) unless express language or the clearest of necessary implications compel such a reading. 
307 138. 
308 Sec 21(1)(d) Act 98 of 1978. 
309 By sec 9 Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 1980. The amendment was not made retroactive in 
effect, and could therefore not be applied to the Northern Office Micro Computers case (cf 129 135 
of the case report). 
310 It is not entirely impossible, though, since sec 21 (1 )(e) makes provision for the provisions of sec 
21 (1 )(d) to be excluded by agreement between the parties. Furthermore, sec 21 does not seem to 
affect the situation where a computer programme eligible for copyright protection is developed by an 
independent contractor for another person. If the latter has trade secret rights to the programme, a 
conflict similar to that in Northern Office Micro Computers may arise. 
311 Cf par 3.4.5 above. 
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9.4.4 THE SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION, FIDUCIARY RELATIONS 
AND THE INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH LAW 
In Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter312 Stegmann J set forth a general overview 
of the protection of confidential information in South African case law. The expression 
confidential information he purposefully used in a broad sense so as to include trade 
secrets and also "all other kinds of confidential information".313 He then proceeded 
to make two points on the legal protection of confidential information. The first dealt 
with protection by way of express contractual terms. The second point was 
formulated314 as follows: 
"[O]ur law recognises fiduciary relationships which, as a matter of law, 
give rise to an obligation to respect the confidentiality of information 
imparted or received in confidence, and to refrain from using or disclosing 
such information otherwise than as permitted by law or contract. The 
fiduciary relationships which give rise to such legal duties are in some 
instances based on contracts and in some instances they are not... When 
the fiduciary relationship is based on contract, the obligation to respect the 
confidentiality of information imparted or received in confidence is 
generally regarded as a term of the contract implied by law ... When the 
fiduciary relationship is not based on contract, it is necessary to look to 
the law of delict, and in particular to the principles of Aquilian liability, in 
order to ascertain the extent of the legal duty to respect the confidentiality 
of information imparted or received in confidence." 
Stegmann J then stated315 that there could be no limit in principle to the number of 
potential categories of information which might qualify for protection either in delict, 
"by way of a legal duty arising from the application of the principles of Aquilian liability 
to situations in which a fiduciary relationship not based on contract is recognised"; 
or in contract, "by way of a contractual term implied by law where the contract is one 
that creates a fiduciary relationship". 
This exposition seems to imply that confidential information can in South African law 
only be protected in the context of some fiduciary relationship. However, for authority 
to refute such a conclusion one need look no further than the locus classicus on the 
delictual protection of trade secrets, Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants 
312 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 426ff. 
313 426. 
314 426, emphasis added. 
315 428, emphasis added. 
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Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd. 316 In that case, there was no fiduciary 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Indeed, there was no known 
relationship of any nature between them. Specifically, the defendant was not a 
subscriber to the plaintiff's credit records, and obtained copies thereof in a manner 
unknown to the plaintiff.317 This did not deter Corbett J from holding - correctly, it 
is submitted - that such filching of confidential information was a wrongful act making 
the perpetrator liable in damages. 318 
It is submitted, therefore, that the passage quoted from Meter Systems Holdings must 
not be understood to confine the protection of trade secrets to situations where a 
fiduciary relationship - or any relationship, for that matter - exists between the trade 
secret owner and the infringer. Delictual protection of trade secrets is not dependent 
on the existence of any relationship between the parties, but rather on the nature of 
the information - that is, whether it really is a trade secret - and whether it has been 
acquired, used or disclosed without consent or any other ground of justification.319 
The origin of the categorization in Meter Systems Holdings of protectable trade 
secrets in terms of fiduciary duties breached, must, it is submitted, probably be 
sought in the influence of English law. To succeed with the English action for breach 
of confidence, the plaintiff must prove the breach of an obligation of confidence. The 
implication is that the existence of an obligation of confidence must first be proved, 
and this will usually depend on some320 relationship between the parties.321 
316 1968 1 SA 209 (C); see par 9.3.1 above. 
317 See the plaintiff's particulars of claim at 210. 
318 221: "[W]here, as in this case, a trader has by the exercise of his skill and labour compiled 
information which he distributes to his clients upon a confidential basis (i.e. upon the basis that the 
information should not be disclosed to others), a rival trader who is not a client but in some manner 
obtains this information, and well knowing its nature and the basis upon which it was distributed, uses 
it in his competing business and thereby injures the first mentioned trader in his business, commits a 
wrongful act vis-a-vis the latter and will be liable to him in damages" (emphasis added). In a very loose 
sense it may be said that Corbett J did require the plaintiff and the defendant to be in some form of 
relationship, namely that of rival traders. However, such a 'relationship' - if one insists on naming it 
thus - is certainly not a fiduciary one. In any case, it has been shown (par 9.3.1.2.2 above) that trade 
secrets can also be protected against infringement by non-competitors. 
319 See again par 8.2.2; 9.3.1.2 above. 
320 Not necessarily a contractual relationship - par 2.2.2.1 above. 
321 Cf par 2.2.2.1 above; LAW COM no 110 18ff; Coleman 31 ff; Gurry 112ff. Where there is no 
direct relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the latter can be subject to an obligation of 
confidence if he has received the relevant confidential information from someone who was in a 
relationship of confidence with the plaintiff - see eg Gurry 112: ·An obligation of confidence can arise 
in either of two distinct situations. The first involves a disclosure of confidential information by a 
confider to a confidant... An obligation of confidence can also arise when a third party, who was not 
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However, although reliance on English law has generally had a beneficial influence 
on the development of the legal protection of trade secrets in South Africa, sight must 
not be lost of the fundamental differences between the two legal systems. 322 The 
action for breach of confidence is not part of our law. 323 In South Africa, the legal 
protection of trade secrets must be based squarely on the South African law of 
contract and delict.324 The scope of protection must be delimited in accordance with 
the principles of South African law, not English law. In particular, the clear recognition 
by the courts that the delictual protection of trade secrets is based on Aquilian 
principles, means that a delictual obligation not to misappropriate a trade secret must 
not be sought in the existence of a relationship of confidence. It must be seen simply 
as the correlate of the subjective right to the trade secret, which right can be infringed 
also by someone who has never stood in any relationship to the holder of that 
right. 325 If the limitations of the English law of breach of confidence are adopted 
here, South African courts may well experience similar difficulties326 to hold an 
industrial spy - who stands in no relationship with the trade secret owner - liable for 
trade secret infringement, to name but one practical example of the deleterious 
consequences of such an unwarranted limitation. An application of South African 
delictual principles, on the other hand, will prevent such a result. 327 
privy to a disclosure by a confider, receives confidential information from a confidant who was. The 
liability of third parties is secondary in the sense that it is dependent upon a breach by a confidant of 
an obligation which he owes to the original confider." Cf par 2.4.3 above. 
322 As Stegmann J himself said in the Meter Systems Holdings case (427). Cf Van Heerden and 
Neethling 64-65. 
323 Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 
1 SA 209 (C) 214-215; Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W) 695-696; Atlas 
Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Gwhano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 190-191; Schultz v Butt 
1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter 1993 1 SA 409 (W) 427; cf Domanski 
1993 THRHR 443-447; Leon 1992 De Rebus 379; Van Heerden and Neethling 239; Pienaar 100-105. 
Although there is some authority for the application of the action for breach of confidence in South 
African law, it need not be taken too seriously in the light of the weight of authority - including the 
decision of the Appellate Division in Schultz v Butt - quoted here. Cf Domanski 1993 THRHR 443ff; 
Van Heerden and Neethling 239. Some decisions which have been cited as authority for the 
applicability of the action for breach of confidence in our law, have in any case been misunderstood -
Pienaar, for instance, cites inter alia (104 fn 97) Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd v Oude Meester Group 
Ltd; Oude Meester Group Ltd v Stellenbosch Wine Trust Ltd 1972 3 SA 153 (C) - while Diemont J 
pointed out clearly (161-162) that liability was Aquilian, and (104 fn 99) Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH 
(Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W) - while Goldstone AJ stated clearly (696): "[O]ur law does not recognise 
any such 'broad principle of equity' and the equivalent remedy is Aquilian." 
324 Cf Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Gwhano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T) 190-191. 
325 Cf par 8.2.2.1; 9.3.1.2 above. 
326 Par 2.4.2 above. 
327 See par 8.6.2 above. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the recognition and protection of trade secrets in South African law 
is basically on a sound footing. An application of general principles of especially the 
South African law of delict and contract, forms the basis of trade secret protection 
which compares favourably with the position in English, American and German law, 
and which is gratifyingly in step with the GA TT TR/Ps agreement to which South 
Africa is a signatory nation. Recognition of a subjective right to the trade secret -
which is already implicit in decided case law - combined with a knowledge of 
solutions to practical trade secret protection problems in foreign legal systems, will 
facilitate the further development of a healthy South African trade secrets law. 
Undesirable trends which have to a certain extent gained a foothold in South African 
case law, but which must be resisted, are the notions that trade secret 
misappropriation can only take place in a context of unlawful competition, must be 
intentional to give rise to liability (and possibly even to found an application for an 
interdict), and only occurs in the context of fiduciary relationships. Fortunately, 
authority to counter all these propositions already exists in the positive law. With 
these few provisos, it is submitted that no legislative action is necessary in the field 
of trade secret protection in South Africa, and that this branch of the law can be left 
in the province of the judiciary. 
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SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 1980 
Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992 
Designs Act 195 of 1993 
Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 
Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
Patents Act 57 of 1978 
Patents Amendment Act 76 of 1988 
Plant Breeders' Rights Act 15 of 1976 
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 
Wage Act 5 of 1957 
